CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1953/08/23

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02872264
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: July 15, 2019
• Document Release Date: July 22, 2019
• Publication Date: August 23, 1953

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SECURI FORMATION
23 August 1953
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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SUMMARY
GENERAL
3. Tentative Soviet-Belgian agreement calls for tripling annual trade
(page 4).
FAR EAST
4. Important changes in Peiping's foreign policy seen possible (page 4).
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
5. Iranian Communists reportedly will try to,infiltrate pro-shah groups
(page 5).
WESTERN EUROPE
tit"Comment on Soviet-East German negotiations (page 5).
7. Western officials p�aspicious of East Germany's new trade permit
policy (page 6).
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GENERAL
2.
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3.
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3. Tentative Soviet-Belgian agreement calls for tripling annual trade:
Belgian representatives have informed C000113.3(h)(2)
that their government has tentatively agreed
on a three-year extension of its present trade
pact with the USSR.
Belgian imports in the first year are to total
between $45,000,000 and $50,000,000 and include $10,800,000 worth
of manganese ore, $1,600,000 of other "strategic" raw materials, and
important quantities of anthracite, cereal grains and wood and petrol-
eum products. Belgian exports are to include $20,000,000 worth of
textiles and no commodities of possible strategic importance except
10 small refrigerator ships.
Comment: This tentative agreement would
triple annual Soviet-Belgian trade over 1952'. It is in line both with
1953 trade increases between the USSR and other Western European
countries, and with Malenkov's 8 August statement that the current
Soviet efforts to expand trade with the West will be pursued "with
still greater insistence."
FAR EAST
4. Important changes in Peiping's foreign policy seen possible:
The American consul general at Hong Kong
sees a 'igood possibility" that a recent
e ditorial in the official Chinese Communist
Party organ may foreshadow important
changes in Peiping's foreign policy. The
statement, contained in a lengthy endorsement of Malenkov's
8 August speech, calls for the "resumption and strengthening of
(China's) normal relations with Far Eastern and other countries.,."
3.3(h)(2)
Comment: The summarized text of the
editorial supports the view that Peiping, in the hope of gaining China's
seat in the UN and inducing a reduction in Western trade restrictions,
may follow the Soviet lead in attempting to improve relations with
certain nonrCommunist countries without altering its basic hostility
to the non-Communist world.
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The Peiping regime may therefore become
Increasingly conciliatory in dealing with the non-Communist govern-
ments of India, Burma, Indonesia, Pakistan, Denmark, Sweden,
Switzerland and Finland, with which it has full diplomatic relations.
It may also encourage the establishment of full diplomatic relations
with Great Britain, Norway, Israel, the Netherlands, Ceylon, Afghan-
istan, and Yugoslavia, which recognize it. Finally, it may make new
overtures for recognition by certain other governments, such as the
remaining Commonwealth nations and France.
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
5. Iranian Communists reportedly will try to infiltrate pro-shah groups:
Comment: These tactics would correspond
more realistically to the Tudeh's present capabilities than the armed
violence which earlier reports suggested the party was, planning.
Although Prime Minister Zahedits new regime is alert to possible
Tudeh violence, its ability to combat the suggested type of infiltra-
tion is uncertain.
WESTERN EUROPE
6. Comment on Soviet-East German negotiations:
The evident aim of the 22 August statements
concluding the Soviet-East German negotiations in Moscow is both
to thwart West German participation in European defense plans and
to lessen East German discontent Malenkov's statement that the
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"whole world will pay attention to our sincere desire to ensure a
peaceful settlement of the German problem" suggests that the talks
were designed to create the impression of SOiet good faith in both
parts of Germany.
In West Germany, the statements are more
likely to help Chancellor Adenauer in the 6 September elections than
to harm him. Since Communist terms for German unity have ob-
viously not advanced beyond those in the unacceptable 15 August note,
these new developments will, if anything, probably suggest to West
Germans that the Kremlin is interested mainly in defeating Adenauer
and strengthening the tottering East German regime. Malenkov's
singling out of Adenauer as a chief enemy', may well raise the latter's
status at home.
Except for the promised release of German
prisoners of war not convicted of "particularly wicked crimes," the
tangible Soviet concessions outlined in the concluding communique
will affect only East Germany. The promise of economic assistance,
Including food shipments, is evidently a recognition of the economic
sources of East German discontent highlighted by the 17 lune riots.
7. Western officials suspicious of East Germany's new trade permit
policy:
The West German Economics Ministry repor13.3(h)(2)
that the East German government is approving
West Berlin trade permits in record numbers
since it took over this responsibility from
Soviet occupying forces on 17 August.
While officials in Bonn are gratified by this
development, they suspect that the reason for the change in apparent
responsibility is to grant the East German government more bargain-
ing authority in East-West German interzonal trade negotiations.
Consequently, they believe that East Germany may become even
"nastier" than the Soviet Union about approving the permits if current
and subsequent interzonal trade negotiations fail to satisfy them.
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