CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1951/10/23

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02730351
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: April 15, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 22, 2019
• Publication Date: October 23, 1951

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23 October 1951
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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SUMMARY
FAR EAST
1. Communists trying to expand air operations in Korea (page 3).
2. Burma described as "weakest link" in Southeast Asia (page 4).
SOUTH ASIA
3. US delegate urges speedy UN Security Council action on Kashmir (page 4
NEAR EAST
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Mossadea requests continuation of Iranian-Soviet claims talks (page 6).
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EASTERN EUROPE
7. Yugoslavia ready to sign bilateral arms agreement (page 7).
WESTERN EUROPE
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FAR EAST
1. Communists trying to expand air operations in Korea:
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The Far East Command believes that intensive
construction efforts at two new Communist air-
field locations in northwestern Korea may be in
preparation for large-scale air operations from
Korean fields.
During the past week, photo interpretation has
indicated the construction of revetments and the resurfacing, possibly with
concrete, of runways at two new airfields, at Taechon and Namsi, north of
Sinanju. Each field, capable of supporting jets when completed, will be about
6, 500 feet long with revetments for 45 aircraft. The field under construction
at Taechon is protected by an unusual concentration of both heavy and light
antiaircraft weapons.
In the light of the recent expansion of Communist
jet interception activities to the Sinanju area, Far East Command states that
a "continuation of the high level of enemy air activity in this region would
undoubtedly render UN air efforts north of Pyongyang extremely hazardous...
Under these circumstances "it would be possible for the Communists to base
aircraft on these facilities with relative safety...."
Comment: UN air supremacy over North Korea
and the ability to destroy enemy air facilities before they became operational
have been predominant factors preventing extensive enemy air operations from
Korean bases. This intensive airfield construction, well within the defensive
range of Communist jet interceptors from Antung, suggests a Communist
strategy of "leapfrogging" units to airfields farther south in order to challenge
UN air supremacy closer to the battle line.
On 22 October, nine UN medium bombers
attacked the airfield at Taechon and, according to press accounts, "knocked
it out."
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2. Burma described as "weakest link" in Southeast Asia:
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The UK Commissioner General for Southeast
Asia has emphasized that Burma is the most
vulnerable area for Communist expansion in
Southeast Asia. I
Burmese Communists will have firmly established themselves in Upper Burma
by the end of 1952, and that Peiping will probably create a Chinese-controlled
"autonomous" state in the Kachin tribal areas.
In view of this situation, the Commissioner is
recommending that the British Government suggest to Indian Prime Minister
Nehru that he take the occasion of his forthcoming meeting with the Burmese
Prime Minister to discuss the possibility of a joint Indo-Burmese effort to
solve Burma's difficulties. 3.3(h)(2)
Comment
The British have previously attempted to interest
Nehru in taking positive steps toward helping the Burmese Government achieve
internal stability, but with little success. It is unlikely that any new effort
along these lines will be any more successful as long as the Kashmir dispute
remains unresolved.
SOUTH ASIA
US delegate urges speedy UN Security Council action on Kashmir
3.3(h)(2)
Ambassador Austin states that the assassination
of the Pakistani Prime Minister emphasized the
need for immediate consideration of the Kashmir
case when the Security Council reconvenes in
Paris on 29 Oct er. Austin suggests preparing a resolution outlining areas
of agreement and disagreement between India and Pakistan on Kashmir,
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instructing UN Representative Graham to continue his efforts to effect de-
militarization, and possibly extending his authority to fields outside the
narrow limits of that subject. Austin also suggests a declaration that the
Security Council will not recognize actions of the recently "elected" Kashmir
Constituent Assembly.
Comment: Disavowal by the Security Council of
Indian-sponsored Constituent Assembly actions should produce an adverse
reaction from the Indians. The "election" of the Assembly has been widely
publicized as an expression of the will of the Kashmiris, and New Delhi un-
doubtedly foresees imminent ratification by the Assembly of Kashmir's
accession to India.
NEAR EAST
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5. Mossadeq requests continuation of Iranian-Soviet claims talks::
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Comment: The commission was set up to examine
claims and demands between Irar-75�ma the USSR, including the matter of
12,000 000 dollars in gold which the USSR removed from Iran during World
War IL The decision of the Soviet delegation to remain in Tehran, which
was announced in the press, is accordingly in response to Mossadeq's direct
request.
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EASTERN EUROPE
7. Yugoslavia ready to sign bilateral arms agreement:
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Assistant Foreign Minister Mates has assure a 3.3(h)(2)
Ambassador Allen that the Yugoslav Government
now has a clear conception of the cooperative
character of US military assistance and that he
is cer ainl a t e si ateral arms aid agreement can be carried out in this
spirit.
The Yugoslav Government therefore proposes
that the agreement be signed as soon as possible and that the chief of the US
military group, General Harmony, and an initial staff of six or seven officers,
come to Yugoslavia at their earliest convenience to work out details. Mates
explained that the Yugoslav Government now appreciates that the US Govern-
ment needs to furnish satisfactory reports to Congress on use of the military
equipment. He added that recent discussions had also brought out the Yugo-
slav reasons for avoiding any recurrence of the interference and domination
which it experienced with the Soviet military mission.
Comment: Signature of the agreement as the
Yugoslays propose will not settle the US-Yugoslav differences over the size
and functions of the US arms aid group. This problem will remain to be ne-
gotiated after the agreement is signed, and the Yugoslav Government will
probably continue to insist that the group's size and functions be limited.
WESTERN EUROPE
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