THE EXPLOITATION OF THE RAW INTELLIGENCE FLOW FROM SAIGON - 1967/12/11

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Tet Declassified
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02874995
• Document Creation Date: July 27, 2018

Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 CO2874995 3.5(c)
MORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:
11 December 1967
SUBJECT: The Exploitation of the Raw Intelligence Flow From. Saigon
1. Our survey of the raw intelligence take in South Vietnam --
captured documents, interrogation reports and COMINT -- concluded that
we have available at Headquarters the SILMB volume that MACV has in
Saigon. We also believe that by and large we receive these materials
expeditiously although in some cases we could receive them even more
quickly.
2. We have suggested that arrangements be made for Headquarters
to receive copies of the two machine fuse needin Saigon for storage,
retrieval, and analysis. We believe those machine files should enhance
our exploitation of this material.
3. We have also concluded that the basic problem is with the
personnel available for processing and analyzing these materials at
Headquarters. The purpose of this memorandum is to suggest changes in
organization and manning that will be necessary if we are to signifi-
cantly improve our ability to respond quickly to policymaking officials
both for current intelligence analysis and increased indepth research
for the production of strategic intelligence.
4. For purposes of this study we have considered organization and
manning in OCI, OER, ONE, and SAVA. ONE'. effort is a minimum staff
function and consists of a one end ane-half analyst effort on all
aspects of the war in the South. SAVA's effort in terms of analysis of
raw intelligence from enemy sources is restricted to two analysts full
time on strategic intelligence production. Their primary area has been
the organization of the political infrastructure although much of the
Agency's limited work on military order of battle estimates has been
accomplished by one of these analysts. Processing raw intelligence for
diverse purposes usually related to operations is a part time activity
of several other members of SAVAis staff.
5. �CI's South Vietnam branch currently has three analysts on
military matters, one Revolutionary Development specialist, and two
political analysts. The political section, which is being expanded to
four persons, focuses primarily on GVN politics. The North Vietnam
branch has primary responsibility for the National Liberation Front
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because of the latter'e rolatio :Ivith the Vietnamese Communist -Party.
OCI's military analysts have-A.4w primary producers of articles on
current developments in the graved war in the South, but there is
considerable duplication of this analysis in SAVA.
6. OER's South Vietnam branch has tmo analysts on the GVN economy
and five on the VONVA. Of these fivei:two are responsible for the VC
economy -- economic policy and organiaation, taxation, production, and
food supplies. These analysts also handle our work on population and
manpower availability of the VC and thsGVN. One analyst handles enemy
military logistics and two remaining aaalysts work on enemy military
order of battle.
7. Whereas the collection, translation, and dissemination of
captured documents and interrogation reportsjare, on the whole, efficient,
the analysis of these materials the US intelligence community is in
many respects deficient. Despite the issuance of a large number of
studies on military aspects of the war during the past few months by
MACV and its subordinate organisations, we believe we leek even a
reasonably comprehensive view of the enemies military and political
organization and viability. Although we cannot hope to contribute to
MACV's day to day needs for tactical intelligence from Washington, we can
and should assume a greater responsibility for evaluating the course of
the war. For this reason, we should greatly intensify our research on
enemy manpower, logistics, organisation, strategy, and tactics.
8. To this end we suggest the addition of -mine analysts organised
against research and reporting responsibilities as follows. Because
these are intelligence production functions, we suggest the augmentation
take place within the DDI.
a. VC/CVN population control and South Vietnam country-wide
population study. These subjects should include a continuing
evaluation of the Hamlet Evaluation System and all Allied programs
for pacification and population control as well as VONVA population
control policies and activities.
(Three analysts) This effort could be accomplished by maintaining
the present OCI effort for current reporting and adding one
additional analyst in OER.
b. VC/NVA military Order of Battle. Manpower inputs -- VC
recruiting and NVA infiltration including composition and losses.
Manpower losses -- KIA estimates, WIA estimates, desertion,
defection, sickness and accident losses. The 0.8. -- time series
by echelon (NVA regulars, VC Main and Local Forces, Guerrillas,
Administrative Service Troops, and the various irregular elements
and by geographic area. In addition a profile of these troops --
changing age structure, training, health, morale.
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(-----lanalysts) The assignment of
OER would staff this function.
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additional analysts to 3.3(h)(2)
c. VOIVA operations. Changing tactics and strategies as
reflected in organisation and operations.
60601 (TUP...analysts) This effort could be accomplished by adding one
----additional analyst to OCI's present complement.
d. VC/NVA logistics and organisation. Military stores and
munitions procurement, base areas, losses, production, distribution,
and medical system.
(Two analysts) This effort could be accomplished by adding one
additional analyst to OER's present complement.
e. The VC economy -- organization, financing, procurement
shortages production and lend reform.
Wiee analyst) No additional manning required.
f. The Political and Economic Infrastructure -- organization,
miseions, and manpower.
(Three analysts) This intelligence production effort should be
located within the DDI. Because of its close relationship to b and
e above, we suggest it be assigned to OER's manpower section.
9. Of the overall augmentation of nine analysts suggested, eight,:
are proposed for OER and one for OCI. We would expect, however, that as
a result of the sharply increaeed research effort in OER, OER would be
able to provide greater current support to OCI than is the case now.
OER would provide current reporting covering its area's of substantive
research responsibilities. On balance, we believe this particular distri-
bution of effort would beet enhance our ability to respond to policy-
makers current needs and provide a longer term in depth view of the
progress of the war in South Vietnam.
Acting Chief
South Vietnam Branch
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