CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1951/09/20

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02745281
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: April 15, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 22, 2019
• Publication Date: September 20, 1951

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20 September 1951
Copy No. 41
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO,
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C r
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
AUT
b
DAT
REVIEWER
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.
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SUMMARY
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USSR
1. Air defense readiness noted in Vladivostok (page 3
FAR EAST
2. Iapanese officials believe Yoshida plans eventual rearmament (page 3).
SOUTH ASIA
3. Ceylon refuses to prevent rubber shipment to Ceylon (page 4).
NEAR EAST
4. Israel refuses to consider proposals for Arab-Israeli peace agreement
(page 5).
5. Egyptian King unable to prevent treaty abrogation (page 6).
6. Plastiras and Venizelos to collaborate in Greek parliament (page 6).
EASTERN EUROPE
7. Inclusion of Communists in new Finnish Cabinet unlikely (page 7).
8. Finland unwilling to curtail deliveries of certain strategic items to the
USSR (page 8).
WESTERN EUROPE
10. Comment on the British general election announced for 25 October
(page 9).
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USSR
1. Air defense readiness noted in Vladivostok:
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Crew members of a B-29 who participated in a
night mission in northeastern Korea on 25
August stated that while they were within sight
of Vladivostok all the city and port area lights
were blacklid out simultaneously. The ability of the USSR to black out all the
lights in a critical area simultaneously has been noted elsewhere and denotes
a high degree of air defense readiness.
The crew also noted ten aircraft, believed to be
single-engine jets, which took off in pairs from an unlocated airfield and
followed the bomber for app roximately half an hour at a distance of three to
five miles.
Comment: The interceptor aircraft appear to
have risen either from a Soviet airfield near the Korean border, on which no
planes were known to be based, or from a North Korean field just below the
border, previously believed to be inactive and unsuited to jet operations.
On the same day, a UN air strike on Rashin,
located near the Korean-Soviet border, was closely observed by the Soviet
naval antiaircraft organization. Soviet fighter_aircralfwareAiserLfar_vignaL
observation in waters adjacent to the border.
FAR EAST
2. Japanese officials believe Yoshida plans eventual rearmament:
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Japanese Foreign Office officials believe that
Prime Minister Yoshida plans to undertake
effective Japanese rearmament at a propitious
time. These officials state that Yoshida's
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14 September statement to the press opposing rearmament "for the time
being" was prompted by a desire not to involve the peace and security treaties
in the debate on rearmament, and also by a doubt that Japan, particularly in
the light of undefined peace treaty obligations, has the economic strength to
undertake large-scale rearmament at the present time.
The US Political Adviser suggests that Yoshida
may desire public opinion to shift further before advocating rearmament, and
comments that his political wisdom appears justified by the increasing aware-
ness of the Japanese public, as reflected in opinion polls, of the need for de-
fensive strength.
Comment Yoshida's statement, various inter-
pretations of which drew unusual attention in the press, actually does not
reflect any change from his cautious pre-treaty attitude toward rearmament
A series of public opinion polls during the past
year indicates increasing support for rearmament; the latest, taken just
after the peace treaty's signing, showed 76. 3 percent in favor of rearmament
and only 12.1 percent opposed. The vast majority of those favoring rearma-
ment, however, think that rearmament should be postponed until the nation's
economic reconstruction is further advanced.
It is a moot question whether rearmament solely
for defense would require an amendment of the Japanese constitution's war
renunciation clause, which in turn would depend upon a popular referendum.
SOUTH ASIA
3. Ceylon refuses to prevent rubber shipment to China:
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Urgent representations by the UK and US have
failed to convince the Ceylonese Government
that it should prevent the imminent shipment to
Communist; China of a full cargo of rubber now
being loaded aboard a 4467-ton Polish vessel
in Colombo. The details of the UK approach are
unknown, but the American Ambassador clearly
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pointed out the adverse effect the shipment would have on US opinion regarding
Ceylon. He also noted that, if the rubber goes forward, the US would neither
issue an export license for 1, 200 tons of sulphur desired by Ceylon, nor
grant an exemption under export control regulations.
Comment: No satisfactory explanation for
Ceylonese behavior has been made. Ceylon has been dissatisfied with American
policy on purchase of its rubber. It may be attempting to force the US into
preclusive buying at inflated prices. In any case, if the rubber is shipped and
Ceylon is penalized, both the Ceylonese and the Indians may be expected to
accuse the US of playing power politics in South Asia.
NEAR EAST
4. Israel refuses to consider proposals for Arab-Israeli peace agreement,
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Israel's representative to the Palestine Conciliatian
Commission meetings in Paris has informed the
chairman that Israel is still not prepared to
receive the commission's proposals for an Arab-
Israeli peace agreement. The Israeli representative maintains that the PCC
should restrict itself to the choice of agenda items, leaving the actual nego-
tiation of solutions under the agenda items to the Israeli and Arab representa-
tives themselves.
According to the Israeli representative, his govern-
ment can not "give" anything in the course of the negotiations and has in fact
withdrawn its original offer of repatriating a certain number of Arab refugees.
The commission chairman comments that there is little hope for success of the
current meetings in Paris if Israel continues to object to further suggestions for
solving the Arab-Israeli disagreements. The chairman further states that
Israel's attitude is hurting the commission's relationship with the Arab dele-
� gations, who are now more favorable toward the commission's position than at
any time in the past two and one half years.
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Comment: Israel's unwillingness to cooperate
so far in the meetings of the commission is partly due to its annoyance at the
, Arab refusal to meet with the Israeli representative around the same table.
The frank admission that Israel has no real concession to "give" to the Arab
States offers little hope that the meetings in Paris will achieve any substantial
success.
5. Egyptian King unable to prevent treaty abrogation:
3.3(h)(2)
The Egyptian Royal Press Counselor has in-
formed the US Ambassador that, unless Britain
comes up soon with some new acceptable pro-
posal, King Farouk will be forced to allow his
government to aprogate the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty. The king, through
his counselor, made it clear that he disapproved of the way his government
� has handled the negotiations. However, since abrogation has wide popular
support, he feels compelled to go along. To do otherwise would involve
"dismissing the government, dissolving parliament, and ruling by military
force.??
The counselor, in view of possible new proposals
from the British, stated that he would suggest to the king that he attempt to
delay the denouncement of the treaty.
Comment: Farouk, concerned over Egyptian
stability and his own position, will delay abrogation as long as he deems such
'action compatible with his own security. ;:-Even if Middle East Command plans
are completed quickly and Egypt is invited to participate, there is some doubt
as to whether such an offer would assuage Egyptian nationalism sufficiently to
prevent formal denunciation of the treaty.,
6. Plastiras and Venizelos to collaborate in Greek parliament:
3.3(h)(2)
General Plastiras, leader of the EPEK party,
has told the American Embassy in Athens that
he and Prime Minister Venizelos have decided
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to collaborate in parliament. Plastiras believes that such a combination would
command a bare majority with 130 to 132 seats in parliament. According to
him it was not yet decided whether the new government should be purely EPEK
with Liberal support, or whether the Liberals should actively participate.
Venizelos has previously told the embassy that he would prefer the former,
since such a government would soon demonstrate Plastiras' utter incapacity
to govern.
Comment: On the basis of Marshal Papagos'
plurality he presumably will be asked to form a government. Papagos does
not have a majority in parliament, and there are no indications that he will
attract enough deputies from the opposition parties to form a government. A
Venizelos-Plastiras combination would be highly unstable because of Plastiras'
leftist views, the widely divergent policies of the two men, and the attacks
that could be expected from the Papagos plurality.
EASTERN EUROPE
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7. Inclusion of Communists in new Finnish Cabinet unlikely:
The US Legation in Helsinki reports that inclusion
of� Communists in the new cabinet is very unlikely.
According to the legation, the present Social
Democratic-Agrarian coalition is expected to
form the basis of the new cabinet, with representatives from the Swedish
People's Party and possibly from the new National Party.
Comment: The new cabinet is being formed as
a result of the National Diet elections in July in which the Social Democrats
won 53 seats, the Agrarians 51, and the Communists 43. The Communist Party,
though likely to be excluded from the cabinet as it has been for the last three
years, will continue to be a potentially disruptive force in the Finnish political
scene.
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8. Finland unwilling to curtail deliveries of certain strategic items to the USSR:
The Finnish Foreign Minister has informed the
US Minister in Helsinki that Finland could not
ake steps to curtail deliveries of strategic
tems to the USSR. The foreign minister pointed
out that aside from contractual obligations -- the Finnish-Soviet reparations
and trade agreements -- compelling political reasons demanded that Finland
make agreed deliveries. The minister's comments were categorical and left
no apparent loophole.
Comment: The US has been particularly inter-
ested in halting the shipments of Finnish copper to the USSR which receives
about 40 percent of Finland's yearly output of approximately 18, 000 tons.
While Finland is not willing to curtail its export of strategic items to the
USSR, it has voluntarily tindertaken to keep a close watch on irregular move-
ments of such materials to the Soviet bloc. Finland has prevented illegal
transshipments of strategic goods through its ports to the USSR, despite
considerable Soviet pressure. Also, there are no known cases in which stra-
tegic goods imported for use in Finland have been shipped on to the Soviet
bloc.
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WTERN EUROPE
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10. Comment on the British general election announced for 25 October
Prime Minister Attlee's announcement of a
25 October general election comes at a time when his government is under fire
on both cost-of-living and foreign affairs questions. Public opinion polls show
the trend running markedly against labor.
The decision to dissolve parliament under these
circumstances probably springs from a calculation that the Labor Party would
fare worse if the election were postponed. On the economic side there is the
likelihood that Britain's situation will continue to deteriorate; in particular,
there may be a severe coal and power shortage this winter. On the political
side the Labor Party probably feared facing three pending by-elections in which
a poor Labor showing would not only whittle down the government's already pre-
carious parliamentary majority but also leave it to confront a subsequent
general election with greatly diminished prestige.
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