CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1951/10/28

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02739300
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: April 15, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 22, 2019
• Publication Date: October 28, 1951

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TY INFORMATION
28 October 1951
Copy No.
47
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO. 311111-
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NEXT REVIEW DATE:
MTH: HR 70.2
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
TOP S ET
SECUR NFORMATION
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SUMMARY
USSR
1, British Ambassador considers Soviet Union anxious for cease-fire
(page 3).
FAR EAST
2. Chinese Communist support of Viet Minh depreciated (page 3).
3. Pope grants audience to De Lathe on Vietnamese problems (page 4).
NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST
4. Current international situation alarms Afghanistan (page 4).
5. Terrorist campaign predicted against British nationals in Arab
states (page 5).
6. British and American Ambassadors warn of serious developments
in Egypt (page 6).
7. Cypriot Communists reportedly planning coup (page 6).
NORTH AFRICA
8. Spain seeks rapprochement with Moroccan Nationalists (page 7)
WESTERN EUROPE
9. Benelux countries may oppose European Defense Forces plan
(page 8).
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USSR
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British Ambassador considers Soviet Union anxious for cease-fire:
US Emb London During an official conversation with Vyshinsky,
25 Oct 51 the British Ambassador to Moscow reports,
SE the soviet Foreign Minister raised the subject
0./ of a cease-fire in Korea, stating the USSR was
anxious for it and that it would be an important step in easing international
tension.
Comment: The Communist decision to modify
the previously adamant stand on the 38th Parallel may be a reflection of
Soviet anxiety for a cease-fire. There are, however, no indications
that the Communist negotiators will further discuss their new offer,
which is "unacceptable" to the UN representatives.
FAR EAST
2. Chinese Communist support of Viet Minh depreciated:
US Leg Saigon
3.3(h)(2)
26 Oct 51 no Chinese were identified
among Viet Minh personnel killed or taken
isoner during recent operations in Tonkin.
He also ifirmed a sharp decrease in the activities of Viet Minh training
schools in China and said that those trainees still remaining were re-
ceiving their military education through service in Chinese units.
In considering the uestion of Chinese
ist intervention in Indochina,
the Chinese and the Viet Min - . ,bu no o ma e le nam a
second Korea. " materiel aid by the Chinese would con-3.3(h)(2)
tinue but "other �upport- would decrease.
3.3(h)(2)
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Comment: No member of the Chinese Com-
munist armed forces has ever been identified as serving with the Viet
Minh. This fact together with the above report, supports a recent 3 3(h)(2)
estimate that only "a few" Chinese Communist ad-
visers and technicians are present in Tonkin,. thus discounting another
estimate of 10, 000 to 15, 000,
3. Pope grants audience to De Lattre on Vietnamese problems:
3.
3(h)(2)
Comment: The Vatican has been cool toward
the French puppet government of Vietnamb Bao Dai was received with
reserve when he visited Rome, presumably because of strong represen-
tations to the Vatican by Vietnamese Catholic leaders. The French are
anxious to secure the cooperation of these leaders, whose following of
some million and a half Vietnamese Catholics includes many intellectuals
and represents a much greater force in the area than numbers would
Indicate,
NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST
4. Current international situation alarms Afghanistan:
US Emb Kabul The Afghan Gbvernment, genuinely alarmed at
23 Oct 51 the recent turn of events in the Near East and
CONFjD1 South Asia, has assured the US of its coopera-
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tion "in every possible way" and has requested the US to reconsider the
withdrawal of its proposal to bring Afghanistan and Pakistan together to
settle their current disputes.
Comment: The American proposal, first
made on 6 November 1950, has achieved no concrete result to date,
and the US has recently informed Afghanistan and Pakistan of its with-
drawal.
As a consequence of this action and of the
events in the Near East, the Afghan government may have taken stock
of its international position. It is possible, therefore, that an import-
ant change in Afghan policy is in the making, which will lead to a more
conciliatory attitude toward Pakistan and to a more active participation
in world affairs.
3.5(c)
3.3(h)(2)
Terrorist campaign predicted against British nationals in Arab states:
3.3(h)(2)
"Violent terrorist attacks" upon British
nationals will begin within ten days in Syria
Egypt, Lebanon, and Jordan,
The campaign, al-
legedly to be directed by the former Grand
Mufti of Jerusalem, will combine the efforts
of his Arab Higher Executive with those of
3.3(h)(2)
the Moslem Brotherhood.
':3;.em Brotherhood should be "given a free hand and encouraged in
extremist members of the Egyptian Government believe that the
violence and terrorism" while the government itself should allege that
it was doing its best to control the organization.
Comment The chief responsibility for a
continuation of disturbances in Egypt or for any eruption of violence in
the other Arab countries would probably lie with the hypernationalistic
Moslem Brotherhood. This group is well-organized in Egypt, where it
has semi-legal status, and also in Syria.
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The Moslem Brothers, supported by the
Mufti's henchmen and the Communists, have already evidenced a readi-
ness to exploit the current Arab tension despite the restrictions which
the Arab governments themselves are likely to impose against terror-
ist activities.
6. British and American Ambassadors warn of serious developments in
Egypt:
US Emb Cairo The US Ambassador in Cairo reports that
25 Oct 51 his British colleague advised London on 25
TOPEetT October that the now British Government would
� C 7500n have to make "very grave decisions" in
regard to Egypt. If the pr sent situation in the Suez Canal zone is allowed
to drift,be said, a revolution in Egypt is in prospect, ending with British
reoccupation of the country. Without a minimum of Egyptian cooperation,
it is "probable that it will become increasingly difficult to maintain
British troops at Suez. " If, on the other hand, British military authori-
ties exercise their power to shut off oil, "disaster will probably ensue. "
The American Ambassador comments that
the United States must also "think this whole business out and not get
involved in a dead-end loaded with dynamite."
7. Cypriot Communists reportedly planning coup:
US Emb Athens The Cypriot Communists have procured 1, 500
26 Oct 51 rifles and are preparing for an early coup
TOP ET according to the Greek Prime Minister.
Comment: This report probably represents
an effort by Greek Nationalists to promote Greek-Cypriot union, or enosis,
by exploiting US concern over recent events in the Near East, The Nation-
alists believe that the US, if sufficiently alarmed over the security of
Cyprus, might be presuaded to exert pressure upon Britain in favor of
enosiso
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The Communists,aware of the current pos-
sibilities for weakening the British hold on this strategic island, may
be planning an incident to focus world attention on Cypriot demands.
However, the British security forces in the area are believed capable
of coping with any Communist-inspired disturbances.
NORTH AFRICA
8. Spain seeks rapprochement with Moroccan Nationalists:
US Leg Tangier
24 Oct 5
SEC
General Franco allegedly has approved a
scheme for including Spanish Moroccan
T Nationalists in the administration of the
/5) Spanish protectorate of Morocco. The
Spanish High 6mmissioer plans to talk with the leader of the Spanish
Moroccan Nationalist party, a man who has long been considered a
fugitive from Spanish justice.
The US Legation in Tangier comments that
the High Commissioner apparently is moving rapidly toward a rapproche-
ment with the Nationalists despite the opposition of his advisors, who
caution that the Nationalists would use Spanish Morocco as a base for
anti-French activity.
Comment: Spain has long resented the pre-
ponderant French influence in Morocco, and desires to strengthen Spanish
prestige with the Arab states.
3.5(c)
By apparently relaxing their severe repression
of nationalism, by promising participation in government now, and by
hinting that Spain favors Moroccan independence, Spanish officials hope
to discredit France with the Arab League and improve Spain's relations.
Spain has no intention, however, of relinquishing its hold on Morocco.
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WESTERN EUROPE
9. Benelux countries may oppose European Defense Forces plan:
US Emb The Hague
26 Oct 51
A Socialist member of the Dutch Parliament
states confidentially that the Benelux meeting
at Brussels on 25 October was convened "to
voi organize a united front against the European
Defense Force The Dutch Foreign Office strongly opposes the Euro-
pean Defense Forces plan, and the Cabinet is divided on the issue with
the Socialists and Catholics supporting the plan.
Comment: The meeting of Benelux ministers
ostensibly was intended to eiii1nihe various questions which might be
raised in connection with a common European defense organization.
None of the Benelux countries has indicated any enthusiasm for the plan,
and the Dutch Foreign Minister is known to be personally opposed.
However, alter much Cabinet and high level discussion, the Dutch
recently sent an official delegate to the European Defense Forces con-
ference in Paris.
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SECUBn3Y11FORMATION
30 October 1951
Copy No.
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO. 111111(
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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SUMMAR Y
FAR EAST
1. Communist tactics to gain control of Korean air situation forecast
(page 3).
2. Military government for Malaya recommended (page 3).
3. "Revolution" in Thailand predicted (page 4).
NEAR EAST
4 . British now seen ready to settle Iranian oil crisis (page 5).
5. Iranian Communists hope to secure representation in Parliament (page 5
WESTERN EUROPE
6. Italy chooses new Ambassador to Great Britain (page 6).
7. French adamant on own terms for US North African commitment
(page 6).
NOTE:
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FAB EAST
1. Communist tactics to gain control of Korean air situation forecast:
3.5(c)
3.3(h)(2)
The Far East Command believes, in view of
enemy airfield construction activity, and the con-
tinued high level of combat interceptor sorties,
that logical steps for the enemy to take in ex-
g air capabilities are:
(1) Increased air efforts over the Sinanju area
to achieve air superiority in northwestern Korea;
(2) Utilization of this superiority to cover flights
from newly-constructed fields in that area;
(3) Basing of jets at these fields to ensure main-
tenance of local air superiority;
(4) Expansion of the area of Communist air supe-
riority further southwards once jet strength on Korean fields has been increased;
(5) Movement of conventional fighters and ground
attack and light bombers to these secured Korean airfields;
(6) A challenge to UN air superiority over the
immediate battle area and initiation of air to ground strikes against UN
ground forces and installations.
2. Military government for Malaya recommended:
0'7JN z_.
3.3(h)(2)
he Chief of Staff of the British Far East Land
orces reportedly has endorsed a Staff recommen-
ation that "military government" is necessary
or successful operations against the Communist�
led insurgents in Malaya.
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Comment: Such a policy would presumably mean
abandoning the program of gradual development of self-government in Malaya
which the British Government has followed despite the great obstacles posed
by the "emergency."
The murder of High Commissioner Gurney on
6 October and a particularly bloody ambush of British-led security forces
during the past week will lend weight to the insistence of military officials who
have recommended "taking the gloves off. " It is possible that the Conservative
government in London will reinforce British troops in Malaya, but not at the
expense of the principle that the battle for Malaya is primarily political in
character.
3. "Revolution" in Thailand predicted:
3.3(h)(2)
3.3(h)(2)
3.3(h)(2)
A Chinese Nationalist predicts
that a bloodless "revolution" will probably take
place in Thailand on 31 October.
Premier Phibun and General Sarit,
ssistant ommander in Chief of the Thai Army, are planning to remove
General P.hao, Director General of Police, and General Phin, Commander.in
Chief of the Army. The plotters are timing their action to take advantage of
Phao's current absence from the country.
Comment: A reorganization of the government
along lines suggested by this report has some plausibility. General Sarit is
known to be antagonistic toward the Phin-Phao clique, and Phibun has been
desirous of broadening his administration by includ-
ing representatives of opposition political parties -- a move which has been
consistently opposed by Phin and Phao. In addition, the ambitious Phao3.3(h)(2)
represents the chief threat to Phibunis authority. On the other hand, the
alleged plan would be difficult to accomplish, as a radical realignment of
military loyalties would be required.
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NEAR EAST
4. British now seen ready to settle Iranian oil crisis:
3.5(c)
3.3(h)(2)
The US Embassy in London assumes that the
Conservatives will be anxious to start off their
term in office by settling the Iranian oil question.
It believes that the British are now willing to
agree to any reasonable settlement, possibly including the acceptance of a
completely non-British organization to operate the oil industry.
Comment: Although the British have to date re-
fused to commit themselves to the replacement of British management of
the oil industry, they have gradually come to realize that this is inevitable.
5. Iranian Communists hope to secure representation in Parliament:
3.3(h)(2)
The illegal Tudeh Party reportedly intends to
present at least thirty "disguised" candidates in
the approaching Parliamentary elections in order
to obtain the 12 or 15 seats necessary for the
effective obstruction of Parliament. 3.3(h)(2)
Comment: Tudeh interest in securing repre-
sentation in Parliament has been reported previously,
Since Tudeh has identified itself with nationalism in the present
oil issue, its candidates may well be elected together with bona fide adherents
of the National Front.
Increasing Tudeh strength and a reported
Communist plot against the Shah have stimulated the new Iranian Chief of
Police to arrest thirty Tudeh members and to plan a further program of
repression, including the arrest of all Tudeh members now in key government
positions.
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WESTERN EUROPE
6. Italy chooses new Ambassador to Great Britain:
US Emb Moscow
27 Oct 51
RES
730
particularly useful to have
London.
3.5(c)
3.3(h)(2)
Manlio Brosio, Italian Ambassador in Moscow,
has been chosen to be the new Ambassador to
Great Britain. Brosio is said to have displayed
unusual acumen in evaluating Soviet policies.
Comment: In view of Mr. Churchill's suggestion
that a Truman-Churchill-Stalin conference be
held, the Italian Government may consider it
a man of Brosio's background and abilities in
7. French adamant on own terms for US North African commitment:
3.3(h)(2)
French Foreign Minister Schuman� in rejecting
a US revision of a proposed exchange of notes
between the United States and France on North
Africa, emphasized that a satisfactory text could
k.av
paii. ULU euuu r enc h redraft which he thereupon presented to
Ambassador Bruce.
The French Government insists that a satisfactory
exchange of notes must be concluded before ,it will pet mit a military survey of
Tunisia or grant military facilities in North Africa,
Comment: The French Government is insisting
on written assurances that the US will not interfere in internal North African
affairs. In the meantime, a United States military survey mission in the
Mediterranean has been refused a Tunisian clearance.
Growing discord between the Arab world and the
West is increasing French anxiety to obtain US approval of French policy in
North Africa. If such approval is not given, France can be expected to
attempt to curtail all outside influence in its North African holdings.
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