CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1951/07/04

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02740736
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: April 15, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 22, 2019
• Publication Date: July 4, 1951

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4 July ,1951.
Copy No.(0 /-
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS CODE WORD MATERIAL
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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SUMMARY
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FAR EAST
Enemy conttnues to augment forces in Korea (page 3).
Embassy Moscow believes Communist cease-fire terms dictated by
prestige considerations (page 4).
3. Soviet Representative in Japan optimistic concerning Korean settle-
ment (page 4).
4. Morale of Chinese Nationalist forces declining (page 5).
NEAR gAST
5 Tanker recall:It nroblem under consideration in Iran (nage 5
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ITS company offers 2, 500 US technicians to Iran to operate oil industry
(nage 7).
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FAR EAST
Enemy continues to augment forces in Korea:
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According to Far East Command numerous
reports indicatet that the enemy is continu-
ing to reinforce and provide replacements
for both Vorth Korean and Chinese Communist
forces in Korea. Front line Korean cores have been strengthened by
replacements drawn from units in the Pyongyang and Wonsan areas. The
strength of these units, in turn, has been maintained by the consolidation
of units assigned to rear area security missions, the reactivation of units
dissipated in the defeats of last autumn, and the continuance of recruit-
ment and training at a relatively high level. Recent unconfirmed reports
� have mentioned the activation in Manchuria of new North Korean divisions
gyka their movement into Korea. 3.3(h)(2)
the ar-
rival in Korea of additional Ch Communist units to replace those
recently withdrawn as a consequenc of combat losses. Prisoners of
war have confirmed the presence in Korea of the 140th Army. Other
prisoners have reported that other units of the Fourth Field Army-are
in Korea in a relief role, confirm the movement
of sizeable Chinese Communist forces alang the main enemy supply route
to the rear of the northwest front. 3.3(h)(2)
Comment: There is ample evidence of a
long range program to build up the North Korean armed forces, which
might be significant if all foreign troops were withdrawn. The extent
to which the Chinese Communists have instituted a rotation of forces
to replace units withdrawn remains uncertain. The influence of the cease-
fire negotiations on such long term manpower commitments have not as
yet been reflected in available information.
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2. Embassy Moscow believes Communist cease-fire terms dictated by
prestige considerations:
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Embassy Moscow believes that the choice
of Kaesong as the site of negotiations and
the delay preceding negotiations are for
reasons of prestige and propaganda. The
Embassy points out that if the delay were designed to allow Communist
forces to improve their military situation, the launching of an offensive
would be likely to boomerang against their alleged peaceful intentions.
The Embassy further questions whether the Communists could not
expect to improve their milittry position materially before cease-fire
negotiations, except in the unlikely event that they are determined to con-
clude the Korean war With a large-scale air offensive against UN rear
bases and naval vessels.
Comment: In addition to possible prestige
and propaganda advantftges, the Communists probably con ider a delay
necessary in order to prepare for a conference that has developed quite
rapidly. With regard to military considerations, there is evidence that
Communist forces in Korea will be capable by mid-July of resuming the
offensive if they so desire.
3.3(h)(2)
. Soviet Represe*tive in Japan optimistic concerning Korean settlement:
General Kislenko, the Soviet member of the
Allied Council for Japan, privately told US
Political Adviser Sebald on 2 July that "at
last we are going to have peace," When
Sebald replied that complex etuestions were
sometimes difficult to resolve, Kislenko stated emphatically, "No, this
time there is nothing to worry about." The US Political Adviser corn-
/netts that the subject was spontaneously raised by Kislenko, as if the
latter had some foreknowledge of cease-fire negotiation plans. This
attitude was in marked contrast to a position taken earlier by Kislenko
In regard to the Malik speech, when he denied all knowledge of it and
refused comment.
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Comment: It is not customary for a Soviet
representative to hint at possible future actions or attitudes of his
government, particularly witi regard to a question as important as a
Icorean peace settlement.
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. Morale of Chinese Nationalist forces declining:
Suicide and desertion among members of
the Chinese Nationalist armed forces have
become a problem, according to a senior
Chinese Nationalist general. The causes:
(1) fear of the Soviet-style political officers of Chiang Ching-kuo,, the
Generalissimo's eldest son; (2) physical sickness; (3) homesickness,
heightened by the backfiring of propaganda promising an early return
to the mainland; and (4) assignment to "coolie Jobs."
Comment: Any marked increase in the
already high sick rate would seriously affect the combat potential of
the Nationalist forces. While the institution of political officers serving
with the armed forces is not new, they had not been accorded as much
power priOr to Chiang Ching-kiio's appointment as their chief. Chiang
spent approximately lp years in Russia, and reportedly is attempting
to emulate the Soviet methods of insuring control over both military
forces and civilians In the process, he is arousing increasing resent-
ment from all elements.
NEAR EAST
5. Tanker receipt problem undomic!eration in Iran:
The US Ambassador in Tehran reports that
he saw Prime Minister Mossadeq on 2 July
and suggested acceptance by the new National
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Oil Company of the receipt proposed by AIOC (Anglo-Iranian Oil
Company) which acknowledges the amount of oil loaded, but which
would not:prejudice the eventual outcome of the oil dispute. Mossa-
deq stated that heNwould accept such a reservation only if given an
"absolute guarantee" that this endorsement will not be used by the
AIOC or any other company transporting the oil as an excuse to avoid
payment.
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Comment This suggests that the current
dispute over the oil tanker loadings could be resolved. Since Mossadeq
has maintained an intransigent position heretofore, however, it will be
surprising if he does not manage to attach conditions involving the
"absolute guarantee" which will be unacceptable to the British. 3.3(h)(2)
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US company offers 2,5.00 US technicians to Iran to operate oil industry:
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The US Ambassador in Tehran reports that
Lee-Factors Inc. of Los Angeles has written
Iranian Prime Minister Mossadeq and the
chairman of the Iranian National Board offer-
ing to negotiate immediately a contract to supply up to 2, 500 technicians
to operate the oil industry in Iran. The letters state that the firm is
"not interested in politics, but in rendering efficient and capable service
to enable your petroleum industry to function on a highly profitable basis
and to expand your petroleum industry as the needs may require. The
Ambassador comments that the Lee-Factors approach unquestionably will
be made public soon and cannot fail to complicate an already serious
situation. 3.3(h)(2)
Comment: The major US oil companies have
a tat understanding that they will net offer their services to Iran at the
present time inasinuch as the repercussions would far outweigh any
advantages which might accrue to them.
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