CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1951/03/31

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02733110
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: March 18, 2019
• Document Release Date: March 28, 2019
• Publication Date: March 31, 1951

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 
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Office of Current Intelligence 
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 
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SUMMARY 
GENERAL 
1. Soviet attitude toward Foreign Ministers' meeting (page 3). 
2. US delegation's reactions to new Soviet CFM agenda proposals (page 3). 
4. US Embassy Moscow estimates Soviet reaction to Iapanese treaty 
draft (page 4). 
FAR EAST 
5. Lull in Indochina broken by"heavy" Viet Minh attack in Tonkin (page 5). 
EASTERN EUROPE 
6. Yugoslays opposed to any attempt to unseat Hoxha now (page 6). 
SCANDINAVIA 
7. Soviet official in Norway interested in Norwegian molybdenum deposits 
(page 7). 
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GENERAL 
1. Soyietattitude toward Foreign Ministers' meeting: 
By way of pointing out that major Western 
concessions on- preparing a Foreign Min-
isters' agenda could only result in Soviet 
advantage, US Embassy Moscow presents 
possible alternative Soviet attitudes toward holding a Foreign Minis-
terlmeeting. The Embassy believes that the USSR still puts con-
side able store by CFM meetings, at least for disruptive tactics � It 
is also possible that in the face of a firmly united Western opinion, 
the USSR would desire a Ministers' meeting to compromise on the sub-
stance of some of the issues at stake, and thus attempt to diminish 
the impetus of the Western defense drive. If this is the case, the Em-
bassy feels that Gromyko will, if necessary, accept a neutral agenda� 
The Embassy points out that if Gromyko will not yield, as Britain and 
France fear, it would be evident that the USSR feels no real compulsion 
at this time to contribute materially to any serious efforts to alleviate 
European tensions and at most is interested in a Ministers' meeting 
solely as a forum for propaganda. 
2. US delegation's reactions Soviet CFM agenda proposals 
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Ambassador Jessup, in commenting on the3.3(h)(2) 
new Soviet proposals of 28 March for a 
Foreign Ministers' agenda, expresses a 
belief that Moscow ordered this concession 
to be made at least partly in order to arrive at agreement within a 
reasonable time. The chiefs of the French and UK delegations clearly 
consider the new Soviet proposals to be a basis for reaching rapid 
agreement with the USSR on an agenda, and Jessup anticipated a "seri-
ous problem" in the tripartite meeting scheduled for 29 March. Jessup 
regards the latest Soviet proposals as "the first formal and serious 
break in the Russian position on anything of major importance," and 
reports that it was not possible to prevent the Western press from pre-
senting the Soviet move as a concession, 
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Comment: The new Soviet proposals 
can be expected to strengthen public and official determination, in 
both France and the UK, to press for a Foreign Ministers' conference. 
The Soviet concessions indicate that the USSR may compromise fur-
ther if necessary for the sake of achieving a Foreign Ministers' 
meeting. 
4. US Embassy Moscow estimates Soviet reaction to Japanese treaty 
draft: 
US Embassy Moscow expects a sharp 
Soviet reaction to the Japanese peace 
treaty draft. The USSR's tactics would 
be designed (a) to prevent the conclusion 
of the treaty on a multilateral basis, (b) to dissuade other countries, 
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particularly in Asia, from signing the treaty, and (c) lo disrupt the op-
eration of the treaty. In addition, the USSR would attempt to portray 
Japan as a US colony and a base for US aggression in Asia and also 
to capitalize on Asian countries' fear of renewed Japanese imperialism. 
China may be expected to advance the most violent opposition to the 
treaty. 
The Embassy anticipates that Soviet 
opposition to the draft treaty is capable of limiting achievement of 
US objectives in Asia, even though a number of states sign the treaty. 
The USSR would consider that it had gained an advantage if, by its 
opposition, several independent Asian states did not sign the treaty, 
and if Communist denunciation of the treaty crystallized Asian dis-
trust of US motives and fear of Japan. 
Comment: The USSR has already utilized 
almost all political and propaganda means at its disposal for opposing 
a "separate" Japanese peace treaty. However, if the USSR refuses 
to sign the draft treaty, it will thereby gain a useful lever for exerting 
pressure on the Japanese Government in the course of bilateral deal-
ings and later treaty negotiations � since technically a state of war 
between the USSR and Japan would still exist. If Communist China 
does not sign the draft, it will possess comparable advantages. It 
is conceivable that India, in particular, might not be willing to sign 
a treaty which was unacceptable to both the USSR and Communist China. 
FAR EAST 
5. Lull in Indochina broken by "heavy" Viet Minh attack in Tonkin: 
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The US Military Attache in Hanoi states 3.3(h)(2) 
that Viet Minh forces have begun a heavy 
attack at Mao Khe, 30 kilometers north-
northwest of Haiphong. The attack, which 
began during the night and was resumed at daylight, had been in pro-
gress for eleven hours at the time of the Attache's report, The Viet 
Minh push is directed against one of the weakest and most vital areas 
of the French-defended delta perimeter. 
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/ The Mao Khe area, hard 
to defend because of its position at the foothills of Vietl Minh-held 
mountains, lies close to the road and railroad which connect Hanoi 
with its supply port of Haiphong. Reports indicate that the weather 
in Tonkin continues extremely unfavorable for both air operations and 
ground observation. 
EASTERN EUROPE 
6. Yugoslays opposed to any attempt to unseat Hoxha now: 
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3.3(h)(2) 
In a 29 March article in the Yugoslav news3.3(h)(2) 
paper Borba, Vladimir Dedijer, secretary 
of the Yugoslav Parliamentary Committee 
on Foreign Affairs, expressed the fear that current internal strife in 
Albania may furnish the USSR with an excuse for armed intervention 
in the Balkans. According to Dedijer, a purge of individual leaders 
in Albania has been followed by collective purges of party organizations, 
which have resulted in an intensification of terror throughout the coun-
try. This situation is being exploited by certain elements in Greece 
and by Albanian emigre groups in Italy, who are parachuting armed 
men and dropping propaganda leaflets into Albania. Dedijer pointed 
out that Soviet propaganda has been accusing Yugoslavia of preparing 
aggressive action against Albania. He added that the actions of the 
emigres could provide the USSR with a pretext to intervene in "de-
fense of a small socialist country," and might be used as an excuse 
to launch an attack on Yugoslavia, 
Comment The Tito government has 
consistently opposed any external intervention in Albania on the grounds 
that the USSR might use such action as a pretext for armed aggression 
against Yugoslavia. Another factor bearing on the Yugoslav attitude 
may be an estimate of its inability to take advantage of unsettled con-
ditions to establish a pro-Tito regime in Albania.  
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SCANDINAVIA 
7. Soviet official in Norway interested in Norwegian molybdenum deposits: 
3. 
Comment: Norway succeeded in eliminating 
molybdenum (which is on the US 1-A list) from its 1950 trade agree-
ment with the USSR by persuading the Russians that Norway's sole 
molybdenum mine (at Knaben) had ceased operations for technical rea-
sons. The.present Soviet interest may stem from the fact that, late 
In 1949, a Norwegian business man informed the Soviets that additional 
molybdenum deposits existed and could be exploited. Although the Kna-
ben mine is now back in operation, the USSR is not known to have raised 
the question of molybdenum again with Norway. 
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