VIEWS OF VIET CONG PRISONERS OF WAR IN PLEIKU ON OBJECTIVES OF THE TET ATTACKS, THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES HAD THE ATTACKS SUCCEEDED IN PLEIKU, REACTION OF THE POPULACE TO THE ATTACKS, PLANS FOR A COALITION REACTION OF THE NFLSV TO POSSIBL

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Tet Declassified
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02800002
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: April 27, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 30, 2019
• Publication Date: February 9, 1968

a
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO2800002
vow
CENTAL PNTELLIGENCF AGENCY
Intelligence Information Cable N
PRIORI 1 'y
471427
PAGE OF i7
STATE/INR DIA
NMCCMC (SECDEF
DD/I EXO
JCS
ARMY NAVY AIR' CLA,MMCC 1N.IC NSA SDO ON
OER FRIS DCS IRS Alin
. . .._ ___ . ... .
This ozaterrsi contains infcrmation affecting the National Defense oi the United Clates 4411:15.1.11L the meaning 61' the Illspionage,
Secs.. 793 and 794, the transmisson or revelation of which in any manoer to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
!
tviiv,v11,5,,Av!Oi44
THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT,
NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.
091343Z
VW
CITE 3.5(c)
DST 9 FEBRUARY 19. be
COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM
DOI 29 JANUARY - 6 FEBRUARY 1968.
?URJ E CT VIEWS OF V IETCONGPR ISONERS OF W AR IN PLEIKU
ON OBJECT IVES OF THE TET ATTACKS, THEIR
RESPONSIBILITIES HAD THE ATTACKS SUCCEEDED
IN PLEIKU , REACT ION OF THE POPULACE TO THE:
ATTACKS, PLANS FOR A COALITION GOVERNMENT !,
FUTURE NFLSV PLANS, AND POSSIBLE REACT ION
OF THE NFLSV TO POSSIBLE MILITARY DEFEATS
ACQ.
SOURCE
3.3(h)(2)
h)(2)
3.3
A. PHAN VAN KINH (AKA KINH ANH) , AN ETHNIC SOUTH
VIETNAMESE NATIVE OF HOA I MY VILLAGE HOAI NHON DISTRICT,
NO FOREI GN u I 5Stm
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO2800002
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO2800002
IN 147427
�
(ciassizIkth
3.5(c)
PAGE 2 ,A".
3.3(h)(2)
%Br
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO2800002
3.3(h
"Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO2800002
� GONFI.DENTIAL
(eass(ftcation) (dissem controls)
NO FOREIGN DI../LErl
....IN �47427
3.5(c)
PAGE 3 OF 17 PAGES
I. ASKED WHAT THEY WERE TOLD WAS THE OBJECTIVE OF THE TET
COUNTRY-WIDE ATTACKS IN SOUTH VIETNAM, WHICH BEGAN ON 29 JANUARY
1968, THE PRISONERS ANSWERED AS FOLLOWS:
A. THE MISSION WAS TO
(1) ATTACK AND DEFEAT THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM (GVN) AND
ALLIED ARMED FORCES; (2) ENCOURAGE TO JOIN THE REVOLUTION ALL
THOSE ELEMENTS WHO HAVE NOT UP TO THIS POINT ACTIVELY
PARTICIPATED IN THE REVOLUTION, SUCH AS THE LARGE CIVILIAN
MASSES IN THE CITIES, AND ALL OTHER GROUPS WHO FOR ONE REASON
OR ANOTHER HAVE BEEN LIMITED OR COMPLETELY RESTRICTED FROM
ACTIVELY PARTICIPATING IN THE REVOLUTION; (3) ESTABLISH
FAVORABLE POLITICAL CONDITIONS FOR ALL THOSE ELEMENTS WHO
ACTIVELY SUPPORT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A COALITION GOVERNMENT.
IN THE PARTICULAR ATTACK ON PLEIKU THE OBJECTIVE WAS TO ENTER
- - - -D- -A-L NO FORI
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO2800002
)(2)
3.3(h)(2)
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO2800002
IN 47427
o
cril23-stA;or
N r-aRt
PAGE Lror 17
3.5(c)
PLEIKU AND, AFTER SECURING THE AREA ORGAN:ZE ALL ELEMENTS
WITHIN THE CITY TO AGITATE ACTIVELY FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF
A cuALIT ION GOVERNEMENT.
B.
THE OBJECTIVE
OF THE COUNTRYWIDE ATTACKS WAS TO LIBERATE. ALL OF SOUTH
VIETNAM IN THE CASE OF PLE /KU, THIS WOULD BE DONE BY THE
LIBERATION ARMED FORCES ENTERING PLEIKU
AND STAGING MASS DEM ONSTR AT ICINS.
C.
STOPPING ALL TRAFFIC,
INITIAL ATTACK,
AFTER THE
WAS TO PARTICIPATE IN DEMONSTRATIONS
ALONG HIGHWAY 19 AND THAT HE WAS TO HELP LEAD THE PEOPLE INTO
PLEIKU CITY.
OCCUR WHILE THE LIBERATION
PLEIKU AND ALL OF VIETNAM
D
THE DE MONSTRAT IONS WOULD
ARMED FORCES WERE LIBERATING
3.3(h)(2)
3.3(h)(2)
T HE 3.3(h)(2)
OBJECTIVE OF THE ATTACKS IN PIEIKU AND MANY OTHER PROVINCES
WAS TO LIBERATE BOTH MILITARY REGION 5 AND ALL THE REST OF
SOUTH VIETNAM.
-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO2800002
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO2800002
marl - 1+7427
cation
{nem contro *
E
THE OBJECT IN LAUNCHING SIMULTANEOUS ATTACKS THROUGHOUT
VIETNAM WAS TO (1) LIBERATE ALL OF SOUTH VIETNAM; (2) UPSET
THE THIEU-KY GOVERNMENT, AND (3) ESTABLISH A COALITION
GOVERNMENT REPRESENTING ALL SECT IONS OF VIETNAM. A COALITION
GOVERNMENT IS NECESSARY BECAUSE, ALTHOUGH NORTH VIETNAM AND SOUTH
VIETNAM ARE VERY CLOSE, IT IS liEQUIRED THAT SOUTH VIETNAM
HAVE ITS OWN GOVERNMENT FOR THE PRESENT.
2. ASKED WHAT THEIR FUTURE CONTINUING RESPONSIBILITIES
WERE BEYOND THE IMMEDIATE ATTACK ORDERS, THE PRISONERS REPLIED:
PAGE 5 OF 17 PAGES
-VA
3.5(c)
A.
3.3(h)(2)
THE PART ICULAR MISSION 3.3(h)(2)
OF THE H-15 BATTALION (BN) AFTER THE ATTACK WAS TO ENTER AND
SECURE THE AREA IN FLEIKU WHERE THE GOVERNMENT OFFICES WERE
LOCATED. THE H-15 BN, AFTER STATIONING ITSELF AND SECURING
THE ADMINISTRATIVE AREA, WAS THEN TO CONDUCT A SEARCH FOR ANY
REMAINING POCKETS OF RESISTANCE. KINH AND HIS BATTALION WERE
THEN TO WAIT FOR FURTHER ORDERS OR UNTIL A COALITION GOVERNMENT
COULD BE FORMED.
F- I ----N-T- I -A--L
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO2800002
00 LI" I I 'vine,
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO2800002
(classification) (dissem controls)
PAGE 6 OF 17 PAGES
ON THE MORNING FOLLOWING THE
ATTACK, KY WAS TO PARTICIPATE IN BRINGING INTO PLEIKU CITY ALL
OF THE PEOPLE IN SURROUNDING NEAR-BY AREAS AND SEND
THEM TO VARIOUS COLLECTION POINTS THROUGHOUT THE CITY WHERE
POLITICAL CADRES WOULD EXPLAIN TO THEM THE REASON FOR THEIR
LIBERATION. FOLLOWING THE POLITICAL LECTURES, THE COMMANDER
WOULD ARRIVE IN THE CITY TO ISSUE FURTHER ORDERS TO THE
LIBERATION FORCES AND THE PEOPLE.
C.
INSTRUCTIONS WERE TO GO TO PROVINCE
HEADQUARTERS AFTER THE ATTACK AND INITIATE THE POLITICAL
STRUGGLE. CONCURRENTLY, HE WAS TO COORDINATE WITH THE
LIBERATION ARMED FORCES AND THE STAFF OF PLEIKU PROVINCE.
HEADQUARTERS ON PLANS TO CELEBRATE THE LIBERATION.
D.
FOLLOWING THE ATTACK,
TO GO TO THE OUTLYING AREAS OF PLEIKU AND EXHORT
THE PEOPLE TO COME INTO PLEIKU, WHERE THEY WERE. TO ATTEND
LECTURES.
CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN DI SSEM
+my
valao
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO2800002
3.3(h)(2)
3.3(h)(2)
3.3(h)(2)
POL I T I CA,
B. HE
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO2800002
moo' IN 47427
NO FOREIGN DiSSEV
(classification) (dissent controls;
PAGE 7 OF 17 PAGES
3.5(C)
E.
FOLLOWING THE .ATTACK 3.3(h)(2)
WAS TO MEET WITH A NUMBER OF COMRADES AND PEOPLE TO ORGANIZE
POLITICA1 MEFTINing. HE WAS THEN TO ORGANIZE THE WOMAN'S)
YOUTHS) AND FARMERS' GROUPS AND INITIATE POLITICAL LECTURES
FOR THEM IN WHICH IT WOULD BE EXPLAINED THAT THE PURPOSE
OF THE REVOLUTION WAS TO ACHIEVE PEACE IN VIETNAM UNDER
THE VIETNAMESE AND THE MONTAGNARD:::;, AND ESTABLISH A. GOVERNMENT
IN SOUTH VIETNAM WHICH WOULD EVENTUALLY BRING ABOUT
REUNIFICATION WITH NORTH VIETNAM.
3. ASKED IF THEY WERE TOLD AND IF THEY BELIEVED THAT
THE POPULATION WOULD JOIN ANY GENERAL UPRISING AGAINST THE
GVN AND THE AMERICAN FORCES, THEY ANSWERED AS FOLLOWS:
A.
POLITICAL CADRES HAD
TOLD HIM AND HE BELIEVED TI-AT AFTER LIBERATION ARMED FORCES
HAD ENTERED THE CITY OF PLEIKU AND THE FIGHTING HAD ENDED, THE
POPULACE WOULD EMERGE FROM THEIR HOUSES, STAGE MASS DEMONSTRATIONS,
AND PARTICIPATE IN THE MEETINGS WHICH WERE TO BE HELD.
WAS OFSIMILAR MIND PERSONALLY, THAT 90 PERCENT OF THE PEOPLE
SINCERELY WISHED TO BE LIBERATED AND THAT WHEN A LARGE BODY
C-n-NFT IlFN1-11 L NQ FOREICN DISSEM
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO2800002
3.3(h)(2)
3.3(h)(2:
U. . 400/ � �
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO2800002 IN 47427
�
(Moist cation dissent controls
NO FORE '31 DS SE
3.5(c)
PAGE 8 OF 17 PAGES
OF LIBERATION FORCES WERE PRESENT THESE 90 PERCENT WOULD JOIN
THE REVOLUTION. AS TO WHY HE AND MANY SOLDIERS BELIEVED THE
PEOPLE WOULD JOIN IN AN UPRISING, HE SAID MANY PEOPLE, EVEN
THOUGH UNARMED, JOINED THE TROOPS MARCHING INTO THE CITY.
THIS WAS BECAUSE THEY RELIEVED THAT THE LIBERATION ARMED
FORCES WOULD SUCCEED.
C.
THE PEOPLE WOULD 3.3(h)(2)
PARTICIPATE IN THE LIBERATION OF PLEIKU. AT THE TIME
HE BEGAN HIS MARCH INTO THE CITY HE BELIEVED THAT IF THE
BATTLE WAS INDECISIVE, THOSE PEOPLE MARCHING WITH THE TROOPS
WOULD BE KILLED OR CAPTURED BY GOVERNMENT TROOPS.
D.
FOLLOWING 3.3(h)(2)
THE LIBERATION OF PLEIKU THE PEOPLE WERE TO ENTER THE CITY,
HE HAD NO IDEA HOW MANY PEOPLE WOULD PARTICIPATE.
HE BELIEVED, HOWEVER, THAT THE MAJORITY OF THE PEOPLE WANTED
VERY MUCH TO BE LIBERATED.
E.
WAS TOLD BY A POLITICAL CADRE 3.3(h)(2)
THAT FOLLOWING THE LIBERATION OF PLEIKU THE POPULACE WOULD
BE ORGANIZED FOR A "CELEBRATION" AND BROUGHT INTO THE CITY.
IN HIS OPINION, THE SUPPORT OF THE POPULACE DEPENDED ON THE
SUCCESS OF THE LIBERATION.
C-O-N- F- I -D-E-N- I-1-.A.-L NO I-OPE I CN DI SSM
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO2800002
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO2800002
47427
.CO-NrIDCNTIAL NO FOREtCN Dt55Em
(clastil!canon) � (dissem
3.5(c)
PAGE 9 OF 1 7 PAGES
4. ASKED WHAT ACTUAL. SUPPORT THEY RECEIVED FROM
THE POPULACE, THEY REPLIED:
A.
THE PEOPLE GAVE NO SUPPORT, ACTIVE
OR PASSIVE, TO THE LIBERATION FORCES, INSOFAR AS HE WAS
AWARE. HE BELIEVED THE PEOPLE STAYED IN THEIR HOUSES
BECAUSE THEY WERE AFRAID OF ALL IED ARTILLERY AND A IRSTR IKES.
HE DID NOT BELIEVE THEY WERE AFRAID OF THE LIBERATION FORCES.
B.
FROM THE TIME
MARCHING
TOWARD PLEIKU UNTIL THE TIME HE WAS CAPTURED ABOUT A T HREE-
AND- ONE- HALF - HOUR ?ER IOD , NONE OF THE PEOPLE LEFT THEIR HOUSES
UNLESS SPECIFICALLY CALLED UPON BY THE VC TO DO SO. EVEN
THEN, THEY RETURNED TO THEIR HOUSES AS SOON AS THE LIBERATION
FORCES HAD PASSED. THEY WERPOLITE., BUT THEY WERE ALSO VERY
AFRAID OF BEING KILLED.
3.3(h)(2)
3.3(h)(2)
IT WAS NECESSARY FOR 3.3(h)(2)
THE VC ARMED FORCES TO BE PRESENT IN A LARGE BODY TO GIVE THE
PEOPLE CONFIDENCE. HIS GROUP OF ONLY FOUR OR FIVE PERSONS
1.4i\S OPTKIHmizFRFD BY THE PEOPLE, SO IT COULD NOT FORCE THE PEOPLE
TO JOIN THE DEMONSTRATIONS.
-u-t-N-T- I -A- L
NO FORE I CN DI SSEM
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO2800002
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO2800002 IN
47427
� CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN ID
(clevstflcation) (disarm controls)
ger,-7arnsterwr...--- :t., 4164t;s4itwoos 'w ...........^.�.---..... ,....,,,,,,....."1,-- -- -- � - .....40,-.4....
w 04' Cs THE PEOPLE WERE AFRAID OF LEAVING THEIR
1
Ftel
PAGE 1U OF 1/ PAGES
3.5(c)
HOUSES. EVEN THOUGH THE CADRES THEMSELVES DID NOT KNOW WHETHER
OR NOT VICTORY HAD BEEN WON, THEY EXHORTED THE PEOPLE TO
LEAVE THEIR HOUSES BY SAYING THAT PLEIKU HAD BEEN LIBERATED.
IF THAT DID NOT WORK, THE CADRES FORCED THE PEOPLE OUT TO
JOIN DEMONSTRATIONS. DURING THE FOUR HOURS TROM WAS
MARCHING, HE SAW FROM 150 TO 200 PEOPLE PARTICIPATE IN
DEMONSTRATIONS. HE WAS AWARE THAT A NUMBER OF PEOPLE ESCAPED
AND RETURNED TO THEIR HOMES BUT HE DID NOT KNOW HOW MANY.
D.
THE PEOPLE GAVE NO ASSISTANCE, BUT
HE WAS SURE THAT FOLLOWING THE LIBERATION OF THE CITY, THE
PEOPLE WOULD HAVE JOINED THE
ASSISTANCE REQUIRED.
E.
THE FIGHTING WAS STILL GOING
AFRAID TO LEAVE THEIR HOMES.
5. ASKED IF THEY WERE
ACTION WOULD BE SUPPLEMENTED
REVOLUTION AND GIVEN ANY
3.3(h)(2)
3.3(h)(2)
NO ONE GAVE HIS GROUP HELP. 3.3(h)(2)
ON, AND THE PEOPLE WERE
LED TO BELIEVE THAT CURRENT MILITARY
BY A MAJOR OFFENSIVE IN THE NORTH
AT KHE SANH OR THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE (DMZ), THE PRISONERS REPLIED:
CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN DIEM
vise
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO2800002
�
-Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO2800002
Asp,
CONF I DE-NTA-L NC FOREIGN
IN , 47427
3.5(c)
PAGE 11.OF17 PAGES
-I-
(clottiflonticri) (Masan- controls)
DISSEM
A.
WAS TO BE ATTACKED
ATTACKS IN THE
HE KNEW THAT ALL OF SOUTH V IETNAN
HEARD NOTHING CONCERNING SPECIFIC
T HIEN (TRI-T HIEN) / DMZ AREA.
WAS TOLD THAT MAJOR ATTACKS
3.3(h)(2)
3.3(h)(2)
BUT HE HAD
QUANG TR I-T HUA
B.
HE
WOULD BE LAUNCHED IN THE HUE AND DMZ AREAS WHILE PLEIKU WAS BEING
ATTACKED. HE BELIEVED THAT THE TARGETS OF THE ATTACK IN
THE PLEIKU AREA WERE THE U.S 4TH INFANTRY DIVISION AND
II CORPS HEADQUARTERS AND THAT THE ATTACK WAS PLANNED TO
PREVENT THESE FORCES IN THE WESTERN HIGHLANDS FROM REINFORCING
THE NORTHERN AREA. IN HIS OPINION, THE FOOD AND SUPPLY
SITUATION IN HUE WERE MORE FAVORABLE THEN IN PLEIKU AND
THEREFORE THE NORTH MIGHT HAVE MORE IMPORTANCE THAN THE
WEST IN THE EYES OF THE MILITARY REGION.
C. HE WAS AWARE THAT SIMULTANEOUS ATTACKS
WOULD BE LAUNCHED NATIONWIDE, BUT HAD NOT HEARD THAT SPECIFIC
ATTACKS WOULD BE LAUNCHED IN THE TR I -T HIE li/DMZ AREA.
C-O-N-F- I -D-E-N-T- I -A-L NO FOREIGN DI5EP1
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO2800002
3.3(h)(2)
01#41.111,14...
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO2800002
IN 47427
3.5(c)
PAGE 12 OF 17 PAGES
�GCN-FIDENTIAL
NO FOREIGN DI FAEM
(clanictor) Jdissem controlaL
PRIOR TO BEING
3.3(h)(2)
D.
HE WAS NOT AWARE,
CAPTURED OF ANY SPECIFIC LOCATIONS THAT WERE TO
BE ATTACKED.
E.
HE WAS TOLD THAT
ALL OF SOUTH
3.3(h)(2)
VIETNAM WOULD BE ATTACKED; HOWEVER, THE TR I-T HIEN AREAS
OF THE DMZ WERE NOT SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED.
6. ASKED IF THEY WERE AWARE OF ANY EFFORT TO ORGANIZE
AN "ALLIANCE
TO NEGC TIATE
PRISONERS REPLIED:
FOR PEACE AND DEMOCRACY" AS A COALITION :10VEMENT
WITH THE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT (NFLSV), THE
A.
HE HAD NOT HEARD OF ANY
3.3(h)(2)
PLAN FOR A COALITION
GOVERNMENT, OR OF AN ALLIANCE
ESTABLISHED TO
ORGANIZE A COALITION
GOVERNMENT.
B.
HE WAS TOLD BY CADRES THAT A
3.3(h)(2)
COALITION GOVERNMENT
MIGHT
REPLACE THE NFLSV AND BECOME THE
SOUTH VIETNAMESE
GOVERNMENT.
C.
HE HAD HEARD THAT A POLITICAL COALITION
3.3(h)(2)
OF SORTS WAS TO BE FORMED FOLLOWING THE FIGHTING BETWEEN THE
LIBERATION ARMED FORCES AND NATIONALIST TROOPS. HE KNEW
OF NO PLANS CONCERNING EITHER AN ALLIANCE OR A GOVERNMENT BY
COALITION.
L-0-N-F-I-D-ENTI AL NO FOPFTGN DT SSEM
'ger
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO2800002
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 G02800002
VW' `4111014 ,I+7427
(dant non dissent controls
rOREI DI k.141
PAGE 13 OF 17 PAGES
3.5(c)
D.
HE HAD HEARD THAT THERE WOULD BE
A COALITION GOVERNMENT WITHIN THE NEAR FUTURE WHICH WOULD
COORDINATE WITH THE NFLSV TO SETTLE THE WAR.
E.
HE WAS TOLD BY POLITICAL CADRES
THAT POSSIBLY FOLLOWING VICTORY, A COALITION GOVERNMENT
WOULD BE ORGANIZED IN ORDER TO CARRY ON DISCUSSIONS WITH THE
NFLSV AND EVENTUALLY TO REUNIFY NORTH AND SOUTH VIETNAM. IN
HIS OPINION A COALITION GOVERNMENT OR EVEN A FRONT WOULD BE
IDEAL FOR ESTABLISHING PEACE AND INDEPENDENCE IN SOUTH VIETNAM.
A COALITION GOVERNMENT OR FRONT WOULD HAVE THE PARTICULAR
ADVANTAGE OF NOT BEING CONSIDERED AN ORGAN OF THE COMMUNIST
PARTY AS THE NFLSV IS. A COALITION GOVERNMENT OR FRONT WOULD
APPEAL PARTICULARLY TO THOSE ELEMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAMESE
SOCIETY WHO MOST STRONGLY OBJECT TO A COMMUNIST GOVERNMENT;
A COALITION GOVERNMENT WOULD PERMIT THEM TO PARTICIPATE
FREELY IN GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS.
7. ASKED IF THEY WERE AWARE OF ANY PLANS FOR FOLLOW-UP
STEPS IN THE CURRENT STRATEG /, THE PRISONERS ANSWERED:
A.
IN THE EVENT THAT SOUTH VIETNAM
IS NOT COMPLETELY LIBERATED, THE OBJECTIVES OF THE NFLSV WILL
C-0-N-F-I-D-E-N-T I A L NO FOREIGN DISSEM
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 G02800002
3.3(h)(2)
3.3(h)(2)
3.3(h)(2
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO2800002IN
� C O-N I D-E N T I -A-L NO FOIKICN
(classification) (dissem controls)
47427
PAGE 14 0F17 PAGES
3.5(c)
REMAIN UNCHANGED AND WILL CONTINUE TO BE PURSUED BY METHODS
USED PREVIOUSLY. THE NFL SV WILL NOT FADE . AWAY,BUT IF
NECESSARY, WILL WITHDRAW TO ITS BASES AND CONTINUE THE SIR UGG LE .
ALL COMMANDERS AND SOLDIERS KNOW THAT IN ALL AREAS AND WITH
ALL UNITS THERE WILL BE TIMES OF TOTAL VICTORY AND TIMES OF
SMALL DEFEATS AND SOMETIMES THERE WILL EVEN BE LARGE
DEFEATS. BUT TO ACCOMPLISH THE REVOLUTION ALL THAT IS
NECESSARY IS THE DETERMINATION TO SUCCEED.
B
ACCORDING TO HIS POLITICAL CADRE, 3.3(h)(2)
STRATEGY WOULD CONTINUE TO BE THE SAME AS BEFORE THE ATTACKS
IN THE EVENT SOUTH VIETNAM IS NOT COMPLETELY LIBERATED. THE
POLITICAL CADRE SAID THAT THIS WAS POSSIBLE BECAUSE ONLY
ONE-THIRD OF THE LIBERATION ARMED FORCES HAD BEEN COMMITTED
AND THAT TWO.-THIRDS WERE STILL IN RESERVE. IN ADDITION,
LARGE AMOUNTS OF ASSISTANCE WERE BEING RECEIVED FROM FOREIGN
COUNTRIES AND CONSEQUENTLY THE NFLSV WOULD HAVE AMPLE
SUPPLIES. FOR EXAMPLE, THE ARMED FORCES ONCE HAD ONLY 60MM
AND 81/82MM MORTARS FOR HEAVY-WEAPONS SUPPORT AND NOW WITH
FOREIGN AID THEY HAVE ROCKETS AND VERY LARGE MORTARS EVEN
AT BATTALLION LEVEL.
CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN DIEM
gar
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO2800002
������� �
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO2800002
,...1�1 1+7427
PAGE 15 OF 17 PAGES
3.5(C)
C.
OT HER THAN THE LIBERATION OF V D-;_: I NAM , HE
HAD HEARD OF NO PLANS CONCERNING ALTERNATIVE OBJECTIVES. IN
RESPONSE TO THE QUESTIONS OF SOME SOLDIERS REGARDING WHAT
WOULD HAPPEN IF PLEIKU WERE NOT LIBERATED, A POLITICAL CADRE
ANSWERED BY RIDICULING IHE SOLDIERS. NO IDEA WHAT
THE NFL SV WOULD DO IN THE EVENT PLE IKU WAS NOT LIBERATED.
D.
POLITICAL CADRES SAY THAT IN THE
EVENT COMPLETE VICTORY IS NOT ACHIEVED, STRATEGY WILL CONTINUE
TO BE ATTACKS ON THE CITY AND SABOTAGE ACTIVITIES IN ALL
URBAN AREAS, AND THE CONTINUED REINFORCEMENT AND BUILD�UP
OF THE LIBERATION ARMED FORCES SO THAT THEY CAN ANNIHILATE THE
GVN/ALL IED ARMED FORCES.
E. THE NFL SV CONSIDERS THAT IT
CAN SUFFER LOSSES OR INDECISIVE BATTLES AT A LOCAL LEVEL
WITHOUT LOSING GENERALLY. CONSEQUENTLY IT CONSIDERS THAT
WHILE IT MAY BE POSSIBLE TO SUFFER A LOSS AT THE LOCAL
LEVEL IN ONE PARTICULAR AREA, THIS WOULD NOT CONSTITUTE
A LOSS OVER ALL, OR AT ALL BECAUSE VICTORIES IN OT HER LOCAL
AREAS MAY COMPENSATE.
� � �D� � �T� �A�L NO FOREIGN DI5
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO2800002
3.3(h)(2)
3.3(h)(2)
3.3(h)(2)
3.3(h)(2)
nor .1
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO2800002
(class{ cation dtssern controls
IN 47427
3.5(c)
PAGE 15 0F17 PAGES
8. ASKED
EXPLAIN AN INDECISIVE
ACTION, THE
A.
HOW THEY THOUGHT
MILITARY
PRISONERS REPLIED
THE NFLSV OR HANOI WOULD
CONCLUSION TO CURRENT MILITARY
AS FOLLOWS:
WHETHER CURRENT MILITARY ACT ION
3.3(h)(2)
IS DECISIVE
OR NOT, THE NFLSV,
IF NOT ENTIRELY
r
SUCCESSFUL WILL MERELY CONTINUE ON WITH THE STRUGGLE
NO EXPLANATIONS
WILL BE NECESSARY.
B.
REGARDLESS
OF THE RESULTS OF' THE
3.3(h)(2)
RECENT ATTACKS THE NFLSV WILL NOT ADMIT TO LARGE LOSSES.
THE FRONT HAS ALWAYS STATED THAT "TO FIG HT IS TO LOSE MEN".
DESPITE LOSSES THE FRONT WILL CONTINUE TO FIGHT. EVEN IF
THE FRONT HAS TO RESORT TO GUERRILLA WARFARE AND TO THE
USE OF THE "THREE ARROWS" TACTIC, IT WILL CONTINUE TO FIGHT.
C. THE FRONT EXPECTED HEAVY LOSSES, BUT
REGARDLESS OF WHETHER THE LOSSES WERE LARGE OR SMALL THE
FRONT WILL NOT DISSEMINATE THE RESULTS OF THE MISSIONS,
ACHIEVED OR NOT.
THE FRONT WILL STATE
THAT FIGHTING WILL CONTINUE AS BEFORE.
C-0- - - -D- -N-T-I-A-L No ruKt 161N DISStM
.04110'
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO2800002
3.3(h)(2)
3.3(h)(2)
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO2800002
Vow
� CONFIDENT I_AL NO FORE.ICN DISSEri
(dant non - dissem controls
1+7427
3.5(c)
PAGE 17 OF 17 PAGES
D
IF CURRENT FIGHTING IS INDECISIVE
OR EVEN IF THERE IS A LOSS OF SOME KIND, THE FRONT WILL MERELY
3.3(h)(2)
REPEAT WHAT IT
BLOOD, A DIFFICULT
RESULT WILL BE
E.
HAS SAID BEFORE:
VICTORY COSTS
VICTORY."
"AN EASY VICTORY COSTS LITTLE
MUCH BLOOD, REGARDLESS, THE
AN EXPLANATION BY THE FRONT
3.3(h)(2)
CONCERNING AN
INDECISIVE OR EVEN
A LOSING BATTLE WILL NOT
BE NECESSARY, BECAUSE, AS STATED BEFORE, A PARTICULAR LOSS
IN A LOCAL AREA DOES NOT CONSTITUTE AN OVER-ALL LOSS.
3.3(h)(2)
REPORT CLASS
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO2800002