CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1951/09/19
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Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
02745280
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RIPPUB
Original Classification:
U
Document Page Count:
7
Document Creation Date:
April 15, 2019
Document Release Date:
April 22, 2019
Sequence Number:
Case Number:
Publication Date:
September 19, 1951
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULL[15602893].pdf | 251.65 KB |
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- 19 September. 1951
Copy No,
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO.
47
11.11-.P
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Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
-T019-SEeR-Eg
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I 01'
SUMMARY
GENERAL
1. British and French tone down opposition to US-Spanish ties (page 3).
FAR EAST
US Consul General argues for economic blockade of Communist China
(page 3).
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NEAR EAST
3. Comment on the Iranian-Soviet Oil Barter Agreement (filige 4).
4. Egyptian government party leaders reportedly favor immediate abrogation
of 1936 treaty (page 5).
WESTERN EUROPE
5. East and West Germans continue discussions on Berlin and interzonal
trade (page 5).
6. East German Communists revive unity campaign (page 6).
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1.
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J. Ur� OLLAIL
GENERAL
British and French tone down opposition to US-Spanish ties:
1
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3.3(h)(2)
During the tripartite meetings on 14 September,
British Foreign Secretary Morrison urged the
US to go no further than necessary in its relations
with Spain, and under no circumstances to raise
the question of bringing Spain into NATO. Morrison indicated that there was
strong feeling in the UK on this issue.
French Foreign Minister Schuman said he be-
lieved that French opinion would be relieved by the US assurance that no
attempt was being made to bring Spain into NATO. The main French fear, he
said, would be a Spanish army equipped by the US. Such an army would be
competing with France for supplies, and would make it appear that the US was
basing Western defense on the Pyrenees. 3.3(h)(2)
Comment: Last July the British and French openly
opposed any bilateral US-Spanish defense arrangements.
FAR EAST
3.3(h)(2)
2. US Consul General argues for economic blockade of Communi# China:
The view of British Foreign Secretary Morrison
that an economic blockade of Communist
China probably would be ineffective and might
force Peiping to "rely more heavily" on the USSR
is opposed by the US Consul Qeneral in Hong Kong.
He points out that a blockade, while unable to disrupt the primitive Chinese
economy or destroy the Chinese military potential, nevertheless would in-
crease the strain on the economy, aggravate dissatisfaction over the Korean
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venture, and strengthen the position of those elements wishing to end the
Korean conflict. He believes that additional Chinese economic dependence
on the USSR would hasten Peiping's disillusionment with Soviet aid.
NEAR EAST
Comment on the Iranian-Soviet Oil Barter Agreement:
The Iranian Government announced on 17
September that it was preparing to sign a barter agreement with the USSR,
presumably exchanging oil for sugar and other consumer goods. Previously
Iran had stated that it was negotiating the sale of 1, 200, 000 tons of oil to
Poland and Czechoslovakia.
The USSR, along with its European Satellites,
owns 32 tankers and charters about 10 more. It could divert only a few of
these from present commitments to hauling Iranian oil to Communist China
or to the USSR itself. However, even a few tankers operating between
Abadan and China would help the Soviet Union meet its Far East oil commit-
ments, especially since an estimated 95 percent of the oil furnished China
by the USSR is moved by rail.
In any event, the USSR will probably not have
enough tankers available to move more than a small percentage of the normal
annual output of Abadan. At present the 30, 000, 000 barrel storage tanks at
Abadan are presumably nearly full, and contain more than could be moved by
existing Orbit tanker facilities within several years.
Soviet barter agreements with other Middle
Eastern countries have lagged behind promised deliveries, and there is no
reason to believe that any Iranian-Soviet agreement would be fully imple-
mented unless it were to the distinct advantage of the USSR. All concerned
may, however, derive propaganda benefits.
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3.3(h)(2)
4. Egyptian government party leaders reportedly favor immediate abrogation
of 1936 treaty:
The British Ambassador in Cairo was informed
on 16 September that a majority of the govern-
ment party leaders, who met the preceding day,
favored immediate abrogation of the 1936 Anglo-
Egyptian Treaty, but that the Minister of Interior had succeeded in post-
poning any action for ten days.
The ambassador is suggesting to London that
the UK reply to the Egyptian Prime Minister's latest communication by in-
dicating that new "interesting" proposals will be forthcoming. The US
Ambassador warns the abrogation of the treaty will be difficult to prevent if
some hope of new proposals is not offered Egypt in the immediate future.
Comment: While party leaders have been
gradually pushing the government toward definite action in regard to the
long-threatened abrogation of the 1936 treaty, King Farouk, who has long
opposed such action, probably will succeed in preventing any immediate
steps.
The "interesting" proposals presumably will
be an invitation to Egypt to participate in a joint Middle East Command. The
present Egyptian mood, however, probably will not permit acceptance of
membership in such an arrangement as a substitute for complete British
evacuation of the Suez Canal area and of the Sudan.
3.3(h)(2)
WESTERN EUROPE
East and West Germans continue discussions on Berlin and interzonal trade:
West German authorities, reporting to the
Allies on the progress of their current talks
with East German officials on resumption of
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3.3(h)(2)
interzonal trade in return for cessation of cur-
rent Soviet-East German restrictions in Berlin,
are optimistic that various "conditions" will be
met by the East Germans if the interzonal trade
agreement is signed. The West Germans
assert that both delegations are now prepared
to sign the trade pact, with the verbal statement
to be made by the West Germans that the trade
agreement will be suspended if any impediments to trade are imposed.
Before considering whether the West Germans
should be permitted to sign the interzonal trade pact, the Allies have in-
sisted that the West German delegation obtain assurances from the East
Germans that, in the event of the establishment of the proposed committee
to review Berlin exports, the West German unit would have the final deter-
mination as to the legality of each shipment.
Comment: Despite a willingness to make cer-
tain concessions, the East Germans have left so many of the details un-
settled, that the Allies cannot be sure of any appreciable improvement in
the situation.
East German Communists revive unity campaign:
3.3(h)(2)
At a special session of the East German People's
Chamber on 15 September, Premier Otto
Grotewohl revived the spring 1951 campaign for
"Germans at one Table," requesting the People's
Chamber to send a new offer to the West German Parliament to hold an all-
German unity conference. Grotewohl recommended a two-point agenda:
(1) organization of all-German free elections for a national assembly charged
with establishing a "united, democratic, peace-loving Germany," and (2)
speeding up the conclusion of a peace treaty.
Grotewohl added that, in view of the gravity of
the situation, East Germany would be willing to abandon its previous in-
sistence on parity between East and West German delegations. In later
remarks he stated that the number of representatives is "not of fundamental
importance."
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Comment: Soviet and East German offers to
negotiate German unification and to hold all-German elections have been made
many times before, but there has never been evidence of willingness to hold
elections on any other than Communist terms. The major aim of these
"unity" proposals is to frustrate Allied efforts to obtain German participation
in Western European defense preparations.
T-OP-SEeRET
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