CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1951/10/17

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02730350
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: April 15, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 22, 2019
• Publication Date: October 17, 1951

Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2730350
*40.'
17 October 1951
Copy No.
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
I. DECLASSIFIED
CLAS. CHANGED TO: ,
NEXT ilf.:VIE1W DATE;
AWittii
4
'JO
REVIEWER
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
TOISECfET
Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2730350
3.5(c)
3.5(c)
3.5(c)
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2730350
SECRET
SUMMARY
GENERAL
I. Comment on SoViet note to Norway charging treaty violations (page 3).
2. French Foreign Office official suggests Big Three act together on Moscow
economic conference (page 3).
FAR EAST
3. Chinese Nationalists will accept US recommendations on budget (page 4).
SOUTH ASIA
4. Comment on the assassination of the Pakistani Prime Minister (page 4).
NEAR EAST
5. Initial Syrian and Jordanian reaction to Middle East Command (page 5).
EASTERN EUROPE
6. Yugoslav Chief of Staff concerned over West's strategic plans (page 6).
WESTERN EUROPE
7. French refuse Italians' plea for help in gaining UN membership (page 7).
- 2 -
TOpEdiET
Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2730350
3.5(c)
3.5(c)
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2730350
T)PSECRET
GENERAL
1. Comment on Soviet note to Norway charging treaty violations:
The Soviet note to Norway protesting the estab-
lishment of bases for use of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is in line
with previous Russian protests on the occasion of Norway's adherence to
NATO in 1949. Threatening in tone, the note resembles other protests to
Western nations regarding NATO or German rearmament.
3.5(c)
Although the note does not refer specifically to
current US negotiations with Norway for operating rights at Norwegian air and
naval installations, its timing suggests Soviet awareness of such negotiations.
Charges of Norwegian violation of assurances to the USSR may somewhat pro-
long these negotiations or delay subsequent ratification by Norway's
Parliament. The Norwegian Government has consistently refused, however, to
be deterred by Soviet maneuvers.
2. French Foreign Office official suggests Big Three act together on Moscow
economic conference: 3.3(h)(2)
A French Foreign Office official, discussing the
Soviet-inspired economic conference now
scheduled to be held in Moscow during December,
expressed his informal opinion that the US, the UK
an ranee s ou el er agree publicly to call this a Soviet political maneuver
and discourage acceptance, or else encourage the attendance of "courageous
individuals who will speak out." An international initiating committee is cur-
rently in session, or about to meet, in Zurich to plan the agend.a.
The French Government has so far "discreetly
discouraged" those French industrialists, technicians, trade unionists, and
public officials who have been invited to the conference.
Comment: The French have recently shown a
growing reliance upon concerted action among the Big Three on all major
- 3 -
Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2730350
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2019%04/02 CO2730350
TOP RET
3.5(c)
international issues. Nonetheless, during the past year they have repeatedly
shown interest in resuming East-West trade relations and have recently been
placing increasing emphasis on France's need for additional imports from the
Orbit. Bilateral French-Soviet trade discussions are now in progress, and
the French are probably loath to turn down any opportunity to expand East-
West trade, even though the prospective conference will not be governmental
and may be exploited as a Communist propaganda forum.
FAR EAST
3. Chinese Nationalists will accept US recommendations on budget:
3.3(h)(2)
The Economic Stabilization Board, on which US
officials are represented as observers, will re-
view the Chinese Nationalist budget prior to
approval, according to a proposal made by the
Nationalistsko the US Embassy in Taipei. The Economic Stabilization Board
will make recommendations on both military and civilian sections of the budget.
As a further opportunity for the US to review the budget,
the Nationalists propose that its military sections be prepared in consultation
with the Military Assistance Advisory Group before it is submitted to the
Board. The Nationalists also propose to submit regular statements of cur-
rent expenditures and receipts to the Board.
Comment: This is a partial surrender of
sovereignty which the Chinese Nationalists have found hard to accept, but
the continuing financial solvency of the Nationalist Government is being as-
sured only by US aid. To ensure the efficient use of aid funds, the US has
sought effective control by American officials over Nationalist expenditures.
SOUTH ASIA
4. Comment on the assassination of the Pakistani Prime Minister:
The assassination of Pakistani Prime Minister
Liaquat Ali Khan on 16 October increases the possibility of war between
India and Pakistan in Kashmir. :By removing the ablest figure in the Pakis-
tani Government, it raises doubts as to the future stability of the regime
- 4 -
'TC) SECIT
Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2730350
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2730350
and the national economy. Finally, it may necessitate a reexamination of
Western policy in South Asia.
Indications are that the assassination was asso-
ciated with an extremist group which opposes the Pakistani Government's
go-slow policy on Kashmir and advocates direct action, including war if
necessary, to break the current deadlock on that issue. If the authority of
the central government is not maintained by the army in Pakistan-held Azad
Kashmir, there is danger of border raids which might lead to all-out war
with India.
The death of the Prime Minister leaves the
Pakistani Government without a firm guiding hand. None of the four most
likely successors is of the Prime Minister's caliber, and none is likely to
keep the political opposition in check for any considerable period of time.
3.5(c)
Anti-Pakistan elements inside and outside the
Covernment of India may try to capitalize on Liaquat's death by increasing
political and economic pressure on Pakistan. Considering the delicate
balance which characterizes the Pakistani economy, internal difficulties and
3.3(h)(2)
Indian pressure might cause it to collapse.
NEAR EAST
5. Initial Syrian and Jordanian reaction to Middle East Command:
The Prime Minister of Jordan and the Syrian
Chief of Staff both expressed considerable interest
in the proposed Allied Middle East Command when
T C3
- 5 -
Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2730350
3.3(h)(2)
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2730350
3.5(c)
3.3(h)(2)
S diplomatic representatives in Amman and
amascus explained the details of the plan. Both
fficials voiced the hope that their respective
ountries might participate in the Middle East
efense organization.
Comment None of the Arab States except
Egypt was to be a founding member of the Middle East defense organization.
The private views of these two influential Arab officials reflect the initially
favorable reaction which many Arab leaders felt toward the Middle East
Command proposals. It is clear, however, that the official attitude of the
various Arab governments will be tempered by subsequent events in Egypt,
where nationalistic demonstrations have followed Egypt's abrogation of the
1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty and summary rejection of the Western-proposed
Middle East defense plan,
EASTERN EUROPE
6. Yugoslav Chief of Staff concerned over West's strategic plans;
3.3(h)(2)
In a conversation with General Collins, Chief of
Staff Popovic expressed concern over the apparent
desire of the West that Yugoslavia concentrate on
holding the Ljubljana gap in the north and the
Vardar gap ill the south in case of a general conflict. He stated that the
Yugoslav Government, for political as well as strategic reasons, must defend
all parts of its national territory with equal vigor. Popovic described as
unwarranted the fear that the Yugoslav army would quickly withdraw to the
Bosnian mountains, exposing the Allied flanks, but, he added, neither could
the Yugoslav army expose its own center by the concentration of its troops on
these flanks.
Ambassador Allen reports a statement by Tito
that outstanding differences on the military aid agreement were minor and could
easily be solved. Tito based his plea for military assistance on the view
that if any attack on Yugoslavia were prolonged, the conflict would probably
expand into a general war, whereas a quick Yugoslav repulse of the Satellites
would lessen this danger.
6 -
T (D) S Er 1C