INSURGENCY IN<SANITIZED> IRAN

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02627399
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: March 8, 2023
• Document Release Date: May 30, 2019
• Case Number: F-2018-00456
• Publication Date: June 11, 1963

Approved for Release: 2019/05/22 CO2627399
Nwe RET Iwo
EYES a Y
OCI No. 1996/63
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Current Intelligence
11 June 1963
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: Insurgency in
Iran
NR Record
NR Record
ONLY
SE
Approved for Release: 2019/05/22 CO2627399
Approved for Release: 2019/05/22 CO2627399
CRET Noe
EYES
NR Record
3. Iran
a. Urban Riots - The rioting that took
place in Tehran, Qom, and Shiraz on 5 and 6 June
was instigated by a clique of conservative religious
leaders (mullahs) of Iran's dominant Shia sect, who
violently oppose land reform and the emancipation of
women--key features of the Shah's reform program.
The mullahs doubtless obtained financial assistance
from the landowning class. Iranian officials have
also charged Nasir with complicity in the outbreak,
probably without real cause.
The Iranian security forces had been
forwarned of trouble during the Moharram period of
religious mourning (25 May to 24 June) when the
mullahs are in particularly close contact with the
public. The authorities at first decided to per-
mit normal religious activity as long as the ser-
mons did not take on a political tone. When the
mullahs called for the overthrow of the government
it was decided to arrest the chief agitator,
Ruohollah Khomeini, and a number of his followers.
Khomeini's arrest of 5 June set off a
series of protest demonstrations in Tehran and its
suburbs, and in the large shrine cities of Qom and
Shiraz. These domonstrations were well planned and
organized, and were evidently intended to produce
a complete breakdown of public order.
-2-
ONLY
SE
Approved for Release: 2019/05/22 CO2627399
Approved for Release: 2019/05/22 CO2627399
SEJET
EYES 0
In Tehran, the rioters planned to over-
whelm the local police by carrying out a number of
simultaneous attacks in various parts of the city.
Saboteurs were dispatched by taxicab and bicycle to
a number of points. They were able to start several
fires and do some minor damage to buildings and ve-
hicles, but did not succeed in knocking out any ma-
jor installations.
Meanwhile, the agitators had mobilized
a large number of bazaar idlers and slum dwellers
from south Tehran. Crowds headed for major targets,
such as the radio station, government buildings,
and Tehran University, where they hoped to link up
with mobs of student rioters.
The city police were committed early in
the disturbances, but were quickly outmatched, hav-
ing only the cadets from the police academy as a
reserve. The commander of the Tehran military gar-
rison immediately committed his troops, but also
found he needed a reserve. An additional battalion
was brought in from outside the city.
Once committed, the troops performed
well. It had been feared that they might refuse
to fore on the crowes, but there was no difficulty
in this respect. In one instance, when a detach-
ment cordoning off a street was rushed by a crowd,
the troops fired into the mob, killing and wound-
ing a large number. However, they generally be-
haved with restraint, firing over the heads of the
crowds and keeping causalties to a minimum.
The overwhelming use of military force
broke up the demonstrations, and after a brief re-
newal of skirmishing on the morning of 6 June, or-
der was restored in Tehran. Similar troting and
counteraction took place in Qom and Shiraz on 5
June.
Curfew and martial law regulations
have been strictly applied in Tehran, and the ar-
rest of Khomeini and his cohorts has deprived the
mullah group of valuable leadership. However,
some new leaders are appearing and calling for a
renewal of the struggle. They may attempt further
disturbances. The government forces available
-3-
ONLY
SEC
Approved for Release: 2019/05/22 CO2627399
Approved for Release: 2019/05/22 CO2627399
SE1JET Nige
EYES 0
should suffice to maintain general order in the
city.
The religious fanatics do not appear
to have enough public support throughout the coun-
try to seize control of any other important towns.
In their bitterness and desperation, however, they
may well attempt sabotage or isolated terrorist
attacks. The danger of assassination attempts
against the Shah and other government officials is
also increased. Furthermore, if Khomeini is ex-
ecuted, ill feeling against the Shah will be ag-
gravated.
b. Tribal Insurgency - The assassination
(by his brother) of Abdollah Zarghampur, the prime
mover in the tribal troubles, leaves only one ac-
tive leader of a tribal group of guerrilla fighters
in the southwest. This is Nasir Taheri, a minor
khan of the Boir Ahmadi tribe. His forces, prob-
ably numbering about fifty, are split up, and may
be attempting to escape to Iraq or Qatar. Most of
the other tribal chiefs have submitted to the mili-
tary authorities, and the government will now be
able to turn more attention to the brigandage and
highway robbery that has plagued the Shiraz area
for several months. Although this is largely
carried out by Qashqai bands, there is no reason
to think that it is politically motivated.
-4-
Approved for Release: 2019/05/22 CO2627399