CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1952/03/02

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02692606
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: May 24, 2019
• Document Release Date: May 30, 2019
• Publication Date: March 2, 1952

Approved for Release: 2019/05/08 CO2692606
�0�0 1 '.jr J. Neff
SEC 19( INFORMATION
,2 March 1952
Copy No. 4
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. pt
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1. REVIEWEC1
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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SEC Y INFORMATION
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SUMMARY
FAR EAST
I. Hoa Binh withdrawal not indicative of general emergency in Indochina
(page 3).
2. Burmese insurgent negotiations for an alliance collapse (page 3).
3. Burmese Commander outlines plan for evacuation of Chinese Nation-
alists (page 4).
4. Plot against Thai Government reported (page 4).
5. Comment on plans for new Indonesian cabinet (page 5).
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
6. Iran reportedly concludes oil contracts with German and Italian firms
(page 5).
7. Comment on Iranian Government's Internal Security Decree (page 6).
8. Comment on new Egyptian Prime Minister (page 6).
LATIN AMERICA
9. Possible coup d'etat in Bolivia (page 7).
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3.5(c)
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FAR EAST
I. Hoa Binh withdrawal not indicative of general emergency in Indochina:
The recent French withdrawal from Hoa Binh
is not considered by the American Legation in
Saigon as a symptom of a general deterioration
of the situation in Indochina. The military as-
sistance chief, General Brink, reiterates his estimate of early February
that the military picture in the Tonkin delta is not alarming and that this
area can be defended, albeit with some difficulty.
Comment: The chief effect of the withdrawal is
its adverse psychological impact on the "fence-sitting" Vietnamese population,
an impact considerably aggravated by previous extravagant French claims
of victories around Hoa Binh,
3.3(h)(2)
2. Burmese insurgent negotiations for an alliance collapse:
3.3(h)(2)
Aiegotiations for an alliance be-
tween the Karens, the two Communist parties
and the pro-Communist Peoples Volunteer
Organization have collapsed. Hdwever, as a
result of the temporary rapprochement, many Karens have joined the Com-
munists.
Comment: The Karens are reported to have
demanded assurances that they would be permitted to establish a large
autonomous state after the defeat of the Burmese Government. This is the
most probable barrier to an agreement.
Sizeable aid from Peiping to the Communist
insurgents in Burma is probably dependent on their ability to form a strong
coalition. Burmese Communist leaders, therefore, may be expected soon
to make further efforts to settle the differences among themselves and to
entice the Karens, whose supply situation is desperate, to join forces.
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3. Burmese Burmese Commander outlines plan for evacuation of Chinese Nationalists:
The Burmese Commander in Chief, Ne Win,
on 29 February amplified to the American
Military Attache an earlier suggestion for so-
lution of the problem of the Chinese Nationalists
in Burma. Ne Win's plan calls for the surren-
der of e Nationalists and their repatriation to Formosa by airlift as far
as Rangoon, and from there by sea.
Ne Win admits that his government has not ap-
proved the project but he wants to know, for planning purposes, whether
the United States will assist in any airlift of the Nationalists and if the
Taipei government would help defray expenses.
The attache doubts that the Burmese Govern-
ment will accept the proposal.
Comment: Burmese leaders have considered
such a project in the past but have been unwilling to approve because of
their fear of Chinese Communist reaction.
Although Ne Win believes he can influence the
government to accept, any decision in the matter would be dependent on
the attitude of Socialist party leaders, who are reportedly planning to
invite Communist China to eliminate Li Mi's forces.
4. Plot against Thai Government reported:
A coup d'etat is to take place in Thailand
during the period between 3 March and 13
March,
The identity of the
, leaders is not known.
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3.3(h)(2)
3.3(h)(2)
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Comment: This is the latest in a long series
predicting planned coups, and reflects the widespread dissat- 3.3(h)(2)
isfaction in Thailand with the ruling military clique0
the increasingly blatant corruption and
dictatorial actions of the Thai Government and warned of possible "deep
and serious repercussions. " 3.3(h)(2)
Plotting for the overthrow of the government is
constant, but no attempt can be successful unless the military services are
persuaded to abandon their leaders. This fact has probably prevented any
recent coup effort and will be a deterrent to future action.
5. Comment on plans for new Indonesian cabinet:
President Sukarno's call on Indonesia's two
major parties, the Masjumi (Moslem) and National parties, to form a
cabinet indicates the continuation of a mildly pro-Western policy and com-
mitment to the Mutual Security agreement--pending its consideration by
Parliament.
The former coalition cabinet, also based upon
a Masjumi-National combination, was not repudiated by Parliament but
fell because of internal disagreement on the Mutual Security issue.
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
6. Iran reportedly concludes oil contracts with German and Italian firms:
The American Embassy in Tehran reports that
the Iranian Government has concluded two
contracts for the sale of oil. A contract with
the Italian Middle East Petroleum Company
involves an unspecified amount of oil; another,
erman company, provides for the exchange of $300,000 worth of
Iranian oil for pipe for the Kermanshah water system.
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3.3(h)(2)
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Comment: An earlier report from the Embassy
in Tehran stated that the Italian-Iranian negotiations, involving 500,000 tons
of oil, had not been concluded and presumably were awaiting the outcome of
attempts of the International Bank to reach an interim settlement.
Several West German firms now have representa-
tives in Iran attempting to revive Iranian-German trade relations and it is
quite possible that any one of these could be negotiating with the Iranian Oil
Company. Various independent operators, including Americans, have been
negotiating intermittently for Iranian oil, but so far as is known none have
concluded any agreement.
7. Comment on Iranian Government's Internal Security Decree:
A decree of the Iranian Council of Ministers
assigning direct responsibility for internal security to the Minister of
Interior appears to be an attempt by the government to extend its control
over the Iranian armed forces which constitutionally owe allegiance to the
Shah and are under his direct control. The decree is almost certain to
arouse opposition from both the Shah and the army.
A previous National Front attempt to win con-
trol over the Air Force resulted in a purge of National Front supporters by
the Army Chief of Staff, backed by the Shah. On the basis of the decree,
any attempt by the Shah to use the army without approval of the Minister
of the Interior might result in a showdown between the government and the
army.
8. Comment on new Egyptian Prime Minister:
Ahmed Nagib Hilali Pasha's appointment as
Prime Minister to succeed Ali Maher fo�hadows a new and stronger line
against the Wafd party and against intern 1 Egyptian corruption,
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Recent reports have emphasized King Farouk's
impatience over All Maher's unwillingness to prosecute Wafd members who
were derelict in their duty or who were implicated in the Cairo riots of
26 January. The King also wished for speedy opening of talks with Britain.
Hilali Pasha, a respected lawyer and politician,
and a friend of the West, is noted for his opposition to corruption within the
government. He has strongly opposed some oi the top Wafd leaders at
whose instigation he was expelled from the party in November 1951. Hence,
there is little chance that the Wafd would fully cooperate with him. A sus-
pension of Parliament, if resorted to, might lend a 'almer atmosphere for
negotiations with the British but would in no way remove or lessen the op-
position.
On 28, February Hilali Pasha, in setting forth
his views on the situation to an American Embassy official, emphasized
that the elimination of corruption and prosecution of guilty Wafd leaders
must precede a solution of the Anglo-Egyptian problem. His statements
on the minimum ,Egyptian requirements for a solution, however, differed
in no way from those voiced by his predecessor. He insisted on evacuation
of the Canal zone and recognition of the Sudan formula, and stated that even
under Middle East Command proposals the presence of foreign troops on
Egyptian soil would not be acceptable. Hilali, however, believes that the
employment of foreign technicians in the Canal zone could be continued.
While the new Prime Minister may be expected
to make strenuous efforts to maintain a stable pro-Western regime, his
continuation in power will depend on a settlement with Britain acceptable
to the Egyptian public.
LATIN AMERICA
9. Possible coup d'etat in Bolivia:
3.3(h)(2)
A faction of the Bolivian General Staff, led by
the head of Army Intelligence, is planning a coup
which will have arkny support and may occur
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shortly, according to a reliable source. The plans call for the establish-
ment of a mixed junta of military and civilian ministers, and possibly with
Hernan Siles Zuazo as president. General Torres Ortiz, Chief of the
General Staff is not involved.
Comment: Hernan Siles Zuazo, was the Nation-
alist Revolutionary Movement's candidate for Vice President in the May
1951 elections.
On 18 February,
General Torres, had switched his support from the Nationalist Revolution-
ary Movement, to the present governing junta in the belief that the Movement
is backed by the small Bolivian Communist Party. All military units are
subject to Torres' command and it would be difficult for the new conspiracy
to engineer a coup without army support.
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