CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1951/07/03

Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
02740735
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
U
Document Page Count: 
8
Document Creation Date: 
April 15, 2019
Document Release Date: 
April 22, 2019
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
July 3, 1951
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PDF icon CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULL[15603083].pdf207.26 KB
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Approved forRelease: 2019/04/02 CO2740735 *so OrA..;11..E 1 Nei 3 July 1951 Copy No. CT - CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN DOCUMENT NO NO CHANGE IN CLASS. LI DECLASSIFIED CLASS, CHANGED TO: NEXT flEVIEW DATE: AUTtliiiHRI)!Ish DATE.] OI finEviE .A/ER TS S PCof Office of Current Intelligence CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2740735 3.5(c) 3.5(c) 3.5(c) 3.5(c) Approved for ROease:.2019/04/92 SUMMARY GENERAL CO2740735 3.5(c) 3.3(h)(1) USSR 3.3(h)(1) FAR EAST 3 3(h)(1) NEAR EAST 5. bin has strengthened its military forces in oil field area age 6). EASTERN EUROPE 6. Role of Czech Army seen as defensive (page 7). 7. Yugoslav Government requests stoppage of strategic metal shipment to Czechoslovakia (page 7). 8� Western officials observe no alarming Yugoslav activity regarding Albania (page 8). TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2740735 3.5(c) 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2740735 3.5(c) 3.3(h)(1) USSR 3.3(h)(1) Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2740735 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2740735 TOP SECRET FAR EAST 3.5(c) .3(h)(2) TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2740735 3.3(h)(2) 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2740735 3.5(c) 3.3(h)(2) Ter;�-SEeRET Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2740735 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2740735 TD SECRET 3.5(c) � 3.3(h)(2) NEAR EAST . Iran has strengthened its military forces in oil field area. 3.3(h)(2) The US Military Attache in Tehran reports that, as of 1 July, the total Iranian ground force at Abadan is estimated to be 2, 500. Its equipment consists of small arms, mortars, machine guns and 11 tanks mounting 75mm guns. Naval strength is placed at 500 men with several small vessels, whose largest guns are four inch. The bulk of the Tenth Iranian Division is located at Ahwaz, some 80 miles away from Abadan (three hours distant in time). The Military Attache believes the troops now in Abadan are completely adequate to preserve order. The Iranians are apparently not awed by the British cruiser with its six inch guns off Abadan and would resist any British efforts to land military forces. Personnel from the British cruiser have already been denied landing permission. There is no doubt, according to the Military Attache, that any British effort to land would result in Iranian military action that would cease only when sufficient Aritish forces were brought in to defeat Iranian units. - 6 - TOP-SEGRET- Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2740735 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2740735 LJ.J J. 3.5(c) 3.3(h)(2) Comment: This latest US military estimate of Iranian deployment and Irania � � � � � � . � rdted by all available reports, Iran's moves to strengthen its military forces in Abadan and elsewhere are, however, also aimed at preventing internal disorders. 3.3(h)(2) EASTERN EUROPE 6. Role of Czech Army seen ag defensive: The US Military Attache in Prague estimates that owing to the absence of strong leadership, the shortage of modern equipment and the low morale of the average soldier, the Czechoslovak Army is at present better adapted for a defensive than an offensive mission. He also expresses the opinion that Soviet failure to make a determined effort to reorganize and re-equip the Czechoslovak army indicates that the USSR intends to keep Czechoslovakia as a supply base for the present. Comment: Previous evidence has indicated an effort in Czechoslovakia, as well as in the other Soviet European Satel- lites, to improve the size and quality of the armed forces. Of the Satellite armies, the Bulgarian and Rumanian seem to be relatively better prepared ideologically and technically to carry out Soviet aggressive designs. Yugoslav Government requests stoppage of strategic metal shipment to Czechoslovakia,: The Yugoslav Government has requested that US-British authorities in Trieste and Austria stop a 150 ton railroad shipment of Yugoslav TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2740735 3.3(h)(2) 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2740735 3.5(c) 3.3(h)(2) ferro-chrome, rerouted to Czechoslovakia from Trieste by a Western European firm to which it had been sold. According to the US Political Adviser in Trieste, the ferro-chrome shipment is being held in the British Zone of Austria pending a decision on Its final disposition. 3.3(h)(2) Comment, Although Yugoslav trade with the Soviet Orbit has progressively decreased since 1948, points tothe continued purchase through intermediaries of Yugoslav non- ferrous metals by bot .h Czechoslovakia and Hungary. No firm evidence is available that this trade is being carried on with the knowledge and consent of the Yugotailay Government 3.3(h)(2) Western officials observe no alarming Yugoslav activity regarding,Albaniw US Ambassador Allen in Belgrade reports that his British and French colleagues concur with his opinion that Yugoslavia is not currently instigating any pro-Tito moves in Albania and that the Tito government is keenly aware of the danger of provoking a situa- tion that might invite Soviet intervention. Allen advises that, if a demarche tti the Yugoslav Government on its Albanian political activity is still consid- ered advisable, it should be drafted as a general statement that the US opposes all foreign adventures in Albania. Allen expresses the opinion that nothing would arouse Yugoslav sensibilities or discourage Albanian resistance more than the implication that Soviet control would be supplanted by some other foreign influence. Comment: Several reports have recently pointed to increased Yugoslav efforts to organize and support Albanian refugees in Yugoslavia for subversive activity in Albania. Investigation of these reports by the US Embassy in Belgrade has thus far failed to re- veal any Yugoslav-sponsored militant activity among the Albanian refugees. It is improbable that the Tito government would sponsor such activity to the point where it might result in the overthrow of the Albanian regime and thus invite Soviet intervention. TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2740735 3.5(c)