MEMORANDUM TO THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE FROM JIMMY CARTER
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
02795352
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
U
Document Page Count:
6
Document Creation Date:
March 8, 2023
Document Release Date:
August 23, 2019
Sequence Number:
Case Number:
F-2018-02530
Publication Date:
January 23, 1980
File:
Attachment | Size |
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MEMORANDUM TO THE DIRECTO[15710519].pdf | 462.42 KB |
Body:
'Approved for Release: 2019/08/21 CO2795352;1
Findin4-Pursuant to Section 662 ofthe Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, -Concerning
Operations in Foreign Countries Other Than
Solely for, the Purpose of Intelligence
Collection �
� I find the following operation in a foreign country is
important to the national security of the United States and
direct the Director of Central Intelligence, or his designee,
to report this Finding to the concerned committees of the -
Congress pursuant to Section 662, and to provide such briefings
_
as necessarT.,
DESCRIPTION
Using any and all possible means;
effect the rescue and safe departure
from Iran of persons held hostage
in the 'United States Embassy in
Tehran and United States persons
and their dependents held against
their will in Iran or otherwise-
unable.freely to depart from the
country.'
TOP SECRET/SENSITIvaLxr,SONLY
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Drivative Cl by DCI 705953
Review on Jan 2000
Derived from D9d.5 &
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'T,41
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't
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON'
TOP SECRET/EXTREMELY SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
MEMORANDUM FOR
January 23, 1980
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
I have today signed a Finding pursuant to Section 662 of the
Foreign Assistance �Act of 1961, as amended, covering operations
to effect the rescue of persons held hostage in the United States
Embassy in Tehran and other United States persons and their de-
pendents who are held against their will in Iran or who are other-
wise unable freely to depart from that country.
I hereby instruct you, and determine that such instruction is
consistent with the timely notification provision of the law, to
give notice to the Congress of this Finding or of any operation
pursuant to this Finding only at such time as, in your judgment,
such notice can be given without undue risk of loss of life should
an inadvertent disclosure 'occur. You may determine, in accordance
with this instruction, that notice should be given only after such
operation is commenced or completed.
TOP SECRET/EXTREMELY SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
Derivative Cl by DCI 705953
Review on Jan 2000 -
Derived from D9d.5 & D9c.3
OP SECRe
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SEN E
Political Consequences of a Hostage Rescue Operation in Iran
1. There are three possible results of a hostage rescue
operation in Iran:
a. Total success: The Hostages are freed; the
armada returns unscathed.
b. jotal failure: The armada fails to achieve its
mission, and suffers significant losses; the hostages
remain in Tehran under the militants' control.
c. A mixed result, with major casualties to both
sides: The U.S. force reaches the Embassy; shoots and
kills a substantial number of militants; perhaps rescues
a few hostages; but m my hostages are killed before they
can be rescued.
In all of the above cases, it is likely that a sub-
statial number of Iranians will be killed, given the targeting
of the helicopter gunships, etc.
2. These possibilities could lead to different results,
as described below. However, in all cases American military
aircraft would overfly Iran and inflict casualties on Iranian
civilians, some of them probably innocent bystanders. We cannot
assume that Iranians, other perhaps than fanatic supporters of
the ancien regime, will be able to reconcile themselves to our
behavior. In short, we can expect a wave of anti-Americanism
to engulf the country. Even the moderates--
or whomever one places in this category--
will condemn us for this action; for most Iranians who regard
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the holding of the Embassy hostages as titmag=6* provocation
will feel that-we should have waited for history to take its
course. MOMMINOlose who, on the other hand, fed that we
halkendured enough humiliation would be likely to conceal their
sympathy for us because of the fear of political reprisals.
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
3.
(b)(1)
ODA
If the operation was a success, the militants and Khomeini could
suffer serious consequences. The raison d'etre for the militants
would evaporate. They and their allies, possibly including
Khomeini, might well be viewed as having invited defeat and
humiliation by their intractability on the hostage issue.
Doubtless the various political elements in Iran would be busy
attempting to place the blame for the debacle on their adversaries
ft
In blifef, a successful operation could lead to a plitical
A
vacuum( with the diminished influence of Khomeinf)iand to
serious, possibly violent political infighting. Ethnic groups
could attempt tc? take advantage of this situation to press for
greater autonomy. The left would certainly attempt to exploit
anti-Americanism-to gain greater influence.
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4.
5V13;;
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
S. Total failure, on the other hand, would represent
victory for Khomeini, the militants, and the radical elements
of the Supreme Revolutionary Council, and, what is equally
important, a defeat for the U.S. Iranians in country would be
reluctant to oppose the regime.
3
AkT.50.
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
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6. There is also the possibility of a mixed result,
%.6artial failure, partial success). The probability is that this
result would convey to Iranians a sense that the U.S. had
attempted, but not completed, its mission. There would be an
apprehension of another rescue attempt, or some sort of
follow-up operation. Government propaganda would
probably play up the successful aspects of the Iranian defense
and glorify fallen heroes as martyrs. This could place the
country on a war footing, go far to unify opposing factions,
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1.4 Lian
4
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