CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1951/10/14

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02730349
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: April 15, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 22, 2019
• Publication Date: October 14, 1951

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11 October 1951
Copy No. 4 7
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
17)0C.T..:ENT NO
itiNCIE IN CLASS.
C1 cHANGED TO: TS
NEX f,,EiVIEW DATE: 7 C2001.
AuTH: HR 70-
DATp REVIEWER:
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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SUMMARY
FAR EAST
I. French report no Chinese Communist units in Indochina (page 3).
NEAR EAST
WESTERNOEUROPE
3. Britain and France request deferment of statement on German
unity (page 4).
4. Delay in Allied counter-action in Berlin favored (page 5).
5. French financial dilemma may force retrenchment in Europe or
Indochina (page 5).
6. France refutes right of UN to investigate Moroccan question (page 6
7. US-Spanish military talks may be reaching stalemate (page 7).
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FAR EAST
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1. French report no Chinese Communist units in Indochina: 3.3(h)(2)
has informed
the US Military Attache in Saigon that it
has not been able to identify any Chinese
Communist units in Indochina except a motor
transport detachment operating supply trucks
across the border. However, the presence of Chinese military advisers
and instructors down to and including the platoon level has been confirmed.
The Attache emphasized that no evidence
of any kind available to him indicates the presence of regular or irregular
Chinese Communist combat units within Tonkin.
Comment: Reports of the entry of Chinese
military formations into Indochina are numerous and persistent. However,
the above statement/
would seem to refute them.
NEAR EAST
3.3(h)(2)
3.
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3.3(h)(2)
WESTERN EUROPE
3. Britain and France request deferment of statement on German unity: 3.3(h)(2)
The British and French foreign offices as
well as the US High Commission in Germany
have all recommended that a proposed US
statement on German unity be deferred.
French Foreign Minister Schuman feels that
Chancellor Adenauer is handling the situation
capably, and that any three-power declaration
would be used by the West German
parliamentary opposition as well as by the
Communists as an indication of dictatorial
interference by the Western powers in German
affairs. British Foreign Secretary Morrison
ould be given further study in light of its
cLODIG1 1,114.1 CoL d.l.e11.1.C116 11
possible effects upon Western policy toward the East; and High Commis-
sioner McCloy believes that it must be very carefully presented in order
to avoid the impression that the Allies are subordinating German unification
to the question of Germany's integration with the West. All three agree
that any statement should be coordinated with Chancellor Adenauer.
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4. Delay in Allied counter-action in Berlin favored: 3.3(h)(2)
2ommenting on the increasing evidence that
he East Germans are not complying with
he conditions agreed to at the time of the
Signing of the interzonal trade pact, High
Commissioner Me"Cloy states that the British, French and West Germans
are reluctant to take any counter-action at this time. In the event any
steps are taken against continued East German restrictions on Berlin
trade, the French and British seem to favor a progressive application of
pressure before considering outright stoppage of interzonal trade.
Comment: Although the East Germans agreed
orally on 20 September, when the trade pact was signed, to lift various
harassing measures in Berlin, their only compliance has been a reduction
of the highway tax. Obstruction of trade permits and interference with
parcel post shipments are continuing, although apparently on a somewhat
reduced scale. The important Rothensee canal lock remains closed.
Reluctance of the British, French, and
Germans to take counter-action may arise partly from the belief that the
net effect on the West Berlin economy of these harassing measures has
been less serious than was originally feared and that the Communists can
impose more damaging restrictions at any time.
5. French financial dilemma may force retrenchment in Europe or
Indochina:
3.3(h)(2)
If the burden of the war in Indochina forces
France to curtail its NATO commitments,
the French may demand that the proposed
German contribution to Western defense be
correspondingly reduced to prevent its exceeding their own. The French
are anxious, nevertheless, to have the Germans carry an equitable share
of defense costs in order to avoid a deterioration in the French balance-
of-payments position with Germany, and they are seeking ways to secure
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additional German financial commitments outside of a direct defense
contribution.
The French may be tempted to cut their
non-European obligations in order to insure a larger German contribu-
tion. This would lead to a progressive deterioration in the French
position in Indochina, and would give rise to renewed pressure for a
negotiated settlement with Ho, Chi Minh,
Comment: The West Germans presumably
will refuse to assume additional financial burdens, particularly if they
interpret the French plan as a scheme to release French resources in
the interests of colonialism.
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The French Government hopes to patch
together a 1952 military budget bolstered by substantial US aid for both
France and Indochina. In view of the worsening French economic
situation, however, it is increasingly doubtful that the National Assembly
will accept the government program.
Since even the most optimistic estimates on
the Indochina struggle call for expanded expenditures for at least two
years, the possibility of a negotiated peace cannot be entirely discounted.
6. France refutes right of UN to investigate Moroccan question:
3.3(h)(2)
The French Foreign Office intends to
counter Egypt's presentation of the Moroccan
independence issue in the UN General
Assembly by declaring the UN "incompetent"
to investigate this matter and refusing to carry out any UN resolution on
the subject. According to a Foreign Office official, the French delegate
will make "a complete statement" before the General Assembly showing
that France is carrying out the provisions of the UN Charter and the
Declaration of Human Rights.
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Comment: Egypt introduced the Moroccan
question in the General Assembly as a result of heavy pressure from both
the Moroccan nationalists and the Arabs after efforts to obtain Brazil's
mediation failed.
Despite repeated urging from US officials
and demands from the Arab League, France has refused to adopt any
concrete program aimed at greater autonomy for the Moroccans. French
stubbornness will complicate the various problems of the Middle East,
which sees the West as opposed to legitimate nationalist aspirations.
7. US-Spanish military talks may be reaching stalemate: 3.3(h)(2)
Latest reports from the US Ambassador in
Madrid indicate that US-Spanish military
talks may be approaching an impasse
because Franco fears that US aid will be of
a limited military nature only and that appreciable economic aid will not
be forthcoming. In a recent statement to an official of a US news agency,
Franco is reported to have mentioned $200 million as a satisfactory
beginning for the economic assistance he wants.
Comment: Franco's determination to
require substantial economic aid as a quid pro quo for a US-Spanish
military arrangement has been reported before and there is no indication
that he will alter his views.
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