CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1951/06/26

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02733140
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: March 18, 2019
• Document Release Date: March 28, 2019
• Publication Date: June 26, 1951

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26 June 1951
Copy No. -
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT N
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Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENC1Y
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SUMMARY
GENERAL
I. Comment on Malik's cease-fire proposal (page 3).
FAR EAST
2. Intensified enemy jet fighter operations noted in Korea (page 3).
4, Bao Dai claims extensive support among the Viet Minh (page 5).
5. Indonesia will be urged to include rubber in,embargo (page 5).
NEAR EAST
et,
6. UK el/Aborates its position on Iranian oil shipping dispute (page 6).
EASTERN EUROPE
7. Polish Army strength reported to be gradually increasing (page 7).
WESTERN EUROPE
8. Election losses not regarded as defeat for French Communist Party
(page 7).
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GENERAL
1. Comment on Maliks tease-fire proposal:
Although the manner in which Malik's cease-
fire proposal was made suggests that it may have been designed forAtiropa-
ganda purposes, it possibly indicates a Soviet desire to settle the Korean
War. If the latter is so, the USSR may have preferred to assume the role
of "mediator" because of its official position of non-involvement in the
Korean War. Even though Malik does not indicate what "belligerents" should
participate in the discussions itether North Korea would be accessible
to UN inspection teams, his propdSal is the first clear suggestion from the
Soviet Government that a cease-fire might precede the withdrawal of the
"foreign interventioniste'ar �iscussion of a general Korean settlement.
the Chinese Communist Government endorses Malik's proposa/ for a
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cease-fire in Korea. It is not yet clear, however, whether the Chinese
Communists will continue to press their demands concerning UN member-
ship and Taiwan as conditions for a Korean settlement. These demands
were not included in Malik's proposal, and they have been omitted from
Moscow propaganda and from informed statements by Soviet spokesmen
since early April.
FAR EAST
2. Intensified enemy jet fighter operations noted in Korea:
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The Far East Command views the intensification
of enemy Jet fighter operations during the past
week as a firm indication that the Communists
will continue to provide vigorous air defense
of the Yalu River border area. MIG-15's engaged UN aircraft on each
day last week except on the 21st, when bad flying weather may have caused
the lack of activity. An improvement in enemy fighter operations is indi-
cated in addition, by the fact that in each of three aerial engagements
during the week an F-86 was lost to enemy action. This sharp increase
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in combat proficiency may be due to commitment of a newiihighly trained
jet fighter unit to the Korean air war, an hypothesis supported by the
obserVation of ma markings on an enemy jet fighter group. Far East Air
Force's estimate of the total nuMber of jet fighters available to enemy
forces in Manchuria has ndt been increased, as there is insufficient evidence
to estimate accurately whether this unit is new or one previously active over
Korea and recommitted following further training.
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4, Bao Dai claims extensive support among the Viet Minh:
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In a conversation with US Minister Heath and
William C. Bullitt,, Bao Dal stated that he had
received expressions of loyalty and of readi-
ness to surrender from the commanders of
large numbers of Viet Minh troops. He also claimed that he had more ad-
herents in Viet Minh-dominated areas than in the areas controlled by the
French and that he was in constant contact with these supporters In ex-
plaining why these potential defectors continued their opposition to his
government, Bao Dai cited French insistence that they surrender to French
military commanders. He emphasized that no mass Viet Minh defections
would be possible until a Vietnamese army was created that could assume
responsibility for a sizable zone of operations.
Comment: Bao Dai has identified one of the
most important pioblems barring a satisfactory solution of the situation
in Indochina. Although French officials have constantly emphasized their,
determination to build quickly an effective Vietnamese army, their actio4
has been characterized by many delays. Plans for creating a Vietnamese
army are still in the early stages of development.
5.Indonesia izaju ecat_ELitalarjaks.pljejja embargo:
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The Department of State has instructed US
Ambassador Cochran in Djakarta to make it
"crystal clear" to Indonesiamerficisdis that a_
failure to embargo rubber to Communisl-China
will make it difficult for Indonesia to certify under the Kern Amendment,
Cm-1_1_914m Although the Indonesian delegate
to the UN has indicated that rubber has been excluded from the Indonesian
Government's list of strategic exports subject to the UN embargo, the
list has not yet been submitted to the Additional Measures Committee of
the UN. It is possible that, as la result of US pressure, the government
will either include rubber in its list or will supplement the list with a state-
ment that Indonesia is adhering to its historic trade pattern under which no
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rubber has been shipped to China. US Ambassador Cochran has suggested
that the Indonesians omitted rubber because they believed the US would not
force Indonesia to adhere strictly to the requirements of the Kern Amend-
ment,
NEAR EAST
6. UK elaborates its position on Iranian oil shipping dispute:
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The, US Embassy in London reports the state-
ment of a high UK Foreign Office official that
British technicians will be withdrawn from Iran
if the Iranians prevent oil exports because of
disagreement with the AIOC over procedures. The British estimate that,
because of the limitA in present storage cipacIty,ta closure of the Abadan
refinery would result after three weeks stoppage of on-loading. The UK
official stated that haaelieves there is some possibility that the Shah and
other moderate elements, supported by the Army, might be able to take
command of the situation after a period of threatening disintegration. The
Embassy comments that, apart from defensive tactics for the immediate
situation and apart from the possibility of applying economic sanctions
against Iran, the UK Government apparently has not yet evolved plans ibr
further action and remains greatly worried.
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7. Polish Army strength reported to be gradually increasing:.
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The US Embassy in Warsaw reports that infor-
mation presently available indicates a general
increase in the strength of the PoIith Army.
The Embassy bases its Opinion upon (a) personal
observation of new personnel, (b) continued increase in the use of new
trucks by the Army, and (c) repeated reports that older classes are being
retained in service and technician
* �
. �
is estimated at
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Comment: The Polish Army's present strength
180.000. as against an ancroximate 136 000 in.:January 1951-
that non-coms, 3.3(h)(2)
officers were being recalled to active duty from the reserves,
du ed for release from militar service were bein re-
specialists and
and that � t-n s
tamed,
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WESTERN EUROPE
8 Election losses not regarded as defeat for French Communist Party: 3.3(h)(2)
In the opinion of the US Embassy in Paris, the
decrease in the Communist popular vote (from
28.6 percent in 1946 to 26.1 percent in 1951)
can hardly be regarded as a defeat, Inasmuch
as the party has again demonstrated its ability to command the strongest
popular support of anyLparty in Frartt. Furthermore, the drop in Com-
munist voters does not iitdicate any loss in real party strength or capacity
for action.
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The Embassy estimates that French public
opinion has, however, begun to veer away from Communism, even though
the party was in a favorable position toVxpielt social discontent and the
desire for peace. The election results also demonstrated that the Inde-
pendent Communist Movement, which received only 20,000 votes, made
no important cut in the Communist vote. The extent of the Communist
popular vote would seem to point out that large segments of the French
people still fail to understand that the French Communist Party is an in-
strumentAuf Moscow. Communist losses were greatest in departments
where the party's strength has been traditionally low, and the vote fell
appreciably in departments where US troops are presentlytlocated.
Comment: A continuation of the shift in
French public opinion away from the Communists is at present doubtful
in view of the unfavorable outlook for adequate anti-inflation measures in
Franck. However, the bulk of the Communist electorate, which remains
convinced that the French Communist PartyAs the only dependable cham-
pion of low-income groups, considers that its first loyalty is to France.
It is probable that the French Communists will continue to watch carefully
the Independent Communists.
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