CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1951/09/25

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02733144
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: April 15, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 22, 2019
• Publication Date: September 25, 1951

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25 September 1951
Copy No.
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLTZ-991-
I I DECLASSIFIED
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NEXT REVIEW DATE: 70 0
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DATE/71i!_ REVIEWER:
41
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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SUMMARY
FAR EAST
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3.3(h)(2)
EASTERN EUROPE
2. Yugoslavia asks right to command any UN operations on its territory
(page 3).
WESTERN EUROPE
3. US officials concerned over renewed Soviet campaign for German unity
(page 4).
4. Prospective aid to France inadequate for meeting US objectives (page 4).
5. Comment on Pleven government's defeat on minimum wage bill (page 5).
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3.3(h)(2
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FAR EAST
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EASTERN EUROPE
2. Yugoslavia asks right to command any UN operations on its territory: 3.3(h)(2)
The Yugoslav Government has recommended
a revision in the proposal for a UN agency
(Executive Military Authority) to direct UN mili-
tary operations in the event of future aggressions.
Yugoslavia suggests that the victim of the ag-
gression ould appoint the Supreme Military Commander of all troops on its
territory "unless otherwise agreed. " Using Yugoslavia as an example, the
Yugoslav UN delegate explained that in the event of aggression all foreign
troops on Yugoslav soil would have to be under the command of a Yugoslav
Commander even though the latter would be subordinate to a UN Command.
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Comment: As the US has conceived its function,
the Executive Military Authority would act as a centralized general staff
charged with full responsibility for the strategic direction and control of
military operations and with coordinating the contributions of UN members.
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Although the Yugoslav view that the victim of aggression would participate
in EMA consultations has been accepted, the Yugoslav delegate has heretofore
registered no other serious objections to the plan, which is now nearing Com-
pletion. The last minute Yugoslav objection suggests that Yugoslav leaders
have only recently realized that their government might not be in complete
control of UN military operations to resist aggression against its territory.
WESTERN EUROPE
3. US officials concerned over renewed Soviet campaign for German unity:
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3.3(h)(2)
US officials in Germany warn that the Soviet effort
to deny West German support to Western policy
objectives is probably moving into high gear. The
tentative opinion of the US officials is that the
current So'het-East German unity proposal, unless adroitly handled by the
West, will cause more trouble than previous unity offers. They point out
that the Western Allies will be handicapped in the contest for Germany if the
USSR maintains the initiative on the unity issue or wins substantial segments
of West German opinion to the view that integration with the West closes the
door to unification except through civil war.
Comment: The East German unity offer, with
its tacit implication that a united Germany could avoid participation in a new
war, undoubtedly appears attractive to many West Germans. The current
unity proposal is intended to capitalize on doubts of the benefits to be gained
from participating in European defense.
4. Prospective aid to France inadequate for meeting US objectives:
3.3(h)(2)
The ECA Mission to France is "firmly convinced"
that the 170,000,000 dollars which now seem to be
the limit of US economic aid to France for fiscal
1952 will not be adequate to maintain the level of
CUllUILLIC detiviLy eunsLuet ed by the US to be essential for building Western
defense. In view of grave inflationary pressures and the stringent financial
situation, France may be obliged to cut back its military program if sufficient
external resources are not forthcoming.
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Comment: On the basis of military plans for-
mulated in May 1951, the French Finance Ministry estimated required ,
economic aid for 1952 at 300, 000, 000 dollars. However, it soon judged that,
with heavy NATO and Indo-Chinese commitments, governmental instability,
and fiscal inefficiency, France would actually need between 400, 000, 000
and 500, 000, 000 dollars. Even before the House of Representatives acted on
the foreign aid bill, French officials expressed their belief that defense plans
would have to be cut back or spread over a longer period.
5. Comment on Pleven government's defeat on minimum wage bill:
The two-to-one defeat of the Pleven government
on the first reading of an escalator-type minimum wage bill will probably
lead to the posing of a question of confidence when the bill receives its second
reading in November.
The government, which had just decreed a 15
percent increase in the minimum wage, is firmly opposed to this bill as voted
because of a fear that it would be seriously inflationary, and thus would im-
peril economic stability and aggravate the rearmament burden. Growing
inflationary pressures indicate that the measure would soon lead to another
increase in the minimum wage, which in France directly results in a revision
of the whole wage structure.
The government has shown a willingness to com-
promise, however, and there is still no reason to believe that the middle-of-
the-road parties intend to allow a situation to arise which would enable
De Gaulle to come to power on his own terms.
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