CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1951/10/27

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02739299
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: April 15, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 22, 2019
• Publication Date: October 27, 1951

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'ts "UP 6 HET
SECUR1Y1FORIATION
27 October 1951
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN ole
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE 4N CLASS
I
:DECLASSIFIED.
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
AUT � HR 0-
DAT
11EVIEWEE:
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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SUMMARY
FAR EAST
1. Resignation of Chinese Nationalist Premier predicted (page 3).
2. Indian Ambassador reports on Peiping regime (page 3).
3. Official statements give distorted picture of Burmese situation (page 4)
4. Dalai Lama endorses Communist program for the "liberation" of Tibet
(page 5).
SOUTH ASIA
5. Indo-Pakistani relations reportedly have improved (page 5).
NEAR EAST
6. British threaten to cut off Egyptian oil supplies again (nage 6).
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3.3(h)(2)
EASTERN EUROPE
8. Yugoslays seek UN resolution condemning Soviet-Satellite pressure
(page 7).
WESTERN EUROPE
9. Opportunity seen for non-Communist labor alliance as Communists plan
strikes (page 8).
10. Spain reportedly considering nationalization of British property (page 9).
LATIN AMERICA
11. Guatemalan Minister suggests renewal of campaign for British Honduras
(page 9).
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FAR EAST
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1. Resignation of Chinese Nationalist Premier predicted: 3.3(h)(2)
Nationalist China's Premier Chen Cheng will
submit his resignation for the third time before
the end of the year. It will be accepted and will
be accompanied by a cabinet s ake-up,
Chen Cheng is having trouble providing Chiang Kai-shek with
sufficient funds for his "personal expenses" because of the present tight
economic situation on Formosa, but the basic problem is "the struggh.
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for power" between the Premief and Chiang Kai-shek's elder son.
Ho Ying-chin, President of the Executive Yuan,
K. C. Wu, Governor of Formosa, and Chang Chun, head of the Political
Science Group, are mentioned as possible successors to Premier Chen.
Chang Chun, a classmate and trusted friend of Chiang Kai-shek, is the
most likely candidate primarily because the clique which he heads has
lost most of its powerful men and is, therefore, not a threat to Chiang
Kai-shek.
2. Indian Ambassador reports on Peiping regime:
3.3(h)(2)
The French Consul-General in Hong Kong learned,
Indian Ambassador Panikkar intends to sub-
mit to Prime Minister Nehru, that the principal
points of Panikkar's report Are as follows:3.3(h)(2)
(1) the Peiping regime is"effectively directed" by
Mao Tse-tung and it is "useless" to speculate on Chinese Communist
internal dissension;
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(2) the Chinese Communists regard peace in
Korea as possible only through withdrawal of foreign troops;
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(3) Sino-Soviet relations are "close" but Peiping
is not in "servile submission," and Soviet advisers are "strictly limited" in
their activities; and
(4) "most" CCP members regard only the Soviet
bloc nations as their friends and look upon other countries, including India,
as enemies.
Comment: Other evidence generally supports
these conclusions. While the Peiping regime has been faithfully and aggres-
sively Stalinist in behavior, its status appears to be superior to that of the
Eastern European Satellites; the degree of restriction imposed on the Soviet
advisers, however, is not known.
3. Official statements give distorted picture of Burmese situation.; 3.3(h)(2)
Prime Minister Thakin Nu of Burma told a press
conference in New Delhi, after his two day meeting
with Nehru, that conditions in his country were im-
proving daily. He stated that there were only
3, 000 to 4, 000 insurgents scattered about the
country and that their rebellion was no longer
"very serious," The Burmese also said that the
Insurgents had not received aid from China, which,
alme a taaintained a "very correct attitude" towards Burma. 3.3(h)(2)
Comment: These statements represent a deliber-
ate distortion of the facts. It is now estimated that there are about 18, 500
insurgents in Burma and Commander in Chief .Ne Win recently admitted that
theinitiative hadpassed to them. The remarks of the Prime Minister may be
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only an effort to maintain the fiction of Burma's "neutral" foreign policy or
to hide the Burmese Government's weakness. The extreme air of casualness,
however, which has been assumed by both the Burmese and Indians gives
rise to the suspicion that the conference between the two Premiers was of
greater significance than described and that important substantive decisions
may have been taken regarding Burma's foreign relations, particularly insofar
as they relate to Communist China.
4. Dalai Lama endorses Communist program for the "liber4tion" of Tibet: 3.3(h)(2)
Peiping radio has broadcast an exchange of tele-
grams between Mao Tse-tung in Peiping and the
Dalai Lama in Lhasa. Mao thanked the Dalai
Lama for his "efforts in implementing the agree-
ent for the peaceful liberation of Tibet. The
Dalai Lama had advised Mao on 24 October that the local government, monks
and populace of Tibet are giving the May 1951 agreement "unanimous support."
Comment: A delegation from Lhasa concluded an
agreement with the Peiping r�e7ini,e in May 1951 providing for Tibetan cooper-
ation in the extension of Chinese Communist authority over Tibet. It was
widely believed that the Dalai Lama, in refuge on the Indian border, would
repudiate this agreement, which deprived him of all significant power in
Tibet. However, by September the Dalai Lama had returned to Lhasa, under
occupation by Chinese Communist advance forces, and has since been ex-
pected to endorse the agreement. The Dalai Lama's adherence will facilitate
the consolidation of Communist control of Tibet.
SOUTH ASIA
Indo-Pakistani relations reportedly have improved:
3.3(h)(2)
According to the US Embassy in New Delhi, the
depth and sincerity of India's reaction to the
Pakistani Prime Minister's assassination, and
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the conciliatory statement on Indo-Pakistani relations made by Liaquat Ali's
successor have lessened tension between the two countries. A member of the
British High Commissioner's office has also expressed the view that Indo-
Pakistani relations are now better than at any time in the last four years.
Comment: Previous experience with Indo-
Pakistani crises suggests that Indian reaction to Liaquat Al's assassination,
however sincere, is likely to be brief. Pakistan's almost immediate return
to a state of apparent normalcy has demonstrated the ability of the government
to control the country; and identification of the assassin as an Afghan
national has minimized the possibility of armed anti-Indian outbreaks in
Kashmir. Accordingly, the Indians may feel little need to modify their pre-
vious policies with regard to Pakistan, and they may be as uncompromising
as ever when the UN Security Council meets to discuss the Kashmir case.
NEAR EAST
6. British threaten to cut off Egyptian oil supplies again:
3.3(h)(2)
The British Shell manager states that this action
would force the refinery to close within two or three days because of lack of
storage space. This would in turn shut down the producing fields and stop the
flow of kerosene and gasoline to Cairo.
The British military authorities in Egypt have
informed the British Ambassador that "their position in the Canal Zone is
untenable unless they receive a minimum cooperation from the Egyptians,"
Comment: The British-controlled pipeline to
Cairo was closed for one day on 23 October. Cutting off oil supplies would
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result in widespread hardships and a practical breakdown of utilities and indus-
try in Egypt. If this should be done, popular antipathy toward the British
would be heightened and public indignation would increase. 3.3(h)(2)
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Comment: Shishakli has been a potential target
for assassination ever since he engineered a successful coup d' etat last year
and became the man behind the scenes who really rules Syria. The motives
behind this reported plot would be personal revenge on the part of Colonel
Hinawi's relatives, and the desire to promote an Iraqi-Syrian union, which
Shishakli opposes.
There is no evidence of Communist connection
with this rumored plot. Shishakli has exhibited a generayheutralist attitude
toward the West. Shishakli's elimination at the present time would, however,
serve to increase the tension in de Arab world and might promote renewed�
agitation for Iraqi-Syrian union.
EASTERN EUROPE
3.3(h)(2)
8. Yugoslays seek UN resolution condemnin Soviet-Satellite aressur
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Comment: Since this action could be construed
by the USSR as a provocation, it would appear that the Yugoslays are more
confident of their_power position at the present time than they were last
spring, and that they doubt Soviet willingness to risk a general war.
Following the submission of their White Book
last March, the Yugoslays had contemplated raising the issue of Soviet pres-
sure before the UN this fall, but maintained that the precise timing of this
submission would depend upon the trend of events and upon Western support.
WESTERN EUROPE
9. Opportunity seen for non-Communist labor alliance as Communists plan
strikes:
3.3(h)(2)
The US Embassy in Paris believes that present
critical wage-price problems may soon result
in a national conference of French economic
groups from which the government will exclude
ommunis -con ro es eneral Labor Confederation. The success of such
a conference, which would include the Socialists, would make a strong non-
Communist trade union alliance possible. Some of the leaders, with
"astonishing" though perhaps "undue" optimism, are even talking of unification
of the major non-Communist groups "for the first time. "
Meanwhile, there are indications that Moscow has
given the French Communists a free hand for organizing an "economic" mass
movement devoid of "political antics." Strikes will probably be called during
the UN Assembly session in Paris.
Comment. The General Labor Confederation
dominates French labor largely because the non-Communist unions have
always failed to cooperate effectively. Virtually every political crisis in
recent years has been precipitated by the Socialistg)who feared General Labor
Confederation gains at the expense of the non-Communist unions.
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The Socialists, in order to prevent a Gaullist
accession to power, may now try to strengthen the wobbly Pleven govern-
ment by supporting such a national economic conference.
French Communists have consistently failed in
their strike movements largely because they were ordered to tie in political
objectives.
10. Spain reportedly considering nationalization of British property:
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The Spanish Government is considering the
nationalization of the Rio Tinto copper mines and
other British industrial property in Spain,
The government is
so repor e e 'rawing up a documented brief of Spanish claims to
Gibraltar which it will present as an "ultimatum" to Britain.
3.3(h)(2)
Comment: Some British Foreign Office officials
have expressed the fear that the 12-October Spanish note protesting Great
Britain's "unfriendly attitude" was a forerunner of further Spanish claims on
Gibraltar and possibly of a threat to expropriate the Rio Tinto mines.
However, there has been no indication that Spain is actually considering ex-
propriation of British property.
The Gibraltar question has long been one of the
favorite aind more effective diversionary propaganda devices of the regime.
Since Franco has little hope that the UK would give up Gibraltar even in the face
of an expropriation threat, this report may be designed to exploit the current
British position in the Middle East in the interest of a favorable policy toward
Spain by a Conservative government.
LATIN AMER IC A
11. Guatemalan Minister suggests renewal of campaign for British Honduras:
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Comment: Munoz Meany, formerly Foreign
Minister, is well known for his pro-Communist sympathies and his active
opposition to "colonialism" in Latin America. It is probable that he would
accept, and possibly solicit, the aid of European Communist elements in
seeking to establish Guatemala's long-standing claim to Belize -- that is,
British Honduras.
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