CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1951/10/10

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02733148
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: April 15, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 22, 2019
• Publication Date: October 10, 1951

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10 October 1951
Copy No.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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SUMMARY
FAR EAST
1. Comment on murder of British High Commissioner in
Malaya (page 3).
2. Portugal acts to limit flow of military goods to China (page 3
NEAR EAST
3. Iranian Prime Minister desires to avoid Security Council
consideration of oil dispute (page 4).
EASTERN EUROPE
4. Yugoslavia attempts to circumscribe size and authority of US
military aid staff (page 5).
WESTERN EUROPE
5. French popular support of European Defense Forces confused by
East German "unity" proposals (page 6).
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FAR EAST
1. Comment on murder of British High Commissioner in Malaya:
$42,7 The US Consul General in Singapore
conclude h t the murder of High Commissioner Gurney on 6 October
will probably convince the notoriously noncommittal Chinese population
of Malaya that cooperation with the British is a dangerous policy.
The US representative also transmits the
unofficial views of the office Of the Commissioner General for
Southeast Asia that the incident will arouse the British Government to
a greater awareness of the serious Malayan situation, be a strong
boost to bandit morale, increase dissatisfaction with security operations,
and possibly call for substitution of stiffer measures.
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2. Portugal acts to limit flow of military goods to China:
in late September the Lis son
governmen instructed the Macao
authorities that an embargo on the shipment
ox military sue 'lies to Commu.ni eas was to go into effect on
3 3(h)(2)
1 October. on 26 September the avowedly anti- �
Communist Macao chief of police prevented the transfer of eight aircraft
engines from a Macao warehouse for possible sale to the Chinese
Communists.
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Meanwhile, the head of Macao's Economic
Services, P. J. Lobo, reportedly refused to announce the embargo.
He maintained that export trade with China could continue, inasmuch as
no export licenses are required in Macao.
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Comment: Lobo, reputedly political boss
of the colony with a sizable financial interest in Macao's smuggling
activities, has opposed any attempt to regulate the China trade.
Although Portugal has not recognized the
Peiping Government, it is anxious not to antagonize the Chinese
Communist regime, because of possible loss of the colony. While in
general agreement with the need for an embargo, the Lisbon government
has hitherto maintained that Macao, which depends on Communist China
for much of its food and even its water, is an exceptional case.
NEAR EAST
3. Iranian Prime Minister desires to avoid Security Council consideration
of oil dispute:
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Prime Minister Mossadeq prefers to settle
the British-Iranian oil dispute by prior
negotiations and to avoid Security Council
action. Mossadeq expressed this sentiment
in an interview with Assistant Secretary of
ee an nited Nations delegates, and added that the
strong St tement which he must make in the Security Council would
preclude successful negotiations. Therefore he suggested a delay of
six days during which an agreement could be sought.
Comment: There is no reason to assume
that Mossadeq is willing to negotiate on terms more favorable to the
British than those previously offered. Resumption of negotiations,
however, might avoid the dilemma of an Iranian refusal to comply with
a UN recommendation. The USSR would similar ily not be given the
opportunity of posing in the UN as the champion of Iran.
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EASTERN EUROPE
4. Yugoslavia attempts to circumscribe size and authority of US military
aid staff:
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The Yugoslav Government has requested
aMenclment of the US-Yugoslav bilateral
military aid agreement to specify that the
US military advisory group operate as
part of office of the Military Attache, and not directly under the
control of the US Ambassador. It also insists that the US military staff
total not more than 15 or 16, and that US observation of the use of arms
supplied by the US be confined to Yugoslav proving grounds.
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Comment: Although the draft of the bilateral
military aid agreement was handed to the Yugoslav Government on
5 September, Yugoslav efforts to circumscribe the size and authority of
the US military group have delayed its signature. The Yugoslav
Government has resisted a US compromise plan that the US military
supervisory group initially total 30 persons operating as part of the US
Embassy and responsible to the Ambassador.
Yugoslav military officials have also
attempted to limit the supervisory powers of the group. The Yugoslav
attitude can probably be explained in part as an attempt to avoid a
repetition of its experience with the Soviet military mission prior to
the Cominform break; it also reflects the regime's deep-rooted
suspicions of the West.
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WESTERN EUROPE
5. French popular support of European Defense Forces confused by East
German "unity" proposals:
The US Embassy in Paris reports that the
East German "unity" proposals have
confused the current of French opinion
favorable to the European Defense Forces
3Lan, but have not reversect it. The virtual absence of non-Communist
opposition to any German military contribution whatever is considered
by the Embassy as "perhaps the most outstanding feature of public opinion
development."
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Should the USSR demonstrate, however,
that it is prepared to make real concessions in its campaign for German
"unity," French public opinion "would be very profoundly affected."
Comment: US officials in Berlin recently
warned that the East German "unity" campaign might lead France to
reconsider its German policy. It is unlikely, therefore, that the
defense plan will be abandoned by the French Government under any
foreseeable international circumstances, inasmuch as this plan is an
essential phase of the integration of Europe. The French are in-
creasingly inclined to view such integration as essential.
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