CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1952/04/09

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02692619
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: May 24, 2019
• Document Release Date: May 30, 2019
• Publication Date: April 9, 1952

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SEC INFORMATION
9 April 1952
Copy No.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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SUMMARY
SOVIET UNION
1. American Embassy reports on Stalin interview with Indian Ambassador
(page 3).
2. American Embassy in Moscow reports on Nesterov speech (page 3).
FAR EAST
3. Japanese Government's attitude on Taipei treaty analyzed (page 4).
4, London Daily Worker directed to suppress correspondent's BW
stories (page 5).
5, Recent Viet Minh casualty rate not critical (page 5).
6. Communists reportedly plan to smuggle arms into Borneo (page 6).
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
7. Sudan constitution issue imperils Anglo-Egyptian talks (page 6).
EASTERN EUROPE
8. Rumanian Air Force increases jet plane strength (page 7).
9. Poles and Czechs cooperate on border security (page 7).
WESTERN EUROPE
10. Britain opposes setting of deadline for Allied-German treaties
(page 8).
11. British defense guarantee meets Dutch objections (page 8).
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SOVIET UNION
American Embassy reports on Stalin interview with Indian Ambassador:
The Indian Ambassador in Moscow,
Dr. Radhakrishnan, in reporting to the
American Embassy on his conversation with
Premier Stalin, pointed out that it was the
us in erview a in ad held with a non-Orbit diplomat since he saw
Radhakrishnan in 1950.
Following a discussion of Indian politics,
the retiring Ambassador quoted Stalin as wishing India success in its
ambitions. After listening to his criticisms of Soviet actions in the
Baltic States and in the Balkans, Stalin replied that Soviet intentions
were peaceful and nonaggressive,and that the USSR had been concerned
only with its own security and "the establishment of a belt of buffer
countries friendly to the Soviet Union."
3.3(h)(2)
Comment: The interview may be intended to
underline Soviet friendship for India, to increase cultural and economic
penetration of that country, to counter reports of growing Indian amity
toward the United States, to strengthen India's neutralism, and to support
its position on Kashmir.
At the same time, the interview has given rise
to a new crop of conjectures that the recent Soviet diplomatic offensive
may be intended to lead up to top-level big power talks.
1 American Embassy in Moscow reports on Nesterov speech: 3.3(h)(2)
The US Embassy in Moscow views V. M. Nesterov's
speech at the World Economic Conference as an
important statement of Soviet foreign trade
policy. The USSR's assumption of the role
of major world trader and exponent of "normal" world trade gives surface
Indications of a shift in Soviet strategy. However, the Embassy notes
that the stated Soviet import requirements include many strategic items
and concludes that the major goal is therefore to punch holes in the NATO
strategic controls.
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If the USSR is unable to reach agreement on
tie-in deals for strategic materials, the Embassy sees other possible
Soviet moves which would have high propaganda value, such as Nesterov's
offer of machinery and technical assistance to Southeast Asia and the
Middle East Since the Soviet Union has no surplus of machinery, it
may be envisioning a middleman role, buying in the West and selling in
the East In any case, the Embassy doubts the ability of the USSR to
double exports in the next couple of years.
Comment: Nesterov's proposals in general
follow the Soviet commercial policy of the past few years and do not mark
a basic shift in foreign trade strategy. In Europe the Soviet Union offers
agricultural goods and raw materials in exchange for industrial goods,
including items on the export-control lists; in Asia the Soviet Union offers
light industrial goods in exchange for strategic raw materials.
Although the Soviet Union has relatively small
exportable surpluses, it is nevertheless capable of financing "forced
exports" of agricultural goods and raw materials. The Western export
control program still stands as the main deterrent to the achievement of
the Nesterov proposals.
FAR EAST
3. Japanese Government's attitude on Taipei treaty analyzed:
The Japanese Government is sincere in its 3.3(h)(2)
expressed desire to conclude a peace treaty
with the Chinese Nationalists, but it is un-
willing to prejudice its future China policy by
any appearance of acknowledging Nationalist sovereignty over the mainland.
In expressing this view, acting US Political
Adviser Bond in Tokyo warns that the Japanese are becoming sensitive
about foreign pressure, and that conclusion of the treaty on distasteful
terms would cause an adverse public reaction affecting Japan's relations
with the United States and Formosa. Bond points out that a popular
impression that the government had surrendered Japanese interests under
foreign pressure could become a decisive factor in the next general elections.
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Comment: Nationalist China considers that a
provision granting it the benefits given the San Francisco signatories is
essential for maintenance of its position of equality with the other Allies
-- a position which the japanese are unwilling to grant.
Both the japanese and Chinese are facing
critical public opinion which makes it difficult for either side to modify
its position.
3.3(h)(2)
4, London Daily Worker directed to suppress correspondent's BW stories:
Comment: Alan Winnington is the London
Daily Worker correspondent in Korea. His dispatches on the BW campaign
broadcast by Radio Pyongyang have continued to be indistinguishable from
those of the Korean and Chinese Communist press.
5. Recent Viet Minh casualty rate not critical:
During the three recent French campaigns
against the Viet Minh within the Tonkin delta,
the insurgents' casualties, including 833 killed,
were five times those of the attacking forces.
The American Army Attache in Saigon points
u owever, that this comparison, supplied by the French commander
in Tonkin, does not take into account losses among French-commanded
village militia and auxiliaries. He estimates that Viet Minh losses
must be ten times those of the French in order to "insure eventual victory."
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Comment: In the past, the results of clearing
operations within the delta have proved inconclusive.
Three of the five Viet Minh infantry divisions
in Tonkin have engaged in a minimum of combat during the past two
months. The strengthening of these divisions serves to offset Viet Minh
losses within the delta, which appear to be much less significant than the
French have publicly claimed.
6. Communists reportedly plan to smuggle arms into Borneo:
to a Communist plan to smuggle
/ arms and equipment" into Borneo from Hainan,
the head of a Communist group in
the oil port of Tarakan, Borneo, was in touch with Moscow through
underground Chinese Communists and was to be the recipient of aid
transported by submarine and native fishing craft,
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
7. Sudan constitution issue imperils Anglo-Egyptian talks:
Egyptian Foreign Minister Hassouna Pasha
has stated that the real point now at issue
between Egypt and Britain is the attitude of
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Governor General Sir Robert Howe of the Sudan. 3.3(h)(2)
Hassouna informed the British Ambassador in
Cairo that unless assurances were given that
the Governor General would not put the new
constitution into effect, the Egyptian Government would not dare to continue
its talks with the British in the face of an aroused public opinion.
The British Foreign Office has meanwhile in-
formed the American Ambassador in London that the present constitutional
development in the Sudan must proceed on schedule, since "to turn back
now" would provide considerable trouble in the Sudan.
EASTERN EUROPE
8. Rumanian Air Force increases jet plane strength:
The American Military Attache in Bucharest
has observed about 60 aircraft which appear
to be YAK-15 jet fighters at the lanca airfield
near Braila in eastern Rumania. Most of the
aircraft observed had tight canvas covers. Three without covers had
Rumanian markings.
The Attache reports that the field, heretofore
thought to be Russian-occupied,now appears to be a Rumanian jet fighter
base, although it is still under construction `and not yet operational.
Comment: The covers on the aircraft sug-
gest a new shipment of planes td the Rumanian Air Force,which was previ-
ously believed to have only fifteen YAK-15 jet fighters.
9. Poles and Czechs cooperate on border security:
Reports on the eastern sector of the Polish-
Czech border state that the Polish side is
heavily guarded by army troops while the
Czech side is thinly manned by border guards.
Ioint search parties operate on Czech territory tracking down escapees
from Poland.
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Comment: \
3.3(h)(2)
Czechoslovak security forces have been preoccupied with a steady trickle
of Polish nationals moving between Austria Western Germany, and Poland.
3.3(h)(2)
WESTERN EUROPE
10. Britain opposes setting of deadline for Allied-German treaties:
3.3(h)(2)
A British Foreign Office spokesman states
that it would be inadvisable to set a specific
date for the signing of the Allied-German
contractual agreement and the European
Defense Treaty. To do so, he said, would give the West German Govern-
ment an opportunity to obtain concessions by delaying final agreement.
Furthermore, some difficulty might arise which would necessitate a
high-level tripartite conference in order to confront the FederalRepublic
with a common position.
Comment: This report implies that the
Federal Republic is less desirous than the Allies of reaching immediate
agreement. Chancellor Adenauer, who has consistently pressed for
rapid progress toward accord, suggested again last week, however,
that the negotiators "burn midnight oil" until all problems are solved.
11. British defense guarantee meets Dutch objections:
The recent British formula for linking the
Brussels Pact to the European Defense
Community has, according to a high Dutch
Foreign Office official, gone a "long way"
toward satisfying Dutch opposition to the Community's proposed auto-
matic defense guarantee.
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The Dutch official agreed with the US Embassy
that it would not be wise to press now for an extension of the 20-year
North Atlantic Treaty to conform with the proposed. 50-year duration of
the European Defense Community treaty.
Comment: Britain has agreed to an exchange
of automatic mutual security guarantees with the European Defense Commu-
nity, but has limited this agreement to the duration of its membership in
NATO.
Because Dutch officials agree that the Defense
Community treaty should be initialed by all the member countries at the
earliest possible moment, they may defer their objections to an extension
of the term of the Defense Community beyond that of the North Atlantic
Treaty,
The Netherlands, however, has stated that it
would not even sign the treaty unless it received assurances that the
Germans would finance the costs of their forces through 1954.
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