CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1951/12/27

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02696828
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: April 15, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 22, 2019
• Publication Date: December 27, 1951

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SERTTY INFORMATION
27 December 1951
Copy No. 47
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT O.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
I ; DECLASSIFIED
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DATE.
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Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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SEC INFORMATION
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SUMMARY
GENERAL
1. Egyptian Foreign Minister promoted Arab opposition in UN to
Mutual Security Program (page 3).
2. Western Europe concerned over newly defined US export policy (page 3).
FAR EAST
3. Far East Command estimates enemy could challenge UN air superiority
over battle area (page 4).
SOUTH ASIA
-4. Pakistan agreeable to postponement of Kashmir discussions (page 4).
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
6. ' Britain seen steadfast against any deal on the Sudan (page 5).
7. Libya delays accepting credentials of Egyptian Minister (page 6).
WESTERN EUROPE
8. Dutch Government begins crackdown on Communists in its service
(page 7).
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GENERAL
1. Egyptian Foreign Minister promoted Arab opposition in UN to Mutual
Security Program:
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The Egyptian Foreign Minister brought pressure
on the Arab and Asiatic delegations at the UN
General Assembly meetings last week to vote
against the US on the Soviet resolution denouncing
e u y rogram. In revealing Egypt's diplomatic maneuvers,
Charles Malik, Lebanese delegate to the UN, added that the Egyptian Foreign
Minister had urged these delegations at least to abstain on the Soviet resolu-
tion if they could not register positive support.
Comment: While the Soviet resolution was
defeated, the Egyptian Foreign Minister's efforts at Paris may have been
important in inducing the abstention by the Arab and Asiatic delegations
during the vote on 21 December. There have been other reports that Egypt
may be supporting Soviet objectives in the UN in return for Soviet support in
the Anglo-Egyptian dispute.
2. Western Europe concerned over newly defined US export policy:
3.3(h)(2)
Both Britain and France are concerned that the
Battle Act may make impossible further co-
operation in controlling East-West trade through
the Coordinating Committee. The Belgian dele-
gate to COCOM has privately asked the other European members for their
attitudes toward the American policy of denying to Europe US exports of
commodities shipped from Western Europe to the Orbit.
Comment: Some European delegates to COCOM
resent the newly enunciated US export policy, since they feel that it eliminates
the multilateral approach to East-West trade.
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3. Far East Command estimates enemy could challenge UN air superiority
over battle area: 3.3(h)(2)
The US Far East Command now estimates that
the improvement in overall Communist air
effectiveness, combined with increased activity
against UN night-flying aircraft, could enable
the enemy to challenge UN air superiority over the immediate combat areas
and to engage in air strikes against UN ground forces and installations. The
Far East Command cites the bombing and strafing of UN-held islands as in-
dicating an advanced state of readiness of at least one regiment of enemy
bombers. Additionally, the jet fighter attack on UN front-line positions in
early December, although ineffectual, is noted as positive evidence of the
enemy's capability, while the flights of unidentified jets over Seoul on the
3rd and 8th of December are cited as the possible beginning of reconnais-
sance over the front-line and Seoul areas.
SOUTH ASIA
4. Pakistan agreeable to postponement of Kashmir discussions:
3.3(h)(2)
Pakistani Foreign Minister Zafrullah Khan, in
discussing the second Graham report on Kashmir,
left the impression that while Pakistan may con-
tinue, for the record, to press for quick action,
it will have no real objection to postponement of discussions in the Security
Council until the Indian elections are over.
Zafrullah said he felt no useful purpose would be
served by prolonging Graham's mediatory effort and that further progress
could be made only if the Security Council were to adopt a demilitarization
program of its own and call upon India and Pakistan to implement it with the
assistance of a UN representative.
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Comment: Graham drew up twelve proposals
aimed at solving the Kashmir dispute. India and Pakistan agreed on eight
of the twelve. There is no indication that agreement on the remainder is
about to be achieved. The noncommittal reaction of the Pakistani Foreign
Minister gives little clue as to Pakistan's intentions, despite its willingness
not to press for immediate action.
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
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6. Britain seen steadfast against any deal on the Sudan:
h)(2)
The American Embassy in London estimates 3.3(h)(2)
that the "combination of practical, political and
moral reasons held by the British against any
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compromise affecting the Sudan" makes it unlikely that Foreign Secretary
Eden can be induced to compromise on the Sudan as a means for settling the
Anglo-Egyptian dispute. Britain considers itself morally obligated not to
recognize King Farouk as King of the Sudan without consulting the Sudanese,
and estimates that the latter would revolt against such an idea, believing
that Egypt would not be content with mere titular sovereignty. A plebiscite
now in the Sudan would be impractical and would only confirm the factional
splits that already exist.
Commenting on Eden's strong personal con-
victions on the subject, the Embassy suggests that he might be willing at
least to discuss the Sudan if it became evident that solution of the Middle East
Command problem hinged on this question.
7. Libya delays accepting credentials of Egyptian Minister:
Egypt's Minister-designate to the new state of 3.3(h)(2)
Libya arrived in Benghazi unannounced on
20 December and unsuccessfully attempted to
present his credentials to the Libyan King. The
isted that proper credentials had not yet been
received from Egypt and that he would study the matter further. Although
reluctant to accept the credentials from the "King of Egypt and the Sudan,"
the Prime Minister does not wish to offend Egypt.
Comment: Egypt has reportedly been giving
financial support to Bechir Saadawi, an important opposition leader in
Tripoli, who has shown a strong anti-Western attitude. Libya's action is
bound to anger the Egyptian Government and to increase Egyptian opposition
to the new Libyan Government.
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WESTERN EUROPE
8. Dutch Government begins crackdown on Communists in its service:
3.3(h)(2)
he Netherlands Government has just extended
ts list of "forbidden organizations" for civil
ervants to include the Communist Party of the
etherlands, the Communist-controlled labor
federation and other Communist front organizations. Membership in these
organizations can be reason for dismissal. The non-Communist political
parties fully support the government's action.
The US Embassy at The Hague comments that
this measure has been contemplated for two and one half years and that
it is aimed primarily at municipal civil servants in such Communist Party
centers as Amsterdam and Zaandam.
Comment: Communist strength in the govern-
ment is confined primarily to the lower echelons in Rotterdam, Amsterdam,
and Zaandam. The government's action will further circumscribe the
limited Communist capabilities in the Netherlands.
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