CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1953/10/13

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02869429
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: July 15, 2019
• Document Release Date: July 22, 2019
• Publication Date: October 13, 1953

4Approved for Release: 2019/07/10 CO2869429.
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SEC � INFORMATION
13 October 1953
Copy No. 67
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
cocumENTNo.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
El DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TB S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE; c'�C7 g
AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE/-*4/79 REVIEWER
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Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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SECU INFORMATION77 riff70) 17,34
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SECURITY INFORMATION
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SUMMARY
FAR EAST
4( , Large movement of Soviet tanks into North Korea reported (page 3).
SOUTHEAST ASIA
oe Burma will accept Nationalist proposal for limited evacuation (page 3).
SOUTH ASIA
3. Comment on resignation of the prime minister of Ceylon (page 4).
NEAR EAST-AFRICA
4,, Zahedi feels unable to resume relations with Britain (page 4).
WESTERN EUROPE
bre' . Adenauer faces difficulties in Bundestag on Saar issue (page 5).
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ECURITY INFORMA I ION
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FAR EAST
1. Large movement of Soviet tanks into North Korea reported:
approximately
200 Soviet tanks recently crossed the Yalu
River into North Korea.
Comment: Such a movement, if not com-
pensated for by withdrawal-Oriiiequal number of tanks, would be an-
other violation of the armistice agreement. The combined armored
strength of the Chinese and North Koreans in Korea prior to this re-
ported movement was estimated at approximately 450 tanks and 150
self-propelled guns.
SOUTHEAST ASIA
2. Burma will accept Nationalist proposal for limited evacuation:
The president of Burma informed the
American ambassador in Rangoon on 12
October that his government has decided
to accept the Chinese Nationalist proposal
to evacuate 2,000 troops.
The Burmese envisage that the withdrawal
will be conducted in accordance with the plan drawn up by the four-
power committee in Bangkok and are prepared to dispatch army offi-
cers to observe its implementation. Burma is not prepared, however,
to resume its seat on the quadripartite committee.
Comment: If Taipei fulfills its commit-
ment to a limited evacuation and refrains from assisting those troops
remaining behind, Burmese security forces should ultimately be able
to regain control over northeastern Burma. However, Taipei's record
of persistent delays in negotiations and the fact that until very recently
it continued the clandestine delivery of supplies to the Chinese troops
In Burma raise doubt as to its sincerity.
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SOUTH ASIA
3. Comment on resignation of the prime minister of Ceylon:
The appointment of Sir John Kotelawala
to succeed Prime Minister Dudley Senanayake, who resigned on 12
October because of ill-health, will bring no major change in the
policies of the government of Ceylon. The government can be ex-
pected to remain basically pro-Western in its sympathies, but be-
cause of its special problems will continue to follow an independent
course in trade matters.
Kotelawala, minister of transport and
works and veteran leader in parliament of the ruling United National
Party, is conservative, strongly anti-Communist, and more forceful
than his predecessor. Although faced with personal rivalries within
his party, he will probably be able to control them and to keep it
firmly in control of the government.
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
4. Zahedi feels unable to resume relations with Britain:
Prime Minister Zahedi believes that he
cannot resume diplomatic relations with
Britain until an oil settlement is reached
or at least until concrete steps have been
taken in that direction. Zahedi told Ambassador Henderson that a
resumption of relations before a settlement would be exploited by
the opposition as "proof" that he was controlled by the British and
the Americans.
Comment: Zahedi apparently genuinely
wishes to re-establish relations With Britain. Recent statements in
the Iranian press appear to be preparing the ground for public accept-
ance of renewed oil negotiations, but no noticeable attempt has been
made to convince public opinion that diplomatic relations would make
the negotiations easier.
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WESTERN EUROPE
5. Adenauer faces difficulties in Bundestag on Saar issue:
American officials in Bonn report that 3.3(h)(2)
since the 6 September elections opposition
has stiffened within the West German coali-
tion parties to granting concessions to France
on the Saar issue. The officials feel that Chancellor Adenauer can rely
on the unqualified support of only about one third of the Bundestag dep-
uties for any understanding with the French.
Within Adenauer's own Christian Democratic
Union, some party leaders are demanding that any agreement be subject
to revision within ten years of its coming into force and that it be re-
viewed whenever a peace treaty is negotiated. Some leaders of the minor
coalition parties have threatened to leave the government should Adenauer
go "too far" in his forthcoming talks with French foreign minister Bidault.
Comment: Bundestag opposition to conces-
sions on the Saar is encouraged partly by a growing belief that the United
States and Britain would sponsor a German army in NATO should the EDC
fail as a result of a breakdown in the Saar negotiations.
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