PROSPECTS FOR VIOLENCE IN INDONESIA

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02870638
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: June 20, 2018
• Case Number: F-2016-01698
• Publication Date: February 17, 1967

Approved for Release: 2018/06/20 CO2870638
(b)(3)
No. 0794/67
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
17 February 1967
I NTFT.TIXGENCE MEMORANDUM
Prospects for Violence in Indonesia
1. Isolated armed incidents by pro-Sukarno elements
are likely in Indonesia if Sukarno refuses to resign and
has to be deposed by congressional action. The principal
locale for opposition would be Mast Java where marine and
police units, backed by major elements of the population,
still support the President. Incidents could also occur
in Central Java, North Sumatra, and possibly Djakarta.
2. Significant long-term dissidence seems unlikely
for a number of reasons. Military elements which may of-
fer resistance are considerably outnumbered by more dis-
ciplined forces. The national commanders of all military
forces have committed themselves to General Suhartois con-
stitutional strategy against Sukarno. As in past political
crises, when-the time for congressional action approaches,
the armed forces will certainly be placed on alert status
against surprise moves by disloyal military or civilian
elements; they should be capable of prompt and effective
retaliation or even preventive action. Lastly, the desire
to be on the winning side is likely to outweigh the Sukarno
loyalties of most potential dissidents.
3.. Indonesian Army officers expect trouble in East
Java, particularly in Surabaya, the provincial capital,
if Congress deposes Sukarno. The provincial police chief
NOTE: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA. It was
prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence and
coordinated with the Office of National Estimates
and the Clandestine Services.
(b)(3)
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is a devoted follower of the President, and army officers
say that East Java paramilitary (Mobile Brigade) police
units, totaling three battalions or about 2,500 men, are
solidly pro-Sukarno. One of these is an understrength
battalion of about 500 men in Surabaya.
4. Indonesian Army o ficials believe that the ma-
jority of marines in East Java are pro-Sukarno and sus-
pect that the local marine commander is a "Bukarnophile."
There are six marine battalions in East Java, totaling�
about 5,000 men, of which three or four are in Surabaya.
Marines are reported to have provided military training
to leftist youths in the province perhaps numbering up
to 1,000.
� 5. Army strength in East Java is approximately
50,000. The strongly pro-Suharto commander, General
Sumitro, has attempted to purge his units of unreliable
officers. Although pro-Sukarno army elements certainly
remain in East Java, a breach of military discipline on
a significant scale seems unlikely. The deputy army
commander in East Java has told the US Consul in Sura-
baya that the army is developing contingency plans and
that he believes that any resistance could be suppressed
within a week.
6. Incidents in Central Java probably would in-
volve clashes between pro- and anti-Sukarno civilian
youth groups, each supported by small military units.
Despite significant pro-Sukarno sentiment in the prov-
ince, the numbers involved in his behalf probably would
be relatively small. The army maintains approximately
34,000 men in the province. These are supplemented in
time of trouble by elements of the strongly pro-Suharto
RPKAD, the highly mobile and efficient regiment of para-
commandos. The marine and police contingents in Central
Java are small; marine elements are said occasionally
to infiltrate--sometimes in civilian clothes--from East
Java.
7. Incidents in North Sumatra would be chiefly
civilian inspired. Clashes between pro- and anti-
Sukarno youth groups occur periodically, and feeling
would surely intensify it Sukarno were depooed. The
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