CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1952/05/27

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02684301
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: May 24, 2019
• Document Release Date: May 30, 2019
• Publication Date: May 27, 1952

-
Approved for Release: 2019/05/08 CO2684301
SEC INFORMATION
27 May 1952
Copy No.5 3
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
Office of Current Intelligence
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS,
1:3 DECLASSIFIED
CIAO. CHANGED TO: S
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
AUTH: R70-
QATE;
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
TOP S TRET
SECURI NFORMATION
REVIEWER
Approved for Release: 2019/05/08 CO2684301
Approved for Release: 2019/05/08 CO2684301
NrOP SECRET
3.5(c)
S Miy AR Y
FAR EAST
1. Chinese take initiative from North Koreans at Panmunjom (page 3).
2. Communists may be using airborne intercept radar in Korea
(page 3).
3. Peiping believes Chinese Communist prisoners soon to be sent to
Formosa (page 4).
4. Thai police chief reported in contact with Peiping (page 4).
5. Burmese Government concerned over Chinese aid to local Communists
(page 5).
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
6. Iranian National Bank refuses loan to government (page 5).
WESTERN EUROPE
7. Party official reports dissension among Trieste pro-Cominformists
(page 6).
8. Germans prefer contractual agreement to present Soviet unity
proposal (page 7).
9. East Germans draft law for establishment of national army (page 8).
10. France tAing initiative on concessions to Saar (page 8).
* * *
2 -
3.5(c:
3.5(c
Approved for Release: 2019/05/08 CO2684301
Approved for Release: 2019/05/08 CO2684301
OP -SECRET
3.5(c)
FAR EAST
1. Chinese take initiative from North Koreans at Panmunjom:
the 3.3(h)(2)
Chinese Communists have taken the initi-
ative from the North Korean delegation in
conducting the Panmunjom talks, and that
NamIl is now merely their spokesman. Chinese Communist dele-
gates are in constant communication with Soviet political advisers.
The Koreans are said to have abandoned
their demand for the withdrawal of Chinese "volunteers" along with
that of all non-Korean UN troops.
The Chinese reportedly believe that a Soviet
"political feint" directed at Britain, France, India, and Japan will im-
pel some favorable "change in American plans."
Comment: Peiping's views are presumed
to determine the North KorTiETTrirm the talks, because the over-all
military position in Korea depends upon Peiping's willingness to con-
tinue its commitment
Communist China has indicated an intention
to hold its "volunteers" in Korea at least until all UN forces are with-
drawn.
2. Communists may be using airborne intercept radar in Korea:
The Far East Air Force reports that it has
reason to believe the enemy may now be
using airborne intercept radar in the Korean
area.
-3
3.3(h)(2)
3.3(h)(2)
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2019/05/08 CO2684301
Approved for Release: 2019/05/08 CO2684301
CRET
The Far East Air Force comments that here-
tofore the Communists have been severely handicapped in night operations
due to their non-employment of this type of radar. If the enemy chooses
to employ planes equipped with such radar, he will have a capability not
considered available to date in the Korean theatre.
3.5(c)
3. Peiping believes Chinese Communist prisoners soon to be sent to Formosa:
3.3(h)(2)
I Chinese officials claim to have infor-
mation that Chinese prisoners held in South
Korea are "about to be sent to Formosa."
Comment: Peiping is probably aware that
many Chinese prisoners, particularly those who once served in the
Nationalist armies, have asked to be sent to Formosa and that the Taipei
government is urging such a transfer. The claim 3.3(h)(2)
may be introduced at any time into Peiping's prop6,ganaa about Korea and
alleged American plans for "aggression" in Asia, possibly in an attempt
to block any plans for a transfer.
4. Thai police chief reported in contact with Peiping:
The American Embassy in Bangkok has been
informed by two usually reliable sources that
Police Director Phao sent emissaries to
Peiping in March to contact Chinese authorities
on arrangements "for future protection."
Phao admitted to the local press in a mid-May
interview that he had recently sent "secret agents" to Canton and Shanghai.
This was interpreted by one of the sources to be an effort to conceal the
real mission of these "agents" when their trip became known.
4 -
TOP RET
3.3(h)(2)
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2019/05/08 CO2684301
Approved for Release: 2019/05/08 CO2684301
*"19-SECRET
3.5(c)
Comment: General Phao is one of the most
powerful and influential figures in Thailand.
While this report cannot be confirmed, the
Thai have a historical record of "bending with the wind" in time of crisis.
Furthermore, there have been several recent indications that Thai enthu-
siasm for cooperation with the West has cooled.
5. Burmese Government concerned over Chinese aid to local Communists:
Burmese Communists are "trying to smuggle
arms and ammunition from China" to continue
their armed revolt, according to a 7 May
message from Rangoon to the Burmese Em-
bassy in Peiping.
that a representative of the Burma Communist Party, who has been in
China since 1949, recently visited the border area, presumably in con-
nection with the smuggling of materiel into Burma.
Comment: Burmese officials have heretofore
discounted reports of Chinese aid to indigenous Communists. This
Indicates that they now have evidence to the contrary. It further
suggests that recent Burmese Communist peace feelers were a tactical3.3(h)(2)
maneuver rather than a symptom of weakness.
3.3(h)(2)
3.3(h)(2)
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
6. Iranian National Bank refuses loan to government:
3.3(h)(2)
Prime Minister Mossadeq informed Ambassador
Henderson on 22 May that Nasser, Acting Gover-
nor of the Iranian National Bank, had refusedto
advance funds to help the government meet its
monthly payroll. The Prime Minister was furious at Nasser and insisted
that he be replaced even though his removal might shake public confidence
in the bank and thus increase Iran's financial difficulties.
- 5 -
o 1>s E e
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2019/05/08 CO2684301
Approved for Release: 2019/05/08 CO2684301
**-tOP SCRET
3.5(c)
Mossadeq, who claimed that Britain and the
United States had brought pressure on Nasser to refuse the loan in order
to cause the government's downfall, insisted that the bank could afford
to lend the money. The American Ambassador reported that the British
Embassy had confirmed his opinion that it had not put pressure on Nasser.
He commented that Mossadeq would undoubtedly create additional opposi-
tion if he were to remove Nasser, since the latter is widely respected.
Comment: Nasser's refusal to grant the
loan, which would total about ten million dollars, is undoubtedly due to
his concern for the bank's stability. It may also reflect the growing
lack of confidence throughout Iran in the Prime Minister,
WESTERN EUROPE
7. Party official reports dissension among Trieste pro-Cominformists:
A dissatisfied official of the pro-Cominform 3.3(h)(2)
Communist Party in Trieste has indicated that
it may be necessary for elements of the party
to break away from the leadership of Vittorio
Vidal'. The official states that Vidali has been controlling the party
through a special junta established about 1 April 1952. This group is
"sacrificing old comrades for new members who automatically obey
directives without question."
Comment: Vidali's party has been losing
members steadily for more than a year. In addition, considerable dis-
sension recently was generated among party officials when reports
reached them that Vidali had advocated the return of the Free Territory
to Italy in pre-election speeches in southern Italy. Large elements of
the party desire for various reasons to maintain the present line calling
for an independent Trieste.
TOI>SECT
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2019/05/08 CO2684301
Approved for Release: 204/05/08 CO2684301
'*NZOP SECRET
3.5(c)
8. Germans prefer contractual agreement to present Soviet unity proposal:
Reporting the views of both East and West
Germans on the Soviet unity proposals, Ameri-
can observers in Bonn state that the proposals
have apparently elicited no more support in
East Germany than they have in the West.
East Zone residents interviewed in West
Berlin believe that the proposals are nothing more than propaganda and
should be rejected., Even if the USSR were to drop its insistence on the
Oder-Neisse border, opposition would still outweigh approval among
East Zone respondents. A mong West Germans, however, Soviet con-
cession of the territory east of the Oder-Neisse line would make the pro-
posal acceptable to better than half of those interviewed, including not
only those of neutralist inclinations, but also those who have previously
supported the West.
Comment: There has never been any evidence
of substantial East German support of the Soviet proposals; there have,
on the other hand, been reports of uneasiness among Socialist Unity Party
functionaries for fear that their party might be sacrificed for unity.
The one reported declaration by the East
German radio in March that the USSR was willing to reopen the Oder-
Neisse question was refuted by subsequent Soviet statements that the
border was final.
The latest Soviet note on a German peace
treaty serves as another clear indication that the USSR is not yet pre-
pared to make any significant concessions in Germany. Although it was
the last chance to prevent Allied signature of the contractual agreement
and the EDC treaty, the Soviet Union not only did not meet the Western
condition that there be agreement on free all-German elections prior
to a four-power conference; it also did not advance from its position as
stated in the Soviet note of 10 April,
3.3(h)(2)
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2019/05/08 CO2684301
Approved for Release: 2019/05/08 CO2684301
OP 1-{ET
3.5(c)
9. East Germans draft law for establishment of national army:
1 German Government has drafted a law for the
establishment of a national army. United States
Army observers in Heidelberg believe this
-action was taken in anticipation of the signing of the contractual agreement.
Comment: The recently reported allocation
of heavy weapons to the paramilitary police, an acceleration in recruiting,
and vigorous propaganda on the need for an armed force to counteract
West German contingents all suggest that the 24 Alert Police units may
soon be formally unveiled as a national army. This probability is sup-
ported by a governmental reorganization which may culminate in the estab-
lishment of a defense or armaments ministry.
The paramilitary police, a force of 52,000 which
includes 14,000 to 16,000 officers, can easily be expanded at least to keep
pace with the growth of a West German defense force.
The formal establishment of an East German
national army would not preclude continuation of the unity campaign.
10. France taking initiative on concessions to Saar:
3.3(h)(2)
3.3(h)(2)
The French Ambassador and the Saar Govern-
ment have decided on the immediate formation
of a mixed commission to revise the 1950 con-
ventions governing French-Saar relations.
The commission will file a report early in july for the French Assembly's
consideration.
The French Ambassador at Saarbruecken is
said to favor "substantial concessions," provided strengthening the Saar
as an autonomous state does not prejudice French economic interests.
8
TOISECIT
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2019/05/08 CO2684301
Approved for Release: 2019/05/08 CO2684301
OP 1'11E1
3.5(c)
Saar demands will be in the direction of greater autonomy, particularly
in the fields of taxation, banking, social welfare, and labor relations.
Comment France and Germany have been
keeping the Saar issue in abeyance until the signing of the contractual
agreement and the EDC treaty. The latest move seems to be a new
French approach designed to win local goodwill and promote autonomy
for the Saar as the alternative to reintegration with Germany.
TOF>SECT
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2019/05/08 CO2684301