AN IMMEDIATE PROGRAM FOR VIETNAM

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02787196
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: July 13, 2023
• Document Release Date: February 8, 2022
• Case Number: F-2017-01666
• Publication Date: February 2, 1968

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25. D. C.
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR
2 FEB 1968
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Nicholas deB Katzenbach
Under Secretary of State
The Honorable Paul H. Nitze
Deputy Secretary of Defense
General Earle G. Wheeler
Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Honorable Walt W. Rostow
Special Assistant to the President
SUBJECT: An Immediate Program for Vietnam
A number of officers of this Agency who have been
concerned over the years with Vietnam have put together the
attached memorandum suggesting a possible course of action for
the United States at this time. I pass it to you for your consideration
in the light of some of the other factors bearing on the problem.
Attachment
(Signed) Richard Helms
Richard Helms
Director
I C>
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2 February 1968
ME MOR.A.NDUM
SUBJECT: Vietnam - Operation SHOCK
1. The Viet Cong Tet offensive is a clear indication
of continued Viet Cons power which calls for a new look in our
approach to the Vietnam war and to the Government of Vietnam.
Over the years the current leaders of Vietnam have developed
a complacent assurance that American support is immutable.
Consequently, they have felt free to approach the war in terms
of gradualism, favoritism among the limited circle of personalities
at the top and only a casual attention to mobilizing popular support
and engaging the population actively in the war. This gentle
treatment of the members of the Establishment has worked
to exclude from positions of responsibility younger, more
dynamic and modern-minded leaders. The Tet offensive can
be utilized in a frontal attack on these attitudes and habits,
since it has forcefully demonstrated that the present GVN
lacks some of the principal attributes of sovereignty. It
cannot defend its frontiers without a half million U. S. troops
and cannot even enable the American Ambassador to utilize
his Embassy. In this frontal attack, the United States must
insist on standards of performance and American participation
in decision making during an emergency effort. While this
would temporarily suspend the long-standing policy that the
Vietnamese be encouraged and allowed to carry an increasing
load of initiative and decision, the objective would be to remake
the power structure to permit the emergence of new and more
dynamic leadership to whom this role could be passed. This
frontal attack would be thoroughly consistent with our long -
standing public position that the U. S. effort in Vietnam is
only to help the Vietnamese help themselves, not to carry
the fight for them. These points should be expressed in an
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early urgent interview between Ambassador Bunker,
accompanied by General Westmoreland. and President Thieu
and Vice President 1*.
2. In specific terms. the United States should review
for President Thieu the serious situation revealed by the Viet
Cong offensive in terms of the weakness of Vietnamese security
and the lack of popular resolution to contribute to the fight
against the Viet Cong. with the implication that the prospects
of success along current lines and current programs are
insufficient. The point should be made that gradualism can
no longer be accepted as an approach on our side of the war
and it should be stated forcefully that henceforth the GVN
must follow U. S. direction in an urgent program to redress
the state of the war.
3. As the first point in this program, we should insist
that General Nguyen Dec Thang be named Minister of Interior
and of Defense. with "full powers" over the military, the police
and the administrative structure. He should be assigned the
immediate urgent mission of providing for the security of the
nation. Ha should be given full authority over all Vietnamese
forces in order to accomplish this and he should be directed to
concentrate his efforts on strengthening and purging secure areas
outward into less secure areas. He should be advised that Free
vtiorld forces will be emaPloyod against Viet Gong and DRY main
force lanits, through spoiling actions, etc.. and in re-enforcement
of the Vietnamese forces when needed, and that Vietnamese forces
must be 100% committed to an aggressive pacification role.
General Cao Van Yien of the Joint General Staff should be
specifically instructed that all Vietnamese forces will henceforth
be used in direct support of the pacification program commanded
by General Thang through such subordinate commanders as
Thang may select, including province chiefs. In the course of
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re-orienting the RVNAF, General Thang should be given full
authority to reorganise its command structure and remove
officers as necessary to carry out this new mission. Similarly,
the Director General of Police, the Minister of Revolutionary
Development end all other elements of the GVN which can
contribute to pacification should be given the primary mission
of direct support to General Thangl a pacification program.
4. President Thieu should also be directed to appoint
Vice President Ky as his Chief of Staff and Director of Operations.
Ky should be given two major missions. The first would be to
organize an individual review of the personal files and performance
of all Vietnamese military and civilian officers and officials,
with immediate purging of all found involved in corruption or
other abuses of authority. Upon removal, immediate replace-
ments should be appointed from subordinate levels or from
other services. Vice President Ky's second major mission
should be to organise a national political vehicle or front out-
side the government structure, including all non-Communist
political elements, to share a massive rallying of the entire
population in support of this new program to develop the
country and free it of Viet Cong terror.
5. In order to focus the entire nation and government on
this program, and still respect the provisions of the Constitution,
President Thieu should seek the approval of the National Assembly
on an urgent basis of the establishment of a War and Reconstruction
Council. The War and Reconstruction Council should consist of
President Thieu as Chairman, Vice President Ky as Vice Chairman
and Director of Operations, General Thong as Deputy Director
of Operations, and appropriate representatives of the Ministries
and the Armed Forces as well as the Senate and the Lower House.
The War and Reconstruction Council should have counterpart
War and Reconstruction Councils at the province and district
levels, with similar participation not only of representatives
of the Administration but also of provincial and district councils.
The function of the Councils would be to review the degree to
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which the normal operations of government are concentrated
in support of this special program and to provide a means for
ensuring the participation of all elements of the population in
the national effort. These Councils should also be charged
with ensuring that the programs initiated in this emergency
be developed for the long term benefit of Vietnamese citizens
through normal governmental and political structures. The
proposal to establish these Councils should be announced to
the nation in a Presidential speech within the next ten days,
to be given maximum dissemination by all possible media.
The National Assembly should be required to accept or
reject the proposal within a matter of days in order to avoid
legislative wrangling over details and permit full focus on
this urgent problem while the implications of the Tet offensive
are still fresh.
6. President Thieu should be advised that the United
States and all its agencies will support this program to the
fullest and will utilize all its officers actively to assist,
monitor and participate in the effort at all levels. Should
additional financial, logistical, etc. support be necessary,
it will, be immediately supplied outside normal channels if
necessary.
7. Presient Thieu should be advised that we consider
that this program must show obviously positive results within
100 days of Tet ( i.e., by early May). If this does not occur
or if President Thieu refuses this proposal, he should be
advised that the United States will reserve its position with
respect to the GVN. In this event, he should be left in some
doubt as to whether this implies that the United States might
seek an alternate GVN through other leadership or whether
it might begin the process of working out some accommodation
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with the NLF and the DRY at the expense of the GYN. He could
be assured that this 100 day showing is essential to the American
nation, as if it does not occur there will only be a matter of
weeks thereafter before the American nation begins to make its
basic political decisions for the next four years. If the GVN is
not able to show the kind of progress which makes further U. S.
support justifiable. the United States might then have to examine
alternative courses of action.
3. The United States options at the end of the 100 days
would deliberately be left undefined for President Thieu and
Vice President Ky. We might, of course, find that sufficient
forward momentum has been achieved to warrant continued U. S.
support. Should this not occur. the United States might teke one
of the following courses of action:
a. Insistence that President Thieu or other
GVN leaders resign in favor of individuals who might
have proven themselves during the 100 days. who
could be duly elected according to Constitutional
processes at the election three months after the
President resigns.
b. Suspension of the bombing of North
Vietnam and the initiation of talks with the DRY.
This action could be justified as the result of the
GVN.* inability to respond to the challenge and
consequently an American decision to adjust to this
situation. Alternatively it could be utilised as a
further stimulus to Vietnamese leadership to
take more vigorous action.
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c. Development of a dialogue between
the United States and the NLF suggesting the possibility
of some move toward a coalition government. In
this situation. United States assistance could still
be provided to some non-Communist Vietnamese
elements, continuing our policy of helping resolute
Vietnamese fight and help themselves.
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