31 JANUARY TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH SAIGON STATION - 1968/01/31

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Tet Declassified
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02806236
• Document Creation Date: July 27, 2018

Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 CO2806236
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR
31 January 1968
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Walt W. Rostow
Special Assistant to the President
SUBJECT : 31 January Telephone Conversation with Saigon Station
1. At 31/0433Z I was in telephonic communication with our Saigon
Station. The circuit was bad: I could hear Saigon but they could not understand
me. The Station reported that the situation was tp. nerally stabilizing and the .
press peady exonerating Lite seriousness oi the penetration of the VItib4 4s0.
-The_ Chancery was not actually penetTattql, thotagh Viet Cong 414 get into the
compoupA Therm were no U.S c.ivilacitiosta.LaitiggA, in. Saigon, known as oPthat
2. After the phone conversation I transmitted the following specific
questions to Mr. Lapham through the open teletype link, explaining that these
were the points I had hoped to raise over the phone.
a. What does the countrywide situation look like?
b. What do regional officers report?
c. Was attempt made against 'Thieu, Ky or other senior GVN
officials?
d. Did Saigon attack seem pri:marily aimed at American
targets?
e. Was there any local intelligence or other warning of these
attacks (in Saigon or elsewhere)?
f. What do you expect in Saigon and countrywide within next
24-48 hours?
g. Any indication of effect attacks had on mood or attitudes
of Vietnamese population?
,SEC
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h. Your general preliminary comments on meaning and
. import current countrywide spate of VC activity.
i. How is VC surge likely to affect GVN standing and
stability?
3. At 31/0710Z, Mr. Lapharn replied. The text of his reply is given
below. I am passing it to the recipients of this memorandum in the belief that
you may find it useful. You will understand, of course, that these are Mr.
Lapham's initial reactions in a very fluid situation, the full dimensions and
details of which were not known to him at that time.
7)e. 4. * *
, 4. * * * * *
FOR MR. CARVER FROM MR. LAPHAM:
1. Appreciate your need for rapid coverage of events and assure you we
are doing everything possible to comply. It has been extremely difficult during
the morning hours to obtain any hard information on the events of the night since
P.P.PeP trc fully occupi.eti ift:m6PPiris LIP erVeraitor's 45-IvariGui eCtif;i'. C"I e city
For example the VG ceat.t to be 11�1*(4 kap in lsouse �a.cross tmert--4,he. Palaee
and apparently in houses in the area of 7a4n $till Mut., Contrary to earlier
frepoits, Ern' isay eply ..ba'e beet,). stil4stpd,not _riepoit leo -iiitsrk is
2. You will shortly receive dissern concerning police report we have
received re enemy plans for this evening.
3. Mr. Carver's telecon just received. As you can see from above,
announcement premature that situation was calm enough to permit return of
personnel to work. At this moment, ti5 P CICSAbLeAgi -eAti.m4te: hriarja
IA 'take to::m.P 1?-1! vo .116Nk Are_kip1,4.up_,Amunol torwfaQ. If intelligence referred
to above is accurate, we _max heye za.Auj:ji,:ntakt..adgaiet-elhasienint .
4. Will be filing report shortly on countrywide situation (TDCS 314/01647-68).
Regional officers are preparing sitreps for direct transmission. An FVS has
been filed re Loan's comments. 4,y�Tymi
rtva esteci .1411.P.Y.ASAIMAIOi4eii.6.`rr eku mikv.to'.Saisolie moi*g.. Althougk
American facilities received their share of attention, other targets were..jcp_ too.
and rkillipPtrAF.A.16-14.5.544;:_ealatt;-4.tictSaittsisLititictigclitAktiet:IMuring the last
few days, Station has diligently pursued all available sources for intelligence
that might have given us warning of these attacks. The police had a few spotty
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reports but nothing which appeared to be very, hard. They 4,i.ei,e-urlci.i.eseiiyiaTal1>t
not PrePa:r-434 Co*.' 5 attack *A�:04-1eopenitik air of rett, when. P�arge nuirtbe:0&. thein
famili-OL At this point, we anticipate that country-
wide attacks will continue tonight. However, we lacking intelligence from the
regions which would give us an accurate read-out. Your telecon questions, para
2g, h, and i will be dealt with separately.
5. COS and EXO will spend night in Station, with a backup com.mo command
post in another area of the city. We are establishing additional commo links with
various police posts. Every possible precaution being taken to assure security
of personnel and classified facilities.
6. Re your telecon questions g, h and
a. You will appreciate the difficulty we have in even beginning
an answer to these questions which will be of great importance when
the security situation settles down.
b. We are not today in contact with many elements in the
Vietnamese population to discern their attitudes and moods. A
circling airplane with loudspeakers:tole:1 1,0.�e people to. 5.0y:of-f Vide
"streets and in tileir homes.. ;NC e.reporteelly _made specifia
4.1.11r:Ws_.-fo...pe'rsss.ns..11vJng_ut. certain. ea fDvbco-te horn es at risk
�.,Most Saigonese have indeed stayed at home and we
assume that they will follow VC orders as well. ,...ne..rrioed
v,e..riAtiase-4
c. The meaning and import of current activity can be
extracted from VC stated intentions regarding the winter-spring
i campaign, their calls for general uprising, and their obvious
I drive toward a major victory for propaganda and morale purposes.
Witile May bt fundersojEltA oaajoi�-wiultiple4tar:asirrie'ne-iCii4.1idttt't
lasting military sgnficance1Jet tatImate mpokt wU 1epeigitt brvA
their oduegieZ'a-sucec es s oi #1e
t741:rdot.?-thryte.T...,11111F6Paetc,:-b.tosiattArtIta.CiVrCkftNAIA
i ,b.e..411ba'an044-�
d. Regardless of what happens tonight or during the next few
days, ths 4ea-rmS1,11,1c,76*-5�s41:ii�CV iCiWaIic-Saiort--and-arpAnd
i:ttk:CP�PuPtrY,Nill, yes Uci tke _01113: (a:4.-13
pelf erfut A.1_7s ric an allies as- well) in pmyesAftket�ppjl iJi
\Ylrozete.sat;....1014-thease.w4io a SyMP atfl 04,c,�1 St.k.(g,riwArvail
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Lt... /SENSITIVE
criticatAvope:tra expoct
for protection irtorn their
and the- ltwe. lack of NYC liCtivity 5aigbei dc)149 znoryths
cateci a presumption Cti_GVN and pce streAstl iT644)145-aii-eZ4
3.ny, rote.. --dickvose:who kletieve.14,51ec411-_iy ,i-tilattiraftt (not the
; political) is paramount wilt tieduce that oirlly a tough, efficient,"
no-nonsense government run by Ole eni.litekry _Gan meet the. shut
iphys1 th-ri 'Eh* _Viet CoAg.1 Those who cannot stomach such a
\goverrunent will be moved further toward the temptation of negotia-
tions and coalition government.
�,�
e. We would hope to be permitted to delay additional analysis
and prediction until we have provided for the necessary security
of our installations and personnel and can begin to move about the
city to communicate with sources able to provide authoritative
reactions and ideas. In meantime, hope above will be helpful.
cc: Secretary Rusk
Secretary McNamara
General Wheeler
3.5(c)
Geoge A. Carver, Jr.
Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs
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