CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1953/07/16

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02872241
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: July 15, 2019
• Document Release Date: July 22, 2019
• Publication Date: July 16, 1953

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
16 July 1953
Copy No,
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Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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SUMMARY
GENERAL
1. Comment on promised Soviet contribution to UN technical assistance
program (page 3).
SOVIET UNION
2. Comment on dismissal of Georgian MVD minister (page 3).
FAR EAST
North Korean IL-28 jet bombers have "combat" mission (page 4).
. Loss of Tachens seen certain in event of concerted Chinese
Communist attack (page 4).
SOUTHEAST ASIA
5. Alliance between Burmese Communists and Karen insurgents
believed limited (page 5).
6.
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
7. Comment on the resignation of pro-Mossadeq Iranian deputies
(page 6).
WESTERN EUROPE
8. Possibility seen of Soviet moves to block private food shipments
to East Germany (page 7).
* * * *
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GENERAL
1. Comment on promised Soviet contribution to UN technical assistance
program:
The announcement by the Soviet delegate to
the UN Economic and Social Council of the USSR's willingness to grant
$1,000,000 and to lend the services of Soviet experts to the UN technical
assistance program contrasts with previous boycotts by Soviet bloc
countries of all UN meetings dealing with this program. This action
indicates that the political struggle within the Soviet regime has not
changed the foreign policy of conciliation which followed Stalin's death.
It also suggests Moscow's awareness that the American technical assist-
ance program has produced favorable reactions in underdeveloped coun-
tries.
Participation in the UN program, to which the
US contributed $11,400,000 last year, will give the USSR a voice in the
planning of programs and the allocation of funds and will enable it to
claim credit for UN aid extended to "backward areas."
SOVIET UNION
2. Comment on dismissal of Georgian MVD minister:
The ouster of D. G. Dekanozov, Georgian
MVD minister, appears to be the first of several expected replacements
of Beria lieutenants in the police apparatus. After Stalin's death men
classed as loyal to Berta were moved into security ministry posts also
in the Ukrainian, Estonian, Latvian, Kazakh, Belorussian and Armenian
Republics.
Dekanozov, a native Georgian, was appointed
MVD minister in the April reorganization in Georgia which reversed
the purges carried out under Stalin in 1951-52 and placed several Beria
followers in key positions. A Georgian Party Congress called for 25
May to ratify these changes has not been held to date, indicating that
Beria's decisions were undergoing review.
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Dekanozov had worked under Beria in the secret
police from 1921 to 1931, as a party secretary from 1931 to 1936, and
was brought to Moscow in 1938 when Beria took over the All-Union police
machine.
Indications are that the coup against Beria and
his followers is proceeding without serious internal disorder. Dekanozov's
ouster, following the purge of Beria, may presage a shake-up in Georgia,
where the latter was particularly influential.
FAR EAST
3. North Korean IL-28 jet bombers have "combat" mission:
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Comment:
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The North Korean air force now has approxi-
mately 40 IL-28's, and the crews are believed to have been ready for
combat since May.
4. Loss of Tachens seen certain in event of concerted Chinese Communist
attack:
An American general, recently returned fr0r3.3(h)(2)
an inspection of the Tachen Islands, believes
that their loss will be certain in the event of
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a concerted Communist amphibious attack. The general cited the
defeatist attitude of the Nationalist commander and his staff, the
low combat efficiency of the troops, weak naval support, lack of
weapons, and poor defense planning.
Chiang Kai-shek was advised to commit
an additional well-trained infantry division and the Nationalist air
force to the defense of the islands. Chiang said that he had detailed
a more aggressive naval commander to the Tachens, but appeared
reluctant to send either air units or better troops there.
Comment: Observers in the Tachen area
report that the ultimate success of the Tachen Islands defense effort
will depend largely on the Chinese Nationalist navy. To date, all
reports indicate a reluctance on the part of Nationalist naval com-
manders to engage Communist naval units in combat and an unwill-
ingness to conduct patrols west of the Tachens despite orders from
Taipei.
SOUTHEAST ASIA
5. Alliance between Burmese Communists and Karen insurgents believed
limited:
rue in o a
indication, however,
Burma are involved,
in the south.
The American embassy in Rangoon commentE3.3(h)(2)
that press reports of an alliance between Karen
insurgents and the Communists in Burma, which
has been mooted for two years, are probably
pply to the Karens in southern Burma. It sees no
that the more important Karen forces in eastern
Their position is not as desperate as that of those
The embassy points out that most Karen leaders
are ardent Christians and that an agreement with the Communists is
likely to cause serious dissension among the leaders in the south as well
as to further isolate them from the eastern group.
Comment: Karen insurgents in Burma are
believed to total about 4,000, of whom perhaps 1,000 are in south Burma.
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6.
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NEAR EAST - AFRICA
7. Comment on the resignation of pro-Mossadeq Iranian deputies:
The mass resignation with the prime minister's
approval of pro-Mossadeq deputies on 14 july ostensibly leaves him in
a stronger power position, but is actually an admission of the failure of
his parliamentary maneuvering. The action was reportedly precipitated
by the opposition's plans to try to force a vote of confidence and by in-
quiries of opposition deputy Makki, a newly appointed comptroller of
the National Bank, concerning the expanded note issue secretly authorized
by Mossadeq.
The move blocks further action on the "committee
of eight report," which, if adopted, would reduce the shah to a figurehead.
On the other hand, it removes any hope of such opposition elements as
General Zahedi that Mossadeq can be eliminated by parliamentary means.
The prime minister is now free to rule by decree
until his grant of full powers expires in January 1954. While this has been
legally possible in the past, Mossadeq has avoided full responsibility by
consulting the Majlis and getting its support for his various measures.
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The shah has the nominal right under the constitution to remove the
prime minister; there is, however, no indication that under present
circumstances he would attempt to do so.
Mossadeq, who is not inclined to assume full
dictatorial powers, may order new elections if he believes his supporters
can be elected. Even if a decree calling for elections were issued imme-
diately, however, some months would elapse before they could be held.
During this time Mossadeq's opposition would exploit his dictatorial atti-
tude and might even attempt to remove him by force.
WESTERN EUROPE
8. Possibility seen of Soviet moves to block private food shipments to
East Germany:
Any overt action by the Bonn government to 3.3(h)(2)
increase the number of individual food gift
parcels to East Germany may prompt Soviet
authorities to cut off the present flow of
about 2,000,000 packages a month,
Dnly
parcels which are obviously from private sources are passed by the
East German customs. Uniform packaging or the inclusion of Ameri-
can items results in immediate confiscation.
3.3(h)(2)
Comment: Should the West German populace
come to consider the Western relief moves as merely cold-war maneuvers,
the Adenauer coalition might share the blame in the public eye for any
Soviet disruption of current food shipments.
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