OSS: LTC ELLERY HUNTINGTON'S STAFF, 1942

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02730858
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 50
• Document Creation Date: October 23, 2023
• Document Release Date: August 10, 2023
• Case Number: F-2020-01166
• Publication Date: January 19, 1942

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By Oct., 127 agents trained and landed in occupied countries
by parachute or froms subs and boats. SOE had aircraft squadron
for its own use. Finance drawn from Treasury on secret vote
and Director of Finance presents his esimated expenditures in
a lump sum for each coming month and obtains Treas. sanction.
Other memo from S. to WJD
-/"The oppressed people must be encouraged to resist and to assist
"in Axis defeat, and this can be done by inciting them, by assis-
//ting them and by training and organizing them...
'Memo to WJD, 1/19/42
Solborg recc. that "after mature concentration and consultation
with the British, we have come to the conclusion that, in order
to achieve most effective and rapid results, the activities of
SI should be combined with SO from the very beginning...We
should like to have you agree to centralize all these activies
in our group..."
"We propose to give such men as will be selected to be sent
out for field duty an abbreviated course of training which will
be directed by Colonel Ellis and Major Brooker with Colonel
Solborg's, Mr. Bruce's and Major Goodfellow's contribution in
their respective fields." Recc. not accepted for SO-SI merging.
Solborg went to Lisbon in March 1942 to open SO office, and
development of his organizational ideas in BC then delegated
to Goodfellow. G took over officially from Solborg in 2/42.
Solbrog then served SO in Lisbon and London and NA, where he
was in touch with Giraud. He was later appointed military attache
at Lisbon.
Goodfellow was G2 officer in WWI. Then became Pres. and publisher
of Daily Eagle. As reserve officer, he was called to active
duty with G2 in June 1941. In August, he was appointed liaison
from G2 to COI and remained until his transfer to COI in 1942.
Goodfellow had worked for G2 with staff of ten men in days
before COI came into existence in charge of tasks which later
fell to SI Branch of OSS. Solborg, David W. King, Stafford Reid,
Kenneth Pendar and Leland Rounds were already on duty under
cover for G2. They later went to NA in pre-GOI days, Bolborg
as a businessman and others as Food Contral_affio_eza� Other
iraber of this group was Lt. Col. Warren J. Clear. He was seal
to.lar_Eat_aai_Zhilinpines in summer of 1941 to report on
th2_!-AY1-EL02111.1.2_A441.�REACAlcability of set intell
syiTeiTah that area. He escaped from PI bylitt-eit742, and
made a forced land.ing n company of-M-Burle , on return trip
frPort Dwas das�roved by Japbombers ancuiear
was �nit-. � :�. si eis mission from memory since all
Tls_papers destroyed. (liar now in R Division of Armx.
The work of all these men in this Period had to be strictly
under cover before Pearl Harbor.
4/1/42 - activation of COI Service Command to function as HQ
of military personnel assigned to COI. This authorized by
SEC .War on 2/23/42. At that time 51 officers included in this
command. Under this command, headed by Goodfellow, was a Service
Unit, and Training Unit under Lt.Col. Garland Williams.
At that time SA/Bruce separate from SA/Goodfellow
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iOrganization completely informal in these days. There were no
stricbly o-cserved branch lines. Recruiting, processing and
training all overlapped.
SO and SI then trained jointly. CommanderAllliam K. Vanderbilt
then XO to Goodfellow had as adjutant Sgt. (later Maj.)Frank
Ball and as asst. Engisn William Horrigan. They processed
military personnel without ref. to branch lines.
2 kinds of men then recruited by Goodfellow - those with
Quality of initiative to carry on iddividual missions. Those
chosen because they had the physical and psychological stamina
to act as members of guerilla forces
Goodfellow had small staff begin planning and recruiting for
!guerilla fighters as warly as 4/42. This staff included
Col. Ebright, Garland Williams, Maj. Serge Obolenski, Raj.
RiMell Livermore, Lt. Frank Ball, and Robert G. Stout.
\On 6/13/42, Sec.War ordered this activity stopped!
Goodfellow prevented from proceeding because of his own
dubious title. Until 8/19/42, G was officially chief of the
contact and liaison section of G-2, head of SA/G, G2 liaison
Ito COI, etc.
But in spring of 1942, Goodfellow did recruit key personnel.
Eifler Mission: When first recruited Eifler was Capt. in
charge of detention camp on Oahu. Joining Eifler were Coughlin,
head of rival company in Eifler's regiment on Oahu; also Eif-
ler's faithful Sg., Vincent Curl; Lt. Robt. Aitken, Capt.
Archie Chun-ming of medical corps; and Capt. Frank Devlin,
a young West Pointer.
Coughlin brought in Peers and "Montana" Chan, a Korean from
Montana; other original members of 101 were Phillip Houston,
Harry Little, William Wilkinson, Floyd Frazee, David Til-
quist, officers; and Sgts. Irby E. Mores, Charles F. Bruce,
Allen Richter, John R. Murray, George T. Hemming, Jack C.
Pamplin, Skywon Chang, Don Y. Eng, Fimce Haimson, Chan Hong.
TORCH: Through efforts of Solborg and Wallace Phillips, Carleton
Coon, Harvard aatrop. and explorer with knowledge of Arabic
was brought into organization. Coon and others brought in to
serve under Col. William A. Eddy, who was established at
COI chief/Tangier in early 1942. Role of OSS was to pull all
of these ops groups together into united front and to pro-
vide commo and coordinate intell and ops planning in NA for
DDay. SO and SI performed as team. Original COI team for
TORCH consisted of Eddy, then at Tangier under naval attache
cover, who at thome with Arabs, having been brought up in
Syria and Egypt; Donald Coster, former memb. of American
Field Service; Gordon Browne, who had spent many years in
Morocco as business man, sent to Tanginr by COI-SO but osten-
sibly as Vice Consul to American Legation; Joseph Raichle,
commo expert, and Coon. Coon was sent first to train at the
British SCE school in Canada before leaving for Lisbon and
Tangiers in May 1942.
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Other missions:under COI -
Nicol Smith to Vichy
Tolstly - T first proposed mission to Good. in 3/42 to discover
shortest possible route to China through Tibet in case of JaP
attack on India. T and Dolan both explorers and veterans of
Asiatic expeiditions.
L.0
os ngs - brought into COI early in 1942. Leader of Expedition
90, org. by COI and OSS to make surgey of the potentialities
of the Near East in helping to win the war. Political and eco-
nomic studies of Iran an important aspect. Authority for Exped.
90 came from CCS, 11/5/42: "To survey the situation in Syria,
to establish a communication system, cells of defense, and
information centers in Syria, and carry on psychological war-
fare propaganda." Also an oil expert was recruited to survey
oil situation in relation to future hostilities. More imme-
diate purpose was to organize SO and guerilla groups to harass
enemy in case Rommel broke through British lines. This maant
mmag penetration of Arab groups and getting their cooperation.
Hoskin to be accompanied by some 30 or 40 men recruited by
Lt. Andre Pacatte, early recruit in SA/G. Other early offs.
were Maj. George White, Lts. James Goodwin, Robert Schlangen,
and Ben Welles. Preparations in summer of 42. Hoskins commissioned
LtCol in July. Mission cleared by State Dept. and approved by
Donovan. Then order came to halt mission; JCS decided that
Hoskins should undertake a prelim survey before full mission
sent. Hoskins and White left in November. They were scarcely
out of town when entire missions called off. Major Pacatte
remarked that Expedition's motto was "Here today, Here Tomorrow."
Trucks, jeeps, guns, cases of typewriters and small plane requi-
sitioned by Hoskins and Pacatte, all waiting to be shipped
were raided by other missions, and the members of the party
scattered to otherx duties in SO.
Training program:
Based on SOB schools in Scotland and Canada.
In 1/42, began to secure title to 3 tracts of land for camps.
By 4/1 in operation under Garland H. Williams, an infantry
officer and former member of the Narcotics Bureau brought in
by Goodfellow to handle both SI and SO training. Recruits
were trained in small groups - 2 weeks in demo., weapons,
close combat; 2 weeks in raids, attack, sabbtage,; 2 weeks
in advanced work in security, organizing natives for sabotage;
one week in parachute school; one week in landings from vessels
and completing contact; 3 weeks in industirla sabotage; two
weeks in "social circulation work."
William attended SCE school at Oshawa, Ontario and patterned
OSS SO training on their program. Two Brit. instructors, Lt.
Col. R.M. Brooker and Major William E. Fairbairn came to this
country as advisors. In spring and early summer of 1942, COI
sending men to Ganada - membs. of Biller mission and Coon.
Also Cmdr. N.G.A. Woolley was loaned to COI by Brit. Navy
arid helped Donovan and Good. to organize underwater training
and craft landing.
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Equipment:
Good. took personal responsibility at beginning for some several
million dollars of SO materiel. Between 3/1 and 11/5/42, he
ordered 224 lbs. potassium chlorate; 875 lbs. lead shot;
another 3360 lbs. of potassium chlorate; 14 micro swithces;
25000 shaft assemblies; 5000 spring coshes; 4 million battery
cups with primer; 25000 metal containers for packets of pow-
der; 250000 ampoules of sulphuric acid for cigarettes; 3 and
half million rubber sleeves for use in pencils and other de-
vices?
Plastic production began.
Technical Development Sec. one of first estab., with its awn
priorities board headed by Lt. J.H. Rosenbaum. Money came from
Treasury. TDS predecessor of Itiogx R&D Branch. Also two radio
stations at Hollywood and Bellmore purchased and equipped in
G's name. Col. L.W. Lowman, COIls first Oommo chief brought
in by G to handle commo for all Spec. Activities. Lowman helped
develop first agent portable radio, done by radio experts
Maj. Henry Shore and Lt. Comm. S.H. Simpson, both of RCA.
Various sorts of special devices - inc. "Coon-Browne explosive
turd" perfected by TORO" team in NA
By 11/42, 48 OSS officers ready for SO ops
Rim
Recruiting:
SO sought men with language qualifications, knowledge of
special geog. areas, radio and mechanical aptitude. Names
furnished by Army and Navy recruiting offices, by foreign
groups and societies in America, by records of fortIgn origin
enlistments, etc. - Many were first and second generation foreign
born Americans. There was considerable jealousy in Gt. Britain
because of this. SOE seemed to resent and fear these forieng
language speaking recruits of mixed racial and social back-
grounds. In the field there were attempts to block their use.
Working with British:
LONDON AGREEMENT with SOE in summer of 42 made by WJD and G.
Paved by WJD talks with Hambro in London between 16 and 22
June, 42. Delineated areas of responsibilities. and "spheres
of influence" for American and British SO:
India, East Africa, the Balkans and Middle East were to be
province of SOE London with American liaison and assistance.
China, Manchuria, Korea, Australia, Atlantic Islands and Fin-
land to be province of OSS.
Joint handling of Western Europe. - would continue to be
under SOE until alImiktxxx joint military command came
into existence; meanwhile, SO would establish mission in
London and prepare SO organization for attachement to Amer.
Military command in training this organization. Recognized
that Americans could function in areas closed to British -
particularly Vichy.
Special ops. procedures in NA, also (inc. Span. Morocco) -
predominantly American sphere of ops. American head of SO to
be responsible for SOE activities in this area in anticipation
of TORCH. Existing British SOE would maintain close relations
with US SO chief and work under his direction.
But special arrangement for Bibraltar - outside area of American
SO NA mission.
Neither SOE nor SO to work in Russia. West Africa was to have
an American mission working through the existing British office
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Agreement on pooling of resources.
Brit. Maj. F.A. Freeth and R.W.B. Billinghurst were currently
working on SO production in NY under OSS John S. Russell
Also agreement on joint funding.
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9/43 - Huntington appointed 0/OSS/5th Arty, NA; took him
out of direction of Psych. War Ops. Title passed briefly
to Lt. Col. Edward Gamble, then Huntington 's XO. But
Gamble then ciFTFITTT-t-d-Algiers as 0/S0 and in October,
duties of Acting Deputy Director, PWO went to Joseph
Scribner.
Also in September, Dave Hal1-Iwo11 left on overseas mission to
Near and Far East for Donovan (see MILES0). His work in
Washington inherited by Scribner.
Scribner banker from Pittsburgh, partner in investment
securities firm of Singer, Deans and Scribner, and director
of National Assn. of Securities Dealers; Gov. of Pittsburgh
Stock Exchange; Dir., Investment Bankers Assn. of America.
In WWI served in Navy on mine sweepers.
Came to DO in 42 and served as Spec. Asst. to Dir. of Mterials
Div., WEB; Dir. of Minerals Bureau and Spec. Asst. to Dir.*
Genl. of Industry Operations
First Job in OSS - 4/43 - Materials and Supply Officer, SO
Conceived of his job in business terms.
OSS genl. Order 9 - created DDI, Magruder
DD/PWO, Huntington
PWO officer order 1, 6/8/43 - Huntington set up staff offices
to carry out overall function of PWO
But H. more concerned with establishment of OGC and activating
more SO agents than in branch organization. He believed that
in field branch lines were unimportant
But these org. matters did interest Scribner, whose orderly
mind was offended by lack of clear cut lines of authority and
the confusion existing between various branches. Decided to
make order out of chaos.
Policy Committee composed of Magruder; Charles Oheston,
spe . asst. to Dir.; Lowman, chief/commo; Elmo Roper, spec. asst.
to Dir.; Scribner; presented to Donovan a study of OSS an an org.
"Our first conclusion is that...the OSS is...a holding company."
Comm. reccommended that OSS would be most effective if restricted 0175-"61"
to intell, no ops (SO, etc.). But knew that WJD would not agree.
"that means that we must find a way to operate, under the JCS,
what amounts...to a holding company."
Also reoc. that Dep. Dirs. assume the functions of vice-presidelts
in corporation.
Comm. recc. on 10/2, creation of DD/Ops to be chr. of overall
Ops Comm and DD/PWO - and OPS STAFF to approve all ops.
On 10/10/43, meeting held at WJD's home to clarify proposals.
WJD stated at that time:
1) Deputy Directors were not to interfere with Branch Chiefs
administrative functions
2) They responsible for coordination, but not performance by
branches, and should report to Dir. only lack of performance.
3) WJD did not wish an additional echelon between branch ehiefs
arid himself.
4) DD IL would not have power to fire and hire.
Therefore attempt to out ops branches off from direct access to
WJD faile .
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/Geo. Sharp replaced as SO/WE by his assistant F. Bayard Rives
when S. transferred to AMG assignment in France at request of
0 John McCloy; Rives an intl. lawyer first practiced in firm of
I Wintrhop and Stimson, fluent in French and Spanish
V Rives in constant contact with Vanderstricht in London about
qualifications of French SO men
London SO theoretically directing Algiers SO with Pflieger as
liaison, but in practica Algiers independent, though responsible
to Ike in London
V:ipril 10,44, Davis To Algiers as Chief of SPOO
Sept. 1, 1944 - 25 Jed teams in France,
also 41 undercover SO in France
Viug. 14, 1944 - Gamble went into France
info and picking up OSS teams
18 from Eng, 7 from NA;
with 7th Army getting
Aug. 30, 1944 - 1292 tons to France, 532 of drops by SO
Fall 1943 - Ike decided to use 05$/NA for ops in So. France. But
DO had trouble getting slots for transport to NA for men to be
sent to France. WE section had already skimmed off best candi-
dates. Downey had trouble finding even 1G men he finally sent
to NA for French ops.
Jan. 44 - Pflieger, innt former Acting SO chief, then Asst. X0
to Glavin; appointed SO liaison from London to Algiers.
V-SPOO,N.A. set up in an Operations Room (actually some Nissen
Huts and tents with teletypes to OSS and ISSU6) in 5/44 as the
vexclusive agency in MEDTO to handle coord. of resistance in So.
"Franca. SPOC was joint SO/SOE under SHAEF and G3 - directed by
IPAnsety and Davis
'French participation in SPOC consisted of attachment of consid-
erable no. of French officers and NOOs to establish liaison with
40' Mavis in So. France
v7 Jed teams sent from GB to NA in 5/44
�---SPOC problems in So. France: non-existent transportation system;
v widespread demand for arms from *any conflicting resistance groups
"0/44-8/15/44 alone, SPOO dropped 447 tons of supplies and 206? agents
"Liquidated 9/9/44 - Only bright spot in SO-SOE relationship
� "Separate SO operation from SPOO planned in Algiers - ETOILE - planned
by Huntington and executed by Peter Dewey in summer 44
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West Europe:
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Major recruitment under direction of Major Geo. Sharp, AOA
WE/SO. Sharp a lawyer with Sullivan Cromwell. Father had been
US Ambass to France. Success of SO recruitment for WE in 43-44
due to his expertise on France.
Following is Sharp's plan for pre DDay ops, written 10/29/43
r (c.
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Sharp Plan, cont.
"Intelligence Requirements:
Identifications, location of leaders of underground groups
and resistance groups: location, nature, defense of military
installations, communication, centers (see appendix no. 1),
location of small air fields, beach defense regulations...."
Recruiting of agents for France and Low Countries involved
delicate political issues. Besides the Gaullists there were
many other resistance groups of varying political hues and many
resistance centers were discovered after DDay. As Lincoln's
War Diary for OSS/Eto remarks of May landings of the 1st Army:
"They soon discovered that there was a good DeGaullist organiza-
tion in the Manche of which there was no record in the Kardex
files" Other surprises were less pleasant. French agents who
went to England but who were not identified with DeGaulle found
that they couldn't work with OSS independently of the British.
The same issue occured in DO. On 5/12/43, Huntington cabled
Canfield in London that individuals and groups of officers re-
cruited in this country for France are apprently exepcted to be
made part of British organizations and asking whether or not
these officers can be assured that they will be "handled by
Americans." These French recruits felt strongly enough on this
matter to make a condition of it before signing up.
Another problem was the matter of appropriate military rank
for many distinguished and mature men.
Some SO were taken from a pool of French speaking officers
at Fort Begnning
Once these agents arrived in England, arrangements from there
were ruled by the principle stated in the London Agreement of
1942, providing for British supervision of underground activi-
ties in France until an American Command was set up for the 2TO.
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Meanwhile SO in England had charge of final training and screening
of SO agents. Later in the field SO/SOE was iniLegrated into ex
isting networks.
There was a tendency on part of French speaking officers
in US Army, particularly those who were recent arrivals, to
carry over old political antagonisms into their new work.
Frustrated for years perhaps, they wanted, not unnaturally, to
settle old scores and to be assured that the particular resis-
tance of their affiliation was the one SO/SOE would support.
Thus internal quarrels were interposed in an already complicated
situation and a miniature three way dispute, on the lines of
the larger British-French-American differences, was only averted
by screening out those Frenchmen who could not submerge their
party feeling into the larger issues.
This took time. Propsects from French speaking centers like
New Orleans and NY were canvassed on a no. of recruiting trips.
SO files list a long who's who of France in America, and many
of these were chosen, commissioned (since they were not allowed
to operate as civilians), trained and shipped to GB. A further
problem was that many of the agents who volunteered merited
rank of field grades. Yet only 2nd Lt. slots were avilable -
this was ture of all those recruited for Jed teams.
The Jed teams were first proposed by the British. They
were one American and one British officer, one French officer
and one US or Brit enlisted man as WT op. Their job was to
organize the resistance. The director in London was Lt. Col.
Carlton-Smith, head of Milton Hall, SCE training center, and
Lt. Col. Henry B. Coxe,Jr., SNO/London. DO's responsibility
for them began writh recruiting and ended with training and sup-
ply. This was done by the regular WE/S0 staff through fa1143 and
spring 44.
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As early as 5/43 plans for Jed teams were contemplated Ex
21Ex2zi in DO and London. By 8/43 tentative requirements for
the plan were drawn up; and by 9/1/43, Gerald Miller of WE/S0
wrote to Freeman Lincoln, DC/SO that "The So recruiting objec-
tive is...44 officers for staff, 50 officers fluent in French
for teams, and 50 enlisted men for WT operators. The staff of
General Devers has Approved the Jedburgh Plan. G-2 has been in
terested to the extent of requesting OPD to transport 30 men
regardless of the transporation freeze. London feels that the
entire success of OSS in the European Theater will be judged by
General Devers on the success or failure of adcomplishing the
objectives of the Plan."
A memo from WJD to Branch chiefs dated 10/11/43 states that
the Jed Plan was given highest priority for ETO. He therefore
ordered that all branches turn over specified slots for offi-
cers to WE/S0 until requirements for Jeds was filled.
The goal of 94 officers and 50 enlisted to be dispatched
by 12/43 was achieved through the coordinated effort of the
Dep.Dir./SSO Scribner (Goodfellow apparently Dir.SSO), by
fomf
Col Connely of Personnel Procurement Branch, by Mr. Hland of
the Sec. Off., by Major Alderdice, X0 of the OGs, Lt. Colonel
Gamble of PWO; and Lt. Colonel Franklin Canfield (sent to Wash-
ington by SO London for the express purpose of recruiting Jeds
and Officers to be attached by Army staffs; and by O. Sumner
Williams, appointed by Scribner to coordinate this rush job.
The WT operators were trained by Larry Lowman, C/Commo,
and Lt. Colonel R.T.Silzmann, WE/S0 planning officer assited
in interviewing and screening trainees. The OGs also helped in
training.
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The British helped by appointing Col. Skilbeck of the SOE
school in Canada for temporary duty in DC to help train the
crew once picked. A long and detailed correspondence between
Canfield and Joseph Haskell SO/London, reflects the problems
of the period - whether to take volunteers expert in everything
ex. French or to choose men primarily for language ability; whether
recruits could acquire enough French in 2 weeks to pass as French-
ment or whether it would take longer to llok for linguists than
it would to drill French into the recruits selected. This was
a burning issue. By 11/2/43, Canfield could report to Haskell that
59 officers chosen as team leaders were in training and ready
for shipment. One in GB, they would received more trai,ing in
SO/Soe schools under direction of Maj. John Tyson, SO.
Lt. C.P. Frank of SO helped process Jeds and served as their
adjutant. This was a feverish period with Sharp and F.Bayard
of NE/SO
Rives bearing most responsibility; Canfield attached to their
occ-37.2111c_2121.2_221411.s_to expedite the program and keep in touch
Nehq with London; Sgt. Warren Delano in WESO office to assist Sumner
Williams who was coordinating the program there. IgtxxRrxxic
All Jeds came in temporary duty without equipment while waiting
securit: and qualification checks. All were parachutists; all
had French background; all from Fort Benning and Camp McCall.
They were cleared through H.H. Bennett, Personnel Officer of
SSO. They got overseas through Lt. Col Harold W. Fuller, SO
later del:Arty comm. Jed training, England.
In an order of 12/20/43, Jed ops was summarized as:
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WW1:
through the efforts of Lt. Colonel (then Major) Harold W.
Fuller, SO, who later became deputy commandant of Jedburgh
, � ,
training in England.
The role these men were to play in the support of
operations for the Invasion of Northwest Europe was defined
in an official order dated 20 December summarizing the
42inal p
ans (see exhibitttached).
"It has been decided that 70 Jedburgh teams...will
provide the strategic reserve with which S0E/S0 can
create-and tontrol offensive action 'behind the enemy'
lines on and after D-Day where existing communica-
tions, leadership, organization or supplies areHin7_
_adequate,-orto carryout such- additional specific
tasks as are demanded by the military situation.
'"Jedburgh teanswillHnerMaily consist-of three men,
of whom at least one will be a native of the country
in which the team is to operate. Teams will consist
of a-leadera Aecand-in-eomth.and both of whom will
normally be officers, and one wireless operator.
!IT.he principle fUntiiOn of'jPdburgh teams-is that of
liaison with Resistance Groups. Leaders and seconds-
in command of teams should have a.sound working know-y,,,,,
ledge of:Ytheilanguage of the country so that they can
give instruction and orders where necessary. It is
not the intention that Jedburgh teams _will necessarily.
- usurp. the authority oflocal.leaderso'but it is felt '
that the arrival of Allied soldiers, in uniform, behind
the enemy lines, will have a marked:effectran,patriotic.
::.Mordleand that these -teams. aP-a focus'
for local resistance.
"As -a, gtne-raI rule,' Jedburgh to willbC :scia't c.n--;7 to.
those areas where there are known to be actual
� tial resistance elements. _,Their function w;11 7
'according'tt-the nature of the group to which
� sent and ma/ include any or all of the following:
i).-'*Organiiiition-joVa' group fOr guerilla activity.
14). EVAPPI4G,agrPuP
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The orders also deals in detail with zones of ops., equpment,
specific tasks and targets for Jeds, and for coordination and
direction by SOB/SO and commo with SOE/S0 HQ, England.
All Jed program activities, however, were only a part of
overall recruiting of regular SO agents for France. On 9/1/43,
Sharp wrote a memo to Wm. Mudge of SO personnel, stating the
immediate need for 50 more agents, 25 MT operators to go with
them and 10 officer observers of "superior intelligence." In
addition, 50 officers to serve as leaders of Jedburgh teams.
For these officers, Sharp wrote; "They must be prepared to be
parachuted in uniform behind the enemy lines, be experienced
in handling men and if possible have served in an active theater;
must have aptitude for use of small arms weapons; have a good
knowledge ofFrench."
Staff offs. were also needed, both for London and field HQ.
Also training officers and 16 officers to conduct service func-
tions for SO. All of these were in addition to officers needed
by the OGs. Sharp's memo condlues: "Time is of the essence."
Sharp's office in DO also handled relations with the French
Military Mission, concerning status of French officers in train-
ing in US whom OSS was attempting to recruit. The terms on which
these officers were released by the French command were:
That they remain members of the French Armed Forces on
detached temporary service for a specific mission with OSS;
that liaison with the French military authorities should be
permitted at all times, "within the proper limits of security
and protection;" the French High Command was to be notified, al-
ways wit-in the limits of proper security, of departure of the
mission for which these officers were being trained.
By 11/43, Sharp was reporting to Lincoln, acting c/SO on
dispatch of 81 SO trained men to London. By 2/44, Wm. Davis,
who succeded Lincoln as Chief SO reported to MJD that of these
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81 after further training, 46% had been accepted after passing
last hurdles, a rate of acceptance far higher than British
had been able to reach. Yet this figure still shows much wasted
effort and time. Finally by summer of 44, Washington was able
to drop its responsibility for French recruiting when a tripar-
tite staff was set up, responsible through SOE/S0 command to
Koening of FFI acting under SHAEF, to carry on netwmtk of agent
activity sparked to life by British and US efforts.
BY 9/10/44 there were 80 Jeds in France, but aside from them
only 46 other SO agents remained in France. Control of Special
Force Detachments in France passed to Koenig and plans were
under way for using as many as were qualified for SO/Germany.
V By 4/2/45, 227 BO men had returned to DO from ETO of whom
/118 had been transferred to FE. This processing under Harrison
VT. Barrows, Ops. officer ETO
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29 October as follows:
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PSPECIAL
OPERATIONS
PLAN FOR OPERATIONS IN FRANCE
REFERENCES: P.G, 55/1. 1.943 and Implementation Study
Psychological Warfare in Southern France.
,
OBJECTIVE:
SITUATION:
MISSIONS:
PLAN:
(r-50.5-0t,0
Al we/6-d
A1fi4.d. icv2,093
for
Stimulate resistance: Organize and equip resistance
groups: disruption of lines of communication and
supply: coordinate activities with military
operations in direct support thereof.
a:,' The majority of the French people are in
passive resistance to the German occupational
authorities and to the German controlled
-French Government�.'
A,- 'strong., organization .for, :resistance
and-
sabotage: has "been�louilt.:.upL.I.n.,all,.of.,,.-1?rance
the �British.
� .
11umorous ..French,resistance'''GroUps -have-rboon
's ,organizations...�in all -of ...France:
their.offectivetrength., is 'not�.definitely
known and varies widely from community to
2cm:1'm-unity depending';on...the.,,typo of leadership.
13ritish. SO E has �preferred - to :concentrate
:their � efforts.. in _Northern :France,' :and it is
therefore,--necessary :fez! P:, t0 ...bring: 'about �
. a unified organization in 'Southern Franco,
-Supply Eind 'equipit,,.:and',..to coordinate �
resistance group activities in Northern
and Southern Frapda through joint SO-SOE
action.
TO carry our operations -upon special targets
: Of military sianificance as designated by.';:.:
Military Commanders.
To equip, unify resistance groups, and
'coordinate' their, activities.' jtith_, the plans
of the Military ',Cotmaxider.�::
� . To' Sabotage:sources of�key:materials, plants
-'hjlanct:other targets of_:military significanee.
To destroy or disrupt lines of communication
:and.'supply:in..accordancti with plans :of the_ ,
-military 'commander.'".
(1) For specific targets see
to thiO...plan.
Appendix No.
To -introduce into France, prior to
minimum of '12 azont opc rat 5, v
l'for recruitment, liaison,
equipment,', of teams for -:apc.Icific
sub otajG A =Imbrium of one wireles s operator
:with equipment to accompany each agent 'Opera-
tive. S (c, E
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1
b. To int:App- roved for Release: 2023/01/11 o02730858D�Day a
,minimum or ivorricer observers to serve as
-eontact with underground leaders, to report
,upon matters: of organization, equipment,�
discipline, and toordinate:Withthe plans
of the Military:Commandert-lwirolep
operator with equipment to:acCoMpanY'eaelk
officer observer.
0. To form, train and introduce into France
�teams,composed..of.:_
-"l'OffiCer','Leador
1 Officer or. E/M, second .in command
,.(to be obtained from-French. command)
1 'Wireless. Ope -rator
,just prior_to, or. on ,D-Day.,for.the_purpose
of liaison With other groups, to act as guides
whore necessary, and coordinate efforts of .
resistance grouPs on and, after fl-Day.. To
Coordinate and guide'efforts ef-operaticinal
groups in .ncoups-de-main".
- To introdUce into Trance at-titeS 4ibtati'd by
the Military situation, Operational Groups
totalling ,29 officers, 171 enlisted men, for
the purpose of tarrying out 'flooUP-demain",
destruction of installations of military value
and ether limited objectivesl_in accordance
with the Plans -of' the Lilitary Commander.' -
To form, staff groups (35, officers.), and enlisted
rpersennel, Which will be attached' to-Army,' Corps,
or Division Staffs in the field for the purpose
of carrying out the plans of the g1,4arY
Cotmander-by Means of EL.', d. aboVo':,
PERSONNEL SUPPLIES AINavgglaprg.NT REqupmEsTsl_
Officers
PertonnelPieLni:a.. lo-
b* 10
35-
'
e.35
E. M.
10 (Exelusive'of personnel
10 required for staff,
eommunications, liaison,
171- ' "80 Base of-OPeratiOns-.)
88
,
Equipment: A M1nimUM'of-1.00 radio Seta:- IndividUal equipment,
weapons, etc., to be supplied at SO Base of Oper-
ations of,119,,officers,.314 men between 1 November
1943,-tO'l Debember-1943. -Thereafter, from Bases
to Operational Areas as dictated by the Military-
situation. ,
-Supplies:. Not subject to estimate beyond an estimated initial
supply of 651 lbs. per man. Same as nbov. To Ix,
furnished by Army depots at SO Base of Oporationz...
TRANSPORTATION REQ:UIREYMITS :
Air or water transportation should be made Immediately.
available for the transportation to SO Bases of
Operations of 119 officers, 314 men::.between1 November
- and 1 December 1943. ThereafterifrotiBases to
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Western Europe:
Related at all points to SOE, since England base for ops. in
WE - Was necessary for SO to have permission and goodwill of
SOE in order to operate.
ondon Agreement - 6/42 So-SOE pact, but it was still only
1"possible for SO to send limited missions to explore possible
'fops until Directive from the JCS in 12/42 giving OSS authori-
bfzation to carry on ops. in any area where the theater comman
'der wanted its services.
win early 43, small group of SO officers in London. At that
vtime a modification of the London Agreement was arranged and
,set forth in an Operational Agreement signed by Charles Hambro
rand Col. Huntington (ATTACHMENT)
Through this arrangement, SO obtained a toehold on the SOE
ops already underway - at that time SO/London had only 10
men, while SOE already numbered 6000 on its rolls.
The only way SO could begin was to attach their officers to
the WE section of SOE on a temporary basis to learn the ropes.
In 43 these officers included, Lt. Col. Paul Vanderstricht, who
had be_en_h_ead of the WE desk in_ SO/DC, Capt. William Grell,
Capt. Paul 1:5P11nn, Lt. Col. Franklin O. Canfield, Maj. Henry
Coxe, Lt. Col. John A Bross and Maj. Robert R. Doddrige.
DO always maintained the view that SO should always maintain
its own identity, no matter how closely it collaborated with
SOE. Therefore, in addition to those attached to SOE, SO main-
tained its own skeleton staff in London - Bross, Lt. Col.
George E. Brewer, Lt. Col. G.W. Embury, Col. Joseph F. Haskell
and Col. Charles S. Vanderblug,
This mission acquired real first prestige when on 6/4/43, it
became a military detachment headed by Lt. Col. David K.E. Bruce
under General Devers' orders. Later on 11/11/43, in order to
keep SO control in line with SOE, then 'under COSSAC, Su was
itself put under COSSAC.
The only thing SO could do in 43 was to supply badly needed
personnel and materiel to SOE and to try to get in on the
planning of future operations on a joint basis. SO was first
established as an operational unit in 8/43 when the first offi-
cers dropped into France. The number of agents continued to
increase in 43 and 44 in cooperation with the Maquis so that
there was a resistance network supplied and ready by D-Day, to
carry out specific tasks of demolition and harassment while
allied armies were landing and securing the beachheads.
SO/London also controlled a large number of individual French
native agents dropped into the country and supplied by SO.
They received their orders from Grell, an American of Belgian
birth who recruited, briefed and Maintained contact with hun-
dreds of natte French agents. Much of this activity was car-
ried on without the knowledge of the French resistance, SO and
SOE considering their security dubious and not wishing to run
any greater risk to their agents than necessary.
Similar ops with native agents were carried on in Norway and
Denmark.
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There were thus three separate group of agents sent into the
continent by SO/SCE:
Their own operatives known as ;section, sent to set up commu-
nication "closed" circuits unknown to the FPI;
French agents known as RP section, dropped, supplied and run
by SO/SOE;
Jedburgh teams of mixed US-French-British who organized resis-
tance groups in France, equipped them Rnd supervised their
activities, working always under the instructions of the local
FFI, who in turn were instructed_froM London.
Starting with a few teams in E/4' the Jeds increased to a
45 American officers and 100 enlisted men by late summer.
v"SO/L got another boost in 10/43 when, after Col. Joe Haskell's
vtransfer to the OSS detachment, he was able to get the services
vof the 492nd bomber group attached to the 8th Air Force, to
/carry out SO missions. Jos. Scribner of Uashington shared in
./this achievement, which made it possible for SO to carry out
'independent sorites and fulfill the work la&d. out at its packing
/station set up at Holme.
1/In 'ilashinton, the year 43 was one of feverish recruiting acti-
vvity. In England, Col. Haskell was the key SO figure ot this
time. He was a regular army officer who had inside connections
'with staff officers in London through his former position as
vAsst Chief of Staff, G-5. It was through Haskell's effort in
'that post that the OSS det. was set up, giving its respectable
/status and the right to requisition supplies and use regular
/military channels. Haskell also secure increasing nos. of planes
/from the 492nd BC once he had secured its use for 083. 64 planes
"eventually became available to SO.
In 1/44, SO and SCE joined organically to operate as a unit.
Brig. Mockler-Ferryman and Haskell had equal status in this
merger which controlled ODS. heading toward DDay - included
Jed teams, individual agents of SO and SOE, the Operational
Groups, the 492nd BC (inc. supply drops). The admin staff was
modelled on Eisenhower's Staff, with complete integration of
planning and ops. and sharing of planes available to either
side. HQ was original HQ of SOE Baker St. This arrangement
lasted until France fell entirely into allied hands, then SO
pulled out of Special Force HQ for ops. in Germany, while re-
maining under SPHQ for ops. in the Scandinavian countries and
Denmark.
As London HQ became more and more active it,' 44, relations with
DC became more independent and by DDay, London relied on DC
only for men and supplies. Plans were completely under Ike
and his staff, as Gen. Marshall had forseen they would have
to be when he made his suggestions for the drafting of OSS'
charter Directive from the JCS in 12/42. Liaison with SOE/DO
was maintained through Col. Bouverie, general hedd of BSC/DC
The attachment of SO officers to the allied armies as Special
Force Dets. was worked out in London. As noted in Lincoln Free-
man jar Diary: "The general conception of the function of an
SF Detachment was that it would serve as a liaison between the
field forces and SPHQ in London for the planning and execution
of strategic missions by resistance groups behind the enemy lines."
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On 6/1/44, SO staffs attached to US field forces and simi-
lar SUE staffs with British armies were designated as Special
Force Detachments and assigned SF number; with the OSS des-
ignations as follows: b.r.s�ds-imierg
ci-DobeleATitcse
va- om Ago - b,44, mmoim
1st US Army Group SF Bet 12 -
First 7S Army SF Bet 10
3rd US Army SF Bet 11
9th US Anny(ptud044) SF Bet 13
Un-named Army SF Bet 14
By 6/30/44, 100 SO officers were in these dets, operating
as liaison between resistances and the ARmy, picking up info.
from the resistance as the Army progressed in France, carrying
out necessary sabotage ops and directing ushc ops on the part
of French groups whom they had supplied with materiel. Inter-
ference v:ith enemy comma and transport lines was, the object
of most of these ops. One important contribution was the
role played by Det 10 in solving the myster of V1 and V2 bombs.
Contacts established by this Bet in the Cherbourg peninsula
provided the key info on the launching sites and working of
these missiles.
By early Sept., 80 Jed teams o:?eting in France. One American
Jed found the plans of all German defenses of Lorient and St.
Nazaire and worked his way through German lines with them to
3rd Army HQ.
Also 100 SO agents operated behind lines before DDay. This
followed the British example of infiltrating French speaking
agents as fast as possible.
1/The SO packing station at Holme, handled supplies from DO.
lAt its peak 365 enlisted men were on duty at Holme where
Jpacking of containers and packages increased from 15,000 in
Vthe first 6 mos. of operation to 48.949 three months later.
'/These containers carried 300 pounds of materiel each and were
vdelivered in 2717 sorites by air to the ontinent.
/In 9/44 a planning and operations comm. was set up in London
vto act as a link between WE and MED So. Shortly after this,
vthese two theaters were combined to form European SO. Maj.
O.S. Eubank was head of ESO desk until his transfer oat of
vS0 in 3/45 when Capt. Harrison T. Barrow was appointed to
vthis office. DO'S responsibilites by this point consisted
mainly of reprocessing returning agents and record keeping,
/under reports officer R.T. Brake
SO Branch report for 1/45 follows:
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Under Thtt- ritAUwe. 4.^nA
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"II THEATER:ACTIVITIES
� E1150
1. TiT/SO
(a) Pre,ress
.� 1. The SO Branch in. ETO has.boen uncl.rcoing�-
a considerable re-organization, - Every effort is being de to develop-::
specie' operations into Germany and Central Europe.
2. A study of.Czechoslovakian.2eSistance
prepared for'USSTAF with a view to obtaining permission for. 192nd r
rEombardmenteGroup (H)�to.flisupply opertione to clandestine groups,
in-I:bray/a and �Bohemia. �
3. Attempts to,arm Danish Resictanco are
progressing favorably; and the briefing and training of SO agents
to be used inside Germany are being successfully effe;ted.
4. "Zeetings have been held with mombera o
the giret Allied Airborne Army, and Staff Officers from SFIQ
� and SI Branch OSS, to discuss SO participation in a projected airborne
operation. It is conte=lated that SO participation will take the
form of effecting "hit and rung tackec and. securing operational
intelligence for the Airborne Corps concerned. �
5. Tasks assigned to SO by the Planning
Section are:
To contact dissident Germans and overrun foreign
worker. -elements which can be placed at the disoosal
cif-Arpy =Its canorne operation for
�
the purpose of obtaining operational intelligence and
assistance in the form of guides and labor.
To maintain contact by VI/T with OSS radio station,
London, and Si representatives concerned in tha
operation. One SO officer and two El from the
Central European section will be engaged in the
operation and it is the intention of this section
to follow very carefully the development of this
pirborne operation.
�6. Members of the 'Astern'Europoan Section
have been engaged in the final liquidation of =FT, which was
closed dawn as of 1 December 1944. However, OSS interesto in Franco
are still being carefully followed.
7.. Captain Edwin A. Willard as appointed
Chief, Planning Staff, vice Lt. Colonel Canfield effecs:
:2 November 1944.
FIELD BASE "T" has been cct
-(b)- Achievements, Awards and ComMandations
-1. Achievements
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Operational 0
antivitv' n"4"4.- -" of e fo llowing:
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(a): Contact has 1,a_zaintainesilrcth len�-c-iltrated
into the Ruhr during the early part of Saltember. Two
other agents we preparing to join him in the near ttture.
Two VIssetshave bgen delivered to safe addresses in
terlin. Briefing and docuMentationfor tad azents is
urinT7-ray and the nets are expected to be operating in
near future.
,:Twoe_zents are beinz trained -and briefed to enter Southarn
Germanyand Austria.' Thoir ha to establi4
,contact with resistance groups, andrrango to supply'
with materiel and equipment,
,Sabotaze in Jutland has been .undertaken on a larze ccale�
durin:z.Nover.� Gorman-tt-oop movements hava becn
substevntially. M.L2TIG AerocL-emo 17T
nuccessfully attacked by sabotelLro on 2 Nova7r.- Two
hangars, about 30 aircraft, and a spacial aero mechanical
Hworkshop with all tools, etc. were destroyed. :An officers
'canteen vas also blown up, and .any Ge=ans were killed
and injured. :On 6 1:ovemborpatri0t5 took ono of the
laroeat ferries and delivered it ,t Zwaden.."
This raport also summarizes air operation in ESO for the year
1944 as follows:
"III SUPPLItS
L5.2.
TE/SO,
(a) Supplies dropp0d4
:The 492nd Bombardment Group (11) ceased
. Carpetbagger operations as of 1.8 September 1944; therefore there':
- were no Az:erica-a air operations for OSS since that date. The
following a re -the figures for the r,calendar year 1944.
-4
1. .-:Aircraft missing on missions to:
. Belgium 4,
Denmark 1
' Franco ,13
,11orway-.�
Poland �6 ',Trae-40e 2'.
Bodies dropped on missions to
Belgium
Containers and packages dropped on .mission t�:
Belgium: 1436:: :containers
'Denmark...- ' 104
France ::. 23,324- , n .
- Norway : , 456 ' 10 , Cif,(5:
n:
Poland -..:. 1,084-
.._ .
38
France 377
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Supplies rui.nishnri o'cri
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ill/41:J
95-1/2 Prance 3,055-1/4
Denmark'. '5-1/4 Poland -1191/2
romay
53-1/2
Bodies picked -up and delivered on Pic44p.missions,.
Belgium
-France
5
176
:Picked up
ti
� 5 dolivered
61
'Nurbor of cortioo (noopr,sfol and non-audoc4;aul).to
'Ji.cagium-� 35 France :-2,595.
Denmark' 25 Poland 108
. 61.
rae:in7 station prorTess
'1 Containers packed during the year 50;675
2. Containers delivered during the
calendar year to:
492nd Bombardment Group (H): 14,125
RIF 23,691
Reseca-ch and Experimental (British) 34
8th USAAF (Day Light) 5,298
EDATC (Norway)
(a)- Supplies - general
1.- Plans are being made to supply ITUOlan Partisans in
Northwest Italy from a base to be sat up in:..the Haute-Savoie region
of France.' It is estimated that this bate will need,enoughnuppIies.:
to -completely outfit 4002 an. H
is expected :that the ,following diSposition ui
-bo made of::the,enlisted.Hmen at the packing station at Th2:
3.140
�
to be
shipped to the Far East approximately
1.January).94.5.
72 to be returned to:the:Army'in:ET0.
0 -:to .remain for ppesible Use in operations.
Of the 140 earmarked:for'tho Far East2-20.enlisted
men and one officer'will-be sent from'Lendon-to Caserta to:open up
- a packing station in Pita-Florence Area Of Northern Italy and Uill
_ _ .
then proceed to the Par East.
2.VED/S0
:(a):, 1Lass drons were Made fra,2,L1 I
Norc.%fbzr, 1944. ,Althou:h 2S0 tons o2 r
.controlled areas:received.appro=i7atol:,
(b):Total.Supplie., fl
the month or -November..uas .repol-tcd �
not, jwi1.evervinc1ude the mass drops to
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- - � , _ _ _
(c) 'Discussions have ben hnld vitil the AAF. Mass
-air drops were Approved for_ReleasV023/.91/1,1 992730858
z...anes have been
flown from Brindisi to North East Italy. Arrangement for ::horter.
� haul_ flights were also discussed and suggestions as to bases in
the Siena area were fs,...ably received. No definite word has -
'been given, hovever.*
(d): The .2000 pounds of initial supplie�or the Annencyy.:
:base have bean dispatched by air 214 November. They were received
lin good order.
'(o) Tho 20 onlioted men and one offiepr wbo wgro
earmarked for FE/TO by London mill be sent to Caserta about
"1 January l914 to open.up.a.packing,statien in the PisaFlorencer
area of Northern Italy."
This same report mentions certain difficulties in the theater.
, worth noting:
IYIV DIFFICULTIES
. E
SO
:(a) -At present, the personnel questio is con.--;.
istituting the greatest- difficulty in tha SO Branch. The 17:2t that
-there is a dearth of German speakinr, officers to lye!Used in proposed
operations-into Germany has hindered present progress. The need of..
personnel to serve in:eliaison capacity between SO and SO' has also
boon felt.-
:(b) The question.of:obtaining suitable'aireraft
to undertake operations to'. the northern section of NerwaY, presonts-:
a grave problem at the. momcnts -
(c) The German increased _system of control and
-cheek-up has hindered the work of SO agents in Denmark to a marked
extent."
The notes in the rest of this :report concern operations now in progress
z7and therefore_ do not belong in this history, but it may be mentl,oned hero
� �
that Colonel William C Jackson, Operations Officer, 0 S Detachment London
was appointed in December 19144 to act as coordl,ntor of Ce7/:79 iic
:in Oermarvf-- SO ppora7tdons.lirOerr7skr are eondileted
those of SOE but close cooperation has been maintained; this in iio
,
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with Gen. Donovan s intention of ke eDing OSS indepdnden.t whenever
possible.
By April 45, pattern of continental ops becoming clear. OSS
activities in Norway, Denmark, CSR, air drops to RTarsaw, safe
routes in and out of Germany, were all part of the picture which
will have to �be put together in a postwar account of ops.
Outstanding ops:
0'2/45 report mentions exploits of Nick Jalick and Arthur Jibilian
.eduring the preceding five months in evacuating or helping to
eevacuate 343 American airmen from Mihailovic territory.
beIn Italy, the 5th Army Det., all SO, established regular sup-
'ply routes to the Partisans operating in the area of the Brenner
%/Pass and was committed to deliver 550 tons a month to this im-
/loortant element
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After transition from COI to OSS in 6/42, organization came
under JCS and WJD submitted 2 reports to Chiefs.
1) Report on functioning of COI for past year; known as "Rogers
Bible" because written by James Grafton Rogers
2) Submitted 8/28/42, basic estimate of OSS future potential
to Joint Psych. Warf. Comm. of JCS
8/11/42 - WJD set up Strategic Services Command under Colonel
Goodfellow, awaiting final directive on SO from JCS.
Appproval for this interim command obtained with aid of Gans.
Nelson, McNatney, and W.B. Smith. A week later this approval
withdrawn. Old line War Dept. officers feared provision for
what they called "Donovan's Dragoons." OSS not allowed to sup-
port guerilla units.
8/19/42 - New order; stated subversion and sabotage to be con-
ducted by OSS and endorsed OSS principle of guerillas, but it
obliged OSS to hold up plans before actually putting guerillas
into operatiton.
Not even SOE allowed to use anything resembling unified mili-
tary guerilla unit. ("Strategic Services troops")
But OSS during this period clearly authorized to send out in-
dividual SO agents, regardless of debate over SO guerilla
units. With Goodfellow involved with unit planning, WJD trans-
ferred Lt. Col. Ellery C. Huntington, Jr., then head of Sec.Off.
to be chief of SO (name changed from SA/G on 8/31/42)
Huntington a lawyer and officer in NY investmJ3nt companies.
Capt. in WW I and active in t7th regiment of NY State Guard.
Came to OSS in 2/42 and started setting up security system
for Donovan. Headed SOc.OFF until transferred to C/SO.
Budget plans for 50,8/42: Administrative staff of SO then about
200 army and navy officers of whom 18 in Washington and the
rest in training and schools. 11 attending British SOe schools.
Scattering of agents abroad. 4 school areas in operation, and
comma school being established jointly with SI
In summer and fall of 42, WJD and Good. continued to attempt
to get clearance for guerilla units from JCS
9/4/42 - Huntington formally appointed C/SO
Ops personnel then divided into SI under Bruce; SO under Hunt-
ington; and remainder under Good.
9/7/42, Huntington set up list of key SO positions:
Acting X0 - Lt. James F. Lawrence
Fiscal Officer - Lt. Col. W. Lane Rehm
Chief Ops. Officer - Lt. Cmdr. Warwick Potter
Project Liaison Officer - Capt. Franklin Canfield
Chief Recruiting Officer - Ensign Wm. Horrigan
Chief Training Officer - Capt. Geo.ximmax H. Brewer, Jr.
Advisory Dir. of Training - Lt. Col. R.M. Brooker
Asst. Ops. Officer - Horrigan
Asst. Training Officer - John A. Bross, Lt.
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1 Potter, Brewer, Lawrence and Bross had all been members of
.Huntington's regiment in the NY State guard. They were all
,
eager for action.
A bitter rivalry existed between this new group and the man
who stayed in Col. Goodfellow's command.
Huntington left on the first of his overseas trips for London
in 9/4/3, leaving SO in the hands of his deputy, Lawrence.
Rivalries with Goodfellow's office continued.
Huntington's first report to WJD on trip to England, 11/2/42
mentions existing missions: Eifler, Tostoy-Dolan, Hoskins,
TORCH
Suggested expansion of current Mission in China under Commander
Miles to include all other missions in the Far East and coor-
dinate their activities.
Projects suggested for future:
Philippines
New mission to replace one man(Smith?) at Vichy
*treater cooperation with the Free French resistance movement
while at the same time operating with other French resistance
groups, so as to lose no possible toehold in Western Europe -
this suggestion strengthened by memo from Lt. Col. Arthur
Roseborough dated 10/23/42, outlining, after talks with the
Free French, their need for materiel to supply existing French
manpower and British bases.
New missions to low countries, Scandinavia, Spain, Portugal,
West Africa, Cairo
Huntington pointed out that there were areas where the Briti,h
could not function as acceptably to native populations as
Americans could and he proposed making men available for such
areas
While the Strategic Service Command remained uncertain timIx after
withdrawal of its authority it August, two units, Maritime Unit
and Operational Groups split off before JOS issued final direc-
tive, (JCS 155/4/D) of 12/23/42 defining exactly what OBS opera-
tions could include.
Directive said:
SO not to operate in Western Hemisphere.
All ops in organized theaters were to be subject to direct
oontrol of theater commanders
Assigned continued responsibility of psychological warfare,
sabotage, guerilla warfare, and resistance liaison
But not guerilla units - "Unless otherwise specifically author
ized, personnel to be provided for guerilla warfare will be
limited to organizers, fomenters and operational nuclei of
guerilla units," - But no full units as in British Commandos.
This ended Strat. Serv. Comm. and Goodfellow became special
Assistant on Donovan's staff for All OSS, while Huntington
began to develop SO "organizers, fomenters, and oper.nuclei"
This order became known as ?The Golden Directive"
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Huntington order 11/28/42 - new SO appointments.
Operations Officer - Warwick Potter
area Operations Officer - John Bross
Admin. and Security Officer - J. Freeman Lincoln (who had been
head of Couriers under William A. Kimbel.
Executive Officer - R. Davis Halliwell (soon 0/a0)
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11/13/43 - Strategic Services Operations/Dept. Dir. created.
Replaced PWO, and Scribner named new DD/SSO.
Branch chiefs objected tot his new arrangement: SO, MO, MU, (7
Scribner as XO chose Lt. Col. Edward Bigelow
B had been asst. to Charles Cheston and Spec. Asst. to Dir.
on personnel; actually personell off. of all OSS until estab.
of Personnel Procurement Board in 6/43
B a Boston Banker.
Chief of Staff for Scribner, Lt. Col. William P. Davis; also
banker. Served with 108th Field Artillery in the National Guard
and later graduated as highest man in his class at command
and General Staff School at Leavenworth.
New Chief of SO, J. Freeman Lincoln, already long service as
member of SO staff.
Area officers, SO: Western Europe - George C. Sharp
North Africa - W.W. Downey
Far East - Carl O. Hoffmann
WV' (40151r)
CommanderiGreen - Personnel Officer, SSO
A
Now 1750 members of OSS fell under SSO.
Problems: Winter-Spring 1944
Eifler Mission asking for additional personnel.
Jed program given trop priority at request of Gen. Devers called
for 50 officer leaders and 50 WT men
Staff officers needed to serve with US field armies as liaison
between AEF,and French resistance orgs.
SO agents trained in sabotage were being requested and over
300 men for SO packing station at Holme, England.
Two srots of men operating in OSS
Ops branches attracted younger, less experienced activists.
More seasoned business men concerned with introducing business-
like methods into organization.; they were partial to intell.
functions, but operations required new and possibly dangerous
departures, not suceptible to complete organization.
Donovan's sympathy with the men of action saved them. Like
the operations men he too was a soldier and an adventurer in
ideas. What the studies and proposals of the protagonists
of the holding company idea had forgotten was the human equa-
tion; men of action not concerned with methods and channels
and impatient with restraints intended to harass them.
3/44 - Scribner left on world tour of OSS installations. Affected
his thinking on theater realities.
In Soribner's place, Bigelow appointed
Scribner returned from trip in June; resigned from OSS in July.
WmTionr-Aw
pl(.611
144FF HA-0
A4 ci
5 cat4A, rn
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It said that the Functions of SO Branch based on a JCS Directive
of 10/27/43, were
1. To conduct sabotage operations in enemy and enemy-
occupied countries.
2. Support and supply of Resistance Groups in enemy and
enemy-occupied countries.
(Copy of Lincoln memo.)
1.49�1\
The OGO were as close to Donovan ever got to his dream
of raiders and rangers modelled on the British Commandos.
With Lincoln's departure for EN, Col. Davis was borrowed
back from SSO where he was Planning Officer to become Chief
of SO, with C.S. Williams as Deputy, with William's ME-SO
Desk taken over by Russell P. Place, then Deputy/SO.
64-W.
Soon after Davis took over, 416MO.& Sharp was transferred
to AMG for assignment in France at the request of John WOloy,
then Asst. Sec. War, and replaced by his assistnat F. Bayard
Rives as Area Ops Off.,/WE. Rives was an international lawyer
who had first practiced in the firm of Wintrhop and Stimson,
and later had his own firm in NY. He was fluent in French and
Spanish, and already well versed in the needs of ETO Ops.
Rives carried on detailec correspondence in this period
with Major Paul Vanderstricht of SO/London regarding qualifi-
cati ns for SO/ETO. With DDay approaching SO/SOE was straining
to get as many agents onto the continent as possible to keep
the French resistance primed for action, and to chart out commo
for advancing American army.
On 3/22/44 Davis announced the consolidation of ME and NA
Ops offices into a new MENA. This was changed to MEDTO in 5/44.
By then, OSS already had officers with 5th and 8th armies in
Italy. Algiers was the HQ of MENA and then MEDTO, in line with
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OS policy of keeping in step with Eisenkower's command. SO/
London was still theoretically directing Algiers SO ops with
Lt. Col. Pflieger as liaison betwean London and Algiers. But
in practice, Algiers was independent, and both offices were
under Eisenhower HQ in London.
On 4/10/44, Davis was relieved to go to Algiers as 0/
Special Projects Operating Canter tm responsible for the NA
end of Haskell's Command.
He was replaced as 0/S0 by Carl Hoffmann, a civilian law-
yer who had gone into the Coast Guard in 1942, serving on sub
patrol duty out of Staten Island. On receiving an honorable
discharge, Hoffmann was asked by Donovan to come to OSS. He
began in 2/43 as Assistant 0/Fe/S0 under Francis Devlin. Wjen
Devlin went overseas, Hoffmann became Chief
The most expansive recruiting phase in SO was over by then.
What remained was the reassining of agents returning to the US
from Europe to the FE. Hoffmann thus sent two men out in the
summer of 1944 to follow the SO activities in ETO and find
out what they were and howmuch longer they would be need in
Europe. These scouts were
who went to NA and
Italy, and Chas. Eubank who went to England and France. As a
result when several hundred agents returned from France, In
the fall of 44, SO was able to received them, and within a
week reassign them for training and to SO.
[lliBy the summer of 1944, Hoffmann also sent Carletoon Coon
and Gordon Browne back to NA to write the history of TORCH
By 9/1/44, Hoffmann reported the presence of 25 Jed teams
in France, 18 from England and 7 fro in NA. There were also 41
undercover agents in France.
In Bel�ium, clandestine sabotage was progressing and air
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supply missions co4ducted under Berndt Balchen? (Pages skipped?)
IN ME, Paul West had visited the heads of the oppsoing
resistance factions in the interestof more effective ops.
agkinst the Germans.
HQ moved from Algiers to Caserta and bases were established
inBari, Brindisi, Sienna, and Rome.
29 officers and 62 enlisted men were attached to 14th Al
in China under AGFRTS.
On 8/15/44, Col. Ed Gamble had gone into France with 7th
Army getting info and picking up OSS teams while mainting
liaison with Allied Command.
By 8/30/44, 720 airmen had been evacuated to Bari alone
and over 1500 had been taken out of the Balkan tmaa, largely
through SO. And at same time, air drops in France had reached
the figure of 1292 tons of which 532i were dropped by SO.
Hoffmann gives much credit to his deputy, W.E. Duggan, USMC,
who assumed admin duties, leaving Hoffmann free to carry on
committee and policy work for Donovan, particularly in de-
velopment of Thai project and transferring SO men from Europe
to FE. Also SO/Washington staff was reduced from 40 to 31 mem-
bers between 4/44 and 9/44, indicating further streamlining.
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, ,..---., ,,�___ ,_�__. _,
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to
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---------........----
C oup de: -1.:6121-n cticia0 as 3erz.1-ed ,..;'; EC ,:..-_:�3
c.s 1120n. E,:_,,L-�,_. :.,--., L fi.o, t -..- -:--,,: t 2 cnz:::::-
oi..-; so:- attaol:s alwa'.ys ..-_;of_-_---..2; ::.:J.ide 6,
tho full a-_-_,-2 .22o val of the '-':::- :::; :::::, :';'2 C01'
f or c ou:p cl:. :. a 1:-.. o:., a r at f_ -.. ..:::. t
be ablo to s,,,,;r,k the lac, of thc, ocuni,zy
the tarset is -1o3atc.--d -',--ho oto :Ls
th&. to e;:-.-.., ar� 0 :, "P31111C,1 do 1.1,:.rt 11.a1zo _
have -1:-.1- very special clua_-1-f-;.oations rclutlref. o_ .
at 0-27anIz3r. Cour) do L'eaLn oy.)eratio,as ar7.,)
b t-1-] -a s o . - o f 1----.-ab.na7.:-.L.io a.,:... tie
c irc.--aas tc,.:..nces
I t. 3111cl be riot oc.7. -:.7,-bat SC.) On '�..':',71:.":7/::_ CI...-.
-
z.:Ina2ply fraa t.ac-se caa on oy
"._
r. that SO '.7.d erat SarO alT:ay (11 T.' ("�;.;
froc_c_eatly .111:11-.1L-2-eds of
arcQn oo
^ onn ,i1-2
^ \poi-. to "2 ea.-for:T. a
ha
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,Iver military js aosLnoa151.
Co-7.andr.
token att-Ln:J2t to ('',. ------------------------;.C.L:_.
siatd hizia a2.thorite3 as tho-se of 5',7r
tezic InT:orta-.cs.
IV. S=D7-7
i25 or- 2O22. �
weapons, fooa, ..-_-
or;yenLze -17,essta2.0e &rou-.os in enc=y and
and ....2.=2,anLc2t3e2.s to
Resistance -(1-2o-a-Ds, at the -aro--
oaZoat ores of tho .L11=locl ,
SO 3roach is aL]:ain pe:..-13=.i1::7 a fL:..nct:on tha,
7.purely stratecic.
It zholzid be str8ssecT, aaa stres,-ea a,ra
o- for
�colabat or sir.7.Liar_aut- La .or near tho front 1nez,
of Eia advss,ce 5l-1117.. In 30311 31320 Id oao
SO should, and does, operate far in advanoo of ,
.battlozona."�
11-e-, � 4-r,
_6 - _
1-1�stato
�a rhic11 Genera.' Donovan set clown in 1.9.-LO aId.3l Ii
case for zue Lilo:warfare. LLacola;:s,statent is ,C.oscrip-
tlon of the work
1.4
otio1-4 b,Lt'zeon
the Operational GrOupswho were az.naarras.D0no,:an evor zot to
his dreaaof
maados-,-and the-SO:22enta:22.6 orza:1:17,323, II 0233.5 that tho
GLaeral had won his-Ooze La essent'Lal
of 103
?he value of SO oLIc
do:-.1.ancis. for all theato-_-__
Operational- Grou,o
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Chapter VI - SO/DC's Main Task
One constant SO goal - recruiting for missions overseas.
From beginning when Goodfellow and Solborg began by rcruiting
friends to later point when whole groups transferred to SO
from army camps. First encourage by "Golden Directive" from
JOS in 12/42. Recruiting has absorbed most of energnes of
SO branch in Q Building.
Earliest recruiting in COI carried on informally, without
reference to branch lines. By spring 43, more definite geo-
graphical and branch needs. Personel officers worked with area
desk heads in SO to find different foreign language speaking
volunteers for ops. then in planning stage under Huntington
and Halliwell.
No. Africa:
NA ops ruled by JOS Directive 170 of 12/23/42 providing
for SO ops in Italy, Sicily, Sardinia, Corsica, France and
"other such places as are required by the NA Theater Comman-
der." Provisions made for SO HQ, commo groups and cell centers
in Canaries, Cape Verde, Azores, Madeira Islands, Spanish, Mo-
rocco, Rio de Oro and Tangier. Specific objectives:
establishment of the NA Mission and HQ
cover for mission in SOS of theater
training school for both SI and SO agents
Directive also approved living quarters, 12 trucks and 8 army
cars and army equipment for SO.
In fall 43, Eisenhower decided to use NA/OSS for ops. in
So. France. In Washington, this task of recruitment given
to Lt. Comm. W.W. Downey, USNR, AO/NA/SO.
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Downey had trouble getting "slots" for transport to NA for men
to be sent into France. West Europe section had already skimmed
off best candidates. Downey had trouble finding even the 10
men he finally sent to LA for .orench ops.
More importrant to NA ops was procurement and training of
Italian speaking volunteers for Ital. ops. In 5/43, Eddy, fol-
lowing up an earlier cable to War Dept from Eisenhower, sent
SO/DC a request for 75 Italians to be in North Africa by 8/1/43.
This request was frist specific one from Ike and came as part
of implement ation of JCS 170. Lt. Commander Downey set out
in May with recruiting mission to army camps. Mision included
several branch reps., including Col. Toulmin, Majors Quay and
- � �
Cheevers, Capt. Peter(z, and Lt. Chas. Stuart of Sec. Off.
Visited camps in No. Carolina and Georgia looking for Italians
for both OG and SO. Had to fluent in Italian and willing to kx
undertake dangerous sbotage (not always in uniform) and, as
Downey put it, to take a "shot at their relatives." Also had
to be capable of training in intell work as well as sabotage.
Out of 4000 possible applicants, Downey pciliked 50 for SO.
Next 25 found at Camp Forest, Tenn. Army not always willing
to transfer these men to OSS, but finally they were cleared and
some of the men on their way to NAHQ by 8/1. By Sept all 75
on way to NA. Downey then joined them in NA.
Recruiting for NA continued under Downey's asst Robert W.
Richards and later John L. Dupree, who replaced Richards.
1/44 - return of Lt. Col. Robert F. Pflieger former Acting
SO Chief, Algiers and then Asst. X0 to Glavin. Pflieger's new
appt. as liaison for SO ops/S France between London and Algiers
HQ helped to clear up confusion of overlapping recruitment. SO
drops of 500 packs a month from NA to S France an important
part of these ops.
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Most FE recruiting in 43 done by Hoffmann as Asst AO/PESO
to Devlin in spring 43 and later as AO/FE, Hoffmann recruited
first 100 men to follow original 101 Det. party to Burma. He
also directed recruiting of SO men for AGFRTS after he became
0/S0 in spring of 44. Col Hoffmann's method of recruiting was
to line up all candidates scouted by his staff and ask them 3
questions:
Had they had a high school education?
Did they come from a small town or from the country?
Did they like to fish, to hunt, to be out of doors?
If a candidate's face lit up Riad he showed any real interest
when asked this last question he was "in." Hoffman believed
that such a man would be able to take care of himself in
the rugged conditions under which FE ops were carried out. On
the contrary, men who were not at home out of doors he consid-
ered a bad risk, regardless of their intelligence qualificatims.
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Exeprience in the field in Burma and China seems to have
proved this method useful.
Under Charles E. Fisher who succeded Hoffmann as FEAO in
10/43, the job of channeling men and supplies to 101 had to
43?
be sustained. Stilwell's instructions of 7/42 to "disrupt
Japanese communications, shipping, and to bring about Japanese
reprisals on native populati n, which will result in disc ouraing
by
native aid to Japanese" was amply carried out xi 101. By 11/43,
SO had in field or enroutb to 101, 24 officers and 32 enlisted
men. Natives made up majority of personnel at 101.
The Free Thai mission came into the picture about this time.
These were Thais trained in the fall of 42 under GoodfellOw's
direction. Nicol Smith sent as US lision officer of the group,
led by Kunjara. Goodfellow got Thai funds unlocked and got the
JCS to agree to activation of the mission as the Free Thal Army.
Following dispatch of origianl group to China in 3/43? 16 more
Thais were in training in the fall, inc. 2 doctors who were
and the whole project
badly needed. The Washington arrangements werecarried on under
the watchful eyes of the Chinese rep. of the Central Government
in Washington.
Other projects under discussion were those for Indo-China,
for the Philipp flee and other Pacific Ocean areas. But the only
one to surrive was the Meynier Mission. This consisted of
Captain de Corvette Meynier, a French naval officer close to
Giraud in NA; his wife, exfiltrated from France by the British
as a favor to OSS; and a partyof officers and Annamites, who
were sent to Chungking in 7/43 and established under Miles.
After many complications, the mission was actually infiltrated
into Indochina.
In 1944-45, $O has concentrated on FE treruiting. As of
1/1/45, 160 offs., 159 enlisted men and 7 civilians have embarked
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to CBI since 5/42 and b: 3/28/45, 235 officers and 246 enlisted
men and gone to CBI and 53 to SEAC. This indicates the rapid
Increase of FE retruiting.
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Percy S. Wood, Chief So/Cairo
By 1/9/44, 25 So men infiltrated to Greece by parachute, plane
or sea
Between 8/43 and 4/44, 16 SO men infiltrated to Yugo.
While Farish went in to Tito, Captain George Selvig and Lt.
Melvin Benson went to outlying Partisan HQs.
OSS arranged for delivery of 1400 tons to Tito before deli-
veries taken over by British.
Parish, in early summer of 1944, led Columbia mission (himself,
Lt. Eli Popovich and Arthur Jibilian) through 6 to 8 hun
dred miles in Yugo, visiting missions, establishing pin-
points for drops, gathering intell, evacuating wounded
airmen by stretcher and ox cart.
Parish also reported 6n the issues of civil conflict in Yugo
and the essence of such conflicts in all countries caught
today in the dual pressures of their own divisive interests
and the interests of outside countries using them for other
ends. - Yugo, China, Greece, Poland.
"Major Parish has caught the tragic and epic character of these
dual struggles. He writes with limpid sincerity and disinter
ested understanding, pleading for honest and forthright leader-
ship on the part of the only country these countries trust in
foreign affairs - the United States. This report is more than
intelligence. It is history."
First purely operational mission out of Cairo in 10/43 when
Col. Paul West, chief ops. officer, Cairo, landed at
"Featherbed", secret airport in Greece, to evacuate twelve
American fliers who had been brought down in Greece.
First SO men dropped into Greece in late fall and early winter
of 43 - Capt. Gerald K. Wines, Lts. Kermit W. Anderson,
Robert E. Moyers and N.J.P. Tryforce, and Private Sprios
Kaleyias. Later followed by Capt. James Kellis, leader
of the Chicago Miss6on.
Chicago went int at request of State Dept. to block flow of
chrome from Turkey to Germany by blowing bridges in Evros
District of Greece. R&A furnished much info, on area. Mission
accompanied by 500 ELAS guerillas blew RR lines on nights of
39 and 30 May (yr.?) Then arms and munitions were turned
over to ELAS guerillas and with these,Germans were driven
from Evros in August.
APRU rescue from Chetnik territory - 8/9-10/44 in 16 sorties
more than 225 American airmen evaucated by Americans. By 8/31
over 350 airmen taken out.
f, Rumania: AFRU unit headed by Colonel Krai,gher, and accompanied
by 11 OSS men (5 SO) flew to Bucharest to arrange for the
evaucation of a large number of men grounded there.
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Halyard mission: Muselin report=
8/3- radio contact established with Bari
8/9- 241 Americans evacuated in less than 2 hours.
8/26,27 - 58 more airmen and 2 British evacuated.
SO report by Hoffman:
"Since the fall of 1943, OSS air rescue work carried on
cooperatively with Allied Air Forces has contributed to the
evaucation of more than 3000 airmen from Roumania, Slovakia,
Bulgaria, Albania and Yugoslavia (both Partisan and Ohetnik
areas)..."
8/43 - Carleton Coon, Chief, So/Bari
Chief ops. officer, Huot
Coon sustained a serious head injury in North Africa and was
sent home by Col. Toulmin. At same time, Huot was replaced
by Lt. Col. Paul West.
West personally involed in ops., incl. rescue of fliers from
Greece and visit to Gen. lam Sarafis, chief of ELAS.
Although Americans in Greece were under British operating
control, West was leader of all US troops for a time and led
ELAS guerillas as well in. their resistance.
Maj. Gerald K. Wines played important part in effecting a
truce between opposing ELAS and EDES sometime efore 2/44.
Worked with Woodhouse, who officially gives Wines much credit
for his help in the delicate negotiations attempting to bring
these factions into sufficient agreement.
On one op. called Noah's Ark - blowing up transporations routes
and bridges ahead of retreating Americans - ELAS and EDES coop-
erated In working with OBS officers.
OSS built four landing strips within Greece to facilitate
guerilla warfare. One at EDES HQ in Parmathia.
Under Capt. Robert E. Moyers (actually a dentist in real llfe),v/
OSS established an Allied Military Mission Hospital behind the-'1
lines in Greece (with aid of noncoms Robert C. DeTeleese and V �.
Paul Phillips). They distributed urgently needed medical sup-P".)
plies through Greek physicians and gave actual medical service"
to Greeks in range of hospitalk/
Basic problem in ME, working with British.
Gen. Devers, deputy under Gen. Wilson, was responsible to Bri
tish command for all OSS activities from Cairo, Algiers, Bari.
For ops. purposes, SO was divided into two sections.
Algiers under Col. Edward J.F. Glavin
Cairo under Lt. Col Paul West.
2/44 - Joint Staff Planners stated that combined British-US
ops. in ME and North Africa limited to SO; should not in-
clude MO and SI which would be independent under Theater
Commander and responsible to Washington. TJc 7)44
Dealings of SO with British intricate and uneasy -
"Many British officers held OSS in suspicious regard and, while
they were interested in the material contributions to their op
erations, they were not unnaturally jealous of the toehold Ruch
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contributions might give the organization and its government
in Middle East affairs. A good many individual�Mports of
the 1943-1944 peiod in the theater bristle therefore, with
angry criticism of British methods of keeping OSS down, and
with documentary evidence of actual interference with legi-
timate So Work..."
c4Ick"MICSftJ. avr 47 kg-outcry OF YT4--rr Der, (1-6 6--eirrced
To (ocK Fto GIV COON 6-- ORE. rot, -7.-0 0-6/ TO 6,1yz4c4ivy
gy Df#ti own d-v 5.
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OSS was totally unprepared for Salerno and its effort there
had to be improvised on the spot. Pacatte and Cagiati were
only allowed to join Downes at the last minute and had only
six days to recruit 25 agents from Italians at replacements
pools in NA.
Also, once bases were established in Italy4, there ceased
to be an orgaznic connection with Algiers. Caserta became
the center of 055 activity.
OSS was only partially successful in Italy. Whereas in NA
a network of agents and oommo was set upt far in advance of
the invasion, in Italy the agency had no such toehold before
DDay and came into the operation very late.
Also SI was extremely uncooperative under Vincent Scamparino,
whose policy precluded any exchange of info, or help with other
OSS arrivals in Italy.
Also the British were difficult, as UulIllIgtqh told Donovan JJ).
Ja latter of 11/17/43. The Col. denied Britj:i-H-FE.-aYges that
OSS men were becoming embroiletkin Italian politics.
Lack of preparation was chief hindrance to more coordinated
effort in 1943. Later in winter of 44, there were echoes of
wasted manpower at the base in Caserta under Col. Glavin's
comman4. The desire for a big show which prompted Glvain
in build up personnel there to some 1000 in number seems not
to have been justified by results.
In Spring 44, consolidationof the NA and ME Theaters with HQ
nominally at Algiers, but actually still separate between Toulmin
at Cairo and Glavin at Algiers, meant that as far as SO/DO was
concerned the MB end of the Med. Theater loomed more important
that the Italian offshoot of WA. This was partly due to the
fact that the 5th and 7th Army Dets. were OSS rather than pep-
arate SO and SI groups and SO/DO tended to lose track of its
personnel as they became involved in overall OSS ops without
reference to DC or even to Algiers. A sense of confusion per-
vades this whole period of Italian ops and only the supply
services to Italian Partisans in the North xi= stand out as
separate SO accomplishments
The organization 15f SPOC Special Project Operations Center -
set up in an "Operations Room" (actually some Nissen Huts and
tents with teletypes to OSS and ISSU6) in 5/44 as the exclusive
agency in the Med Theater to handle coordination of resistance
in So France. SPOC was a joint SO/SOE op under control of SHARP
and G-3.
SO and SCE made available to SPOC all SO and OG personnel trained
for duty in So France. The staff was under joint command of SOE
Lt. Col. John Anstey and SO Lt. Col. William P. Davis. It was
organized into a French section, Jeds-OG, Air Ops., and Intell
sections.
French participation in 000 consisted of the attachment of a
considerable number of Rrench officers and NCO's used to es-
tablish liaison with the Maquis in So France. It was for the
ops controlled by UPC that seven American-led Jed teams were
dispatched from Gt. Britain to NA in 5/44
The situation problems in So France with which SPOC had to cope
are timaxihmixix the non-existent transportation system; the
widespread demand for arms from many conflicting resistance
groups, and the _precarious supply situation.
Between 8/1 andAV15Aegal0ne, SPOC dropped 447 tons of supplies
and 206 agents.
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SEA0 was liquidated on 9/9/44 when allied strategy no longer
demanded this specific effort., It was one of the few bright
episodes in the history of SO SOE relatdinships.
An SO operation distinct from SINIC but laid on from Algiers
was 2TOILE, conceived by Col. Huntington and executed in summer
44 by Peter Dewey - further described in Chap. 9 on Saigon ops.
The Eagle Mission sent to establish liaison between the Parti-
san movement in the Belluno, Udine, Goriza area and OSS in
Italy, and to train instructors among Partisans in use of
arms and demolition material drooped to them was reported
by Col. Davis as successful on 10/27/44. A number of ops.
followed7177-establishment of this liaison channel.
Finally, SO Med Theater carried on Air Rescue Work, as Col
Hoffmann reported in 1/45: "The escape and exfiltration sed-
tion of the 12th Air Force advised that since they have been
using OSS facilities to a maximu, the rescue Ifif downed pilots
has risen from 10 to 17. Records now sholl that the recover, 5
our of every 9 men downed in Italy, can be directly traced to
OSS our our direct Partisan connections. Fifth and 8th Army
Detachments have made very suJstantial contributions by their
exfiltrations, not in large batches, but two and three at a
time."
As of 1/45, OSS continues to operate in Italy. Regular supply
channels are established with the IV Corps front and quanti-
ties of clothing and arms are passing ot the Partisans. As
the battle line moves north plans are ready for further pene-
trations and aid to the forces battling on this grim and some-
times neglected front.
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� Cike�t � c�Ck( To getf
FON Dor-- C/4(,.? � Li -
(6/(E:
1VC �CV NfitSe
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SO Branch: Joseph Scribner
Otto Solborg
Millard Goodfellow
Chief - David Halliwell
Joseph Lihcoln --2/44
William Davis III 2/44-4/44
Carl Hoffmann 4/44-
0/FE - Francis Devlin
Carl Hoffmann -10/43
Charles Fisher
DO/FE - Carl Hoffmann 2/43
0/ks C.B.Williams
Russell P. Place
0/W.Eur - F. Bayard Rives 3/44-
George Sharp 43-3/44
0/No. Africa - W.W. Downey
DC - W.E. Duggan
Wm. Davis 1/#4-2/44
C.S.Williams 2/44-
Jos. Scribner
Jos. Lincoln
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Charles Fisher (banking partner of Scribner) - succeeded Hoffman
as FE/SO chief in 10/43
Hoffman was Asst. Chief SO/FE to Maj. Devlin in spring of 43,
and later Chief SO/FE until 10/43.
Hoffman became Chief
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Consolidation of NA and ME Theater, first into ME-NA in 3/44
and then MEDTO with HQ at Cairo and later Caserta,
ilar desk changes in DO. This happened in 9/44.
meant aim-
ME Ops:
Carleton Coon returned in May 43? to DC and put to work
on ME desk, SO to help in recruiting. Desk in charge of Lt.
Andre Smolianinoff, USN and asst. (Granville Holden. Conn= as-
signed to find hundreds of SO men for Yugo, Albania, and Greece.
Recruiting expedited in NY by Francis Kalnay, recruiting
Yugoslav Merchant Marine seamen stranded there by the imboli-
zation of ships. Mostly Dalmatians, well-acquainted with coastal
waters of Yugo. But snag when Halliwell and Sc_ibner suspected
these Yugos of "Communistic tendencies" and questioned Kalnay's
own motives.
Recruiting Albanians also difficult. All Albanians in US
know each other, also minority Greek Orthodox, who are disliked
by majority elements in Albania. Attempt to recruit Gheg Al-
banians who represent best fighting element in country. But
very few of these in US, and competition for their services in
OSS keen. One of best was man who had been 20 years as chief
clerk at American Legation, Tirana, and who had extensive
tribal connections in No. Albania. SI attempted to recruit him
unsuccessfully. Coon succeeded Another prize recruit was edi-
tor of Boston Albanian language newspaper "Liria," organ of
Free Albania. "This man had to be spirited (willingly)away from
his responsibilities and from rival recruiting agents of SI. He
became intell and polit, expert for Capt. Hans Tofte.
Ploesti Plan: (told by Coon)
"One of the hectic projects considered by SO at this time was
the destruction of the Ploesti oil fields. Major Raymond Young,
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an old time oil man who had helped set up the oil installations/
at Ploesti, was living in France under the German occupationi/
in 1941 when he escaped to Algiers and thence to the Unitedt./
States. He had been taken into OSS as a member of SO and had1//
developed a remarkable scheme. This was to recruit a number(/
of oil experts like himself who knew the machinery and instal-
lations from A to Z, also to recruit an OG to go with these 4/'
men with as many as possible speaking Roumanian, then to take,'"
these cien to Cairo and to perform the following operation."
The American personnel would dress themselves up in the cos----
tunes of of Roumanian firemen and Roumanian oil well workers,
complete with monkey wrenches, oil cans, etc. A flight would(/
set out from Cairo and a few bombers would dropt the charges,i/
including incendiaries, on the installations. Other ships would,/
drop the OSS personnel under cover of darkness some few miles away./
Once these men had removed their parachutes, they would proceed,/
to the oil wells and join the frenzied throng milling about the."
burning area. They would rush in carrying fire axes and wearingv
bright red helmets and say 'make way, make way for the Fire,/
Department.' Others with their oil cans in one hand and monkeyt/
wrenches in the other would dash into save certain installations,/
and would smash them. In a few minutes the few vitalpieces oft/
machinery which could be replaced and without which the oil-'
fields could not operate, would be damaged beyond repair and our/
team would have scattered to the hillside discarding its gawdyv
raiments as it ran. A reception committee of pro-allied Hour/
manian politicians would pick them up a short distance fromtv
the scene of the operation and take them into the country otil
hide them. v/
This scheme seemed to me a most dramatic, and well conceived
operation, in fact, a work of genius. I helped Major Young L/
write it up for presentation, and all we needed was to recruit-'
the proper personnel. I was sent over to Ickes' offices once
more to interview top flight oil men to see if any could bey
found who would be fool-hardy enough to take on such a mission:
I found two men, both of whom were high salaried petroleum of-
ficers, both of whom were willing to go. This took me sometime
and a great teal of coaxing over cocktails in various bars and,/
other establishments.
I did my best to urge OSS to take these men, but those in /-
charge delayed so long that the two men in question became disA/
gusted and withdrew. By the time things had come to this pass,'/
the Air Force bombed Ploesti anyhow, lost a lot of American
personnel, and succeded in reducing the flow of oil to the Axis'
from these field only by 25% and only for six weeks..."v
Meanwhile, SO men were being requested for the Balkans in increa-
sing numbers by Cairo. Morris Berg of SO/ME managed the transfer
of as many Greek and Yugo-speaking personnel to SO as possible.
Berg was succeded by 0.Sumner Williams in Dec. 43.
Major problem for SO/ME dealing with British. All SO E wanted
was OSS equipment with, above all, no Americans with language
qualifications on missions. Relations between Guenther, Hun-
tingon, Brewer (of SO/London) with Lord Glenconner were strained.
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It took Donovan's personal intervention in London in summer 43
to clear way for US Balkan missions.
In late 44, OSS closed down branch offices in Cairo and
continued only such necessary SO activities as supply of four
tons of medical equipment to Capt. Moyer's hospital in Greece.
This supply service and packing station at Cecina in winter 44
to supply Italian Partisans were only 2 ops involving MEDSo
cc
Washington. By 2/1/45, 221 men% returned &UV DO from Theater
of whom 91 went on to FE.
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