CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1953/06/30

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02872225
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: July 15, 2019
• Document Release Date: July 22, 2019
• Publication Date: June 30, 1953

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30 June 1953
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
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CLAfi.a CHA;�!,:H_rD TO: TS Stioor
NEXT .i,=�,12'.1V DATE-
AUTH: HR 70-
- 12.40 7,1EVIEWER:
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
TOP S RET
SECUFt INFORMATION
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SUMMARY
GENERAL
2.French official o re co
after Korean truce (page 3).
/SOVIET UNION
. Comment on attendance of top Soviet leaders at opera (page 4).
FAR EAST
14,41Rhee believed stalling to obtain additional concessions (page 4).
3.3(h)(2)
3.3(h)(2)
SOUTHEAST ASIA
6. Bao Dai will seek Vietnam army build-up (page 5).
'NEAR EAST - AFRICA
Caffery denies near split between Nagib and Egyptian officers
(page 6).
EASTERN EUROPE
$. Czech security police alerted following German disturbances
(page 7).
9. Severe Rumanian food shortage reported (page 7).
10. Comment on resignation of Finnish cabinet (page 8).
* * * *
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GENERAL
1.
2. French official to recommend continuation of China Committee after
�
Korean truce:
3.3(h)(2)
In view of the continued hostilities in Indochina, 3.3(h)(2)
the chief of the economic section of the French
Foreign Ministry will urge his government to
support continuation of the China Committee,
which erm nes controls on Western exports to Communist China, be-
yond the date of a Korean truce.
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Comment: The French have in the past been
reluctant to accept American requests for more stringent controls on
exports to Communist China. Several European members of the China
Committee have indicated that they expect a relaxation of the economic
sanctions against Communist China after a Korean truce.
3.3(h)(2)
SOVIET UNION
3. Comment on attendance of top Soviet leaders at opera:
Malyshev's appearance at the Bolshoi Theatre
on 27 June with eleven of the fourteen members of the party presidium
suggests that he has replaced L. G. Melnikov as a presidium alternate.
Melnikov was severely criticized and his ouster
as first secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party was announced on
13 June. Malyshev, now minister of Transport and Heavy Machine Build-
ing, is an important member of the technical bureaucracy. He was
elected to the 36-member party presidium at the 19th Party Congress in
October 1952 and released when it was, drastically reduced after Stalin's
death.
It may also prove significant that L. P0 Beria
and M. D. A. Bagirov were missing. The latter may be in Azerbaijan,
where he is chairman of the Council of Ministers and head of the party
buro.
FAR EAST
4. Rhee believed stalling to obtain additional concessions:
The vice chairman of the South Korean
National Assembly told American officials
on 26 June that President Rhee knows there
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5.
will be an armistice and that his present tactics are designed to wring
more concessions from the United States. The vice chairman said
that he was attempting to get the assembly into a relatively neutral
position so that it could take "independent action" if Rhee is unable
to reach an agreement.
American officials believe from this that
the assembly might be prepared to set Rhee aside if a final break
between South Korea and the United States appears imminent.
Comment: In the current talks Rhee has
constantly voiced new demands, while making no corresponding com-
mitments. He may be expected to continue this strategy. It would be
very difficult at this time for the assembly to oust Rhee or to influence
him regarding the truce negotiations.
SOUTHEAST ASIA
6. Bao Dai will seek Vietnam army build-up:
Bao Dai told Ambassador Heath on 25 ;rune
that he will not press for constitutional
changes at the July meeting of the High
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Council of the French Union but will seek French help in building the
Vietnam army into an effective fighting force. When that is achieved,
Vietnamese, relations with France can be settled on the basis of "some-
thing like equality:'
Subsequently, High Commissioner Gautier
praised Bao Dai's realism in discerning that demands such as the king
of Cambodia is making only result in French reluctance to continue
military and financial sacrifices in Indochina.
Comment: Bao Dal's strategy is to use the
army not only as an eventual counter in bargaining with the French but
to assure his own power within Vietnam. By not asking for political
concessions now, he can secure the support of the French and thereby
undercut his rival, Premier Tam, who recently demanded revision of
the French-Vietnamese agreements.
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
7. Caffery denies near split between Nagib and Egyptian officers:
Ambassador Caffery in Cairo denies that
there is a near split between General Nagib
and Colonel Nasr, leading member of the
Revolutionary Command Council. Caffery
reports that Nasr dominates the council, which still treats Nagib
with deference.
There have also been sharp differences of
opinion regarding the timing of the proclamation of the republic; how-
ever, the officers finally let Nagib have his way. Current differences
center on their opposition to Nagib's desire for a palace, an increase
in salary and a new title, but Caffery does not anticipate a "real fight"
within the group.
Comment: Events have not yet clearly
revealed the behind-the-scenes situation in the council.
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EASTERN EUROPE
8. Czech security police alerted following German disturbances:
3.3(
Comment: This is the first evidence that any
Satellite government has taken special security precautions as a result
of the German disturbances. The Czech government was apparently
less fearful of an uprising among the indigenous Czech population than
among the German minority which it has recently been making new
efforts to assimilate.
No additional security measures have been
noted in the areas inside Czechoslo i which were the scene of
n I ne
9. Severe Rumanian food shortage reported:
h)(2)
3.3(h)(2)
3.3(h)(2)
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the food situa-
tion in Rumania has "reached a degree of ex-
treme urgency which has not been seen since
1944." The price of corn, the main staple of
the Rumanian peasant, is extremely high.
a resentful popul:3.3(h)(2)
tion is accusing the Rumanian authorities of piling up food reserves in
order to effect a show of abundance during the World Youth Festival
scheduled for early August or to be able to put food on sale at new
prices after a currency reform.
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Comment: Last year's particularly bad crop
failures are largely responsible for the present shortage of staple food-
stuffs in Rumania. Basic shortages probably will continue to exist until
the grain harvest in August and September, and public resentment is ap-
parently widespread.
10. Comment on resignation of Finnish cabinet:
The resignation of Premier Kekkonen and his
coalition cabinet on 29 June because of the inability of the Social Demo-
crats and Agrarians to agree upon urgent economic reforms will increase
Finland's problems.
The economic crisis has developed because
rising industrial production costs have priced Finnish goods out of the
world market, thus creating a threat of widespread unemployment this
winter. Failure to resolve the crisis within the next two to three months
would probably result in a Communist gain in the communal elections on
4 October and weaken Finland's ability to resist possible Soviet overtures
to increase the volume of trade exchanges. Approximately one third of
Finland's foreign trade probably will be with the Soviet bloc in 1953.
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