CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1951/04/14

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02733114
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: March 18, 2019
• Document Release Date: March 28, 2019
• Publication Date: April 14, 1951

04-
Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2733114
1401
TOP El
14 April 1951
Copy No,
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
II"ENT NO
NGE IN CLASS.
.1,.f.301FIED
.",,;-:CE) TO: 77.;
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
TOP
Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2733114
3.3(h)(2)
3.5(c)
3.5(c)
3.5(c)
� rr Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2733114
SUMMARY
USSR
1. Collective farms buying milk in order to meet deliveries under the plan
(page 3).
FAR EAST
Sino-Viet Minh action predicted (page 4).
NEAR EAST
Iranian Prime Minister anxious about current situation (page 5).
3.3(h)(2)
EASTERN EUROPE
3.5(c)
WESTERN EUROPE
5. Possittle intensification of Soviet effort to weaken Austrian police (page 7).
-2
TOP ET
Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2733114
3.5(c)
11
Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2733114
� all
USSR
.1I 1, 11 "
1� 1
3.5(c)
t,U2
3.3(h)(2)
Comment: Collective farms deliver their
produce to the Ministry of Procurement, which in turn allots it to con-
sumers, including cooperative stores. In this case, the farms would
have hall to buy more than twice the amount of milk they produce and
then turn it over to the State, in order to meet deliveries under the plan.
This practice (which may be an isolated instance) produces plan ful- 3 3(h)(2)
fillment on paper, despite inadequate supplies.
- 3 -
Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2733114
3.5(c)
T�sAj).proved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2733114
FAR EAST
2. ino-Viet Minh actipn predicted:
3.5(c)
\the
Wet Minh plans to launch a limited offensive
before 20 April against the northern line of
the French defense perimeter in Tonkin.
The attacking force will include 2,000
Chinese Communist troops and will attempt
to cut French supply lines. Other action,
probably in the nature of feints, will be undertaken west of Hanoi and along
the Tonkin coast. 3.3(h)(2)
Meanwhile, French officers in northwest
Tonkin have told the US Military Attache that the column which crossed
the northwest border two weeks ago consists of one battalion of trained
Chinese troops, which are either provincial or regular Chinese Communist
forces or Chinese Nationalists retreating before Chinese Communist forces.
Elements of a Viet Minh regiment have been identified nearby, and the
US Military Attache is therefore inclined to interpret the incursion as
part of a joint Chinese Communist-Viet Minh effort to divert French
troops from th-4-DtIlta defenses.
Comment 3.3(h)(2)
that the Viet bfinh is planning a series of minor attacks on the
northern perimeter of the Delta, but no evidence is available to indicate
definitely that the Chinese Communists would commit a small force in a
limited action so near the center of French control in Tonkin. A Chinese
Communist broadcast of 11 April charging the French and puppet troops
with repeated intrusions into Chinese territory might be used to justify
the presence of Chinese Communist troops in Indochina. A joint plan,
which included the threat of Chinese Communist operations in northwest
Tonkin and was designed to disperse French forces and to affect French
morale, is quite plausible; a French force of more than battalion strength
has already ben transferred by air from the Delta to confront the incursion
across the border.
4
ToC.S3 ECRE�1'
Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2733114
3.5(c)
rr Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2733114
er 1/4./11.1Ca
NEAR EAST
3. Iranian Prime Minister anxious about current siituation:
3.5(c)
,
Iranian Prime Minister Ala has told US 3.3(h)(2)
Ambassador Grady that members of the
Maj Us are disturbed about the current
US-UK diacussions in Washington and fear
that the US might be induced to join the UK in forcing a solution to the
problem of oil nationalization. He added that the Shah and the Iranian
Government are disturbed by reports that-the British are stirring
up tribes in the south against Tehran and may even go so far as to supply
them with arms. The government has reportedly also heard rumors t
the effect that the British may se& troops into Abadan if they think thaQhe
oil company's properties are in danger. Prime Minister Ala stated that-
such action might serve as an :appropriate excuse for the USSR to move
into Azerbaijan under the 1921 USSR-Iranian treaty. Ambassador Grady
outlines what he believes to be the UK solution to the present difficulties,
(i. e., dissolution of the Karns, the appointment of Seyid Zia as Prime
Minister, and government by decree for an in.q-fibite period while the oil
Issue is settled) and states that radical political moves should be dis-
couraged as long as Ala continues to make the progress he is making.
Comment: For some time, the Iranian
Government has feared British intrigue among the southern tribes,parti-
cularly because the UK has traditionally attempted to consolidate its
position with these �nee-independent tribes as an additional protection
for its oil installptions. 3.3(h)(2)
T9PSEtET
Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2733114
3.5(c)
rr Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2733114
,Vgiar ..,1-1.CA 1
EASTERN EUROPE
3.5(c)
3.3(h)(2)
- 6-
T$C$1) SW-Mr
Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2733114
3.5(c)
oir,s4.0kpproved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2733114
1
WESTERN EUROPE
3.5(c)
3.3(h)(2)
rommeo: /Soviet attempts to neutralize
or control Austrian police officers, particularly those in Vienna, have
been intensified in.recent months. The sudden dismissals of Communist
police in late 'March afforded the Soviet element with an excellent opportunity
for an attempt to intimidate or "pack" the east 'zone police. Such efforts,
however, have occurred periodically during the Soviet occupation and this
latest attempt is probably :part of a long-range Soviet effort, rather than
one aimed at precipitating an immediate showdown with the government.
T,S) E
Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2733114
3.5(c)