III CORPS COMMANDER GENERAL KHANG'S COMMENTS ON POSSIBILITY OF FUTURE VIET CONG ATTACKS AND ON PROBLEMS RELATING TO VIET CONG TET OFFENSIVE

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Tet Declassified
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02797876
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: April 27, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 30, 2019
• Publication Date: February 19, 1968

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Intelligence Information Cable
� PRtORI'T Y
IN 54115
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STATE/INR DIA NMCC/MC (SECDEF .)CS ARMY NAVY AIR) CIA/NMCC NIC NSA SDO ONE CRS
DD. EXO 10100808WWWWWWWW4
This mater;a1 contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.O.
Secs. 793 and 794, the transmisson or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
NO FOIEICN DIEM
GROUP I
Excluded from color',
downgrading on0. 0(c)
I declossificorion
THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.
SE5REir
192020Z CITE
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DIST
19 FEBRUARY 1968
COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM
DOI 18 FEBRUARY 1968
SUBJECT III CORPS COMMANDER GENERAL KHANG'S COMMENTS ON POSSIBI-
LITY OF FUTURE VIET CONG ATTACKS AND ON PROBLEMS RELA-
TING TO VIET CONG TET OFFENSIVE
ACO VIETNAM, SAIGON (18 FEBRUARY 1968)
SOURCE
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SUMMARY: ON 17 FEBRUARY, VICE PRESIDENT KY, III CORPS COMM
ANDER GENERAL KHANG, CHIEF OF THE JOINT GENERAL STAFF GENERAL VIEN
AND MAJOR GENERAL THAN1 URGED PRESIDENT THIEU TO TAKE A STRONGER
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STAND AND TO SHOW MORE LEADERSHIP. KHANG ALSO OFFERED HIS RESI-
GNATION ON GROUNDS HE DID NOT
WANT TO BE ASSOCIATED WITH SUCH A WEAK GOVERNMENT AS THE PRESENT
ONE. THIEU TOOK THE RESIGNATION UNDER ADVISEMENT AND MADE NO
COMMITMENT ABOUT CHANGING HIS WAYS. KHANG DOES NOT EXPECT HIS
RESIGNATION TO BE ACCEPTED, ON 13 FEBRUARY, KHANG SAID HE CONTIN-
UED TO DOUBT THAT THE VIET CONG WOULD LAUNCH A SECOND-WAVE ATTACK,
ALTHOUGH HE EXPECTED THEM TO TRY TO ISOLATE SAIGON. KHANG IS
PLEASED WITH THE PERFORMANCE OF HIS DIVISION COMMANDERS. GENERAL
VIEN, ACCORDING TO KHANG, IS NOT PLEASED WITH THE PERFORMANCES OF
II CORPS COMMANDER GENERAL LOC AND IV CORPS COMMANDER GENERAL
MA NH. KHANG EXPECTS MANH TO BE REPLACED BY GENERAL THANG AS SOON
AS THE LATTER CONCLUDES HIS DUTIES WITH THE TASK FORCE. HE IS LESS
CERTAIN THAT LOC WILL BE REPLACED BY GENERAL LAN. DURING THE MEET-
ING WITH THIEU ON 17 FEBRUARY, THERE WAS SOME DISCUSSION OF THE
POSSIBILITY OF ISOLATED ATTACKS IN THE FUTURE BY CATHOLICS AGAINST
BUDDHISTS. END SUMMARY.
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1. III CORPS COMMANDER LIEUTENANT GENERAL LE NGUYEN KHANG
SAID ON 13 FEBRUARY THAT DURING A MEETING WITH PRESIDENT NGUYEN
VAN THIEU ON THE MORNING OF 17 FEBRUARY, HE, VICE PRESIDENT NGUYEN
CAO KY, CHIEF OF THE JOINT GENERAL STAFF (JG) GENERAL CAN VAN VIEN
AND MAJOR GENERAL NGUYEN DUC THANG HAD ASKED THE PRESIDENT TO TAKE
A STRONGER AND, IF NEED BE, TOUGHER LINE TOWARD THE CIVILIAN
MINISTRIES. THIS WAS THE TIME FOR DIRECTIVES AND ORDERS, NOT
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DEBATE. IF A PARTICULAR MINISTER EITHER COULD NOT OR WOULD NOT
IMPLEMENT THE PRESIDENT'S ORDERS, HE SHOULD BE DISMISSED. IT WAS
VERY IMPORTANT THAT THIEU CLEARLY INDICATE WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE,
IN TERMS NOT ONLY OF GENERAL POLICY BUT OF SPECIFIC TASKS. KHANG
SAID THAT EVERYONE PRESENT, INCLUDING KY, STRESSED TO THIEU THAT
THE PEOPLE ARE NOW IN THE MOOD FOR .STRONG GOVERNMENT AND WILLING
TO MAKE SACRIFIES TO GET IT. IF THIEU WAITED TOO LONG AND THE
THREAT OF VIET CONG (VC) ATTACKS BEGAN TO DECLINE, THE MOOD OF THE
PEOPLE WOULD CHANGE.
2. KHANG SAID THAT DURING THE MEETING HE HAD OFFERED HIS
RESIGNATION TO THIEU, NOTING THAT THERE HAD BEEN CONSIDERABLE
CRITICISM OF HIS PERFORMANCE DURING THE CRISIS BY SENATORS AND
DEPUTIES AND HE THUS WANTED TO GIVE.THIEU THE CHANCE TO APPOINT A
NEW CORPS COMMANDER IF HE WISHED. KHANG SAID HE ALSO TOLD THIEU
HE WAS UNHAPPY WITH THE WEAKNESS OF THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT AND
WOULD PREFER NOT TO CONTINUE IN HIS PRESENT POST UNLESS THIEU COULD
GIVE HIM SOME ASSURANCE THAT THE GOVERNMENT WOULD BE MORE FORCEFUL
IN THE FUTURE. KHANG COMMENTED THAT THIEU TOOK HIS RESIGNATION
UNDER ADVISEMENT, ADDING THAT HE DID NOT EXPECT THIEU TO ACCEPT
IT. HE ALSO COMMENTED THAT THIEU DID NOT SUGGEST HE PLANNED TO
REVISE HIS POLICIES OR HIS APPROACH TO GOVERNMENT. RATHER, HE JUST
LISTENED AND THANKED EVERYONE FOR HIS VIEWS.
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3. KHANG SAID HE CONTINUED TO BELIEVE A SECOND-WAVE VC
ATTACK ON SAIGON INVOLVING A LARGE COMMITMENT OF GROUND FORCES
WAS UNLIKELY. THE VC, HE SAID, WILL MORE LIKELY RESORT TO ATTACKS
3Y HEAVY MORTAR AND ROCKET FIRE. KHANG SAID HE BELIEVED THE ENEMY
WILL ATTEMPT TO ISOLATE SAIGON BY INTERDICTING ROADS AND BRIDGES
LEADING INTO THE CITY AND WILL RELY HEAVILY ON POLITICAL WARFARE,
7-SPECIALLY AMONG REFUGEES.
4. KHANG SAID HE WAS PLEASED WITH THE PERFORMANCE OF ALL THREE
ARVN DIVISION COMMANDERS IN HIS CORPS AREA AND THOUGHT THAT THE
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POLI CE FIELD FORCES HAD PERFORMED WELL. HE HAD HAD SOME MINOR
PROBLEMS, ALTHOUGH THERE HAD BEEN VERY LITTLE SUCH ACTIVITY IN
PROPORTION TO THE OPPORTUNITIES.
5. KHANG SAID THAT JGS CHIEF GENERAL VIEN VIEWS AS INADEQUATE
THE PERFORMANCES DURING THE RECENT CRISIS OF II CORPS COMMANDER
LIEUTENANT GENERAL VINH LOC AND IV CORPS COMMANDER MAJOR GENERAL
NGUYEN VAN MANN. VIEN IS ANGRY AT LOC FOR NOT HAVING BEEN IN HIS
CORPS AREA WHEN THE VC ATTACKS BEGAN. LOC HAD COME TO SAIGON
4ITHOUT NOTIFYING THE JGS AND RETURNED TO PLEIKU ON THE MORNING
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OF 31 JANUARY. HE THUS WAS NOT IN COMMAND DURING THE INITIAL
HOURS OF THE ATTACK. MANN IS UNDER FIRE BECAUSE OF THE POOR OVER-
ALL PERFORMANCE OF ARVN TROOPS IN HIS AREA. THE 7TH DIVISION IN
PARTICULAR SHOWED UP POORLY. ALSO, PACIFICATION IN IV CORPS HAS
SUFFERED A SEVERE SETBACK IN THE DELTA, WITH ALL REGIONAL AND
POPULAR FORCES TROOPS MANNING THE HIGHWAY FROM MY THO TO CAN THO
OUT OF ACTION.
6. KHANG SAID HE BELIEVED MAJOR GENERAL THANG WILL REPLACE
MANH IN IV CORPS AS SOON AS THANG CONCLUDES HIS DUTIES WITH THE
COMMITTEE FOR PEOPLE'S RELIEF. HE WAS LESS CERTAIN ABOUT THE
REPLACEMENT OF LOC BY MAJOR GENERAL MUU MONG LAN. KHANG SAID HE
AND VIEN ARE PERSONALLY OPPOSED TO LAN'S APPOINTMENT BECAUSE THEY
FEEL HE IS AND HAS BEEN DEEPLY INVOLVED IN CORRUPTION AND IS NOT
AN ESPECIALLY GOOD FIELD COMMANDER. KHANG SAID LAN GIVES A GOOD
BRIEFING AND SUPERFICIALLY
MAKES A GOOD IMPRESSION. HE HIMSELF, HOWEVER, DOES NOT THINK
LAN WOULD MAKE A GOOD CORPS COMMANDER.
7. REVERTING TO THE 17 FEBRUARY MEETING WITH THIEU, KHANG SAID
THE MEETING HAD BEEN HELD PRIMARILY TO WITNESS THE FORMAL RETURN
TO KHANG BY VIEN OF THE SAIGON COMMAND. HE EXPLAINED THAT DURING
THE FIRST FIVE DAYS OF THE ATTACK HE HAD BEEN RESPONSIBLE FOR THE
DEFENSE OF BOTH SAIGON AND III CORPS AND HAD FOUND IT DIFFICULT
TO FULFILL HIS SAIGON AND BIEN HOA DUTIES SIMULTANEOUSLY.
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v LEN HAD THEREFORE ASSUMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR SAIGON, WITH YHANG
AS HIS DEPUTY. KHANG COMMENTED THAT DESPITE REPORTS TO THE CON-
TRARY DIRECTOR GENERAL OF NATIONAL POLICE BRIGADIER GENERAL NGUYEN
N'30C LOAN WAS NEVER IN COMMAND IN SAIGON. HE WAS AND IS NOW
KHA NG' S DEPUTY FOR SAIGON'S DEFENSE. MOREOVER, LOAN NEVER ASSUMED
DIRECT COMMAND
OF ANY ARVN TROOPS, ALTHOUGH ARVN AND POLICE FIELD FORCES DID
CARRY OUT COORDINATED ACTIONS AND LOAN, AS THE SENIOR OR MOST
FORCEFUL COMMANDER ON THE SCENE, MAY HAVE APPEARED TO BE THE
OVERALL COMMANDER.
S. KHANG SAID THAT DURING THE MEETING THOSE PRESENT BRIEFLY
DISCUSSED THE POSSIBILITY OF ISOLATED CLASHES BETWEEN CATHOLIC
AND BUDDHIST GROUPS IN THE FUTURE IF THE GOVERNMENT DOES NOT SHOW
IT IS PAYING SUFFICIENT ATTENTION TO THE DEFENSE OF THE PEOPLE.
ACCORDING TO KHANG, A NUMBER OF CATHOLIC LEADERS BELIEVE THAT IN
SEVERAL INSTANCES MILITANT BUDDHISTS WERE IN COLLUSION WITH THE VC
AND AIDED THEM IN KILLING MILITANT ANTI-COMMUNIST CATHOLICS.
AS A RESULT, IF THE GOVERNMENT DOES NOT PROJECT A STRONG IMAGE
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AND INDICATE IT HAS THE SITUATION UNDER CONTROL, ISOLATED CATHOLIC
GROUPS MIGHT TRY TO TAKE REVENGE ON THE BUDDHISTS.
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