CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1953/07/11

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02872234
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: July 15, 2019
• Document Release Date: July 22, 2019
• Publication Date: July 11, 1953

Approved for Release: 2019/07/10
TOP CRET
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11 July 1953
Copy No. 67
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BU .TIN
POCUM:NT NO.
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NEM !DATE.
AUTI.-1:1
DATE iteN./it REVIEWER:_
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
3.5(c)
(c)
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SECURITY INFORMATION
3.5(c)
SUMMARY
SOVIET UNION
VComment on ouster of Berta (page 3).
SOUTHEAST ASIA
2, Paris reportedly feels independence for Associated States
"impractical" (page 3).
3. French official lists possible concessions to Associated States
(page 4).
EASTERN EUROPE
Hungarian Communist leaders confused over new economic
policy (page 5).
WESTERN EUROPE
5. Adenauer reverses stand on four-power conference (page 5).
-2.
3.5(c)
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SOVIET UNION
1. Comment on ouster of Beria:
Beria's ouster appears to have resulted
more from a power struggle than a need to provide a scapegoat for
Orbit unrest. His arrest and coming trial emphasize the struggle
that has existed in the top levels of the new Soviet government de-
spite an outward appearance of unity. Judging by the nature of the
accusations, the other Soviet leaders probably suspected that Beria
was wielding his power as police chief too arbitrarily with an eye
to enlarging his authority. They probably seized upon the recent
riots in East Germany as an opportunity to remove him.
Beria's removal increases the power of
Malenkov, who was generally considered to be sharing the leader-
ship with at least Berta and Molotov. It seems likely, however,
that Malenkov needed the support of Defense Minister Bulganin
and Party SecretaryKhrtishchev to effect this arrest.
This move against Beria comes when it
would seem that the new Soviet leaders should have been making
the strongest efforts to appear united. The risk of taking such
action at this time highlights the intensity of the struggle.
The desire of the governing faction to
consolidate its power should provide motivation for a continuation
of its attempts to reduce international and internal tension. How-
ever, there were some indications in the Pravda editorial accompa-
nying the announcement of Beria's removal that the number of in-
ternal concessions will be limited and that this policy may even be
under review.
SOUTHEAST ASIA
2. Paris reportedly feels independence for Associated States "Impractical":
The counselor of the French embassy in
London told an American embassy official
there on 9 July that negotiations with the
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T P 3 C
3.3(h)(2)
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Associated States cannot go beyond the framework of the French
Union, On the basis of guidance received from Paris, he stated
that complete independence for any of the Associated States is
"entirely impractical." He added that the talk of giving Cambodia
a status similar to that of Pakistan within the Commonwealth is a
contradiction in terms.
Comment: These views represent the
position of Foreign Minister Bidault, whose opposition to Deputy
Premier Reynaudis more liberal approach was responsible for the
ambiguous wording in the 3 July French notes to the Associated
States./
3. French official lists possible concessions to Associated States:
The French adviser to the Vietnamese
government, who is currently in Paris,
informed the American embassy there
that he expects France to take several
steps to prove that its 3 July policy statement is not "just a piece
of paper."
These steps, he believes, will include
the return to the Vietnamese of the palace in Saigon, which has
been a symbol of French control; an increase in the number of
local military sectors in Cochinchina under Vietnamese army
command; authority for the Vietnamese to issue their own cur-
rency; appointment of a new team of French officials; and re-
vision of certain judicial arrangements. Further steps, he
asserted, would depend on the forthcoming discussions with the
Associated States.
Comment: All of these steps have been
under discussion for severa months, some of them for several
years. They would have little impact in Indochina now that the
Cambodians have demanded complete independence and the Viet-
nam government has taken the position that the 3 July note promised
independence.
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TSDP'SEET
3.3(h)(2)
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EASTERN EUROPE
4. Hungarian Communist leaders confused over new economic policy:
Open confusion and even fear shown by
low,level party officials since the govern-
ment reorganization on 4 July have damaged
the party's authority and prestige with indus-
trial workers and peasants, in the opinion of the American legation in
Budapest.
3.3(h)(2)
ear panic among 3.3(h)(2)
the Communist rank and file over the past week end. Party officials
fled from some villages in anticipation of trouble, but returned when
nothing developed. According to their own admission, they lacked
directives on the implementation of the new economic policy announced
by Premier Nagy.
The legation notes that similar developments
in East Germany were an important factor in the ultimate appearance
of open defiance there.
Comment: East Germany and Hungary are
the only two countries in Eastern Europe where a conciliatory policy
has been announced.
WESTERN EUROPE
5. Adenauer reverses stand on four-power conference:
Chancellor Adenauer has decided to ask the 3.3(h)(2)
West to seize the initiative in the propaganda
battle over German unity by inviting the Soviet
Union to an early four-power conference. He
ieves that such action would undercut anticipated Soviet unity over-
tures designed to weaken his government's election prospects.
Comment: Adenauer's expressed opposi-
tion to four-power talks has been steadily worn down in the last three
weeks by repeated press attacks on the dilatoriness of the Bonn govern-
ment on the matter of unity.
3.5(c)
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