COMMUNIST INTENTIONS IN THE CURRENT CAMPAIGN IN SOUTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02706865
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: March 16, 2022
• Document Release Date: May 13, 2016
• Case Number: F-2016-00757
• Publication Date: April 10, 1972

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Memorandum
Communist Intentions In The Current Campaign
In South Vietnam
1-17nd e iThurrint-ghawifis_ 7
10 April 1972
Sc No. 06642/72
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COMMUNIST INTENTIONS IN THE CURRENT CAMPAIGN
IN SOUTH VIETNAM
Page
Overview 1
PART I: THE CAMPAIGN STRATEGY
A. Headlines and Courage 4
B. Options and Opportunities 5.
C. The Campaign's Objective:
A Watershed Military Victory 6
D. The Costs and the Risks 7
E. High Stakes and High Strategy 9
PART II: BATTLE PLANS BY REGION
A. The Northern Part of South Vietnam 12
B. The Highlands 16
C. The Saigon Area 18
D. The Delta 20
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
10 April 1972
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
COMMUNIST INTENTIONS IN THE CURRENT
CAMPAIGN IN SOUTH VIETNAM
Overview
The Vietnamese Communist Party's basic, overriding
objective has not changed for more than four decades.
Hanoi wants to gain political control over all of
Vietnam, i.e., to conquer South Vietnam. The major
campaign launched on 30 March is a virtually all-out
effort to bring the Communists much closer to achieving
that objective this year. In this campaign, the Com-
munists appear ready to expend a large number of lives
and great quantities of ordnance with little concern
for the future, i.e., without much regard for husband-
ing resources that would be needed in the next dry
season or the one after that.
Hanoi, in short, is playing this hand for the
highest stakes. As outlined below, it is shoving
most of its chips into this hand's pot. Such action
is perforce a major gamble, no matter how strong
Hanoi may consider its cards. If the North Viet-
namese win this hand--i.e., if the current Communist
campaign produces what comes to be considered in
South Vietnam or the United States as a major Com-
munist victory--Hanoi will have gone a long way to
ward recouping its losses of the past four years and
a long way toward achieving its definition of winning
the game.
Note: This paper was prepared by the Central Intel-
ligence Agency and coordinated with the Defense In-
telligence Agency.
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This memorandum focuses on Communist near term
tactical intentions in South Vietnam, assessing these
intentions region by region. It therefore does not
specifically address or discuss near term Communist
intentions in Laos or Cambodia. South Vietnam is of
course the main theater of combat and will clearly
be the focus of Hanoi's major efforts in the weeks
immediately ahead. In reading the paragraphs below,
however, it should not be forgotten that Hanoi will
use the residual forces it has in Laos and Cambodia
to exert what pressure they can to support Communist
efforts and further Hanoi's objectives in South Viet-
nam.
The conduct and net political outcome of Hanoi's
current offensive campaign will be materially in-
fluenced by a subtle but profound change that has
gradually come over the Indochina struggle over the
past year or so. Hanoi, in a sense, is now in the
politico-psychological position the allies were in
during the second half of the nineteen sixties: It
is now the Communists who stand to lose if they are
not widely regarded as having won. This becomes even
more the case now that Hanoi has launched what is so
clearly an all-out effort, putting so many of its re-
maining chips unarguably and undisguisedly into this
pot.
The current offensive is not a "do or die" effort
in the sense that failure to win decisive victories
would necessarily spell a quick end to Hanoi's strug-
gle. Four decades of history give abundant witness
to the Communist Party leadership's tenacity and dogged
determination in the face of adversity. Should the
current Communist offensive come to be widely deemed
a failure in South Vietnam and the US, however, the
stakes involved in its initiation are such that Hanoi's
already existing problems would be compounded by or-
ders of magnitude. This would probably not produce
surrender and probably would not even produce early
acceptance of negotiation on essentially US/GVN terms.
But it would produce profound stresses within the top
levels of the Vietnamese Communist leadership and,
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almost certainly, a basic re-examination of Hanoi's
long term prospects and feasible strategies for their
pursuit.
Given the stakes involved, Hanoi's current offen-
sive effort will be as prolonged and intense as the
Communists can make it. There will undoubtedly be
peaks and valleys, sharp actions followed by respites
or lulls. Overall, however, the current phase of
struggle will last for many weeks and, with recycling,
will probably be extended until mid-summer or even
beyond. Its ultimate outcome is not inexorably fore-
ordained at this writing and hence cannot be predicted
with confidence or certainty. The long term results
of Hanoi's current major gamble will be determined by
what actually happens on the battlefields of South
Vietnam and, equally, on how what is happening comes
to be viewed and regarded by the people and govern-
ments of both South Vietnam and the United States.
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PART I: HANOI'S CAMPAIGN STRATEGY
A. Headlines and Courage
1. If Hanoi is to take over the South, it must
reverse a number of unfavorable trends. The decline
in popular support for the Communist cause and the
decline in locally based Communist forces has become
f-onspicuous during the last two years. One of the
principal objectives of the current Communist cam-
paign is to stop this decline in Communist vitality
within South Vietnam. The main force assault on gov-
ernment forces and positions is meant to give new
courage to all Communist cadre, fighters and com-
manders, and their sympathizers.
2. Moreover, Vietnamization had been proceeding
in an orderly fashion inside South Vietnam, steadily
eroding Communist strength and assets in populated
areas. Partly (but not entirely) because Communist
main forces have been fighting in Laos and Cambodia,
the withdrawal of US forces from a direct ground com-
bat role has gone smoothly, and South Vietnamese
Army (ARVN) units and the territorial security forces
and local militia have assumed the burden of protect-
ing the country. Although they have moved with some
caution in order to keep their own losses down, ARVN
and the RF and PF have generally kept the initiative,
and this has given them new confidence. Conversely,
the confidence of the Communist side within South
Vietnam has been undermined. At a minimum, the cur-
rent Communist offensive is intended to reverse this
trend, by destroying the new confidence of the gov-
ernment's military and paramilitary forces. Ideally,
Hanoi wants to inflict shattering defeats against at
least some major GVN forces or units.
3. The Communists have always considered it es-
sential to destroy the cohesion of the anti-Communist
government in Saigon. They now hope at the least that
they will be able to inflict such punishment on the
government's forces and so impressively challenge
the government's control to some key populated areas
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that the GVN will lose its confidence and new dissen-
sion will arise among its ranks and within its lead-
ership.
4. Hanoi has also been deeply concerned as it
has seen world attention turn away from the Indochina
war. Since it has counted heavily on the pressure
of US public opinion to induce the US Government to
withdraw its support from Saigon, it is particularly
concerned that anti-war sentiment within the US no
longer appears very vigorous or politically potent.
Moreover, trends in South Vietnam have given some
weight to allied claims in Paris that the Communists
are not dealing from a position of strength in South
Vietnam. The new enemy offensive is meant to reverse
these trends as well, to incite new agitation by anti-
war elements in the US and to backstop Communist nego-
tiators in Paris.
B. Options and Opportunities
5. Given the decline in Communist local forces
and the adverse trends on the diplomatic and politi-
cal fronts, the main-force option is practically the
only one remaining to Hanoi. Since the initial al-
lied incursions into Cambodia two years ago, the Com-
munists have been laying the groundwork for a return
to heavy main-force action in South Vietnam. They
have improved supply routes down through Laos and
into Cambodia. They have developed a new system of
base areas deeper in Cambodia. Last year, at heavy
cost, they fought off a major ground threat to their
essential Laotian routes. This year the Communists
have dealt major blows to Cambodian and Laotian gov-
ernment forces, in an effort to secure their rear
from attack as they adopt a more aggressive posture
against South Vietnam's borders. The enemy's heavy,
and effective use of artillery on the Plaine des Jarres
provided a preview of their recent tactics against the
line of South Vietnamese fire support bases on the
southern edge of the DMZ. In a similar way, their
strategy of inflicting heavy punishment on Cambodian
forces in last December's action along Cambodian Route
6 may provide a preview of what the Communists hope
to do to demoralize many South Vietnamese units.
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6. Because of the size of the stakes, because
of the pressing need to reverse so many adverse trends,
because the main-force option seems to be the only
one that holds out any promise of success, and be-
cause this will work only if heavy damage is done
to South Vietnamese defending forces, it seems clear
that the Communists are intent on launching heavy
assaults, even though these will inevitably entail
severe Communist losses. Hanoi is probably will-
iLg accept such losses because it also sees this
as a year of special opportunities. US withdrawals
have reduced the strength of all allied forces in
South Vietnam to the point where the Communists
feel much less concern for the safety of their sup-
ply routes and base areas in Laos and Cambodia.
Moreover, this is an election year in the United
States. For all these reasons, Hanoi regards this
as the year to try to demonstrate its clout on the
battlefield, to demonstrate to the US public and
to the world at large that the Communists are far
from a spent force in South Vietnam, and to make
clear that there is no end in sight to the war un-
less the allies are prepared to offer Hanoi real
hope of taking over control of the South, i.e., to
bargain on what are essentially Hanoi's terms.
C. The Campaign's Objective: A Watershed Military
Victory
7. The Communists clearly hope their efforts will
produce what comes to be regarded as an over-all net
victory, so impressive that it will lead to a whole
series of new trends. At best, they hope to unravel
the fighting forces �of South Vietnam, to sow such
dissension in the government establishment that it
begins to come apart at the seams, and to mortally
weaken US support for the anti-Communist effort in
Indochina, thus paving the way for a direct take-over
of the South. This may have been what Pham Van Dong
was talking about months ago when he told more than
one diplomatic contact that he expected to see funda-
mental changes in Vietnam by mid-1972. This is the
message, reminiscent of Tet 1968, that is now being
passed to Communist soldiers; they are being told
that this is to be the "last battle of the war."
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8. At a minimun, the Communists hope to get
some fundamental if less spectacular returns on
their investment basically reversing currently ad-
verse trends. They hope to take the initiative
and make the government's military forces more
self-protective, cautious, and defensive-minded,
vacating much of rural South Vietnam in order to
defend urban centers and other vital areas. Con-
sely, Hanoi hopes to give new courage and new
treedom of movement to Viet Cong local forces.
Even if the main-force campaign fails to achieve
Hanoi's objectives, if it goes at all well the Com-
munists will be looking for a shift in psychology
and in local balances of power favorable to their
side. If the Communists again appear to many South
Vietnamese to be the invincible wave of the future,
if their local assets can be rebuilt and move about
with greater freedom, and if they can again draw
support from the local populace, they will probably
believe they have achieved a considerable victory.
D. The Costs and the Risks
9, The Communists are prepared to accept heavy
personnel losses to their main forces this year,
partly because these losses can be replaced--
albeit at considerable cost and with a further
decline in troop quality--by drawing on the man-
power pool available within North Vietnam. It is
less clear, however, that they are willing to suf-
fer heavy losses among what remains of their local
force structure within South Vietnam. If their
campaign falls far short of its goals, as their
offensives in 1968 did, it would be even harder this
time to find replacements among southerners for these
losses. Decisions on how to employ remaining local
forces will therefore probably be made only after
the Communists get a clearer picture of the likely
outcome of the main-force campaign.
10. The Communists are also prepared to accept
political and propaganda setbacks as a result of their
use of more conventional invasion tactics. They are
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prepared to accept any stresses or strains the cur-
rent offensive may possibly produce in Hanoi's re-
lations with Moscow or Peking (though here we cau-
tion that the question of Moscow and Peking's posi-
tions with respect to this offensive is a complex
subject beyond the scope of this paper.) Further-
more, Hanoi's air defense preparations throughout
North Vietnam indicate that the Communists have
also anticipated and are prepared to accept a urn-
resumption of the bombing of southern North
Vietnam. Indeed, they may feel the costs of such
bombing may be at least partially offset by po-
litical or propaganda gains abroad.
11. What Hanoi has to fear more than these
concrete costs is the political cost of having to
settle on the battlefield for something that looks
like a failure, or even a result that cannot be
plausibly touted as a net success. If Communist
forces eventually must pull back from Quang Tri
city and Hue without capturing either, and if they
suffer very heavy losses in the sieges, it would
be widely interpreted in South Vietnam as a suc-
cess for the defending forces and failure for the
Communist side. If this happens, if the Communists
have not at least broken government control over
some important centers, if they have not driven
local security forces back to the towns and out of
much of the countryside, and most important, if
their actions have not resulted in some signifi-
cant political breakthrough in South Vietnam, it
will be considered a serious reverse for their side.
Given the trends that have characterized the situa-
tion up to today, Hanoi must be regarded as having
won its watershed victory or it will perforce suf-
fer a major and damaging psychological defeat with
profound political ramifications.
12. A clear defeat at the hands of South
Vietnam's defending forces might well produce an
agonizing reappraisal in Hanoi. There have been
many signs of disagreement on priorities and strat-
egies in North Vietnam for much of the past year,
and a clear defeat of the army now invading South
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Vietnam would call many recent decisions into ques-
tion. A less clear defeat or even an ambiguous net
result would also produce considerable anguish in
North Vietnam, but the North Vietnamese would retain
the capability and probably the will to return to the
battle another year.
E. High Stakes and High Strategy
13. With the local force war going badly
against them, the Communists have for the first
time turned to a relatively straightforward, con-
ventional invasion. Never before have the Communists
relied so heavily on invading divisions and so lightly
on in-country local forces. The new premium they are
putting on heavy artillery, tanks, and heavy anti-
aircraft weaponry indicate that this time they do
not mean to fade away quickly if the battle appears
to be going against them. This time they are much
more likely to fight for control of the lines of
communication that are needed to move their weaponry
and supplies, and also to fight for territory and
position, particularly at the northern end of South
Vietnam.
14. It seems highly likely that the Communists
hope to sustain heavy pressure simultaneously on
several fronts for as long as possible. Hanoi hopes
that with most of the US force gone, the South Viet-
namese will feel themselves spread thin and in danger
of being whipsawed, as they were in 1965. Over a
three-day period last week, the South Vietnamese
decided in rapid succession to send the 9th ARVN
Division from the delta to the northern end of the
country, to send the 21st ARVN Division north instead
of the 9th, and finally to send the 21st to northern
Military Region 3 rather than MR-1. This series of
decisions demonstrated graphically how difficult it
may be for the South Vietnamese to reinforce several
major theaters if they are threatened simultaneously.
Similarly, the Communists doubtless are also hoping
to confront the allied side with difficult choices
in allocating its air resources. The rapidityof the
allied buildup of air and naval power, however, may
have already exceeded Communist expectations.
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15. The Communists have already compounded the
reinforcement problems on the government side, merely
by maintaining a credible threat against Hue, Kontum,
and the area north of Saigon, while mounting an actual
heavy assault against Quang Tri Province. The mere
presence of strong enemy forces has been enough to
make it dangerous to send units from Hue to Quang
Tri city, or from Saigon to Kontum. It seems un-
likely that the Communists plan to expend their
supply stockpiles or their manpower resources
quickly. Instead, they are more likely to keep
the pressure on in each of South Vietnam's military
regions at least for at least the next several weeks.
16. As will be discussed in greater detail
in the region by region discussion that follows,
it appears likely that the Communists would ideally
want to seize and hold virtually all of Thua Thien
and Quang Tri provinces, including the cities of
Hue and Quang Tn. They very probably also hope to
seize and hold Kontum city and much of the surrounding
highlands. They often speak and think in terms of
maximum objectives, but they are realists, and they
probably recognize that in the final event they may
achieve a good deal less than this.
17. The Communists undoubtedly expect that
even if they fail to seize and hold Hue or wide
stretches of the highlands, their attacks in the
attempt will be devastating for South Vietnamese
morale. If they can get into some major cities,
the Communists can make expelling their forces a
very costly proposition--costly both to the allied
forces fighting them and to the cities themselves.
18. The extent to which the Communists can
seize and how long they can hold key centers or
stretches of territory will depend, of course, on
how the battles go. As the course of the battle
becomes clearer, the Communist High Command will
decide how to proceed: whether to commit available
local forces in particular areas; whether to have
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the Provisional Revolutionary Government run up
the flag and claim to govern certain areas for a
period or indefinitely; or whether to take new
initiatives in the propaganda and diplomatic
fields.*
*For example, a quick call for cease-fire if sig-
nificant tactical successes are achieved.
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PART II: BATTLE PLANS BY REGION
19, The Communists have always been able to
bring their greatest strength to bear on the northern
end of South Vietnam for the simple reason that this
area is closest to North Vietnam. In general, the
farther south one goes in South Vietnam, the less
serious is the threat from the North. Quang Tri
presently is most seriously threatened, Hue is next,
and Kontum third. Although the enemy has assembled
a powerful force north of Saigon, the supply routes
there are long and the defending forces relatively
strong. At the southern end of the country, the
enemy can cause considerable disruption, but, his
capabilities in Military Region IV are weaker than
elsewhere.
A. The Northern Part of South Vietnam
20. The terrain of northern South Vietnam
gives the North Vietnamese Army both advantages
and disadvantages in its current campaign in the
coastal lowlands. Just south of Hue, a spur of
mountains extends to the sea. Thus, while the
terrain is fairly flat from the DMZ into Quang Tri
and Thua Thien provinces, land routes must wind
through some rugged hills to connect those prov-
inces with the rest of South Vietnam. In terms of
terrain alone then, these two provinces may be more
accessible from the North than from the South.
21. On the other hand, these same mountains
will soon shield the Quang Tri and Thua Thien coasts
from the Southwest Monsoon rains, and although flying
weather will get progressively worse by late May and
early June through much of the rest of South Viet-
nam, the weather will improve along this particular
short stretch of coast. In sum, the weather cuts
both ways. At the same time that it may be easier
to reinforce and resupply this area from the north,
it will also be easier for the allied side to bring
its expanded air power to bear.
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22. The Communists are probably prepared to
undergo prolonged assaults from the air if they
can secure control of this coast. Their initial
assaults into Quang Tri Province and their subseequent
deployments lend some substance to their bold words
about trying to make this a "last battle." The
ferocity of the first artillery and ground assaults
were clearly a shock to the green and untried ele-
ments of the recently formed 3rd ARVN Division.
It appears that it was primarily the sheer volume
and accuracy of the artillery fire, rather than
ground force pressure that caused friendly forces
to withdraw from most of the fire support bases
along the southern edge of the DMZ.
23. Since their initial assaults, the North
Vietnamese have been compelled to regroup, and
bring up equipment. They have been maneuvering
the equivalent of over two divisions toward the
South Vietnamese defensive positions along the Cua
Viet River. These forces include the 308th NVA
Division and the regiments controlled by the Com-
munists' B-5/70 Front. Trucks, heavy field guns,
anti-aircraft artillery, and possibly even surface-
to-air missiles have been detected converging on
the government's new lines. The presence of these
heavy weapons in the enemy's arsenal seems to im-
ply that they will try to stay and hold their ground
for an extended period rather than attack for two or
three weeks and then move off to safer terrain as
they have often done in the past. They have, how-
ever, been taking considerable equipment losses,
particularly a large number of tanks.
24. At the same time this force of over two
divisions has been moving toward Quang Tri city
from the north, a third division, the 304th, has
been moving from west to east toward Quang Tri city.
It would appear that the enemy intends to send all
three divisions against Quang Tri city's defenses.
The latter includes the one regiment of the 3rd
ARVN Division that is still considered combat ef-
fective, and South Vietnamese Marine and Ranger
battalions recently sent as reinforcements from
the south. These forces are getting better air
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support than could be made available during the
initial assaults on the northern tier of fire
support bases when the weather was bad, but the
Communists will doubtless try to concentrate
their attacks during the intervals of cloudy
weather that are likely to occur this month.
25. The Communists probably cannot muster as
much heavy firepower for the next attacks as they
did during their initial assaults from across the
DMZ. For one thing, allied air attacks and their
extension above the DMZ are making it increasingly
difficult for the Communists to bring their heavier
equipment south. Thus the Communists will probably
have to rely more heavily this time on powerful in-
fantry assaults, protected from air attack, if pos-
sible, by cloudy weather and by the anti-aircraft
weapons they have brought with them. Given the
size of the enemy forces the enemy can bring to
bear, repelling them will not be easy.
26. To the south of the Quang Tri theater, the
Communists' 3243 Division has been edging east out
of the mountains to threaten Hue, much as the 304th
is putting pressure on Quang Tn. At the moment,
however, the 324B is the only major force threaten-
ing Hue. It is possible that it will mount strong
attacks against the defending 1st ARVN Division,
the best South Vietnam has to offer, but it seems
more likely that for the time being it will basi-
cally continue to put on enough pressure to make
the threat credible, tying down the 1st ARVN Divi-
sion while the action proceeds to the north around
Quang Tri, The 3248's pressure will include heavy
probing, however, and if tactical opportunities de-
velop the Communists would certainly want to exploit
them to launch an attack on Hue simultaneously with
their renewed pressure against Quang Tri,
27. If the two divisions bearing on Quang Tri
city from the north and the one division moving in
from the west can seize and occupy that center and
destroy or scatter the defenders, then two of the
three divisions are likely to continue south to
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repeat the same general scheme of attack against Hue
in cooperation with the 324B. If the threats to the
south against Kontum and north of Saigon sufficiently
impede South Vietnamese reinforcement of Hue, and if
the Communists manage to seize Quang Tri, they may be
able to develop enough momentum to seize Hue, mainly
on the strength of their infantry. This would be
such a major setback for the South, involving as
it would the defeat of the government's most re-
spected division, that it would be well worth a
great cost in lives to the North Vietnamese. Whether
or not the Communists proved able to hold this ter-
ritory indefinitely, they could make it extremely
costly for the allied side to drive them out again.
Under such a scenario, civilian losses in Hue and
Quang Tri cities would be particularly severe.
28. This is what the Communists probably hope
to do if all goes well for their side. But their
initial impact on the still-new 3rd ARVN Division
should not be taken as a clear indication of how
they will fare in future battles. The Communists
are now up against better quality troops in the
Rangers and 1st ARVN Division, and the South Viet-
namese have always fought more effectively when
they have been defending their homes and families.
Moreover, allied air power has now begun to inflict
a heavier toll. Even if the Communists fail to
achieve their maximum objectives, they are prob-
ably willing to continue to take substantial losses
from government counterattacks on the ground and
from allied air attacks, in order to throw a real
fright into the population of the cities and their
defenders.
29. If the Communists can put enough pressure
on Hue and Quang Tri city, and if they can do enough
damage to the government side farther south, they
may then decide to use some of their remaining local
forces. It is unlikely, however, that they will ac-
cept very heavy local force losses unless they think
they can seize the area, since it would otherwise be
almost impossible to rebuild their local apparatus.
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B. The Highlands
30. The enemy has built the largest force it
has ever deployed in the highlands, over 40,000 men.
Although this force is impressive by virtue of its
size, it does not include high quality troops com-
parable to those of the 304th, the 308th, the 324B,
and the B-5/70 Front to the north. In fact, the
quality of this force is highly uncertain, partic-
ularly that of the 320th Division, which is the
main new addition to the enemy's highlands deploy-
ments this year. The 320th has been taking casualties
since it started through Laos and does not seem as
competent as some of the others. This division has
a history of taking substantial casualties in bat-
tles where the military return was slight and of
breaking contact when the going got rough.
31. So far, this force has not accomplished
much. It has been in the area for about two months,
and has been hit from the air by pre-emptive B-52
raids and on the ground by ARVN spoiling probes
and it may have been severely disrupted. Much of
this force has been edging toward Kontum city. It
clearly should have launched a powerful attack against
the city timed to precede the attacks across the
DMZ and add to the psychological impact of the as-
saults across the DMZ. The bulk of the force still
seems to be holding its fire and it clearly has
problems of some sort. Some elements have put
pressure on a few fire support bases on "Rocket
Ridge," north of Kontum city, but without success
and with heavy losses. Nothing has yet been heard
from the heavy enemy guns known to be in the area.
32. Whatever the enemy's difficulties may be,
it is clear that he intends to do a lot more with
this sizable force than he has so far. Enemy docu-
ments say that the Communists want to capture Kontum
city, Pleiku city, and much of the surrounding ter-
ritory. They want to overwhelm the not-very-highly-
respected ARVN forces there and seize Route 14 and
Route 19. The enemy would then like to push east
to the sea, destroying the government's control over
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Binh Dinh Province, the most populous in the country.
Even if the Communists cannot impose their own con-
trol over this stretch of coast, if they could se-
verely damage the government's control they would
have cut the country in two, an objective of the
Communists since the early 1960s.
33. If the force now assembled in the Kontum
area could merely push into western Binh Dinh, it
could expect some help from the Communist 3rd Divi-
sion that operates in northern Binh Dinh and southern
Quang Ngai provinces. This is the area where the
Communists' local roots are three decades deep and
they still enjoy considerable popular sympathy. The
Communists might be willing to expose their local
forces to government counterf ire here if they thought
this would help swing the balance in their favor.
34. If the enemy achieves his maximum objec-
tives in the highlands, and if he manages at the
same time to overrun Hue, he would then be able to
call on the strong local support still available in
Quang Nam Province and in Quang Ngai Province and
put heavy pressure on Da Nang. Control over the
whole northern half of the country would then be
within his grasp. This is probably the enemy's
ideal scenario for northern South Vietnam.
35. The Communists' opportunistic use of bad
flying weather to protect their advancing troops in
Quang Tri Province, however, also suggests the pos-
sibility that the highlands force may be waiting un-
til the weeks just before the onset of the Southwest
Monsoon, which could begin in late May or early June.
Logistics problems would mount during the rainy sea-
son and it would be difficult to deploy large units,
but the strong assaults might be timed for shortly
before the rains, particularly if the Communists
hope to capitalize on their heavy weapons. If the
Communists could capture Kontum city and the sur-
rounding district towns, it would be extremely dif-
ficult for the government side to bring air power
to bear in any effort to dig them out without de-
stroying the cities and towns. It would also be
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difficult to send in a large relief force overland
to the highlands. It therefore seems entirely pos-
sible that by timing his attacks carefully with the
weather, the enemy still hopes to make his word good,
seize large portions of the highlands, and hold them
for months to come.
36. But just as the Communists may well be
stopped in their tracks before they get into Hue,
their unimpressive showing so far in the highlands
suggests that they should have a hard time taking
Kontum city, let alone holding it or pushing east
to the sea.
37. The Communist local force may be able to
mount some troublesome harassing actions in the south
of Military Region 2 in such centers as Dalat and
Ban Me Thuot, but the enemy is not believed to have
effective concentrations in these areas, and the
challenge to government control there is likely to
be limited. The same also holds true for much of
eastern Military Region 3, where the enemy is rela-
tively weak both locally and in terms of main force
strength.
C. The Saigon Area
38. Along the Cambodian border north of Saigon
the enemy has assembled three first-line divisions,
the 5th, 7th, and 9th, and during the last week he
has sent regiments from each of them into northern
Military Region 3. Moving down Route 13 through
Binh Long Province, the enemy has already captured
a district town, some fire support bases, and an air-
field. The threat to Binh Long and Phuoc Long
provinces, both sparsely populated and not very
heavily defended, is high. These provinces by their
nature, however, are not very lucrative targets for
the North Vietnamese.
39. Politically more important Tay Ninh Prov-
ince, home of the Cao Dad sect, and the provinces
closer to Saigon, on the other hand, are relatively
well defended. The South Vietnamese 25th, 18th, and
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5th divisions are now being reinforced by the 21st
Division from the delta, and the Regional and Popu-
lar Forces man many defensive positions between the
Cambodian border and the urban centers in Tay Ninh
and farther south. Any Communist drive in force
toward Tay Ninh city and points south would be ex-
tremely vulnerable to air attack until the monsoon
rains come, and thereafter large scale deployments
will be difficult. If the Communists do manage to
take some important centers in Military Region 3,
the government almost certainly has enough forces
nearby to push them back out and certainly enough
to limit their progress toward Saigon.
40. Because the government enjoys a more fa-
vorable local balance of forces than in the threat-
ened areas to the north, the prospects for keeping
the Communists at bay seem relatively good. The
enemy nevertheless clearly intends at the least
to maintain a credible threat, partly to prevent the
government from freely sending reinforcements farther
north. The move of the 21st Division from the delta
to MR-3 rather than farther north suggests that he
may be having some success. To make his threat seem
more menacing, the enemy probably intends to attempt
to send elements of the 5th, 7th, and 9th divisions
fairly deeply into Tay Ninh Province, and he may
well attempt to seize and hold parts of Binh Long
and Phuoc Long provinces. He probably also will
ask his more modest forces which operate in the
provinces surrounding Saigon to conduct harassing
actions.
41. If government forces should be severely
discouraged by news of possible Communist successes
to the north, and if there were signs of growing
dissensions within the government, the enemy might
well revise his thinking and, accepting heavy losses,
try to drive hard against the government's superior
forces in the capital area. This involves a whole
series of "ifs," however, and at present the enemy's
intentions in Military Region 3 appear to be limited
to developing a credible main-force threat to the
northern three provinces of the region and mounting
some harassing actions closer to Saigon.
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The Delta
42. As usual, the delta is receiving the lowest
priority from the Communists as a theater of main-
force operations. So far, the enemy is sending
four regiments and a division-level headquarters
(the 1st NVA, now called the "Phuoc Long Front")
from its forces in Cambodia to help raise the threat
level in Military Region 4. Clearly Hanoi intends
to rely primarily on the few forces it already has
in the region to do their best to tie down the gov-
ernment forces there and prevent their being used
as reinforcements farther north.
43. On the other hand, the departure of the
21st ARVN Division for MR-3 and the arrival of four
enemy regiments in or near the delta will improve
the enemy's force position in MR-4. With the 7th
and 9th ARVN divisions stretched thin, the Commu-
nists probably hope that the three understrength
Communist regiments that have been operating out
of the U Minh Forest and the four other regiments
scattered across the delta will be in a better po-
sition to try to overrun some major government mili-
tary positions and district towns. They are certain
to ask them to try.
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