CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1951/10/07
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
02733147
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
U
Document Page Count:
9
Document Creation Date:
April 15, 2019
Document Release Date:
April 22, 2019
Sequence Number:
Case Number:
Publication Date:
October 7, 1951
File:
Attachment | Size |
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULL[15602903].pdf | 305.68 KB |
Body:
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7 October 1951
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO. ----- -
NO CI-LAN5E IN CLASS. ?IC
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NEXT fr.:VEW DATE:
AUTH: HR 70-2
DAT F1EVIEWER:
;
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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SUMMARY
GENERAL
FAR EAST
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2. Chinese UN delegate discusses withdrawal of Nationalist troops from
Burma (page 3).
3. Communist armies on the Korean front appear well-supplied (page 4).
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5. British diplomat suggests postponement of Japanese recognition of
China (page 5).
6. French Air Force aids in beating off Viet Minh (page 6).
NEAR EAST
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8. Loss of Iranian crude oil being made good more quickly than
anticipated (page 7).
WESTERN EUROPE
9. France may review German policy in light of East German unity
proposals (page 8).
LATIN AMERICA
10. Argentine army may ask Peron to resign (page 9).
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GENERAL
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FAR EAST
2. Chinese UN delegate discusses withdrawal of Nationalist troops from
Burma:.
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During a conversation with the US repre-
sentative in the UN, the Chinese Nationalist
delegate indicated surprise at a report that
the Burmese Government might allow
a ona s roops o w hdraw from Burma rather than insist upon their
disarmament and internment The Nationalist official believed that, if
this report is true, his government might be willing to undertake the
removal of the troops in question from Burma.
Comment: All previous information has
indicated that the Burmese are adamant in their refusal to agree to any
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settlement short of surrender and internment. I
/the Burmese are becoming in-
creasingly aware of their inability simultaneously to contain the
Nationalist troops and conduct operations against domestic insurgents.
Therefore, it is possible that, in the overriding interest of internal
security, the Burmese are now willing to risk antagonizing the Chinese
Communists by permitting the Nationalists to leave Burma.
3. Communist armies on the Korean front appear well-supplied:
The US Far East Command observes that
"the determined defense, the expenditure
of artillery and mortar ammunition at a
relatively high rate and the physical
appearance oi prisoners of war testify to adequate, although not abundant,
food (and ammunition) supply� Winter clothing is reported as having
been partially issued to Chinese Communist forces, and North Korean
prisoners report such issues are expected "in the near future." FECOM
also notes that although the disease rate will rise with the coming of
winter, the improved supply situation should keep the enemy non-battle
casualty rate below that of last winter. In a final comment, it is
observed that "the estimated enemy morale and combat efficiency along
the entire front ranges from good to excellent. "
Comment: These observations by the US
Far East Command are in sharp contrast to those of recent Satellite
diplomats commenting on the civilian supply situation in North Korea.
FECOM' s analysis tends to support the view that combat troops enjoy a
high logistic priority at the expense of the civilian population.
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. British diplomat suggests postponement of Japanese recognition of China:
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Sir Esler Dening, who has been designated
as Britain's first post-war Ambassador to
Japan, believes that it would be to Japan's
best interests to refuse to establish
ic e a ions w either the Taipei or Peiping regimes "until
the situation clarifies." In an informal conversation with the US
Political Adviser in Tokyo, the British diplomat expressed the opinion
that a Japanese "commitment" to Taipei undoubtedly would cause later
embarrassment, "especially since the Chinese Nationalists are incapable
of reestablishing their hold on the Chinese mainland."
The US Political Adviser adds that Dening is
proposing to call on Prime Minister Yoshida within the next few days, and
that it is safe to assume he will advance this idea in an endeavor to in-
fluence the Japanese course of action on Chinese recognition.
Comment: While the Japanese Government
has given assurance that it will not deal diplomatically with the
Communist regime, there are indications that it would be amenable to
any suggestion that Japan's recognition of the Nationalists likewise be
postponed. This attitude is based both on a desire to maintain a limited,
non-strategic trade with Communist China, and on a desire to avoid this
controversial issue. Japan will undoubtedly continue, as it has in the
past, to support the Nationalists in various international organizations.
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6. French Air Force aids in beating off Viet Minh:
US Cons Hanoi Enemy attacks on the outer defenses of the
5 Oct 51 post of Nghia Lo in western Tonkin have been
SECRET beaten off. The airstrip at Nghia Lo, which
the French are now confident of holding, is
still in use and French aircraft have been very active. Viet Minh losses
are estimated at 1,000 killed, 2,000 wounded.
Comment: The French appear to have put
up a better defense of Nghia Lo than they themselves anticipated in view
of the fact that they were apparently willing two weeks ago to write off
this and other posts in western Tonkin whose loss "would not affect the
basic situation. " It is believed that the capture of Nghia Lo was
attempted by the Viet Minh as a morale-booster, as well as a source of
rice and opium.
NEAR EAST
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Loss of Iranian crude oil being made good more quickly than anticipated:
Expansion in the production of sterling crude
oil has been even more rapid than had been
anticipated. For example, Kuwait production,
which in June was at the rate of 24 million
tons annually, had by September been increased to 34 million tons
annually and is expected to rise to 40 million tons annually by early 1952.
British officials now anticipate that,by the end of 1952,sterling crude
production will be sufficient to replace the crude normally supplied by
Iran and to provide all that is needed for the expanded sterling refineries.
Comment: It had been anticipated that
Iranian crude oil supplies coTilaTr�x.eplaced with relative ease. The
real loss has been the closing of the Abadan refinery, the largest in the
World, which in 1950 had a refined output of nearly 25 million metric
tons. This loss will be partially compensated by new, refineries opened
at Fawley, England and Antwerp, Belgium. It will still be impossible to
replace immediately Abadan's 18,000-barrel daily output of aviation gas.
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WESTERN EUROPE
9. France may review German policy in light of East German unity
proposals
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US officials in Berlin are seriously concerned
lest the East German "unity" campaign lead
the French to reconsider their German policy.
According to reports from the office of the
US High Commissioner in Berlin, French
officials in Berlin believe that the USSR is '
now ready to accept free elections under four-
power control in order to achieve de-
militarization of the whole of Germany, the
East German press "is making a persistently
strong pay or renc support of a demilitarized united Germany," and
"most observers" in Berlin believe that the Germans would be strongly
attracted by an opportunity for truly free elections "at the price of" de-
militarization.
The concern of the US officials is heightened
by reports that the French Foreign Office possesses "secret instructions,
purportedly issued by the West German Chancellor's office, directing
that Germans living in the Saar and Alsace-Lorraine be encouraged to look
forward to a reunion of these areas with the Reich. The US officials
suggest that these "instructions" may be another form of Communist
deceptive efforts aimed at the French.
Comment: While the French Government is
not known to be reconsidering its German policy as a result of the East
German "unity" proposals, French political circles have shown wide-
spread interest in the possibility of a "new Soviet diplomatic initiative"
which might be particularly directed toward France. The pro-Government
press has reported opinions of "certain political personalities" that such
an initiative is "plausible." The mounting defense burden is already
forcing the French to reconsider many of their foreign policy commitments,
and the increasing instability if the present regime weakens the capabili-
ties of the Foreign Office for ignoring the still strong misgivings in
France concerning German remilitarization.
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LATIN AMERICA
10. Argentine army may ask Peron to resign:
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Comment: The extent to which the armed
forces and especially the army, which is the final arbiter, are prepared
to press the ouster of Peron at this time is not known.
This report, if true, would indicate an
advancement in timing of army plans which originally called for support
for Peron through the elections, postponing a decision on the future
course of action regarding him. There are reports that Merca,nte and
the army will attempt a coup in the future, but in the past the army has
attempted to avoid bloodshed.
Considerable maneuvering and political
tension can be expected to continue until well after the elections. In the
meantime Peron has increased his security measures.
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