CIA'S COVERT ACTION PROGRAM IN CHILE SINCE 1970
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
02873812
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
U
Document Page Count:
7
Document Creation Date:
July 13, 2023
Document Release Date:
March 3, 2022
Sequence Number:
Case Number:
F-2019-02353
File:
Attachment | Size |
---|---|
CIAS COVERT ACTION PROGRA[16032134].pdf | 199.77 KB |
Body:
� � ..
r.Y
Approved for Release: 2022/03/01 CO2873812 7-
\vioNTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGFZNOihneir
WASHINGTON D.C. 20505
MEMORANDUM FOR: Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
The Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
SUBJECT: CIA's Covert Action Program
in Chile Since 1970
1. This Agency did not conduct covert action operations
in support of either of the two democratic candidates who
oppo.sed Salvador Allende in the 1970 presidential election.
Out' role in the election was limited to an effort to denigrate
Allende and his Popular Unity (UP) coalition during the cam-
paign. Since Allende's inauguration, U.S. policy has been to
maintain maximum covert pressure to prevent the Allende
regime's consolidation. Under this policy the 40 Committee
has approved since January 1971 fina*ial support
for Chilean political patties, media, and private
sector organizations opposed to the Allende regime.
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
2. Funds and guidance channeled to opposition forces in
Chile through our Santiago Station enabled the three opposition
political parties -- Christian Democratic Party (PDC), National
Party (PN) and Democratic Radical Party (PDR) -- to improve
their internal organizations, acquire new media outlets, and
to compete successfully in a number of congressional by-elec-
tions. The Station also succeeded in inducing another party --
Radical Party of the Left (PIR) -- to pull out of the UP
government and to join the opposition coalition prior to the
4 March 1973 congressional elections. These congressional
elections were considered by both the UP and the opposition
as a form of plebiscite to determine whether or not the govern-
ment had a popular mandate to continue the implementation cf
its revolutionary program. Our support of the opposition con-
federation in these congressional elections was described by
opposition leaders as having been of vital importance in
WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED.
Classified by Signer. Exempt from General Declassification Schedule of
E.O. 11652. Exemption Category 5B(2). Impossible to determine date of
automatic declassification.
C
5Ecn- Nsnirt
pi�
Approved for Release: 2022/03/01 CO2873812
rr.-.6577/Ta7:
Approved for Release: 2022/03/01 CO2873812
Cl- %AVIA
-2-
enabling them to campaign strongly and to win
Funds authorized by the 40 Committee were also - (b)(3)
used to insure the continued existence of El Mercurio, Chile's "
largest and most important newspaper, whicH�acted as an
effective rallying-point for opposition forces. Limited
support was also made available to private sector organiza-
tions, but because some of these groups began to try to
provoke a military coup, our funding was confined to specific
activities in support of the opposition cqalition in the
March congressional elections.
3. After the March 1973 elections, it became increasingly
apparent that three years of political polarization had strained
the fabric of Chilean society to the breaking point. Various
U.S. policy options were considered, and on 20 August 1973
the i40 Committee approved an additional to support 0:0(3)
opposition political parties and private sector organizations
through June 1974; support to the private sector, however, was
made contingent on the concurrence of Ambassador Davis and
the Department of State. Since this cpcurrence was not given,
no support was provided to the privatector, whose initiative
in launching and maintaining a series'of crippling strikes was
instrumental in provoking the military coup of 11 September
1973. Thus, while the Agency was instrumental in enabling
opposition political parties and media to survive and to
maintain their dynamic resistance to the Allende regime, the
CIA played no direct role in the events which led to the
establishment of the new military government.
eW. E. Colby
Director
Attachment:
Summary of 40 Committee Approvals
,SECilEi/SLNSITiVE
EYES ONLY
Approved for Release: 2022/03/01 CO2873812
Approved for Release: 2022/03/01 CO2873812
Approved for Release: 2022/03/01 CO2873812
Approved for Release: 2022/03/01 CO2873812
Approved for Release: 2022/03/01 CO2873812
Approved for Release: 2022/03/01 CO2873812
TRANSMITTAL SLIP
DATE
3 Sept 75
TO:
John Waller /DDO
ROOM NO.
BUILDING
REMARKS:
Per our conversation.
B. C. Evans
FROM:
ROOM NO,
I BUILDING
I EXTENSION
FIONIV5.241
REPLACES FORM 36-8
WHICH MAY BE USED.
Approved for Release: 2022/03/01 CO2873812
I I (
MEMORAN DIN FOR: Dr.
Approviry ed for Release: 2022/03/01 CO2873812��
.tAwrussinger
You may also recall discussion of a Track
Two in late 1970 � which has not been included
in this summary.
W. E. Colby
13 September 1973
(DATE)
-0R�4 110. 101 REFL Ace5 FORM 10.101
AUG 54 WI-110E)), MAY BE USED.
S w.") c �-;\ S
(47)
v-; -e_
se
\-�D
C0.2%�19 --�c k
s \-C
\-"`�"\ N.-0-CA- � v, A_
ctr�kr-e� Nr1 .
r�-\ CP-4cts,--
Approved for Release: 2022/03/01 CO2873812
D UNCLASSIFIED
Approved for Release: 2022/03/01 CO2873812,.'lENTIAL
1---1 'SE ONLY
1110.0�1
pri SECRET
ROUTING AND RECORD� SHEET
SUBJECT: (Optional)
CIA's Covert Action Program in Chile Since 1970
FROM:
David A. Phillips#INI
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division
EXTENSION
1366
NO.
DATE
13 September 1973
TO: ,(Officer designation, room number, and
building)
DATE
namo movAmm
OFFICER'S
INITIALS
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.1
ADDO
DDO
DCI
5.
6.
7.
8.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
(b)(3)
FORM
3-62
MOIMMINI10111�110.111,
6 1 0 usIDMS/a US
INTERNAL
n
SECRET fl CONFIDENTIAL 'ISE ONLY UNCLASSIFIED
Approved for Release: 2022/03/01 CO2873812
or