CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1951/05/04
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
02733123
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
U
Document Page Count:
10
Document Creation Date:
March 18, 2019
Document Release Date:
March 28, 2019
Sequence Number:
Case Number:
Publication Date:
May 4, 1951
File:
Attachment | Size |
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULL[15587375].pdf | 333.69 KB |
Body:
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4 May 1951
Copy No. CL -1
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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DOCUMENT NO. �
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
I 1 DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS
NEXT REVIEW DATE: �
A.IJTH: HF 70iit
DAT ia_eirr_g REVIEWER: _
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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SUMMARY
FAR EAST
I. Indications that enemy offensive in Korea will continue (page 3).
3. US Military Attache in Saigon sees UK-French cooperation going
forward at expense of US (page 4).
4. Burma contemplating complaint to UN over activities of Chinese
Nationalists in Kengttmg (page 5).
NEAR EAST
. Iranian Prime Minister is cordial but unyielding in discussions
of oil issue (page 5).
6. Greeks about to propose union of Cyprus with Greece (page 6).
SOUTH ASIA
7. India suggests US foodgrain offer may be unacceptable (page 7).
EASTERN EUROPE
8. US Department of State views on Oatis case (page 8).
WESTERN EUROPE
9, French Communists brand new "independent" group as government
sponsored (page 9).
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FAR EAST
. Indications that enemy offensive in Korea will continue
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The Far Eastern Command cites several indications
that the current Communist offensive in Korea
is actually designed to extend over a prolonged
period and to penetrate deep into South Korea;
(a) recent prisoner of war statements to the effect that the current
operation is planned to extend over two months and to consist of three
major attacks, (b) the-unlikelihood that the enemy would concentrate
27 newly-arrived Chinese Communist divisions in the west-central
sector if it had only the limited objective of driving UN forces from
the Seoul-Inchon complex, (c) a noticeable increase in tank sightings
and continued heavy, vehicular movement into forward areas, (d) an esti-
mated 400 percent increase in enemy anti.aircraft protection along major
lines of communications and ports of entry, and (e) continued attempts
to maintain North Korean airfields in a state of operational readines0.3(h)(2)
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neutrality in the East-West struggle and as an- expression of support
for Liberal Prime Minister Yoshida's pro-US policies. While local
issues and personalities strongly influence the vote at this level, the
major emphasis given the peace treaty question by all the parties prob-
ably was significantly reflected in the final vote. The results are being
interpreted by the Yoshida government as an unmistakable mandate for
proceeding with the US plan for concluding a treaty, with or without
Soviet participation. The poor showing of the Socialists probably
will force that party either to modify its three-point peace program
(opposition to a separate treaty with the West, US bases and rearma-
ment), or to face a split in its ranks.
3. US Military Attache in Saigon sees UK-French cooperation going
forward at expense of US:
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The US Military Attache in Saigon believes 3.3(h)(2)
that Franco-British politico-military policy
In the Far East is being developed and iMti-
ated without regard for the obligations and
interests of the US. He bases this observation on the exclusion of US
personnel from UK-French staff conferences held in South East Asia
since August 1950, the current "huddle" of De Lattre and MacDonald,
the installation of a British Naval Liaison Officer at French Navy oper-
ational headquarters in Saigon and the attachment of British field and
company grade officers to French units in combat.
Comment: The French do not fear UK inter-
vention in Indochina nor pro-UK feeling among the Vietnamese. They
fear the US in these respects, however, and may therefore be reluc-
tant to afford the US a greater voice in their affairs by including it in
joint discussions and operations. Moreover, General de Lattre Is
sensitive to any indication of a joint US-UK policy favoring more in-
dependence for the Vietnamese and, as a countermeasure, may be
seeking to enlist UK support for his own politico-military policies in
Indochina.
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Burma contemplating complaint to UN over activities of Chinese
Nationalists in Kengtung:
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The Burmese Prime Minister and the British
Ambassador to Burma have expressed their
deep concern to the US Charge in Rangoon con-
cerning reports that Chinese Nationalist troops
in Burma are being supplied with modern arms for use against the
Chinese Communists. The British Ambassador stated that he had re-
ceived information implicating US citizens and high Thai officials in
this matter. Prime Minister Thakin Nu, while making no reference to
US involvement, stated that these reports are being investigated by
the Burmese Foreign Office and, if confirmed, would leave his govern-
ment no alternative but to bring the case before the UN. Thakin Nu,
however, agreed to withhold an appeal to the UN in order to allow the
US Department of State to study the problem and indicate its views.
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Comment: A Burmese appeal to the UN re-
garding the three to five thousand Nationalist troops in Kengtung was
narrowly averted in the summer of 1950 after the US extracted an
order, which proved to be ineffective, from Taipei requesting its troops
to evacuate Burmese territory. Since then, however, there have been
numerous reports that these troops were receiving US assistance through
Thailand. /
/The Nationalists themselves, including
their leader)General Li Mi, are reported as openly boasting of US sup-
porttand their claims are generally believed by the local population.
Furthermore, Chinese Communist and Viet Minh propaganda has re- �
cently accused the US of utilizing Kuomintang "remnants" in Kengtung.
NEAR EAST
Iranian Prime Minister is cordial but unyielding in discussions of oil
issue�
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The US Embassy in Tehran reports that while '-
Iranian Prime Minister Mossadeq was cordial
andeager for US good will and assistance during
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his interview with Ambassador Grady, Mossadeq depreciated U$ aid
to date and asserted that if he had had his way, the Point Four program
would have been rejected aswholly inadequate. Mossadeq severely
criticized UK interference in Iranian affairs and stated that negotiation
with the UK over the oil issue was umiecessary as the Iranian Parlia-
ment had already acted.
UK Counselor Middleton, in reporting a dis-
cussion between the UK Ambassador and Mossadeq, stated that the dis-
cussion consisted mainly of "ardent protestations of everlasting friend- �
ship" on the part of Mossadeq. Although UK efforts to ascertain the
Prime Minister's views as to the next steps to be taken concerning
the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company were fruitless, Middleton gathered that
no immediate Iranian action to take over the company need be anticipated.
Comment: While Mossadeq's interviews with
the US and UK Ambassadors were cordial, he apparently has not de-
viated from his previously-held position that the receipt of revenues
from Iran's oil industry would make anyloreign aid unnecessary. If
his actions are equally consistent with his earlier statements, he may
well attempt to cancel US military aid and possibly economic aid as
well. Although he apparently has not yet formulated specific workable
plans on the oil issue, British reliance on the impression that Mossa-
deq is considering no immediate action would seem unrealistic in view
of his impetuous action on the issue to date.
Greeks about to propose union of Cyprus with Greece:
The British E 3.3(h)(2)
inbassy in Washington has in-
formed the US Department of State that the
Greek Government plans, to make a proposal
to the UK concerning union of Cyprus with
Greece, that is, Enosis. If the Greeks obtain an unfavorable answer,
they are considering raising the question at the sixth UN General
Assembly. Before doing so, however, they plan to consult the US.
The Department has suggested that the US Embassy in Athens dis-
courage the Greek Government from pursuing its plan.
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Comment: The US Embassy in Athens hag
repeatedly pointed out to the Greeks that it would be undesirable to
bring up Enosis in the UN General Assembly at this time. However,
Greek representatives in the U.S.see potential support for this peren-
nially popular theme in US public opinion, and have already, approached
several US congressmen. While US and UK opposition will probably
thwart the Greeks again, Enosis, which has widespread popular sup-
port in Greece, will be pushed by the Greeks at every opportunity.
SOUTH ASIA
7. India suggests US foodrain offer may be unacceptable:
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In speeches made on 29 April and 1 May, Indian
Prime Minister Nehru raised the possibility
that his government would refuse an offer
of US foodgrains if "unacceptable" conditions
regarding publicity and distribution of the grain
were attached to it. The Indian press strongly
supported Nehru's statement that his country
was not so "down and out" as to have to accept
conditions dictated by any foreign country that might sully India's national
honor.
Comment: Indians have previously expressed
their antipathy toward "strings" attached to offers of economic assig=
tance, and some of the above may be merely routine moves to eliminate
such "strings" from a US food bill. Nevertheless, in recent weeks
India has apparently been developing an increasingly independent and
antagonistic attitude toward the US and the United Nations. This has
been manifest in (a) Indian support for the 1 May proclamation convening
a Constituent Assembly in Kashmir in direct deftance of the UN Security
Council Resolution of 30 March and (b) the negotiating of two contracts
with Communist China for 100,000 tons of foodgrains9, of which at least
half will be delivered within two months. It is therefore believed that
India will make a strenuous effort to weather its food crisis without US
assistance.
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EASTERN EUROPE
8. US Department of State views on Oatis case;
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The Department of State has notified the Uf.3.3(h)(2)
Embassy in Prague that strong retaliatory
action must be taken against the Czechoslo-
vak Government regardless of whether Otis
was arrested in connection with a forthcoming espionage trial or is an
attempt to secure possible US concessions. The Department outlines
four possible consecutive steps designed to force Oatis' release: (a)
the prohibition of travel to Czechoslovakia by non-official US citizens
and the immediate departure of those already there; (b) the detention
or expulsion of former Czechoslovak consular personnel and other
agents in the US Zone of Germany; (c) an embargo on US exports to
Czechoslovakia; and (d) the blocking of Czechoslovak assets in the
US. The Department, agreeing with Briggs contention that a mere
protest would be futile, suggests that the first step be taken within
the next few da,ys.
comment: In connection with (b) above, US
High Commissioner McClOy warns that the possibility of Czechoslovak
retaliation in its ti-ade commitments to Western Germany must be
weighed, especially with regard to Czech exports of brown coal, which
is essential to Bavarian industry. Action to implement point (c) would
only affect approximately six million dollars worth of commodities, the
major item being cotton, since all other strategic exports are already
on the 1A - 1B embargo lists. A boycott of Czechoslovak imports into
the US, on the other hand, would eliminate a source of hard currency
which provided Czechoslovakia with nearly 37 million dollars in 1950.
Point (d) involves some five and one half million dollars on deposit in
US banks and an undetermined amount of non-fluid assets.
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WESTERN EUROPE
9. French Communists brand new independent" group as government
sponsored;
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Immediately following reports concerning the
formation of a new "independent" Communist
group in France, the French Communist Party
has asserted that this group is sponsored by
the French police and the American's. Citing the Reichstag fire as a
comparable precedent, the Communist daily Humanite called for "in-
creased vigilance, uncompromising and constant vigilance." Meanwhile,
Pesin, a former Communist mayor, is revealed as the leader of the
movement in the Department of Nord, and there is now every indication
that it is in large part a development of the Le Corre national deviationist
movement -- which has been operating within the French Communist
Party for more than two years. 3.3(h)(2)
Comment: The public Communist attack on the
new movement suggests that they consider it too serious a development
to be ignored.
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