CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1953/07/28

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02872247
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: July 15, 2019
• Document Release Date: July 22, 2019
• Publication Date: July 28, 1953

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INFORMATION
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28 July 1953
Copy No. 67
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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SECU INFORMATION
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SECURITY INFORMATION
3.5(c)
SUMMARY
GENERAL
3.3(h)(2)
SOVIET UNION
2. Moscow reaffirms post-Stalin policies (page 3).
3. Comment on return of Melnikov to official status (page 4).
SOUTHEAST ASIA
4. French promise Cambodia independence (page 4).
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
5. Mossadeq reportedly unable to decide on future action (page 5).
6. Comment on Lebanese elections (page 5).
EASTERN EUROPE
7. Imminent high-level personnel changes rumored in Prague (page 6),
8. Rumania reported suspending work on Danube-Black Sea Canal
(page 6).
WESTERN EUROPE
9. Comment on changes in East German politburo (page 7).
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3.5(c)
3.5(c)
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CURITY INFORMATION
3.5(c)
1.
GENERAL
3.3(
SOVIET UNION
2. Moscow reaffirms post-Stalin policies
In a lengthy TASS release of 25 July, the 50th
anniversary of Bolshevism, the Kremlin strongly reaffirmed the concil-
iatory foreign policy and internal "liberalization" program which have
developed since Stalin's death. Lenin was quoted on the possibility of
"lasting coexistence" and also on the need of the West for trade with the
Soviet bloc. Minimizing Stalin's role in party history, the editorial em-
phasized the recent theme of collective leadership and warned that "the
cult of the individual.., has nothing in common with Marxist-Leninist
concepts."
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h)(2)
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SECURITY INFORMATION
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3. Comment on return of Melnikov to official status:
The appointment of L. G. Melnikov as Soviet
ambassador to Rumania suggests that his earlier disgrace was engi-
neered by Berta in the power struggle which resulted in the latter's
arrest. Melnikov, an alternate member of the top party presidium at
the time, had been ousted on 12 June from his position of leadership in
the Ukraine on charges of harsh Russification of that republic's western
oblasts. His re-emergence supports previous indications that the now
scrapped anti-Russification propaganda campaign had been a Beria crea-
tion,
4. French promise
SOUTHEAST ASIA
Cambodia independence:
its latest note to Cambodia, the French
government reaffirms its intention to allow
the Kingdom,of Cambodia to attain complete
independence and sovereignty. It offers to
discuss any outstanding problems.
Ambassador Heath in Saigon believes that
this meets Cambodian demands but fears that the king may be influ-
enced by his advisers to continue in his present wary attitude toward
the French.
Comment: The French note is unprecedented
in promising full independence. The essence of the Cambodian demand,
however, is that France acknowledge that Cambodia is actually, not
merely potentially, independent.
The Cambodian prime minister, after a visit
to the king's headquarters, announced that France and Cambodia had
reached agreement "in principle."
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3.3(h)(2)
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SECURITY INFORMATION
3.5(c)
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
5. Mossadeq reportedly unable to decide on future action:
The recent letter of President Eisenhower and 3.3(h)(2)
the continued absence of Ambassador Henderson
have made Prime Minister Mossadeq unsure
concerning his future course of action, the
American embassy reported on 25 July.
In addition, the Tudeh's impressive display of
strength during the 21 July demonstrations and the failure of the prime
minister's negotiations with the Soviet Union to arouse alarm in the United
States have added to Mossadeq's uncertainties.
As a result mainly of the president's letter,
some of Mossadeq's more moderate backers appear to be reconsidering
whether to support him.
Comment: Mossadeq has long attempted to
stimulate American fear of a Communist take-over in Iran, in order to
get financial and economic aid from the United States. The evidence of
a lack of American support and the significant increase in Tudeh capa-
bilities may be causing him to re-examine his tactics.
6. Comment on Lebanese elections:
The first free elections in Lebanon returned
a 44-man unicameral legislature of generally middle-class political
Individualists interested in an independent, Western-oriented state.
These elections break the power of the feudal
sheikhs largely responsible for the corruption of the government and
legalize the forced removal of the Khoury regime last fall. They also
mark a definite trend away from the leftism popularly embodied in the
demagogic chieftain, Kamal Jumblatt, who is the sole representative
of his socialist party in the new parliament.
S ince this election returned legislators as
Individuals rather than party members, the resulting parliament is
likely to be disunited and unstable at least for a time.
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SECURITY INFORMATION
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EASTERN EUROPE
7. Imminent high-level personnel changes rumored in Prague:
Rumors of imminent changes in the Czech
Communist Party and government hierarchy
persist in Prague despite the reappearance
after prolonged absences of most of the Czech
leaders. The most recent rumors center about the replacement of Pre-
mier Siroky. He and President Zapotocky are rumored to have returned
recently from high-level consultations in Moscow.
The American embassy believes that the Czech
government will probably announce policy changes 'on the Hungarian mod-
el as "paper concessions" to the disgruntled populace. It does not fore-
see, however, any major purges resulting from the Berta affair.
3.3(h)(2)
_ Comment: If the Czech regime softens its in-
ternal policy, one or more leaders will probably be replaced. Abolition
of the presidency has long been expected in line with general Orbit policy,
in which case Zapotocky would probably be eliminated from the govern-
ment but retain his leading role in the party.
8. Rumania reported suspending work on Danube-Black Sea Canal:
The American lezation in Bucharest reports
that work
was suspended on the Danube -Black Sea
Canal on 20 July and that all "free" labor
was shifted to harvesting in the East Danube grain belt. The legation
believes that this move may be designed to ensure the harvesting pro-
gram, remove prison labor from the canal before visits of members
of International Youth Festival, or possibly to cut', baek the long-range
investment program.
Comment: The Danube-Black Sea Canal,
originally planned for completion by 1955, is still in an early stage
of construction; work might be suspended on it in order to shift re-
sources to other parts of the economy where more immediate re-
sults would be obtained.
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T9ISEC