CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1951/06/06

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02733135
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: March 18, 2019
• Document Release Date: March 28, 2019
• Publication Date: June 6, 1951

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, 6 June 1951 
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 
146 
DOCUMENT NO. 
NO CHANGE IN CLAt3c3. 
f- 1 DECLASSIFIED 
CLASS, CHANGED TO.. "I 3 
NEXT REVIEW DATE.. 
11EVIEWER.. 
HR 7 
DKr 
Office of Current Intelligence 
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 
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SUMMARY 
FAR EAST 
New Communist jet aircraft reported in Korean theatre (page 3).  
NEAR EAST 
4. British hope to enlarge scope of oil negotiations (page 4), 
EASTERN EUROPE 
5. No unusual Soviet military activity in the Balkans noted by Yugoslays 
(page 5). 
WESTERN EUROPE 
6. Sharing of Western economic aid to Yugoslavia still unresolved age. 6). 
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FAR EAST 
1. New Communist let aircraft reported in Korean theatre; 
A recent Air Force operational summary 3.3(h)(2) 
includes a delayed report of a 10 May sight-
ing by a B-26 pilot of an enemy twin-jet 
fighter in northwestern Korea. The UN 
pilot "definitely identified" the enemy fighter as very similar to the 
German ME-262 (which bears the superffcial characteristics of the 
Soviet Type 8 jet). While inferior gunnery seemed to negate the pos-
sibility of air-borne radar, the enemy aircraft may have been vectored 
in by ground control. FEAF speculates that this third sighting of an 
enemy twin-jet aircraft may indicate the presence of a new type air-
craft in Korea "for combat testing, possibly with a view to adaptation 
for use as an all-weather night fighter." 
Comment: While no confirmation of the 
type or performance of these new aircraft has been received, it is 
probable that the USSR is conducting operational tests of newer types 
of jet aircraft along the Sino-Korean border. Additionallyjthere have 
been two sightings of enemy jet aircraft of an unidentified type believed 
to be Type 15 Soviet fighters. 
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Comment: While the ROK Government has 
publicly pledged itself to achieve overall unification of Korea and expul-
sion of all Communists, the continuing flurry of rumors concerning a 
UN "cease fire" at the 38th Parallel has greatly upset the ROK Govern-
ment and may have forced a softening of their unification policy. 
3.. Swedish Ambassador cites Communist China's vulnerabilities: 
The Swedish Ambassador to Communist China 
has stated that (a) China's military and in-
dustrial potential has been "greatly overrated" 
by Western nations; (b) the Chinese Communists 
are in "critical need" of shipping and a "very 
effective squeeze" could be placed on China if UN members agreed not 
to permit their ships to call at Chinese ports; and (c) Communist materiel 
losses in Korea are more important than their cisualties, as the Soviets 
would "affix conditions" for resupply of equipment. 
Comment: Although the Ambassador seems to 
give too little weight to China's manpower resources, his opinion regarding 
the effectiveness of a shipping embargo in "squeezing" Communist China 
is supported by figures which show that most of the ships calling at China's 
ports are Western flag vessels. Regarding Soviet conditions for replen-
ishing materiel losses in Korea, there are indications that such materiel 
has been and will be supplied on a cash or barter basis. 
NEAR EAST 
4. British hope to enlarge scope of oil negotiati rts. 
In reporting the British decision to send 
representatives of the Anglo-Iranian Oil 
Company (AIOC) to Iran to meet with the 
Oil Commission, US Embassy London states 
that the Foreign Office envisages an effort to identify and clarify the 
problems involved in nationalization before proceeding to definite 
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proposals. In this way the British hope to wean Iran away from its narrow 
attitude that any discussion must be within the framework of the nationali-
zation law. 
Comment: The British decision was made in 
answer to the Iranian aide memoire handed to an AIOC representative 
on 30 May which outlined Iranian plans for implementing the nationaliza-
tion law and which requested that AIOC comment on the plan within five 
days. Although Iranian Premier Mossadeq's reiterated willingness to 
receive company representatives suggests that the Iranians realize the 
magnitude of their problem and desire AIOC cooperation, the Foreign 
Office hopes that it will be able to weaken Mossadeq's determination to 
nationalize the oil industry seems unlikely to be realized. The arrival 
of the British mission, however, should pr vide Mossadeq with an ex-
cuse to postpone hasty action in implementing the law. 
EASTERN EUROPE 
5. o unusual Soviet military activity in the Balkans noted by Yugoslays: 
Yugoslav officials have informed Embassy 
Belgrade that they are convinced there are 
no Soviet troop units in Bulgaria. They 
also do not believe that a Soviet armored 
division has arrived in Constanta, Rumanian Black Sea port. 
Comment: The Yugoslav statement, as 
well as recent information frOm Western diplomats, tends to refute 
reports of unusual Soviet military activity in the Balkans. Recent re-
ports of the arrival of Soviet troop units in northeastern Bulgaria  
have also been largely refuted  
Constanta is known to be headquarters for the estimated 30,000 
Soviet troops in Rumania and is an important port of entry for Soviet 
equipment destined for the Balkan Satellites. 
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WESTERN EUROPE 
6. Sharing of Western economic aid to Yugoslavia still unresolved: 
UK Foreign Secretary Morrison, in an 
interview with US Ambassador Gifford and 
the chief US delegate to the US-UK-France 
talks on economic aid to Yugoslavia, stated 
that Chancellor of the Exchequer Gaitskill insists that the UK cannot 
provide the full 25 percent share being urged by the US. Morrison 
also expressed concern lest UK agreement to the 25 percent share set 
a precedent. He agreed, however, that official notification to the US 
of the maximum British contribution should be speedily forthcoming and 
agreement reached at the earliest possible opportunity. 
Comment: The three countries have 
reached substantial agreement on the many vexing problems involved 
in the program for meeting Yugoslavia's substantial trade deficit and 
they hope to coordinate this program with a $200 million investment 
loan from the International Bank. Throughout the talks, however, the 
UK Treasury has apparently remained unimpressed by Foreign Office 
reminders of the�urgency of the Yugoslav situation, probably owing 
to a preoccupation with the UK's own economic difficulties. The UK 
decision will determine the share accepted by the French, who insist 
that their share shall not be more than half that of the British. 
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