CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1953/08/15

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02872257
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: July 15, 2019
• Document Release Date: July 22, 2019
• Publication Date: August 15, 1953

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO.
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Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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SUMMARY
GENERAL
/. USSR apparently maneuvering to participate in postarmistice
conference (page 3).
FAR EAST
2. Amami Islands' return reversing anti-American trend in japan
(page 4).
SOUTHEAST ASIA
3. Rumors in Indonesia of widespread arrests to take place on
16 August (page 4).
SOUTH ASIA
4. Pakistani army remains calm over Kashmir crisis (page 5).
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
ilef Comment on threat to depose the Moroccan sultan (page 5).
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GENERAL
1. USSR apparently maneuvering to participate in postarmistice
conference:
Soviet UN delegate Vyshinsky on 13
ugust suggested to the UN secretary
eneral that a postarmistice political
conference should include all main
groups, countries and viewpoints interested in the general
issues, but stated that he had no definite instructions from his
government. He referred to the fact that in its prearmistice
proposal for the prisoner of war commission the Soviet Union
had suggested a group of 11 nations, including itself. Vyshinsky
added that the General Assembly should decide on the nations to
take part in the conference.
Comment: On 31 Suly Soviet UN
delegate Tsarapkin expressed a for a conference
limited to the "two sides" in the dispute, presumably without
Soviet participation, and argued that the General Assembly
had no responsibility under the armistice agreement to name
the participants.
Vyshinsky's shift in approach may be
in response to strong sentiment among UN members, including
Britain and France, in favor of inviting the USSR as well as
India to participate in a broad conference. The US favors a confer-
ence with the General Assembly designating representatives from
among the 16 TM. nations which fought in Korea with the Communists
deciding on their own representation, which could include the USSR.
The Kremlin may now see an opportunity
for gaining indirect recognition of Communist China by a UN recom-
meaation for Peiping's participation in the conference. The Krem-
lin probably also wishes to avoid having a Soviet bid for participation
rejected and accordingly may be waiting for a coalescence of Western
sentiment before taking a firm position on the membership question.
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FAR EAST
2. Amami Islands' return reversing anti-American trend in japan:
The return of the Amami Islands to Japan
on 8 August may have reversed the tide of
anti-Americanism which had been gathering
momentum during the past six months, in
the opinion of the American embassy in Tokyo. It is also the first
American postoccupation action to have a significantly favorable
effect on the generally leftist Japanese intelligentsia and publicists.
Comment: The return of the islands
removes a major source of friction between the United States and
Japan. The Japanese press contrasted their return with the Soviet
Union's failure to recognize Japan's historic rights to the Habomai
and Shikotan islands north of Japan. The press also acknowledged
that American retention of the remaining Ryukyu and the Bonin
islands was necessary for Japanese security.
SOUTHEAST ASIA
3. Rumors in Indonesia of widespread arrests to take place on 16
August:
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Comment: One objective of the new
government is the removal of strongly anti-Communist officers
from the army high command. There have been no reports to
indicate that this would be accomplished by widespread arrests.
The circulation of such rumors, how-
ever, will bring added support to those favoring a coup d'etat.
Regular armed forces units of considerable strength have moved
into Djakarta, ostensibly for independence day celebrations.
SOUTH ASIA
4. Pakistani army remains calm over Kashmir crisis:
Pakistani army headquarters near
Kashmir is maintaining an attitude
of complete calm with regard to the
recent developments in Indian-held
Kashmir, according to the American
army attache in Karachi. The Paki-
stani army is not contemplating can-
cellation of leaves and does not plan
to move additional troops into the area.
Comment: Pakistan, as in previous
crises, is apparently taking all possible precautions to avoid a
conflict.
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
5. Comment on threat to depose the Moroccan sultan:
the
sultan of Morocco probably will not be deposed. It is anticipated
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that despite conflicting rumors the resident general and the sultan
will reach a compromise, the exact nature of which may not be made
public. An acceptable compromise must enable the French to claim
that the sultan has accepted their demands and yet not alienate the
sultan's following.
The American embassy in Paris reports
that Premier Laniel, Foreign Minister Bidault, and Resident Gen-
eral Guillaume are confident they can use the current situation to
force the sultan to accept the French reform program. The French
authorities are also in a position to bring sufficient pressure on El
Glaoui, the sultan's chief opponent, to prevent him from upsetting
the status quo.
While the possibility of clashes between
rival factions exists, it is not probable that large-scale disturbances
will occur since the 56,000 French security forces are capable of
maintaining order. Basic tensions will not be alleviated, however,
and El Glaoui and his supporters will continue to be a source of
trouble.
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