CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1951/10/11

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02733149
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: April 15, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 22, 2019
• Publication Date: October 11, 1951

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11 October 1951
Copy No. 4 7
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO. .
NO CHANGE IN CLAS
r DECLASSIFIED
CLASS, CHANGED TO:
4�,1 13
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AUTF-: H
-REVIEWER:
1061
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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SUMMARY
USSR
I. Set fighters confirmed in the Soviet Maritime Province (page 3)
FAR EAST
2. Presence of heavier Soviet-type tanks accepted in Korea (page 3)
3. Caucasian troops again reported in North Korea (page 4)
4. Withdrawal of Nationalist troops from Burma requires Thai or
French cooperation (page 5)
NEAR EAST
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5.. Security Council may further postpone meeting on Anglo-Iranian
dispute (page 5) 3.3(h)(2)
6. India's attitude toward the Anglo-Iranian dispute (page 6)
WESTERN EUROPE
8. US Embassy comments on French cantonal elections (page 7)
LATIN AMERICA
9. Comment on Argentine President's request for leave of absence
(page 8)
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USSR
1. Set fighters confirmed in the Soviet Maritime Province:
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Photo-reconnaissance missions on .21 S(3.3(h)(2)
tember confirm the presence of Soviet jet
aircraft units in the Maritime Province and
possibly Sakhalin. The photographs suggest
the possibility that at least one complete jet
regiment is based near Sovetskaya Gavan, and that at least one unit on
Sakhalin is also jet equipped. The possibility exists that conversion of
other units of Soviet Far Eastern air arms may be well advanced. Since
the Sovetskaya Gavan area is believed subordinate in strategic importance
to Vladivostok, there is a strong probability that jets form the principal
strength of air units based in that area. 3.3(h)(2)
Commpni--
It is now
estimated that 190 jet planes of one type or another are stationed in that
area, but the proportion of MIG-15's has not been established. These
planes are in addition to the jets nOw operating in and from Manchuria,
whether piloted by Russians, Communist Chinese or others.
Russian jet production now appears to be
sufficient to supply fighters for units located in peripheral areas
-,inatiding Satellites-- as well as for the protection of targets deep
within the Soviet Union.
FAR EAST
2. Presence of heavier Soviet-type tanks accepted in Korea:
On the basis of UN pilot sightings in th13.3(h)(2)
Pyongyang area since 1 October, the US Far
East Command has accepted the presence in
Korea of enemy armor heavier than the now-
familiar. T-34. Observing that these tanks
are probably organic to the Chinese Communist forces, FECOM states
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that they are probably Joseph Stalin I's and U's rather than the new
Joseph Stalin III. The possibility that the Joseph Stalin III may be
employed for testing is not to be discounted entirely.
Comment: Although the Joseph Stalin I and
II tanks --now superseded in the Soviet Army by the Joseph Stalin III--
mount a larger gun than their UN counterparts--122 mm, compared with
90 mm --their underpowered engines and _ the difficulties of the Korean
terrain, will do much to counter their effectiveness. In sufficient number,
however, these tanks will form an important addition to the lightly-armored
Communist forces in Korea.
3. Caucasian troops again reported in North Korea:
learned from inhabi-
tants of North Korea that 5, 000 Caucasian
troops (believed Russians) with 80 to 100 T-34
tanks were at Hamhung in late September. 3.3(h)(2)
During the same period "10, 000 Caucasian
mechanized troops equipped with tanks and heavy artillery were between
Yangdok and Songchon" across the peninsula in northern Korea. On 28
September "600 European troops in Chinese Communist uniforms were
moving from Pyongyang" southward.
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3.3(h)(2)
Comment: While the figures in this report
are probably exaggerated, it is further evidence of the considerable num-
ber of Soviet military personnel currently believed to be performing rear
area functions in North Korea. These troops may total as many as
20, 000.
The "Caucasians" referred to as operating
tanks are probably Soviet military personnel delivering armor to the
Chinese Communists and North Koreans.
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4. Withdrawal of Nationalist troops from Burma requires Thai or Ftench
cooperation:
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3.3(h)(2)
The US Embassy in Rangoon reports that,
although the Burmese Government would be
"delighted" to have all Chinese Nationalist
troops withdrawn from its territory, the
withdrawal must be accomplished without
antagonizi the Chinese Communists. Thus, the troops would have to be
conducted to the Thai or Indochinese border ostensibly as a retreat before
the Burmese Army. The Embassy points out, however, that both the Thai
and the French have been reluctant in the past to allow the entry of Nation-
alist forces into their. territory.
Comment: The Thai might be persuaded to
alter their position. The French, on the other hand, may be expected
to insist on internment if the Chinese enter Indochina.
It may be inferred, however, from an appar-
ently lessened Burmese concern over the presence of the Nationalist
troops and from the absence of new reports of their depredations, that
they are not now presenting the problem they did before their rout from
Yunnan.
NEAR EAST 3.3(h)(2)
5. Security Council may further postpone meeting on Anglo-Iranian dispute:
British UN delegate Sebb is seeking delay of
the next UN Security Council meeting in order
to ascertain whether Turkey, India and
Yugoslavia would co,-sponsor the draft re-
solution on the British-Iranian oil dispute
recommended by the United States and Great
Britain. ter he was informed that Brazil, India and the US would
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prefer to postpone the meeting, jebb agreed that if the necessary seven
votes were obtained by 12 October he would inform London that he pro-.
posed to request a meeting for 15 October.
Comment: The draft resolution calls for
early resumption of British-Iranian negotiations in accord with the prin-
ciples of the International Court provisional measures, or alternatively
for a mutually acceptable settlement consistent with the principles of the
UN charter. Since India, Turkey and Yugoslavia apparently desire to
see negotiations resumed, they may co-sponsor the resolution. Post-
ponement of the Security Council meeting, however, may offer some hope
for reaching a negotiated settlement.
6. India's attitude toward the Anglo-Iranian dispute:
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3.3(h)(2)
A high Indian official has informed the US
Charge in New Delhi that India approved
Britain's step in taking the Iranian oil ques-
,tion to the UN Security Council. He also
asserted that India had previously assured
Britain of its support for any Security Council move calling upon Iran to
cancel the order expelling British nationals from Abadan. India could
not, however, support a proposal upholding the International Court of
Justice interim decision in detail, since India considers the latter to have
been superseded by certain agreements reached during the course of
Harriman's mediation efforts.
Comment: The International Court ruled that
no measure should be taken to hinder the operations of the Anglo-Iranian
Oil Company, and that the management of that company should continue to
direct operations under a five-man Board of Supervision including members
chosen by both Britain and Iran.
India's desire to insure regular delivery of
its oil supplies, 95 per cent of which are imported, may outweigh its
natural inclination to defend Iran's assertion of national sovereignty.
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India might therefore be persuaded to vote for a resolution calling for
negotiations leading toward the resumption' of oil operations under .some
type of temporary management.
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WESTERN EUROPE
8. US Embassy comments on French cantonal elections:
(h)(2)
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The US Embassy in Paris cautions against
any inference from press reports that the
French cantonal elections held on 7 October
clearly indicated important losses of
popular support for the Communists or the
Gaullists. Elections were held in only half the cantons of France; none
were held in the Paris region where both extremes are strong; and the
Gaullists ran candidates in only about 40 percent of all the contests.
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Nevertheless, the marked shift to the right
in these elections will probably increase the government's reluctance to
make concessions to induce the Socialists to re-enter the coalition.
Comment: Although the Communists received
only about 24 percent of the popular vote, compared to their 26. 5 per-
cent in the June national elections, they are still the largest French party.
Furthermore, the apparent sharp drop in the Gaullists' share of the popu-
lar vote as well as the strong showing of the right-wing parties in the
present government, may make it expedient for the Gaullists to join later
in a coalition government.
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The Embassy has recently estimated that the
long-term prospect is for a more rightist government, but believes the
Pleven government is likely to remain in power through 1951 and that the
majority of its members prefers to strive for the re-inclusion of the
Socialists.
LATIN AMERICA
9. Comment on Argentine President's request for leave of absence:
President Peron's announcement that he will
ask a special session of Congress on 11 October to grant him leave of
absence until after the 11 November elections may represent at least a
temporary compromise with the armed forces.
the armed forces planned to demand Peron's
resignation and to replace the Peron-Quijano electoral slate with Colonel
(retired) Domingo Mercante and ex-Foreign Minister Bramuglia. The
present arrangement, whether dictated by the army or designed by Peron
for tactical reasons, may encourage the armed forces to defer any de-
cisions regarding Peron's ouster until after the elections have provided
a gauge for his popular support.
Peron' s announcement did not indicate who
would act as president during his absence. Legally the succession would
be Vice-President Quijano, who is ill, and then Rear Admiral Alberto
Teisaire, President pro tempore of the Senate.
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