FUTURE COMMUNIST MILITARY STRATEGY IN SOUTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Tet Declassified
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02782724
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: April 27, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 30, 2019
• Publication Date: February 27, 1968

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
ret
Intelligence Memorandum
Future Communist Military Strategy
in South Vietnam
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WARNING
This document contains classified information affecting the national security
of the United States within the ineaning of the espionage laws, US Code
Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
27 February 1968
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
Future Communist Military Strategy in South Vietnam
Summary
Developments during the past few weeks have made
it clear that the Communists now plan to put extensive
and sustained military pressure on the urban areas of
South Vietnam. At a maximum, they hope to move in and
control some of the major cities; failing this, they
will try to bring about a deterioration of governmental
authority in urban areas, as well as in the country-
side. They would hope that the disintegration of the
government position eventually would force a political
accommodation in the war on Communist terms.
During the last few weeks there have also been a
number of indications, apart from the attacks on the
cities, that additional shifts in Communist war strat-
egy are in process. Among these has been evidence
of plans to use the limited North Vietnamese air arm
in a logistic or attack role in South Vietnam. New
Communist weapons including tanks and possibly bet-
ter artillery rockets have appeared in the DMZ area.
Signs pointing to additional troop infiltration to
the South have been noted, while the flow of supplies
to the DMZ and down the Lao corridor has continued at
a stepped-up pace. Additional enemy road building
has also been under way which will improve the Commu-
nists' ability to support military units in both the
DMZ and the coastal area of the two northern provinces
in South Vietnam.
Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA. It
was prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence and
was coordinated with the Office of Economic Research,
the Office of National Estimates, and the Director's
Special Acsistant for Vietnamese Affairs.
T-041-S-Ettittrr
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The developmentssuggestthat the enemy is try-
ing to get in a position throughout the two northern
provinces which will permit him to conduct sustained
offensive operations, probably along more conventional
military lines than ever before in the war. Recently
the bulk of one division of Communist troops from the
DMZ area has slipped south into the coastal plains of
Quang Tri and, along with NVA elements already in the
sector, will probably attempt a gradual, but sustained
campaign, to erode and destroy friendly control over
the rural population and the cities in the area. It
also appears that the Communists are going to make a
major effort to hold positions around the city of Hue,
invest or capture Quang Tri, and, if possible, gain
de facto administrative control over Thua Thien and
Quang Tri provinces.
Continued pressure on the allied bastion at Khe
Sanh is likely in the course of the Communist effort
in the north, with the enemy seeking to tie down a
substantial allied reaction force. Whether Hanoi
will make an all-out effort to overrun the base re-
mains to be seen; there is some evidence in the
recent shift of Communist troops to the eastward
that the enemy may be reducing his forces somewhat
in the general vicinity of Khe Sanh. On the other
hand, there is evidence of continuing enemy prepara-
tions for a ground assault against the base, should
the prospects for success appear promising.
We believe the most likely course of over-all
enemy action in Vietnam during the near term will
revolve around a major effort in the north combined
with selective pressure in the central highlands
and against the urban areas farther south. The pres-
sure against the cities will include both limited
ground probes and coordinated attacks by fire. We
think it likely the enemy will make a special effort,
partly for political and psychological reasons, to
harass and disrupt the city of Saigon. Should secu-
rity in the city deteriorate, the enemy could decide
to move in again with major forces.
TO
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The Communists will also be heavily engaged in
trying to consolidate the gains they have made
throughout the rural areas of the country since the
government's retreat to defend the cities. In par-
ticular, they will attempt to destroy much that has
been achieved in the pacification/RD program, and
will utilize renewed access to the rural population
to intensify recruitment efforts and the collection
of taxes and other forms of logistic support.
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Recent Enemy Activities
1. New Weapons: There have been many indica-
tions in recent weeks that the North Vietnamese now
plan to use their limited air arm in an offensive
and/or logistic role to support the war in South Viet-
nam. Radar and communications facilities have been
established in North Vietnam's southern provinces
since the first of the year which would permit Hanoi-
based MIGs to intercept B-52 fliahts in -Liao. DMZ Arpa_
The enemy has used significant new weapons on
the ground in northern South Vietnam. In addition
to the surface-to-air missile units positioned just
north of the DMZ, Hanoi has introduced a number of
antiaircraft_ artillery units around Khe Sanh and
in the A Shauvalley which may be equipped with wea-
pons as large as the 37-mm. AAA gun. Other ground
weapons which have been discovered in Communist
hands since the first of the year include an extended
range 122-mm. rocket supplied by the Soviet Union
and a new, highly portable, 107-mm. rocket provided
by the Chinese.
3. Perhaps the most significant development in
Communist weaponry in recent weeks has been the in-
troduction of armor. PT-76 amphibious tanks spear-
headed the drive against Lang Vei near Khe Sanh and
have recently been sighted in the eastern sector of
the DMZ.
enemy armor units just north ot the DMZ in the Vinh
Linh area and on a new road the Communists are build-
ing betweenthe A Shau valley and Hue. Unconfirmed
agent reports credit the enemy with tanks in the west-
ern highlands in a position to threaten Kontum and
Pleiku. On 26 February a US special forces detach-
ment engaged an enemy unit 65 miles northwest of
Saigon which was equipped with three armored vehicles,
initially reported as T-34 tanks.
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4. Renewed Infiltration and Redeployments:
5. two
regiments of the NVA 316th Division may nave al-
ready deployed out of the country during 1968.
One or both of these regiments could be in the DMZ
area. There is some evidence from POWs, moreover,
that elements of the North Vietnamese 308th Division
have been in the DMZ/Quang Tri Province area for
some time.
6. At present, the Communists are known to
have at least 18 regiments, under four division
headquarters and one senior front command arrayed
Thus
it seems probable that additional enemy orces are
present whose exact identity is still unknown.
About half of the forces in Quang Tri are concen-
trated in the western half of the province; strong
elements of the other half, however, have been re-
positioning southeastward over the past few weeks
for what will probably become one of the major
enemy offensive movements of the war.
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7. The 324B Division has slipped down from
the DMZ along the foothills and joined several in-
dependent NVA regiments operating out of the moun-
tainous base area (called Base Area 101) and the
open country south of Dong Ha and north of My Chanh.
These forces now pose a major threat to the urban
centers in the area. The continued use of north-
south Route 1 and the Cua Viet River, as allied
supply links to the DMZ. is also threatened by these
enemy deployments
8. It seems unlikely that the Communists
would move DMZ forces as far south into eastern
Quang Tri if they were not fairly confident of their
ability to maintain relatively secure supply links
from the DMZ area to these units. It is possible
that some of the missing elements of the 316th
Division are now filling in along the eastern DMZ
in order to plug the hole left by the southward
shift of the 324B Division.
It also appears that
some elements of the 320th Division which shifted
eastward are intended to help cover the area
around Con Thien.
9. New Logistic Patterns: The Communists
may also intend their recent logistic activity in
the A Shau valley area to play a supporting role
in the stepped-up NVA operations in eastern Quang
Tri. Photography late last month showed that about
four miles of new road had been constructed east-
ward off Route 548, which runs through the A Shau
valley. the Communists hope
to link it up with the existing road to the low-
lands and to the city of Hue which runs from the
village of Ta Luong in central Thua Thien. Some
US officials in the area believe the Communists are
already moving supplies over the truckable portion of
this road net,
10. Photography shows in addition that the
integration of the A Shau valley complex with other
enemy facilities in northern South Vietnam involves
the construction of landline telephone circuits along
the Laos-GVN border from the DMZ to the A Shau area.
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11. The road building around A Shau has been
accompanied by Otherenemy road improvement to the
north which facilitates movement into the Khe Sanh
sector and central Quang Tri. Aerial photography
shows two new roads under construction from a point
near Ban Dong on Route 9 toward the Khe Sanh area.
The enemy has also been using Route 9, having driven
a Lao military unitfrom its position at Ban Houei
Sane in late January. Photography of early February
showed that medium to heavy vehicular traffic had
been moved over portions of Route 9 near the South
Vietnam border.
12. Communist road construction has been paral-
leled by a sharp step-up in the movement of sup-
plies into the southern DRV-DMZ area and down to the
Lao panhandle road net. Although the exact level of
this activity is not apparent, it appears to have
been sufficient to build up at least a substantial
reserve of war supplies throughout much of the DMZ
13. Expanded Ground Pressure in Laos: The
Communists have also been maintaining an unusually
high level of military pressure in Laos over the
past several weeks. Much of this activity has been
centered around the strategic Bolovens Plateau
area in southern Laos. North Vietnamese and Pathet
Lao troops have surrounded and harassed the provincial
capitals of Saravane and Attopeu and attacks have
been mounted in recent days against the important
government base camp at Lao Ngam and outlying posi-
tions along the southern rim of the Bolovens. The
Communists have also been more active in the north-
ern portion of the country, pushing government troops
from advanced bases south of the Plaine des Jarres
and occupying Tha Thon on 20 February. In addition, the
Communists are closing in on Phou Pha Thi, a guer-
rilla base only 15 miles from the North Vietnamese
border which has played an important role in guiding
US air strikes against North Vietnam, and it appears
increasingly doubtful that the base can be held in
the face of a concerted thrust.
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Possible Communist Strategy
14. We believe that the developments described
above, together with the current pattern of major
Communist military action--particularly the buildup
and harassment of Khe Sanh and the tenacious enemy
defense in Hue--point to the probability that the
most concentrated enemy effort in South Vietnam
over the near term will be focused on the two north-
ern provinces. Action in this sector could be ac-
companied by continued military pressure of various
types elsewhere in South Vietnam and possibly on a
wider scale in Indochina. The following paragraphs
describe some of the possibilities and our assessment
of their likelihood.
15. A Second Front in Laos: It is conceivable
that the North Vietnamese intend greatly to expand
the fighting in Laos, possibly in combination with
a new outbreak of insurgent activity in Thailand.
They might hope to accomplish further thinning of
US military resources in Vietnam by forcing the US
to deploy troops into Laos or Thailand. Even if
the US did not react with troops, Hanoi might hope
that the threat created in Laos would confuse and
cloud the war issue in Washington and possibly
deter or delay the US from some additional commit-
ments in Vietnam. The best of the evidence for such
a Vietnamese plan is seen in the current pressure
in southern Laos.
16. Hanoi doubtless would be pleased if its
current effort in Laos had a deterrent effect on
US commitments in Vietnam, but we doubt that this
is the primary goal of the North Vietnamese action
around the Bolovens, or that Hanoi is prepared at
the present stage of the war to commit very many
resources to a major military campaign in Laos.
The Communists have not, for example, attempted to
follow up on the panicky government retreat from
the Nam Bac valley in northern Laos. We believe
they are probably interested primarily in reestab-
lishing their presence in the Se Done valley west
of Saravane and, when they have stripped out the
area's rice stocks to support their Vietnam-oriented
buildup in the infiltration corridor and in northern
South Vietnam, will probably relax their pressure
on the tbwn. It is entirely possible that the
Laotians will have deserted Saravane by that time,
however, and that the city will come at least tem-
porarily under enemy control.
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17. In summary, we do not believe that Hanoi
intends to greatly expand its military objectives
in Laos over the next several months, nor do we see
any signs of Vietnamese intent to expand hostilities
there much beyond the normal level of dry-season
fighting. There is a good chance, however, that the
enemy will attempt--probably in orchestration with
events in South Vietnam--to win a psychological
victory by harassing government towns on the Mekong
River or possibly -iver occupying one for a short
period. The timing of such a move is of course
difficult to predict, but our best guess is that the
Communists willhold off until and unless the situation
in South Vietnam reaches a climatic stage, when Hanoi
might expect that a series of dramatic "victories" in
Laos could have an additional and telling psychological
impact on the overall allied positions in the war.
18. Current anti-government activity by in-
surgents in Thailand may be viewed in Hanoi as
helpful in deterring fuller US or Thai commitments
in Vietnam. There is little evidence, however,
that sufficient Communist assets are presently in
place there to pose much more than a continuing
terrorist threat to Thai security forces or the US
air bases, assuming that the insurgents were
ordered into an all-out effort by Hanoi and/or
Peking.
19. A Full Scale Invasion of South Vietnam:
There is also the possibility that the military
developments described earlier in this paper in-
dicate that Hanoi has decided to throw its full
military weight into the fray and launch an "all-
out invasion" of South Vietnam, putting sufficient
manpower into the effort to try to ensure that
allied forces cannot block Communist occupation of
at least the far northern provinces. Hanoi might
be acting either from a belief that the allies
were on the ropes in South Vietnam as a result of
recent Communist military action, or that Viet-
namese Communist resources are no longer sufficient
to sustain a protracted war. In this case, Hanoi
might have assurances from Peking that Chinese
forces will be sent into the DRV to man the defenses
left by the NVA as it moves south en masse.
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20. Evidence of recent NVA activity, however,
does not suggest that any such plan is currently
beina implemented
Although
there is evidence that infiltration into the South
is continuing, the pattern and pace so far are
in line with "normal" NVA movements and are not
suggestive of wholesale deployments. It does not
appear, moreover, that the present scale of logistic
support to the South is indicative of an all-out
push. Rather, the level seems designed more to
support sustained military operations by the forces
now in place in the area.
21. Other evidence on the state of affairs
within the DRV, includin the re ime's domestic
ro a anda �itch
and do not suggest that any all-
ou pus is coming. In fact, regime propaganda in
the wake of the Tet offensive is again stressing
the protracted nature of the conflict as if to pre-
pare the people for a long road of sacrifice ahead.
22. New Mass Urban Attacks: Another possi-
bility is a new round of coordinated mass attacks
on the urban areas of South Vietnam--similar in
scale and magnitude to the Tet offensive. This
might be kicked off simultaneously with a heavy of-
fensive in the northern provinces--perhaps a major
push against Khe Sanh and a thrust in the eastern
coastal plains. The Communists may also reopen a
major campaign in the highlands where they retain
substantial uncommitted force, principally from the
NVA 1st Division.
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23. At the present time, however, we do not be-
lieve the evidence is indicative of a new urban of-
fensive on anything like the scale of the Tet attacks.
The Tet offensive, it is now clear, took long, careful
planning and extensive logistic preparations. To re-
peat such an effort, particularly given the heavy
losses in military manpower and covert resources which
the Communists suffered, would, in our judgment, take
a long time to prepare. Moreover, the important
element of surprise is now lost to the Communists--
probably for some time. Were they to throw in the
bulk of their uncommitted forces, they could hardly
expect now to accomplish much more with a new round
of mass assaults than they did the first time. In
view of their near total failure to enlist the active
support of the populace in the first round, they may
be preparing for an extensive propaganda effort among
the people before kicking off a new mass effort at a
"general uprising." Field reports, in fact, in-
dicate that such a campaign may be getting under way.
24. It is clear, nonetheless, that even if a
new mass wave of attacks is not in the offing, the
Communists plan to keep up military/terrorist-type
pressure on the cities much more extensively than
before. A recently captured document giving an
assessment of the Communist situation on 1 February,
just after the opening of the Tet offensive, in-
dicates clearly that the initial attacks were only
the opening of a longer period of substained Com-
munist offensive operations. In the Saigon area,
for example, the enemy may make a special effort,
partly for political and psychological reasons, to
harass and disrupt the life of the city. The cur-
rent lull there could be covering enemy efforts to
infiltrate a core of regular and guerrilla fighters
for a new round of terrorist attacks. If the
city's defenses began to falter, the substantial
enemy main force elements still positioned near
Saigon could be moved in to exploit the situation.
25. It would also appear from the present
military dispositions of Communist forces that con-
tinuing, selective attacks on provincial capitals
and lesser centers are highly likely. Some of these
will probably be coordinated assaults along the lines
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of the 17-18 February assaults. In the countryside,
reports indicate that the Communists are attempting
to mix more readily with the people than they did
during the past year, and that they are trying to
enlist and arm the rural populace in some places,
thus bolstering their guerrilla and militia capa-
bility. Attacks on the urban areas support Commu-
nist actions in the countryside, partly by drawing
the allied forces out of the rural areas.
26. It is probable that this type of action,
combined with major feints and probes at isolated
allied military and civil facilities in the high-
lands and in concert with a very heavy push in the
two northern provinces of South Vietnam, constitutes
the most likely scope of enemy military strategy over
the near term.
27. We believe that the coming weeks will
also see a continuing increase in attacks by fire
on allied airfields and other key installations.
Assaults of this type have been rising steadily
in number and intensity for over a year, as the
Communists moved new arms into most areas of South
Vietnam to help accomplish the mission. Such at-
tacks tend to reduce friendly reaction capability
and also force the concentration of more allied
resources into static defense operations.
28. Even if their maximum objectives are
frustrated, the Communists will endeavor to main-
tain enough control over rural areas and enough
psychological, military and terrorist pressure on
urban centers to erode popular confidence in the
GVN's ability to govern and in the capacity of
allied and GVN arms to proVide basic physidal
security anywhere in South Vietnam. Through propa-
ganda and political agitation, the Communists will
also endeavor to focus popular resentment over the
physical destruction of property and the plight
of the dislocated against the GVN and its foreign
allies, principally the US.
A Major Effort Probable in North South Vietnam
29. The developments described earlier in this
paper strongly suggest that the Communists intend
to inaugurate a major military push in the northern
two provinces of South Vietnam. Major Communist
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forces are, of course, in position around Khe Sanh, and
a massive ground assault on the base could come at any
time. We think it probable, however, that the heavy
aerial bombing raids in the vicinity of the base and
the continuous allied artillery fire into surrounding
Communist positions will make it very difficult for
the Communists, at least over the near term, to mount
ground attacks of the extent necessary to overrun the
site.
30 It is possible they will attempt a long "siege"
effort, seeking by occasional infantry forays and strong
attacks by fire, gradually to render the base untenable
or at the leat-t, to keep major allied forces tied down in
defense of the base. On the other hand, there is evidence
of continuing enemy preparations for a ground assault
against the base, should the prospects for success ap-
pear--promising.
31. In the course of the action, the Communists
may even reduce their besieging units by deploying some
of them into other areas of Quang Tri and Thua Thien for
military operations. The move of the 90th Regiment of
the 324B Division eastward toward the coast, after it
had engaged in at least logistic support operations for
the Khe Sanh build-up, may be an indicator of Communist
plans, as is the shift eastward of 320th Division elements.
32. Whether or not the Communists make an all-out
try at Khe Sanh, it appears that they plan to move into
a stage more closely approximating conventional warfare
against the allies throughout tb: northern two provinces
during the coming months. Enemy air operations, the in-
troduction of new weapons, the spreading of Communist
units deep: into the coastal sector, and the long-term
logistic backup implied by the construction of roads and
landline facilities in the area are all indicative of
such an intent. They denote an intent to keep up sus-
tained military operations--albeit possibly gradualistic
in nature--over a long period in the area.
33. The pattern in the repositioning of enemy units
throughout the northern two provinces suggests the Com-
munists may be planning a slow, steady, creeping effort
to make the allied position gradually less tenable. If
the Communist 324B Division is successful in blocking
Route 1, for example, elements from it and Other
NVA units, such as the 270th Independent Regiment,
would be in a position gradually to besiege such
allied strongpoints as Gio Linh, Dong Ha, and
Quang Tri city. In the meantime, strong ground
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probes and attacks by fire on these points are likely
at any time. Action over the long term in this sector
would be similar to that conducted by the enemy along
Route 9 during the past few months. Because of enemy
positioning, the road in the mountain sector is
virtually impassable to all but the very strongest
allied convoys; at present, it is not a dependable
route for allied reinforcements and resupply.
34. Communist plans apparently also call for
attempts to sustain and hopefully to increase mili-
tary pressure around Hue in Thua Thien Province.
This is strongly suggested by the road building
activities and logistic operations being conducted
eastward by the Communists from the A Shau Valley
area.
35. It would appear from the general pattern
of the Communist buildup in Quang Tri and Thua Thien
that they envisage the development of a situation
in both provinces before the end of the summer
wherein their military initiative and control of the
populace will be strong enough to reduce the al-
lied capability largely to static defense actions
and cautious, limited search operations such as are
now conducted against Communist units in the high-
lands of South Vietnam. From this formidable posi-
tion, the Communists would have numerous options,
depending on how things went for them politically
and militarily in other areas of the country during
the same period.
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36. The Thua Thien area is so far the only
sector where the Communists have chosen to announce
that a "provisional administration" has been formed.
This is another indication of their intent to make
a strenuous effort to bring the region under perma-
nent administrative control.
37. They could use 'the area for staging far-
ther south into Quang Nam and Quang Tin provinces,
augmenting and building their forces there and then
attempting to repeat the same strategy as in Quang
Tri and Thua Thien. On the other hand, if things
went against them elsewhere, they might attempt to
get negotiations started, using their position in
the northern two provinces as a lever to gain con-
cessions during the talks.
38. The Communists probably hope that the major
effort they are developing in the northern provinces
will eventually cause additional diversion of allied
units from areas farther south, particularly the
Saigon and delta sectors. Such a diversion would
assist in the current enemy effort to keep up heavier
pressure in selected provinces. Even if no further
allied diversion to the north occurs, the continua-
tion over an extended period of enemy pressure by
fire attacks and outright assaults on urban centers
could lead to virtual Communist domination of large
areas in the southern provinces if, in the course
of the attacks, the government's administrative and
military apparatus declines in effectiveness and the
confidence of the populace in the government con-
tinues to drop.
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T (12-geelrErf
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO2782724
3.5(c)
3.5(c)
3.5(c)