WEEKLY REPORT PREPARED EXCLUSIVELY FOR THE SENIOR INTERDEPARTMENTAL GROUP

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02870851
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: March 8, 2023
• Document Release Date: February 25, 2019
• Case Number: F-2018-01318
• Publication Date: April 3, 1967

Approved for Release: 2019/02/19 CO2870851
Now
-Secret-
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Report
Weekly Report
Prepared Exclusively for the
Senior Interdepartmental Group
--Seeret
4 4
3 April 1967
No. 0404/67
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'kuw4
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WARNING
is document contains information affecting the national
Ieknse of the United States, within the meaning of Title
sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended.
ts transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
vipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
;IV >UP 1
(UI)EA, VI, OM AUTOMATIC
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WICATHIN
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CONTENTS
Page
1.
Philippines
1
2.
Greece
2
3.
Peru
3
4.
Colombia
4
5.
Dominican Republic
5
3 April 1967
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..arorGitEr
1. PHILIPPINES
The formal Philippine request on 21 March for
transfer of the Sangley Point Naval Air Station
on Manila Bay appears to stem chiefly from pres-
sures on President Marcos by an ultranationalist
faction of his own Nacionalista Party.
Although the Philippine Navy's genuine need
for expanded facilities for its adjoining Cairte
headquarters is an underlying factor, the upcom-
ing off-year elections in November have raised
political temperatures. US-baiting in the Congress
has intensified since the installation last Febru-
ary of Jose Laurel, Jr., as Speaker of the House.
Laurel recently initiated the formation of a spe-
cial congressional commission to re-examine Phil-
ippine-US relations, with special attention to
bilateral military agreements.
Marcos' sudden formalizing of the Sangley issue
may be an attempt to act first to undercut develop-
ing congressional pressures--a tactic he has em-
ployed in the past. He has shown an appreciation
of US military needs for the Philippine bases and
of Philippine dependence on them and on the $22�
-
million annual MAP aid.
His public stand, however, commits him to the
principle of transfer, and the pressures of domes-
tic politics could impel him to press for greater
US concessions than he initially envisaged. For
example, if this question should develop into a
major issue in the upcoming elections campaign,
Marcos might find it expedient to propose joint
jurisdiction over all American bases, which have
long been a favorite target of the ultranation-
alists.
-1-
3 April 1967
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2, GREECE
GREECE
The current intense political maneuvering in
Athens is symptomatic of the deep-seated crisis which
has sharply divided conservative and leftist political
camps.
At the crux of the problem is the deep concern
of King Constantine and his right-wing advisers that
the possible return to power of Center Union (EK)
leader and ex-premier Papandreou would enhance the
position of his son Andreas. Andreas is accused of
"treasonable" actions in connection with the formation
of Aspida--a group of pro-EK military officers. Re-
cent rightist moves to hobble activities of the EK
resulted in Premier Paraskevopoulos' resignation last
week.
King Constantine has chosen National Radical
Union (ERE) leader Kanellopoulos to head a government.
This apparently is the result of failure to compromise
on any candidate less clearly aligned with the ERE or
the EK. Kanellopoulos has announced that the King has
authorized him to head a service government which
would hold elections in 45 days if he does not get a
parliamentary vote of confidence; his prospects for
winning such a vote seem slim. However, the King is
believed to oppose elections under the present rein-
forced proportional system, which tends to favor the
EK, and he might postpone the elections. If the sit-
uation deteriorates further, Constantine may even opt
for some extraconstitutional solution.
The security situation is outwardly calm, but
police and military units are on the alert.
left-wing elements may hold
"peaceful" demonstrations to create an air of uneasi-
ness similar to that which ensued after the King
forced Papandreou to resign in July 1965. The military
chiefs are known to have contingency plans to round
up "undesirables" in a new crisis, but deny that they
21an a "coup."
-2-
3 April 1967
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3. PERU
Peru is well on the way to becoming the first
nation in Latin America to acquire supersonic air-
craft.
President Belaunde claims that the new aircraft
are needed to maintain internal order, resist sub-
version, and defend national frontiers. However, a
more important reason may be his belief that unless
the purchase is made his government will lose the
support of the military. Funds will be made avail-
able from the military budget of $48 million, nearly
double last year's figure.
Swe-
den has submitted a formal offer to sell the Draken
J-35
British and French firms are also expected to make
a definite offer of tactical aircraft shortly.
Belaunde wants to sign a contract before the
Inter-American Summit meeting on the possibility
that armament limitation discussions there would
make it more difficult for him to acquire the air-
craft later. He will probably attempt to justify
the purchases on the grounds that the aircraft are
replacements and thus should not precipitate an
arms race in the hemisphere.
Chile and Argentina have purchased subsonic
fighter aircraft within the last year and are not
at present trying to buy supersonic jets. Their
governments will almost certainly change their
attitude if Peru acquires modern, supersonic planes.
Brazil has also considered purchasing supersonic
fighters but so far has moved slowly. None of the
major countries in the area would be interested in
large numbers of aircraft, but the prestige factor
could push them at least to try to keep up with
their neighbors in terms of acquiring sophisticated
tactical aircraft.
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3 April 1967
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RECENT GUERRILLA ATTACKS
CARIBBEAN SEA
PACIFIC
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COLOMBIA
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4. COLOMBIA
Communist guerrilla activity has markedly in-
creased in Colombia. Five serious attacks in widely
separated areas (see map) have been made on govern-
ment forces in the past month--more than in the pre-
ceding 12 months.
Rural violence has plagued Colombia for many
years. Communist guerrilla warfare has in the past,
however, been confined largely to defense of Commu-
nist enclaves in central and southern Colombia, with
occasional forays or attacks for propaganda purposes
This contrasts with the brutal banditry that was a
major problem from 1948 to 1962, when the government
started an all-out campaign against it.
Until recently, the Communist guerrillas have
been seriously hampered by lack of funds and by per-
sonal, political, and ideological differences. It
is unlikely that these difficulties have been com-
pletely overcome, but some improvement may have
taken place.
The government has reacted with increased mili-
tary and police vigilance and has rounded up alleged
subversives throughout the country. In addition,
President Lleras is inclining toward support of Vene-
zuelan diplomatic moves against Fidel Castro, although
direct Cuban complicity in the Colombian guerrilla
movement cannot be substantiated.
The guerrillas are not strong enough to threaten
the stability of the government at this time. How-
ever, a continuation of the present level of attacks
could cause it serious political difficulties.
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5, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
President Balaguer is attempting to forestall
serious antigovernment repercussions arising out
of the attempt on 21 March to assassinate Antonio
Imbert, one of Trujillo's killers. Suspicion has
focused on the government because the incident
followed a series of political attacks on Balaguer
for using "neo-Trujillo" tactics and relying on
"trujillista" advisers.
To blunt adverse reaction, Balaguer named the
other surviving assassin of the dictator, Luis
Amiama Tio, as minister of interior and police.
Amiama had been critical of "trujillista" influ-
ence in the government and said he would try to
reduce it.
Balaguer has also named a new police chief
in response to criticism of the incumbent's han-
dling of the Imbert case, but this shift may cause
as many problems as it solves. The new chief,
General Soto,
political loyalties seem to run
to the same group of "trujillista" palace advis-
ers whom conservatives such as Amiama find so
objectionable.
Balaguer has taken other actions--such as per-
sonally repudiating the attack on Imbert--that have
at least temporarily silenced his critics. Also, Im-
bert may come to the US for medical assistance. His
departure would remove one irritant from the scene,
at least for a while.
Nevertheless, further conflicts between "tru-
jillistas" and the anti-Trujillo right may develop,
because Amiama is likely to use his post to build
up a personal power base. In addition, military ele-
ments could become dissatisfied with Balaguer's han-
dling of the affair.
The President has indicated some dissatisfaction
.with his "trujillista" palace aides, who often appear
to act independently of him, but he seems reluctant
to sever ties with them because they have long been
his close supporters. Now he may be forced to do so
or face an open break with conservatives of the Amiama
stripe, who retain a measure of political leverage and
economic power along with some influence in the mili-
tary.
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3 April 1967
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