CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1951/08/22

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02739458
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: April 15, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 22, 2019
• Publication Date: August 22, 1951

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22 August 1951
Copy No. 6/
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO:
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
AUTIor oto
DATE/P111 Ir REVIEWER:
IS 8 C
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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SUMMARY
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FAR EAST
1. Communist plans for a sixth phase offensive reported age 3).
2. French military position in Indochina believed to be "very little
improved" (page 3).
SOUTH ASIA
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EASTERN EUROPE
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D. xugostavia retuses to attend San Francisco Conference (page 5).
WESTERN EUROPE
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Prospects for ratification of Schuman Plan deteriorating (page 7).
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( FAR (EAST
1. Communist plans for a sixth phase offensive reported
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3.3(h)(2)
According to a recently captured Chinese Com-
munist soldier from the newly arrived 140th Di-
vision, 47th Army, his company political officer
stated that his division was holding the rine in
order to permit troops in the rear areas to
prepare for a sixth phase offensive. The US
Far East Command concludes, reasoning from
the fact that similar statements by political
officers have preceded previous offensives, that an enemy offensive will be
launched if current cease-fire negotiations fail. 3.3(h)(2)
Comment.' The US Far East Command still
estimates that Communist forces in Korea the capability of sustaining a
major offensive for a two-week period.
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2. French military position in Indochina believed to he "very little improved":
estimates
.nat, notwithscanaing .rren.ch tactical suc-
cesses in Tonkin,- the overall strategic po-
sition of French Union forces is very little .
improved over that which obtained iast fall. He believes that various favorable
factors, including the infliction of a four to one casualty rate on the Viet �
Minh, are hearty offset by improved Viet Minh organization, recruitment,
- troop disposition and logistics. 3.3(h)(2)
The process of reinforcing French forces
and training native commissioned and non-commissioned officers has been
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slow, and the attache believes that an attrition rate of,ten to one would have to
be maintained in order for French Union forces to seize and retain the ini-
tiative and insure the defeat of the enemy.
Comment: lids is an unusually pessimistic
estimate, particularly in view of official French claims that the Viet Minh has
been badly defeated and decimated in battles during the past few, months.
French Union forces, although roughly equal
in numbers to those of the Viet Minh, are better armed. They possess un-
disputed air and sea control of Indochina, are far better supported logistiorally
)
and have access to a greater reservoir of fit manpower than the enemy. Thus,
barring Chinese Communist intervention, a four to one attrition rate on the
Viet /vIinh would appear to promise steady improvement of the French military
position.
SOUTH Asa
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3.3(h)(2)
EASTERN EURO.PE.
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. Yugoslavia refuses to attend San Francisco Conference:
Foreign Minister Vilfan informed US
Ambassador Allen that the Yugoslav Govern-
ment has decided not to attend the San Fran-
cisco Japanese Treaty Conference because of
e remoteness of Yugoslav substantive interest in Japanese affairs. Vilfan
e4plained that, although his government recognized the declaration of war
against Japan made by the Yugoslav London Government, Yugoslavia would
find it embarrassing to take a position on a number of questions that would
probably come up at the Conference.
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Comment: Yugoslavia had previously indicated
that it would decline the invitation. By refusing to attend,, the Yugoslav Govern-
ment can avoid taking a stand on Chinese Communist participation in the treaty,
a question that will probably be raised by the Soviet Union. It can also evade
the awkwardness of signing a lenient Japanese treaty at a time when it is
opposing all suggestions to revise th more punitive Italian Peace Treaty.
WESTERN EUROPE
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3.3(h)(2)
Prospects for ratification of Schuman Plan deteriorating:
Recent developments indicate that the pros-
pect o for prompt ratification of the Schuman
Plan by the West German Parliament (Lower
House) are deteriorating. Rey delegates of
of the two minor parties of the government coalition have commented that
half of their factions might refuse to support the Plan when the Parliament
reconveneslin September. Although H1COG officials believe these claims are
exaggerates, they acknowledge that German anger over the Saar issue and
over recent rebuffs by the Ruhr Authority is certain to delay ratification of
the Plan and strengthen the hand of the forces opposing ratification.
Comment: On 12 Iuly, prior tothe recess,
the law ratifying the Schuman Plan successfully passed its first reading in the
Lower House. Although at that time the three government parties presented a
solid front in support of the Plan, the debate indicated that any adverse de-
velopments, particularly on the Buhr Authority and Saar hisues, might con-
siderably increase the Chancellor's difficulties in securing approval on the
final reading of the bill.
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