NEWS, VIEWS, AND ISSUES[SANITIZED] - 1976/09/12

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Argentina Declassification Project - The "Dirty War" (1976-83)
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02623720
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 48
• Document Creation Date: April 3, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 12, 2019
• Publication Date: September 12, 1976

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CO� NTIAL
INTERNAL USE ONLY
This publication contains clippings from the
domestic and foreign press for YOUR
BACKGROUND INFORMATION. Further use
of selected items would rarely be advisable.
17
NO. 17
SEPTEMBER 1976
PAGE
GOVEMIENT AFFAIRS
1
GENERAL
25
EASTERN EUROPE
WEST EUROPE
34
NEAR EAST
36
AFRICA
39 -
EAST ASIA
41
LATIN AMERICA
44
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DESTROY AFTER BACKGROUNDER HAS
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The New York Times Magazine/September 12, 1976
Not all its covert actions have succeeded, but the
agency did manage to outfox Congressional investigators.
217 'YawIlen. E3EME2(gi'a
There have been enough revelations about the Central Intelligence
Agency over the past two years to keep diplomats, prosecutors, reporters and
philosophers busy for entire careers. Three separate investigations not only
stretched the imagination with show-biz material about cobra venom and
deadly skindiving suits but twisted the lens on the American self-image in
foreign affairs. The investigations rewrote history�the history, for example,
. of the relationship between the United States and the Castro Government
in Cuba. They showed that the C.I.A., in some 900 foreign interventions
over the past two decades, has run secret wars around the globe and has
clandestinely dominated foreign governments so thoroughly as to make
them virtual client states. In contrast to Watergate, the C.I.A. investiga-
tions proved that abuses of power have not been limited to one particular
Administration or one political party. They also established facts that few
people were prepared to believe�such as that distinguished gentlemen
from the C.I.A. hatched assassination plots with Mafia gangsters.
� With all these surprises percolating, the most interesting surprise has
been largely ignored. And that is how the C.I.A. investigations ceased. The
topic faded away so quickly as to make the whole episode look like a fad.
Unlike the F.B.I. issue, which has moved to the prosecutors' offices and
stayed on the front page, the vaunted trial of the C.I.A. has already become
a memory. And the agency itself has survived the scandals .with its covert
operations intact, if not strengthened.
The collapse of the C.I.A. investigations has been due largely to in-
eptitude, poor judgment and lack of will on the part of the Congressional
committees. But the agency also played a role. Its strategy was flawless.
"Those guys really knew what they were doing," says a staff member of
the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence chaired by Frank Church. "I
think they defended themselves just like any other agency would, except
they're better. They had a whole office set up to deal with us, and I some-
tunas had the feeling that they ran operations against us like they run them
against foreign governments. It was like the C.I.A.' station for the Congress
instead of for Greece or Vietnam." The story of how they came out ahead of
their investigators says a great deal about both the Congress and the agency,
and about the problem of reconciling the demands of the superspy with the
democracy he is supposed to protect.
In the spring -of 1975, the Church committee had been spinning its ,
wheels for several months without much success. Charged with the task of
investigating more than a dozen intelligence
agencies, any one of which was an enormous
challenge, the Senators became ensnarled in
debate over how to proceed. The agencies
were stalling, hoping to deflect attention else-
where. Then the committee got a break.
The Presidential commissdon set up
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under Vice President Rockefeller that January, to inquire into charges of
illegal domestic spying by the C.I.A., announced that it had received
evidence of. C.I.A. involvement in attempts to kill foreign leaders. The news
created an instant sensation. Rockefeller said his commission, which was
completing its work, had neither the time nor the mandate to pursue
the matter, and he turned the evidence over to President Ford, who quickly
passed it along to the Church committee. Suddenly, the Senators found
themselves with a large batch of classified documents and with responsi-
bility for the hottest issue since Watergate.
For five months last year, the Church committee focused its energy
on assassinations. Other investigations lapsed. Staff members were pulled
from other projects. While it is no mean feat in the Senate to obtain sus-
tained, personal effort from Senators on any single subject, the members of
the Church committee went to C.I.A. briefings day after day to be intro-
duced to the agency's arcane methods. In November 1975, �the committee
published an interim report on this one aspect, and Senators and staff alike
were proud of it. As an exploration of the Machiavellian underside of
American foreign policy, it was, in fact, a tour de force. Yet it failed to
build public support for investigating or controlling the C.I.A.
Press and TV coverage was intense but shortlived, focusing on certain
salacious details: the gangster plots, the titillating reports of an affair
between President Kennedy and the mistress of one of the gangsters, and
a few exotic spy plans worthy of a television serial. In this last category,
the report featured a C.I.A. plan to treat Prime Minister Fidel Castro's boots
with a chemical that would make his beard fall out and thereby destroy his
charisma. The rest of the material was extremely complicated, conclusions
were tentative, and the assassination plans fell short of the dramatic expec-
tations that had grown up.
The committee did not claim to have found a "smoking gun," in the
form of a kill order ringing down from the Oval Office, through the C.I.A.
chain of command and out to some mysterious trigger man in a foreign
capital. Quite the contrary. Where the American efforts to kill were most
direct and persistent�in the case of Castro�they were unsuccessful. And
where the foreign leaders were actually killed�Lumumba in the Congo, Tru-
jillo in the Dominican Republic, Diem in South Vietnam, Schneider in Chile
�there was no hard proof that C.I.A. operatives actually took part in the
murders. In some cases, the agency seemed to withdraw at the last moment.
In other cases, someone else got there first. Of the Diem assassination the
-committee could only say that the C.I.A. had sanctioned and encouraged a
. coup against his Government when there was a reasonable chance the plot-
ters would kill him. But no direct _orders to assassinate. Everything was a
� little blurred. Even the moit�direct written
communications, as in the Lurnumba case,
were couched in opaque C.I.A. language:-
"Hunting good here when lights right."
Smoking guns are considered thoroughly
unprofessional in clandestine operations,
where secrecy is paramount and it is a mark
� of skill to channel existing forces subtly. The
assassination report, on the other hand, was '
publicly judged by
standards built for palpable
and exotic murders. Because
no foreign leaders were
killed outright by American,
initiative, planning and ex-
ecution, the C.I.A. benefited.
from a general impression
that it came out of the
assassination inquiry with
clean hands. This impression
is false.
Certainly many thousands
of people have died as a result
of secret C.I.A. paramilitary
interventions in countries
ranging from Laos to Cuba to
the Congo. (The Church com-
mittee obtained some casualty
figures but did not publish
them at the agency's request.)
And, in the case of selected
killings detailed in the report,
the line between involvement
and actual murder is often
shadowy. For example, the
Church committee reported
extensively on the maneuver-
ing that preceded the assassi-
nation of Rafael Trujillo in
1961. It showed �low Ameri-
can policy turned against the
Dominican strongman, how'
the agency provided assur-
ances of support to those who
plotted against him, how
C.I.A. officials smuggled
weapons into the country and
exchanged cryptic messages
� on the likelihood of a success-
ful assassination. In keeping
with its courtroom definition
� of assassination, however, the
committee exonerated the
agency of Trujillo's murder on
the ground that the weapons
it smuggled in were probably
not the ones used in the kill-
ing.
"By the time we finished
the assassination report," re-
calls the leader of one of the
committee's task forces, "we
had lost three things�the
public's attention, much of
our own energy and will
power, and our leadership.
Quite candidly, we had lost
Frank Church," The Senator,
according to this investigator,
had given up hope of achiev-
ing major reforms in the pre-
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terest was down. Assassina-
tions proved peripheral to the
main business of C.I.A. covert
action, and the investigation
of that unknown realm had
scarcely begun. With in-
vestigations of the other intel-
ligence agencies, including the
F.B.I., still ahead of them, five
crucial months had been lost
�along with much of the
committee's momentum. The
Senate's February 1976 dead-
line for the completion of all
work loomed large. And
Church wanted to wrap up
his investigative chores in.
order to begin his own Presi-
dential campaign.
The Church committee had
gambled heavily on the assas-
sination report. And lost.
ccording to Mitchell
Rogovin, the C.I.A.'s
special counsel dur-
ing the investiga-
tion, the crux of the inquiry
from the agency's point of view
was ,covert abtion�secret in-
terventions abroad by means
of propaganda, bribes, manip-
ulation of foreign agents and,
in some cases, paramilitary
force � as distinct from gath-
ering and analyzing intelli-
gence. The promotion system
for C.I.A. case officers has
been built around operations,
and C.I.A. leadership has been
drawn from the operators�
Allen Dulles, Richard Helms,
William Colby�instead of in-
telligence analysts. Veteran
agency operatives often say
that without covert action the
C.I.A. would be nothing but
a collection of sophisticated
professors with mounds of in-
telligence, and the agency it-
self would be only a more spe-
cialized version of the State
Department.
The C.I.A. approached the
Congressional investigations
.2with one central objective: to.
protect the means and prac-
tice of covert action. It was
in line with this strategy that
Colby and Rogovin gave
ground on the marginal issue
of assassination, cooperating
with the Church committee,
turning over more informa-
tion than the committee could
digest, helping the committee
use itself up. Then, when the
assassination report was com-
pleted, Rogovin became tough,
about information to be grant-
ed for the 'remainder of the
investigation � especially in
regard to covert action. The
committee was floundering;
Rogovin pressed his advan-
tage. "We agreed with the
committee that they could
have access to information for
six case studies in covert ac-
tion," he says, "provided they
would go public with only one
of them. They swore all kinds
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of secrecy oaths that they
would not even let the names
of the other five countries
leak." The case study he chose
was Chile�a selection favora-
ble to the agency, since a lot
of material on the C.I.A.'s in-
tervention in Chile had al-
ready leaked to the press;
"It was a bad deal," says
F.A.O. Schwarz, the commit-
tee's chief counsel. Many of
the principal staff members
opposed the settlement. What
little they had learned about
covert action in the course of
the assassination investiga-
tion had made them realize it
was one of the hardest but
also one of the most important
issues to deal with. "That is
why we went so heavily into
Mongoose in the assassina-
tion report," Schwarz ex-
plains.
Operation Mongoose was a
covert action designed to
weaken and destroy the Cas-
tro regime through an orches-
trated program of economic
sabotage, commando raids
and paramilitary harassment..
It was the heart of the agen-
cy's effort to overthrow Cas-
tro; simultaneous assassina-
tion attempts complemented
Mongoose rather than vice
versa, Although the campaign
failed, it was kept so secret
that the American public was
left with a fundamentally dis-
torted view- of United States-
Cuba relations for more than
a decade.
Before the committee's re-
port, it was generally accepted
that the Kennedy Administra-
tion ceased hostilities against
Castro after the Bay of Pigs,
until forced to act defensively
by the unprovoked introduc-
tion of Russian missiles on
Cuban soil. The Church corn-
' mittee revealed that not only
were there repeated attempts
on Castro's life before and
after the missile crisis but
covert Mongoose raids were
being intensified throughout
the period. The assassination
report quotes the minutes of
high-level meetings, less than
two weeks before the missile
crisis, at which Attorney
General Robert Kennedy
spurred the C.I.A. on to hit
Castro harder.
The assassination report,
outside sources generally
agree, was the high point of
the committee's investigation.
After that, the staff divided
into two groups, one known
informally as "the lawyers"�.
a group of attorneys drawn
together largely by Schwarz
�and the other as "the
professors," who were gener-
ally foreign - policy experts
with academic roots or Capi-
tol Hill experience. Under
task - force leader William
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Bader, the "professors" be-
came responsible for the C.I.A.
investigation, while the "law-
yers" went off after, the
F.B.I. Frictions developed be-
tween the two groups, the
Bader group tending to criti-
cize the lawyers as too
prosecutorial and "Watergate-
minded," and the Schwarz
team hinting that the Bader
group was too soft in its
handling of the C.I.A.'s pros.
In any event, discouraged by
the covert-action compromise,
the "professors" never recov-
ered the initiative.
n the House, the Select
Committee on Intelli-
gence chaired by Otis
Pike�the counterpart
of the Church committee�
pursued an arduous and in-
dependent course. Created
only after a long internecine
squabble over its leadership,
its mandate weakened by con-
tinuing- feuds in the House,
the committee struggled
through the summer of 1975
to breathe life into itself�
seeking, on one occasion, to
justify US existence- by leak-
ing the sensational but un-
verified story that Nixon aide
Alexander Butterfield had
been a C.I.A. "plant" in thea
White House. The story was
refuted, leaving the committee
with less credibility than ever.
By fall, the traditional jealousy
between the House and the
Senate had flared up behind
the scenes, and Mitchell Ro-
govin, negotiating with .both
committees, was finding them
competitive. "Church," says
Rogovin, "held his 'toxin hear-
ings' because he was afraid
Pike would do it if he didn't."
By December, the House and
,Senate committees were set on
opposite courses. Pike wanted
to impale the C.I.A. for its
abuses. Church wanted to
show that a Senate committee
could handle national secrets
responsibly. The Ford Admini-
stration played the commit-
tees against each other. When
Pike demanded information
and denounced "delaying tac-
tics," Administration spokes-
men would point to the ex.
emplary behavior of the Church
committee and appeal for a
more cooperative spirit. When
the Church committee cooper-.
ated, the Administration tended
to see it as a sign of weakness
and feel freer to hold back
on information. Secretary of
State Henry Kissinger and
C.I.A. director William E.
Colby simply boycotted all
the covert-action hearings,
and the committee accepted
the rebuff instead of subpoe-
naing them. �
"The object of the exercise,"
says a Church committee staff
trionther, "was to prove that
we were not Pike. We were
not going to move the Con-
gress or the public by more
expos�What was going to
'carry us was the kind of edi-
torial we finally got in The
Washington Post: 'An Intelli-
gent Approach to Intelli-
gence.' The committee evi-
denced an increasing aware-
ness of its public image, of
its ability to keep secrets.
avoid leaks and work in some
semblance of public harmony
� with the C.I.A. Many on the
committee staff endorsed this
approach as the path toward
"establishing a relationship"
that would serve the Congres-
sional committee that was to
be set up to exercise over-
sight�supervision of the in-
telligence agencies. Some of
these investigators have, in
fact, moved on to jobs with
the oversight committee, now
in business. Their attitude was
infectious: Even today, many
former Church committee
staff members are more reti-
cent in discussing C.I.A. mat-
ters than C.I.A. officials them-
selves.
n Dec. 24, a band of
unknown terrorists
'iiassassinated Rich-
ard Welch, the C.I.A.
chief of . station in. Greece.
Welch had been identified as
a C.I.A. official by a small
.anti-C.I.A. magazine, and a
furor immediately arose over
whether the revelation had
� anything to do with his death.
The -Senators on the Church
committee received a flood of
letters denouncing its work on
�the grounds that exposure of
C.I.A. secrets is an invitation
to the killing of C.I.A. offi-
cials.
Sources on both sides of the
C.I.A. investigation now agree
that neither the magazine nor
the Church committee is
.likely to have 'caused Welch's
death. He was a relatively
well-known figure in Athens,
certainly to the kind of organ-
ized political groups likely to
have killed him. These proba-
bilities were overwhelmed,
however, by the emotional
power of the tragedy, and the
C.I.A. encouraged the idea
that C.1-4,. critics might have
contributed indirectly to the
murder, Rogovin would only
tell the Church committee
that its own investigations'
were not "directly" responsi-
ble. Colby lashed out in public'
at those who revealed C.I.A.
secrets as being more sinister
than the secrets themselves.
Ford made public statements
to the effect that inquiries
into C.I.A. methods were
unpatriotic.
No single event did more to
turn public opinion against
the investigations than the
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Welch affair. As 1975 ended,
the press was shying away
from the C.I.A. issue, and hos..
tility toward the inquiry was
building up.in Congress itself.
As to the C.I.A.'s private
thoughts on whether naming
� senior officials makes them
more vulnerable to "the other
. side," a move that escaped
public attention may provide
some insight: Welch was re-
placed in Athens by a man
who had been identified as a
C.I.A. official ,by Greek news-
papers and an American
,magazine.
On Jan. 29, 1976, Represent-
ative John Young, Democrat
of Texas, offered a motion on
the House floor to suppress
the final report of the Pike
committee. The ensuing de-
bate was not distinguished.
Some speakers argued that
the report�which they admit-
ted they had not read --
would endanger national . se-
. .
curtty and align the House
with the murderers of Richard
Welch. Others, like Wayne
.Hays, argued for suppression
on the grounds that the report
would be boring: "I suspect
. that when this report
comes opt it is going to be
the biggest nonevent since
Brigitte Barclot, after 40 years
and four husbands and numer-
ous lovers, held a press con-
ference to arrnounce that she
was no longer a virgin."
Views like these prevailed,
and the House,, by a vote of
246 to 124, ordered its own
report to be locked away in
the clerk's safe.
The document did not re-
main suppressed very long. It
was leaked to CBS corres-
pondent Daniel Schorr, who in
turn leaked it to The Vilage
Voice through a series of inter-
mediaries. When The Voice
published the report in two
special supplements under ban-
ner headlines, it became the
most spectacular leak of the
C.I.A. investigations.
Pike developed two themat-
ic criticisms of the C.I.A.
First, he amassed evidence of
� repeated intelligence failures,
showing how the agency -had
failed to anticipate such major
world events as the 1968 Tet
offensive in Vietnam, the Rus-
sian invasion of Czechoslova-
kia the same year, and the
1973 Yom Kippur war in the
Middle East. Citing various
bureaucratic entanglements
and preoccupations as the
cause of poor performance,
Pike took the agency to task
for bungling the one function
� gathering intolligence �
against which there is no nu
clihle dissent. Pike's second
line of cnticisni was more
substantive: ffe attackcd cov-
ert ac:tion hy. revealing a few
of the more startling case
studies. His most poignant ex-
ample involved the Kurdish
minority in Iraq.
Like many of the world's
mountain peoples�the Tibe-
tans, the Meo in Laos, the
.Montagnards of Vietnam, the
Indians of South America�
the Kurds have always
seemed destined for a hard
time. They have been strug-
gling against the Iraqi Gov-
ernment for years. For years
they have been losing. In
1972, when the Kurdish cam-
paign for autonomy was in a
brief period of dormancy, the.
Shah of Iran asked the United
States to help him in one of
his perpetual feuds with
neighboring Iraq. This time it
was a border dispute. The
Shah wanted the United
States to channel clandestine
military aid to the Kurds, rea-
soning that American support
would inspire the Kurds for
another military offensive
against the Iraqi Government,
thus weakening Iraq and aid-
ing the Shah.
Secretary of' the Treasury
John- Connally, acting on be-
half of Henry Kissinger and
President Nixon, informed the
Shah that the United States
would go along. A $16 million
covert- action project went
into effect. According to
Pike's documents, the deal
was made in a convivial spirit
�a favor to the Shah as one
of the fellows. (He himself
had been returned to power
� �by the C.I.A. in a 1953 coup.)
Even the C.I.A. opposed the
scheme, but was overruled.
The agency funneled arms
and money to the Kurds for
more than two years, and the
Kurds once again rose up in
rebellion. Their leader was so
moved by American support
for the Kurdish cause that he
sent Kissinger a gold and
pearl necklace for his new
bride. He ;also sent word, to
Kissinger that the Kurds were
.ready "to become the 51st
state" after achieving libera-
tion.
In March 1975, the bloodied
Iraqi Government came to
terms with the Shah. The Very
next day, Iran and he United
States cut off all aid to , the
Kurds, and the Iraqi Army
mounted a full-scale offensive
against them. The Kurdish
leader, who could not bring
himself to believe the United
States had reversed itself so
cynically, wrote desperate,
pitiful appeals for help to
Kissinger. Kissinger did not
reply.
An estimated 5,000 Kurdish
refugees died fleeing the Iraqi
crisiaught. The Shah, prag-
matic to tho last, forcibly
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repatriated 40,000 Kurdish
refugees to Iraq, where their
fate, while unknown, has
presumably been sad. The
United States declined to pro-
vide any relief assistance to
the remaining refugees and
refused to accept a single
Kurdish application for asy-
lum.
This covert action remained
secret, of course, until the
Pike committee learned about
it and leaked it to the press.
To say the very least, the dis-
closure raised large questions
about the compatibility of
such covert actions with
principles of any kind, as well
as questions about how such
decisions should be made. Yet
no public debate arose, and
except for a one-man crusade
by The New York Times's
columnist William Safire, -the
Kurdish undertaking was
widely ignored in the press..
The reason is Simple: The sub-
stance of the Pike report was
completely overshadowed by
the controversy over how it
was leaked.
Daniel Schorr first denied,
and then admitted, being the
intermediary source. His
behavior helped draw atten-
tion to his own conduct and
away from the conduct of �the
C.I.A. Leaks became the issue.
President Ford pledged the
full resources of the executive
branch to the search for the
culprit on the Pike committee.
The House of Representatives
rose up mightily against the
leak and authorized a
$150,000 investigation by its
ethics committee. A team of
investigators began grilling
the Pike committee staff,
many of whose members left
Washington in Mar. Schorr,
three other journalists and 18
committee staff members
have been subpoenaed to ap-
pear before the ethics commit-
tee this Wednesday.
0
As the Pike committee sput-
tered to disaster, the Church
committee released its report
on Chile�the one case study
on covert action it was, per-
mitted to make public ender
the terms of its deal with the -
C.I.A." "We negotiated with
the agency people on the
wording of that report, line
by line." says one of, the Prin-
cipal authors. The agency, for
instance, permitted publica-
tion of the fact that the I.T.T.
had funneled $350,000 into
the 1S70 Chilean. elections,
but refused to allow identi-
fication of other companies
that, among them, had fur-
nished art equivalent sum.
Still, while abstract and in-
complete, the r-eport. is the
most comprehensive account
�
of a C.I.A. covert action yet
written.
From 1963 to 1973, the re-
port reveals, the C.I.A. spent
more than $13 million to � in-
fluence Chilean politics, apart
from what it spent On gather-
ing intelligence in that coun-
try. It lavished about $3
lion on the 1964 Chilean elec-
tions alone; on a per capita
basis, this was twice as much
as Lyndon Johnson and Barry
_Goldwater together spent on
:their Presidential campaigns
:that year. In 1970, President
Nixon ordered the C.I.A. to
encourage the Chilean Mili-
tary to stage a coup rather
than let President Salvador
Allende take power, and the
agency tried unsuccessfully to
do so through its agents in
the military. When the com-
mander in chief of the Chilean
:Army, Ren�chneider, op- .
posed a coup, C.I.A. officials
entered into talks with groups
planning to kill him.
General Schneider was as-
sassinated by one of these
; groups, but the elected
Marxist President took - of-
fice, and during the three
years of his regime, the
C.I.A. channelled $7 million in
covert-action. funds to a vari-
ety of Chilean unions, busi-
ness groups and political
parties opposed to Allende. It
also spent $1.5 million sup-
porting El Mercurio, Chile's
largest newspaper, in its cam-
paign against Allende's poli-
cies. Several of the news-
paper's key employees were
paid C.I.A. agents, committing
espionage. The agency ,pro-
duced several national maga-
zines and "a large number of
books," according to the re-
port. It had agents in most
of the important sectors Of
. Chilean -society, including, at
times, the Chilean Cabinet.
This covert activity, plus con-
firmed liaison with the mili-
tary, supplemented a slightly
more overt program of con-
stricting Chile's position in
the international credit mar-
ket.
Whether or not this covert
action "caused" Allende's
downfall and death�and offi-
cial American spokesmen had
been denying as late as 1973
that there had been any
United States attempts to in-
terfere with the Chilean elec-
tions�the Chile report did not
make much news, noi spark
much debate. C.I.A. spokesmen
studiously avoided comment.
They had the upper hand, and
did, not cant to say anything
that could somehow rekindle
interest in covert action, That,
early in 1976, could have
raisect thc sensitive' question
of whether the 'United States
4
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Was, or should be, intervening
in the Italian election cam-
paign. The issue did not come
to the fore. Press reports that
the agency was channeling $6
million to ;anti - Communist
parties in Italy died out with-
out resolution amidst the
Welch and Schorr controver-
sies.
By the time the Church
committee drafted its recom-
mendations 'on covert action,
the political base for referm-
ing the C.I.A. had disintegrat-
ed. The committee itself was
badly divided on the issue.
'Accordingly, the Senators
decided not to take a firm
position for or against covert
action, or even to push for
a national political debate
over its proper use. In its con-
cluding recommendations, the
committee declared that coy-
' ert action "must be seen as
an exceptional act," which
"must in no case be a vehicle
for clandestinely undertaking
'actions incompatible with
American principles." To
these vague mandates, the
committee added some rather
foamy standards in keeping
with the professorial tenor of
the staff approach: "Covert
operations must be based on
a careful and systematic anal-
ysis of a given situation, pos-
sible alternative outcomes,
the threat to American inter-
ests of these possible out-
comes, and, above all, the
likely consequences of an at-
tempt .to intervene." These
major conclusions were sup-
plemented by the customary
demand for more effective
oversight by the Congress..
"We tended to say that most
of the hard questions should
be studied," observed a task-
force leader. .
These recommendations
amounted to a clear, though
tortured, endorsement of the
C.I.A.'s covert-action program.
Moreover, they gave the agen-
cy enormous bargaining lever-
age in its efforts to keep infor-
mation secret. "The problem
with the C.I.A.," says F.A.O. �
Schwarz, "is that once you ac-
cept the kinds of things they
do, it's hard to argue that
they shouldn't disguise it bet-
ter." Once the need for some
form of covert action is con-
ceded, it follows that the nec-
essary apparatus should be
maintained and exercised. And
once it is accepted that the ap-
paratus cannot possibly func-
tion solely under the mantle
of the C.I.A., as Colby argued
Ir. a recent interview, then
something else follows: Pri-
vote American institutions
should be enlisted in the
cause.
This chain reasoning
matches the historical process
by which the C.I.A. enlarged
itself over the past three dec-
ades. At its creation in 1947,
the C.I.A. was strictly an intel-
ligence agency, with no au-
thority or capability for covert
action. The need for secret
feats of derring-do and manip-
ulation arose in the cold war,
and quickly became the vehi-
cle for the agency's spectacu-
lar growth. By the late 1950's,
security requirements were so
pressing that the C.I.A. was
spinning off thousands of
� front companies at home and
abroad. Inevitably, this led to
� a rationale for. intrusion into
domestic institutions. Even
though the agency's legal
charter expressly forbids it
from engaging in domestic ac-
tivities, the C.I.A. began mak-
ing arrangements for cover
with American groups, rang-
ing from missionaries to pub-
lishing houses to some of the
best-known corporations.,
In pressing secrecy on the
Church committee, C.I.A. offi-
cials developed the argument
from the basic logic of covert
acticn, until it applied even to
justifying continuation of do-
mestic activities. The commit-
tee gave �in on point after
point. Thus, the C.I.A. escaped
not only serious challenge to
the practice of covert action
but also the� risk of scandal
from exposure of operations
attendant to covert actions. No
one knows just how much ma-
terial remains buried in the
Church committee files or
how much the agency held
back, but a brief investigation
revealed an impressive list of
subjects which the committee
either deleted or consciously
failed to explore. The numer-
ous sources within the coma
mittee staff and the C.I.A.
who described these subjects
requested anonymity.
(1) Two draft sections of
the report �"Techniques of
Covert Action" and "Covert
Action Projects: Initiation, Re-
view, and Approval" �remain
classified.
(2) So do the five covert-ac-
tion case studies the commit-
'tee agreed to keep secret. Ac-
cording to committee sources,
the five countries are the
Congo (now Zaire), Greece,
Indonesia, Laos and Vietnam.
The committee report says
these studies show a pattern
of covert action and penetra-
tion not unlike the one in
Chile, In the Congo, covert ac-
tions began before the at-
tempts to assassinate Patrice
Leanumba and continued
through the chaotic period
following independence in
1960. The agency, according
to C.T.A. swarms, helped estab-
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fish Gen. Joseph Mobutu (now
President Mobutu Sese Seko)
and has maintained a covert
relationship with him and
other key officials ever since.
The relationship illustrates a
C.I.A. pattern of developing
ties to promising foreign poli-
ticians early in their careers
and then "sponsoring" them.
In Greece, covert actions
spanned some of the agency's
proudest achievements in
helping to prevent Communist
domination after World War
II. Today, the agency's ties to
the Greek Army and secret
police remain pervasive � so
much so that both Colby and
Rogovin, interviewed sepa-
rately, expressed fears for the
stability of the present Greek
Government if those ties were
revealed. In Indonesia, covert
action against the regime of
President Sukarno persisted
through the 1965 coup, hi
which more than one million
civilians died.
0) The committee's investi-
gation into the use of classical
espionage�obtaining informa-
tion and using it to influence
foreign governments�remains
classified.
(4) The committee broke no
new ground on the agency's
use of American corporations
for intelligence- work, cover,
or covert action. Staff direc-
tor William Miller terms this
a "failure." There was no ex-
ploration, for example, of the
agency's work with the corpo-
rate interests of the late How-
ard Hughes�in spite of con-
firmed reports of the $300
Glomar Explorer
project for raising a sunken
Soviet submarine. Senator
Barry Goldwater, a member
of the Church committee,
states that corporations "are
the third most important
source of foreign intelligence,
after foreign agents and satel-
lites." Committee sources say
the agency was particularly
reticent about corporation's
because the issue opens the
door to questions of domestic
impact. �
(5) The committee is silent
on the issue of the C.I.A.'s use
of American labor unions
abroad, even though former
agency employees, such as
columnist Tom Braden, have
written on the subject. One
committee source says "no
committee in a Democratic
Congress is going after labor
unions in an election year."
Other sources say it was more
a question of time and re-
sources, or an unwillingness
to investigate labor after
deciding not to look into cor-
porations.
(6) The committee learned
of, but did not investigate, the
extensive network of Ameri-
can professionals who have
secretly assisted the C.I.A.
Lawyers, for example, per-
form functions ranging from
liaison work with other Gov-
ernment agencies to legal rep-
resentation of C.I.A. proprie-
taries, or "front" organiza-
tions. One 'of former White
House counsel John Dean's
lawyers worked for a C.I.A.
front, as did the chief counsel
for Jeb Stuart Magruder. Paul
O'Brien, attorney for the 1972
Committee to Re-elect the
President, was a former C.I.A.
case officer and, according to
John Dean, offered the services
of a C.I.A. front, a law firm in
Greece, to help launder money
for the Watergate cover-up.
These C.I.A. ties to the Water-
gate case alone suggeSt that
C.I.A. relationships, with all
their political and profession-
al implications, are not unusual
among prominent Washington
lawyers.
(7) The committee agreed
to a C.LA. request that it clas-
sify the details of a report on
the clandestine use of Ameri-
can academic institutions.
After noting that C.I.A. assets
are employed by more than
100 colleges and universities,
the report states only that its
purpose is "to alert these in-
stitutions that there is it prob-
lem."
(8) After the C.I.A. issued
new, restrictive guidelines for
the use of American news per-
sonnel, the committee submit-
ted to a request that it classi-
fy the details of a report on
the question. Moreover, the
agency refused to supply the
committee with the titles of
several hundred books�many
of them published abroad, in
English, to be sold in the
United States � that it has
subsidized. "We couldi have
held hearings on the C.I.A.'s
relationship to the press that
would have_blown the lid off,"
blurted a task-force leader
who worked on the media
study.
The Church committee's
C.I.A. reports are impressive
on the surface�full of bu-
reaucratic history and
weighty essays on subjects
like "command and control."
But the tepid conclusions and
the omissions cited render the
work incomplete, if not irre-
sponsible. The contrast with
the thoroughgoing investiga-
tion of the F.B.I. is striking.
The main reason for this is
that F.B.I. wrongdoing in-
volved deviation from gener-
ally accepted standards for
the bureau, whereas the
CIA.'s covert actions ore in-
tegral to the agency's prac-
tices. The C.I.A. investigation
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arias more difficult because it
cut much closer to the bone.
"The alternative to covert
action," declares Senator
Goldwater, "is war." Argu-
ments about covert action
resemble arguments about
war. If the Senator's interpre-
tation is correct, the United
States has engaged in some
900 alternatives to war in the
last generation, and the Con-
gressional committees have
partially unveiled a much
harsher international reality
than most citizens know about.
The CIA. operates in a
world that is, in fact, hostile
and cynical. The agency's
environment is full of plots,
betrayals and people who are
less noble than they seem, and
the agency is built around the
notion that it can only operate
under cover. Secrecy makes
it more effective against ruth-
less enemies. Secrecy masks
an element of hypocrisy
necessary in a Machiavellian
world. It also protects the
American people from grisly
facts at variance with their
self-image. In this sense, the.
C.I.A. veterans consider them-
selves a true professional
elite, capable of immersing
themselves in a ruthless envi-
ronment without -losing their
bearings, and of shouldering
burdens for the American peo-
ple that the people would not
want to bear or even hear
about.
A combination of events
enabled the C.I.A. to prevent
a debate on whether covert
-action�secret wars and se-
cret alternatives to war---is
justified or necessary. The
C.I.A. bowled over the Pike
committee and seduced the
Church committee. Several
sources on the Church com-
mittee assert that the out-
come was the result of a
strategic decision--to duck
the issue, under the adverse
political conditions that de-
veloped this year, so as to be
able to take it up again uns1.,�!r
the authority of the new over-
sight committee, and perh7n!,
with the assistance of a new
Democratic Administra tien.
There is also the hope in some
quarters that these last two
years of investigation and rev-
elation have bad some effect
on the political climate, once
so congenial to the unre-
strained use of covert action,
and even on the way the C.I.A.
itself thinks of its role.
The record thus far, how-
ever, is not one to make for
much optimism. No oversight
committee is likely to have a
better opportunity to control
the C.I.A. than the Church and
Pike committees, whose rec-
ords speak for themselves, and
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WASHINGTON POST
'1-7 SEP 1976
Stephen S. Rosenfeld
Covey Sperati
In claiming that the CIA's covert op-
erations have survived scandal and in-
vestigation "intact, if not strength-
ened," journalist Taylor Branch, writ-
ing in last Sunday's New York Times
Magazine, dignifies a -gathering Wash-
ington myth. Citizens worried about
the official abuse of. secret power
should know it's not so. The myth, not
simply his article, needs to be knocked
down. � ,
Now, it's true that dirty tricks, pre-
viously conducted without statutory or
explicit legislative sanction, have now
gotten official congressional license. To
those who believe that there should be
no dirty tricks, or that the Congress by
sanctioning them legitimizes an illegiti-
mate practice, this may be enough to
damn the whole process.
It's true, too, that not all the CIA'S
myriad operations were investigated by
the Senate or House intelligence com-
mittees and that, of those investigated,
not all the findings were released or
leaked. Again, to those who look at this
matter just in terms of investigation
and disclosure, there's little more to
say.
r I find it inadequate, however, to ac-
cept either of these propositions.
As authentic and extensive a national
debate as can be imagined was waged
On the question of whether the U.S.
ought to be ready to conduct certain
operations under certain conditions.
Plainly, the national answer was yes.
Congress, which reflects the full spec-
trum of public opinion on this issue, is
moving to implement that public ver-
dict. It is not by the CIA's self-serving
manipulations or by the Congress being
"outfoxed" that this is happening, but
by popular demand. Personally, I buy
it.
� Further, the purposes and limitations
of investigation and disclosure must be
understood. These can build care into a
rampant bureaucracy and a negligent
executive, and they can fuel a demand
for reform in the Congress and public.
But is it necessary or wise to investigate
or disclose everything? Apart from the
deference due endangered persons and
apart from the limits of time and staff;
there is the real and valid political lim-
it, which the Senate observed and the
House did not, of acting in a way to
build a political consensus.
As Frank Church, chairman of the
Senate inquiry, puts it, "We did not
want to end up on the cutting room
floor. We wanted to keep the confi-
dence of the Senate and write our rec-
ommendations into law."
the C.I.A. has shown itself to ,
be quite adept at managing
the political climate. The
agency began these searching
Investigations banging on the
ropes, and clearly emerged the
winner. Its powers, so unique
and still largely hidden, re-
main essentially unchallenged.
- �--
ings
The Church committee achieved this
�it forced the President into reforms
meant to be preemptive, and launched
the Senate on its own referms. These
are "institutional" rather than "jour-�
nalistic," and it is instructive to run
down the list.
A permanent intelligence oversight
committee, of representative member-
ship, was set up in place of the old sys-
tem of informal review by CIA-co-opted
legislators. Its chairman, Daniel Inouye,
says he's proceeding with all deliberate
speed, building staff, and savvy, and
gaining executive cooperation: "Ii' they.
lie to us, there'll be hell to pay."
A charter, or statement of missions
and prohibitions, is being drafted by
this panel to cover the whole intelli-
gence community. It will go on top of
the charter decreed by President Ford
last February; Previously a broad range
of secret intelligence activities had no
legislative sanction and, in some cases,
not even recorded executive sanction.
An overall budget for the entire in-
telligence community is being drafted
(for fiscal 1978) to replace the frag-
mented and concealed agency budgets
of the past. The budget will be author-
ized line by line for content as well as
money in the regular fashion, not just
appropriated without authorization re-
view by a few congressional pals of the
intelligence agencies. ,
The Ford executive order gave po-
tential substance to the old form of an
intelligence "community," a concept
that the Senate is recognizing, too. The
necessary difficult internal exercise to
rationalize missions and assets and
divvy up a single budget pie is said to
be moving ahead.
A procedure is being worked out by
which the Senate accepts no prior re-
straints on what information it can re-
quest from the executive branch or re-
lease to the public, and by which it can
bargain out differences over the disclo-
re Not the
sure�even the disclosure of "covert"
operations.
The Senate's new requirement that
the President certify in writing the
need for each covert operation has
forced accountability upon the Presi-
dent�no more mumbles in the Rose
Garden. This assures the Congress of.
notification early enough to raise
meaningful objections, Inouye insists.
The procedure appears to improve
upon the 1974 Hughes-Ryan amend-
ment under which the executive could.
wait until late in the day to notify, in a
cursory way, six congressional commit-
tees, none of them with fixed responsi-
bility or readily available staff.
One should add that, institutional
considerations aside, the public climate
imposes its own restrictions on covert
operations. Look at how congressional
and public reaction aborted the admin-
istration's Angola operation, once the
shape of it became clear. Fear of leaks
is bound to further slow any adminis-
tration's covert hand.
My main point, though, lies here: You
can say that CIA dirty tricks survived
"intact if not strengthened" only by
overlooking the institutional innova-
tions�oversight committee, charter,
budget, intelligence community forma-
tion, information rules, notification of
operations, presidential accountability,
plus ' executive reorganization�by
which covert operations are now guid-
ed.
These innovations do not make ab-
sorbing reading, as do tales of-the poli-
tics and "bureaucratics" of the intelli-
gence inquiries. But they do seem a lot
more important. And although no final
verdict can yet be rendered, they make
it reasonable for citizens to hope that,
in so far as the conduct and control of
covert operations is concerned, things
have indeed changed.
NEW YORK DAILY NEWS
10 SEPTEMBER 1976
EXCEDRIN HEADACIIVS::
1... The CIA requested a print
"General. fdi Amin Dada" sent down to Washington
for their personnel to �view. Intelligence doesn't like to
� have to go around to the box office and dig up $:;�50
The producers. of the� extraordinary documentary on
� �t�he African big mouth dictator naturilly obliged.
- . ,�
6
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RADIO TV REPORTS, INC.
4435 WISCONSIN AVENUE, N.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20016 244-3540
PROGRAM
DATE
The Tomorrow Show
STATION
WRC TV
NBC Network.
CITY
September 16, 1976 1:00 AM Washington, D. C.
SUBJECT Full Text
TOM SNYDER: - Best seat in the house, and not a packed
house at that in Studio 6 in New York .City. Good morning, every
body. We're on the air tonight with Mr. George Bush, .who at the
present time is the Director of the CIA, the Central Intelligence
Agency, George Bush has done all kinds of things during the past
five years. He has been the United States Ambassador to the United
Nations. He has been Chairman of the Republican National Committee.
He has been the chief representative of the United States to the
People's Republic of China, and he has been, and is now, the
Director of the. CIA. And he'll join us here in just a couple of
seconds.
SNYDER: But as I say, tonight we have the Director.
of the CIA, Dr. George -- or Mr. George Bush with us. .And we'll
begin with Mr. Bush after these announcements, and I hope all Of
you will stay tuned.
.SNYDER: And now here is George Bush, the Director of
the CIA, which I want to talk about tonight. But I would like to
ask you about the importance of the death of Chairman Mao and the
effect your think it might have on relations between this country
and Mainland China, based upon the fact that you were our repre-
sentative there until just recently.
DIRECTOR GEORGE BUSH,: I would say that nobody is going
to replace Chairman Mao. You really have Lobe in China for a while
to see the pervasive nature of his presence and of his impact on
China. He gave the 'People's Republic -- well, he gave birth to
the People's Republic of China and he gave China a certain unity
and destiny, sense.of destiny that it hadn't had in many, many
decades. And so I think it's fair to say, certainly it's my judg-
ment, and I guess what's more important to your many listeners,
Tom, the judgment of many in the intelligence community that
Chairman Mao is so special that we don't look for a single re-
placement to him. And I think it's going to take time to sort
out what China does in terms of leadership. Hua Kuo-feng, who
is now the number one man there, is a strong leader, but he lacks
the following .that the Chairman had. He's kind of moderating be-
tween extremes, or two factions, you might say. And I think that
China will move forward in terms of kind of a collegial government
for a while, sort out Its new direction as it goes along.
I don't see anything in the death of Chairman Mao, who
indeed, along with President Nixon, made the opening: I don't
see anything to reverse that. And I don't -- I don't think, and
it's not my judgment, that China will move precipitously towards
a rapprochement with the Soviet Union.
So....
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SNYDER: Excuse me....
DIRECTOR BUSH: No, go ahead.
SNYDER: ...Is there another faction within China which .
Would sooner have China not become too friendly with the United
States?
DIRECTOR BUSH: Sure. There're people there that feel
that way. There're probably some there that would like to see them
closer to the Soviet Union. But their line has been established,
and we don't see any radical shifts either towards the Soviet
Union or away from the United States.
Now, there're some -- are relationships, the United
States and China. I don't want to get into policy, because I'm
in the intelligence business now, although I was involved, as you
pointed out, in the highest levels of our China policy.
SNYDER: .And you were the first person that we have sent
there at that level in some time.
DIRECTOR BUSH: Second. David Bruce....
SNYDER: Oh, excuse me
DIRECTOR BUSH: ...my most illustrious predecessor....
SNYDER: Correct. Correct.
DIRECTOR BUSH: ...opened the thing. And I was just
honored to follow in his distinguished footsteps. But neverthe-
less, I should stay away from policy considerations in our chatting
here tonight.
But I would say that we don't look for anything drastic
,on all this. And I think that there will be a difficulty before
the United States can establish full relations with China. But
we seek to fulfill the Shanghai Communique, which was the basic
doctrine between our countries. We aspire to that. China, in my
opinion, aspires to that.
So the death of Chairman Mao, traumatic, enormously im-
portant, not only in terms of China, but in terms of the world,
in my view will not adversely affect the relationship between
the United States and the People's Republic of China.
SNYDER: You've said twice in the preceding paragraph
or two that now that you're in the intelligence business, you
shouldn't talk about policy. Why not? You're a man with some
political experience....
DIRECTOR BUSH: Sure.
SNYDER: ...some policy experience, foreign policy as
DIRECTOR BUSH:
That's right.
SNYDER: Ambassador to the United Nations. Why now must
iyou switch that off?
DIRECTOR BUSH: I've 'got to not only stay out of policy.
Now if you say to me, how would you handle whether we ought to
formalize our relations with China, I'd duck the question. And
if you said to me, you know, who are you for for President, I'd
duck that question. Because the Director of Central Intelligence
must, one,. stay out of partisan politics, clearly. And secondly,
he must present to the President intelligence, finished intelligence
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his judgment. Under the law it's my judgment that goes to the
President, fortunately for the country, tempered and seasoned by
enormous professional competence. But in the final analysis, under
the law, it's my judgment. And that judgment has to go forward
unfettered by policy considerations.
Sowe . . . .
SNYDER: But can you not still speculate, based upon your.
.broad experience;...
DIRECTOR BUSH: Well, I could....
SNYDER: ...as a private citizen?
DIRECTOR BUSH: I mean I have the liberty of doing it.
Well, certainly if you turn those red lights off, I'll do it with
you. But I'm not going to do it because the Director of Central
Intelligence and the CIA must not get into politics.
on..
SNYDER: Turn the red lights off, but leave the camera
DIRECTOR BUSH: All of them are on.
fLaughter.1
� DIRECTOR BUSH: No, but we -- we've got to -- we've got
to -- we've got to let the policymakers set policy and let the
intelligence go forward unfettered by policy constraints. .
Say there's a policy that says country "a" and country
we must improve relations with them. And then the President
embarks on a course of action that says let's go forward and give
aid and improve it. And then we find certain intelligence that
indicates that if we do, it'll cost us the support of countries
"c" and "d.' We shouldn't be saying., whoops, the President's
committed to this policy that's going to support "a" and "b";
therefore don't you people bring me that bad news about "c" and.
"d." We've got to go forward with the way we see it. Call them
as you see them, you know.
And-so if I start speculating about what I would d9 � .
to formalize relations between China and the United States, that's
not my job. And I couldn't separate out George Bush from the i-ole
of the Director of Central Intelligence or the head of the CIA,
both of which hats I wear, you see.
SNYDER: Not with the foreign policy for the United
States.
DIRECTOR BUSH: Yeah, you can't do it. And I sit in
on the National Security Council meetings. I go to the cabinet
meetings that are related to :foreign affairs. I have direct ac�
cess to the President. My access should be used to give finished
intelligence, and let the policymakers, whoever is President, set
the policy. And that's the way it should be, and that's the way it
will be as long as I'm Director.
SNYDER: Can you tell me the difference between the Rind of
arrangement we now have with the People's Republic and how that differs
from what will be when we have diplomatic relations
DIRECTOR BUSH: Formal?
SNYDER: ...established with them formally?
*41
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DIRECTOR BUSH: You know, that's a tough and very
fair question, and I will try to answer it.
Right now we are less than --.I was less than a full
ambassador.
SNYDER: Well, okay. That really is the question.' What
.was the difference between yourself and a full ambassador?
DIRECTOR BUSH: Well, we didn't go to the airport to
greet foreign dignitaries. We didn't go to the Great Hall of the
People on state occasions when a visiting foreign chief of state
would come. There are certain protocolary differences that made
our rank, our status something less than full. Until we have
full diplomatic relations, our trade will not be -- not be en-
hanced. We won't have the best levels of trade, because certain
problems that could accompany, could go along with full relations,
such as the claims and assets question -- it could be solved before
we have full relations; it might not be. But full relations kind
of imply a solution to tough problems like that, you see.
. . So we -- but beyond that and beyond the protocol ques-
.tion, there are not too many substantive things.
SNYDER: Very subtle differences.
DIRECTOR BUSH: They're subtle differences. And yet
formal relations -- there're certain consular things that go with
it. And it would be better. I mean the United States seeks friendly
relations with almost all countries. And certainly we seek friendly
relations with the People's Republic of China.
Now you're getting me into policy. But I say this in
confidence because of our adherence to the Shanghai Communique.'
But there are certain very difficult problems that remain before
full relations can be established.
SNYDER: Without asking you about the policy problems,
how long a period of time would you estimate, again based upon the
work that you did there and the work that you did to make more
peaceful, I guess is the word I'm looking for, or more quiet, the
entrance of Mainland China into the United Nations when you were
there? How long would it take for this to come about where we
would have full, formal relations with the People's Republic?
DIRECTOR BUSH: I couldn't speculate. I can't, because.
there are certain major problems that exist that the President
and the chief of state in China must wrestle with and that the
secretary of State, in our instance, and the foreign minister;
in theirs, must wrestle with. And so really speculation -- even
if you asked me on a pure intelligence basis, not leaving out
my judgment as the former chief of the U. S. liaison office
in Peking, any answer I gave you would be pure speculation.
And I really want to duck that one because I can't give you
an honest, useful answer.
SNYDER: I understand that, sir. Now when that time
comes, though, would we expect the President of the United States
to make that announcement in concert, probably, with the Chinese
Premier at that time?
DIRECTOR BUSH: Well, I think if full diplomatic rela-
tions were established with the country that has a fourth of the
world's population, you would look for both chefs of states....
SNYDER: Major. Major.
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DIRECTOR BUSH: That's right, Tom. I mean this would
be a major step forward. It would be a major thing, and it would
� be considered -- certainly considered and probably announced at
the highest level.
.SNYDER: All right, sir. I must pause for these words
from our sponsors. We'll continue after these messages.
a.
SNYDER: Why do you think it is that Richard Nixon
was liked so apparently by Chairman Mao, to the point where he
would invite him to come back even after Mr. Nixon left the White
House?
DIRECTOR BUSH: President Nixon went to China, and he
said, "Look, I'm here in the self-interest of the United States."
There was no phoniness. The differences that he had articulated
all his political life were still very much in his mind. He laid
them right out on the table. Chairman Mao understood that. The
reason the Chairman wanted to talk to President Nixon, in my view
is that he felt it was in the national interest of China, just as
Nixon felt it was in the national interest of the United States.
And there was a certain directness. There was h certain mutal
respect. I think Chairman Mao thought President Nixon knew a lot
about world affairs, and I think -- I know that President Nixon
felt that Chairman Mao did. And so there was this kind of prag-
matic understanding and self-respect -- mutal respect that gave.
President Nixon this special standing.
And when President Nixon went back, there was all this
kind of hogwash in the United States that the Chinese were trying
to intervene in the New Hampshire Primary. I don't know if you
. remember that...
SNYDER: Surely. Yes, I do.
DIRECTOR BUSH: And it couldn't have been further from
,the truth. This was the fourth anniversary of the Shanghai Com-
munique. There was this mutual respect, even though they have
very vigorous differences. And the Chinese understood that
:President Nixon had kind of taken a gamble and had opened this
'relationehip, ad they were honoring him for that, not to inter-
;vene in some primary.
So I really think that's the reason that the President
was there and what he said was the national interest of the United
States -- "I'm here in our own self-interest." And the Chairman
sat down and said "I'm here in the self-interest of China; now
let's talk. And they seemed to get along and understand each
other.
SNYDER: Do you think that the meetings could have gone
a different direction in 1972 between Nixon and Mao Tse-tung, that
it could not have come off as well as it did with the Communique
of Shanghai at the end?
DIRECTOR BUSH: Well, I....
SNYDER: You know, you label it as a gamble, that Nixon
and Mao both took a gamble.
DIRECTOR BUSH: Sure. And I think when they -- I think
obviously Dr. Kissinger and others 7- well, Dr. Kissinger did a
lot of preliminary work. And I'm sure that they ironed out some
of the more obvious hurdles, or smoothed those things out before
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the meeting took place, the meetings � in Peking took place.
But, yes, I think up till the last minute there were
some difficult negotiations and some problems that were unre-
solved before our then President went there. And so, yes, there
was. a gamble involved.
But I .think once they decided to meet, there, was enough
at stake on both sides that some kind of agreement was destined to
be forthcoming. And sure enough, it was.
SNYDER: Uh-huh. The papers quoted you back in the-
1960s.when you were, I believe, in political life as saying that
You. felt that the admission of Mainland China to the United" Nations
would destroy that organization. Yet ironically, you were the United
,States Ambassador to the United Nations when Mainland China was .coming
in.. And though you fought long and well for Nationalist China to re-
main with Mainland China, it didn't work out that way.
What changed your mind? Was it -- was it....
DIRECTOR BUSH: Well, there were changed circumstances.
You see, in the early '60s -- and that was a rather accurate
quote -- there were some demands on the part of the People's
Republic of China for admission to the U. N. that were unaccep-
table and remained unacceptable, not only to the United States,
but to the majority. For example, they wanted to go back -- and
just one of the ones -- go back and say that the U. S. was the
aggressor in Korea. Now that was a quid pro quo or .a sine qua
non; without that we won't come to the United Nations. That
was the early '60s. Now that was unacceptable. To me, politi-
cian or fledgling interested individual in foreign affairs, I
was saying to myself and to my potential constituents, "Look, I
don't think that that should bp, that the United States ought to
go back....
SNYDER:-That we ought to take a rap for that.
DIRECTOR BUSH:
...and take that kind of rap." And
we didn't. And so there were changed circumstances.
And then when I was at the United Nations, why, we
had the policy of dual representation, because we felt at that
particglar juncture in history -- and we articulated it as best
we could, and we fought for it -- that though there's one China,
there is indeed two governments at this juncture, that each claimed
to be China. And we didn't feel that the Republic of China, or
TaiWan, should be thrown out of the United Nations, The United
Nations voted differently. And I was Ambassador at the time. I
worked that side of the question. The People's Republic of China
representatives that I later got to. know very well'in Peking and
at the V. N. ass well understood this. And we were on opposite
sides of that. The decision was made. And then I determined,-
as U. S. Ambassador, to work as compatibly as possible with the
will of the majority. And we did. And I think that's the proper
way to conduct oneself. And I fought for what I believed, but
people don't always do it the way the United States wants.
SNYDER: If we leave aside the glamour names in China,
Mao Tse-tung, Chou En-lai and others, can you tell me something
about the kind of people that are running that country at the
bureaucratic level, people that might correspond to our cabinet
officers in this country or to heads of intelligence, such as your-
self? What kind of men nod women are running that country in terms
of their competence and their understanding of the world and China's
place?
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DIRECTOR BUSH: Oh, Tom, that's a tough one, because I
mean it would be like saying what kind of men and women are running
this country. I mean some people would say dedicated. Others
would say too bureaucratic. Some would say aggressive, self-
seeking. Others would say lazy and not -- not stimulated by
their surroundings.
So I think -- I think it's pretty much the way it
is the whole world over. But there is a dedication to Maoism.
There is a central -- with the people in these government posi-
tions, a strong adherence to central doctrine. In fact, there's
very little deviation, if any, from doctrine, particularly in
foreign affairs. And I think there's a certain lack of individual
freedom to move away from a line in foreign affairs. We have it;
not too much, but we have some of that, of course.
But really, when you get down to the individuals, charm-
ing, able, well versed in languages....
SNYDER: Competent.
DIRECTOR BUSH: ...competent, good grasp of history.
Their Foreign Minister, Ch'iao Kuan-hua, educated in Germany,
philosopher, tremendously capable. If you can get him on your
show, you'll be doing very well. Now you and he probably would
come at it from different philosophical points of view. But
capable. You're saying, "Are they able? �Are they good?" Yes,
.they're strong.
SNYDER: The reason I ask that question is that there
are many people in this country who so abhor all kinds of communist
governments that they believe that the people running them are
really wild-eyed revolutionaries who used to be in guerrilla
armies and now, all of a sudden, are occupying places of power --
well, not all of a sudden any more in the instance of China --
.who really are not competent politically, and who really are not
competent in terms of administering to a country that has one-
quarter of -the world's population.
Yet I would just have to think that they must have some
very bright people. there and some very able people who are more
than foot soldiers who came out of the mountains in 1949 to govern
a country.
DIRECTOR BUSH: If a guy was a foot soldier who came
out of the mountains in 1949 to govern a country, that doesn't
mean he's a dumb-dumb.. But they get dumb guys; they get bright
guys. They get fat ones; they get thin ones. They've got happy
ones; they've got sour guys. They've got forthcoming people,
and they've got recalcitrant, withdrawn people. And it's kind of
like Washington, D. C. or Disneyland East. I mean it's the same
the whole world over.
[Laughter.]
SNYDER: It's no secret that if China wanted to, it
could reclaim Quemoy, Matsu and Formosa tomorrow *morning, mili-
tarily, if they wished to do that.
DIRECTOR BUSH: Tom, you're going to get me in a lot of
policy. Go on; what's your question?
ahead.
SNYDER: ..No, I'm not. No, it's not going to be....
DIRECTOR BUSH: That's your statement; not mine. Co
� SNYDER: I think they could if they wanted to. And I
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think that if they wished, for example, in 1999 or whenever the
treaties on the new territories, the leases run out in Hong Kong,
they could reclaim those.militarily with absolutely no problem.
The question is, will they? Now, if that's a policy
question, then you can duck it. But I just have to think to my-
self that if they really were a vengeful nation bent upon gaining
revenge for all of the wrongs they believe have been committed
against them over the last twenty-five or thirty years, they would
go after Formosa, and they would go after Hong Kong and seize that
rich port and its economic treasures. But they don't do that.
� DIRECTOR BUSH: You make a good point. But I would
only add, because it will get me closer to policy than I want to
get, they would be contemplating how will others respond. And we
have a mutual defense treaty at this point in our history with
the Republic of China. And anybody in Peking making that kind Of
decision will obviously be thinking about that. Beyond that, I
don't want to go. But it certainly would be an inhibition to
adventure. And I think that the people in Peking dnderstand this.
On the other hand, that doesn't mean -- I'm not trying to predict
what they will or won't do.
SNYDER: Yes, sir. We will continue And get into the
business of how Bush runs the CIA.. That we are allowed to
talk about, I assume.
we?
DIRECTOR BUSH: Yes, fully.
.SNYDER: We can talk about intelligence policy, can't
DIRECTOR BUSH: Fully.
SNYDER: Fully. Right after these announcements from
.our sponsors.
���
SNYDER: What kind of a job is being the Director of
ithe CIA? Is that. a political. job? You were appointed to that �
lby the President. You are a Republican. You have run for office.
;You have worked for the Republican presidency for some time.
DIRECTOR BUSH: No, it's not a political job in the
isense of partisan. In fact, when -I went into the job,. I properly
:forswore all partisan political activity. Now when I was nominated
for the job by President Ford, there was some debate, rather heated
Aebate. in the United 'States Senate as to whether I should be in.
�ithe job because I'd been Chairman of,the Republican National Com-
mittee, I'd been a Republican member of the United States Congress.
I convinced the senators, an overwhelming majority of
'them, that an American citizen can participate in partisan politics
with partisanship and with fervor, and when out of that can do a
nonpartisan job, as I think I did as Ambassador to the United
-
Nations, as chief of the liaison office in China in nonpartisan
fashion.
And so I went down there and said, "Look, I -- I think
I can do this job. It's an administrative job; it's a coordina-
tive job; it's a job where the Director must have the confidence
of the President and he must have some confidence in the Congress,
and I'm not going to be involved in partisan politics. And if I
did, I ought to be thrown out, because the Central Intelligence
Agency and the intelligence community must be free of partisanship."
And I hope I've conducted myself in that manner. And I think I
have. And certainly I've tried to: And fortunately for me,
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because I like the job and I am enthralled with the mission and
I'm impressed with the people I work with in terms of their dedica�
tion and their competence -- fortunately the United States Senate
agreed and I was confirmed. And there were some doubters, and I
understand that.
SNYDER: I was going to ask you, do you think the debate
over your nomination and your qualifications was a proper debate
ifor the representatives of the people...?
DIRECTOR BUSH: Of course it was. Of course it was
!proper. And, you know, I'm human, and I didn't like it, and
Isome of the senators said things that I wish they hadn't said.
;But my goal the minute I was confirmed is not to go back and show
a vendetta, but to try to earn the confidence and the respect of
those who voted against me for understandable reasons. And only
history will tell if I can do that.
SNYDER: .How effective have you been in at least gaining
some kind of rapprochement with those senadors who did not want
you to have the job? Did you actively seek them out on a. 'personal
'basis afterwards or just let your work speak for itself?
DIRECTOR BUSH: No. .I tried to ,say, look, from this
moment on I'm going to do what I said I'd do; butt out of partisan
politics, lay aside -- saying to myself, lay aside the debate;
bury my own strong feelings about "Why wasn't this guy for me
or not,' and earn his confidence. And I don't know how it's
working. You should ask some of those senators.
But you know, I'm kind of goal oriented. And I'm going
to convince them � through performance, not through a lot of PR,
that the majority was, correct., But much more important than
any personal thing is, you know, how is the intelligence community
running? Good God, these people were. subjected. to some excessive
abuse. not saying everything was perfect in the past; and
I'll be glad to discuss that with you.. But there has been a
piling on....
SNYDER: Well, I want, you to know. I might as well
say this for the benefit of the people who are watching too. I
don't think the purpose of this hour should be to go over all of
the charges, proved and disproved, of the last five or ten years
and try to hold you accountable for you [sic] and say "Now,
what are you going to do about that?" I think that....
-DIRECTOR BUSH: Thank God.
SNYDER: Well, I think committees of the Congress have
done their job properly. I think that the reports have all come
out. The record is there for people to see. And obviously you
were appointed or chosen by President Ford as Director of the CIA
to go forward from the bad old days, if that's....
DIRECTOR BUSH: That's what .1 want todo._
SNYDER: Which I'm sure My detractors will say,
I'm letting you off easy. But I don't think....
DIRECTOR BUSH: Well, but -- yes, some will say that.
The sensationalists will say that. But look, intelligence, foreign
intelligence is Vital to the national security in these troubled
times. We know what we up against. We don't know all about it,
but we know enough about it to have just totally convinced me, not
only when I was a consumer of intelligence in China, in the United
Nations, but now when we produce it and I'm responsible for this --
to absolutely convince me that an intelligence capability second to
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none is vital to legitimate national security.
So I do want to look ahead. And yet I continually have
to look over my shoulder. And I'm delighted. You know, if you
get some flak out of it, too bad, and you probably will, because
there're people who want to still criticize us.
SNYDER: Well, we'll refer those people back to about five
programs we've done on this series with, for example, Mr. Hirsch
of the New York Times and other reporters and writers and members
of organizations which are anti-CIA. They've all had their say
on many occasions, and we've heard it all before. I would like
to see what's coming tomorrow rather than worry about what's
going on -- or what went on yesterday.
But just one question in that area. When � you say you
yant,an intelligence establiShment second to none, fine. But �
�there is a feeling I think created by. the investigations and
..by the probings of Congress that we have far too many people
working in intelligence in. this country, that almost every other
person might be a CIA agent or might be an FBI undercover man,
or might be with the local police department in plain clothes,
and that we have too many people checking on those of us who
are not doing any investigating..
DIRECTOR BUSH: Yes, that's a myth. I'm absolutely
convinced it's a myth. Our personnel levels are subject to
Minute scrutiny by the proper oversight committees in the Con-
gress. And if they felt that -- and believe me, they go over
every budget figure, personnel ceilings that you mention, now,
with a fine tooth comb. And if they thought there was excessive
staffing, that would have come out in these Senate -- in the
Senate report or in the House committee report, or in one of the
thirty-seven appearances, official appearances before Congress
that I've made in nine months of being Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency.
,And so I'm not saying we can't be more efficient. .I'm
not,saying we can't cUt. back here or .there. But this concept that
you accurately portray that Americans feel the CIA has excessive
?people spying is nonsense. It's wrong.
SNYDER: I had a man on this program who said that there's
a very good probability that there could be an employee or two some-
where at RCA or NBC. I don't know how many people this company
employs; too many in some areas. That this man might also be
working for the CIA. 'Well, now, if I found out that there was
a co-worker of mine here who was working for your company and was '
taking notes on what me and my colleagues did or people who ca-me
on this show or any other and sent them down to your office in
Langley, Virginia, I'd be highly upset about that....
DIRECTOR BUSH: Sure you would.
SNYDER: I don't think your agency has any business in
this building.
DIRECTOR SYNDER: And we're not in it. And the very fact
that he gets credibility by saying that on this show, with no proof,
not being compelled to come forward with the facts, gets me -- I
can't use the phrase I used to use in the Navy. I'm upset about
it, because it's not true. And it's been investigated.
SNYDER: It starts with "T" and it rhymes with teed-
off. Okay?
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DIRECTOR BUSH: .No, it starts -- yes. I've got to be
careful. I don't want to get people calling in. But no, it's
1:ot right. And if.it were true, it'd be all over every headline.
And yet we are living with that kind of myth. Movies come out..
Robert Redford and "Seven Days of the Condor," with CIA guys
gunning down each other in the United States. Nobody ever
alleged that. The sensationalism, the excesses of the investi�
gation. We're kind of propelled into this kind of nonsense, and
we have to live with it. But we're professionals. We're patient.
We know our mission is important. We know we're living within �
-- properly now within the constitutional constraints, and we're
determined so to do. We're subjected to proper oversight by the
President on the executive side, by seven committees of the Congress
And I am very comfortable, as one who prides himself on some sen�
sitivity for the rights of American citizens, with the way the
intelligence community is conducting itself.
SNYDER: And isn't it just too bad that the former
President really bastardized the CIA throughthe whole Watergate
thing, or it was alleged that he did that to the CIA?
DIRECTOR BUSH: There have been allegations against
several former Presidents. People look back at the Bay of Pigs
an say, using ninety/ninety hindsight, this was wrong. But my
v5ew -- and I do appreciate your not dwelling on the past, though
I'll glad to respond to any question �you ask about it to the best
of my ability....
SNYDER: I believe it.
DIRECTOR BUSH: But there have been errors, and there
have been, using 1976 moral judgments, some condemnations of
things in the past. But Tom, we're in a tough ball game, and
we better be prepared, we better produce the best intelligence
we can; we better have the best analysts, Ph. D.s, MAs; we better'
have the best security for the premises here and aboard; we better
have dedicated people willing to sacrifice. And .we've got these
things.
SNYDER: And still people who have a tittle humaneness,
a little compassion, a little sensitivity....
DIRECTOR BUSH: We need that, sure.
SNYDER: ...and a little romance in their approach to
DIRECTOR BUSH: That's right. It's not a James Bond life
that we're in. And yet covert action is a small percentrge....
SNYDER: Don't you have a car that shoots -- don't you
have a car that shoots noxious gases out the back?
life.
either.
DIRECTOR BUSH: No. And I've not yet met Fussy Galore
�
[Laughter.]
SNYDER: I can help you there..
DIRECTOR BUSH: I don't want any ef that. Listen, I've
got enough problems running the CIA nn4 the intelligence community.
SNYDER: We will continue with Director Bush after
these announcements. I hope you'll stay tunel.
'*
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SNYDER: ...nonpOlitical'nature of your job for a second
here. � If somebody from the Committee to Re-Elect President Ford
were to call and say the President would like you to make a cam-
paign speech, you would say no. �
DIRECTOR BUSH: Not only would I say no. I'm a former
Chairman of the Republican National Committee. I didn't go to
the convention, didn't go near it; stay away from any political
gathering; feel constrained to not even support the candidate of
my choice as an American citizen; insist that we -- upon presiden-
tial instruction, but that we fully and properly, as we should,
brief Governor Carter, the contender, the major contender to the
President for the presidency. And if you or anyone else point
to anything that I do that smacks of partisanship, I shouldn't be
in it. The agency's been under enough fire. And the process --
much more important, the impartiality from politics of the process
is so'important that a Director ought not to be political.
Now, I think I can.be a-good Director of CIA.
SNYDER: If JerryFord called you on the phone tomorrow,
'which I'm sure he would not do, but if he did and he said "George,
.�I'd like you to go out to Oswego, Michigan and .make ,a little talk,"
you would say "Mr. President, I'm not going."
DIRECTOR BUSH: No, I wouldn't, and II1-1 make....
SNYDER: .What would you say?
DIRECTOR BUSH: ...the differentiation for you. I'll make
the differentiation for you. He's the President. I'm the head of
one of many executive agencies. I serve at the pleasure of
the President. Now if he said -- I'd say, "Mr. President, what
is the purpose, or what do you want me to do in Oswego; Michigan?"
If he says "I want you to go out and make me look good politically:"
I'd say "I won't do it." But if he said "There's a group out there
� that's long been interested in intelligence,..and as the President
of the United States, they're interested in the executive order
that's reformed the intelligence community, and each year the
Director of CIA has done this and I'd like you to do it," I'm
going to do it.
SNYDER: Such as at the University of Michigan.. Okay. -
-I understand.
DIRECTOR BUSH: And so we've got to draw the line between,
you know, the concern people have that a President might ell the
CIA Director to do something iriproper, and the other line is that
there's one President, and he deserves the loyalty and the best
judgment of his Director of CIA, just as he does of Interior,
HUD, Defense, or whatever it is.
So I don't want to be a free-floating spirit. The CIA
must be under the control of the President. And the President
should be able to fire the Director of CIA or tell him what to
do. But he shouldn't be able to tell him to do something that's
improper.
Your question connoted political impropriety, and that
I woutdn't do and, without injecting a partisan note in it, this
President wouldn't ask me to do, you see. And so I -- I -- I
don't think we've got a conflict on this one, Tom.
� SNYDER: What if Jimmy Carter is elected in November?
What happens to your job?
;
DIRECTOR BUSH: I serve at the pleasure of the President.
And I would not make it difficult for a new President to get rid
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of me. And I'll tell you why. I don't believe the agency or the
Director of CIA, Director of Central Intelligence or the head of
CIA should be partisan. But I do believe strongly that. whoever
heads the intelligence community, the Director of Central Intelli-
gence, must have the confidence of the President. He can't serve
intelligence well if he doesn't. And the President is ill-served
if he can't have confidence in what the Director is telling him.
And so there is a certain compatibility separate and
apart from politics that is in the national interest. And so-what
happens, I don't know. And I really think it's far less important
than whether this community stays strong, the intelligence community.
And so I would say "Mr. President, any time you want to get a new
man in here-, please proceed so to do." And I don't think that is�
making partisan a nonpartisan job. It's simply my conception of how
government ought to operate.
SNYDER: I don't have historicity in my head as to
what happens when a President of a different party comes into
office. Do you remember what happened.,..
DIRECTOR BUSH: Vis-a-vis CIA?
- SNYDER: Yes. When Johnson came in, or when Johnson
left and Nixon came in.
DIRECTOR BUSH: Well, Dulles -- Dulles was eventually
replaced by Kennedy. There was a little period of time. I mean
President Kennedy replaced..,.
SNYDER:, Replaced Allen Dulles.
DIRECTOR BUSH: ...Allen Dulles. I can't 7- be
honest; I haven't looked beck.
SNYDER: Who was in when -- does anybody in the room
know when Johnson and Nixon....
DIRECTOR BUSH: Well, Dick Helms.
SNYDER: Well, he remained.
DIRECTOR BUSH: But I don't remember. I thought you
were talking about turnovers. I.can't....
SNYDER: No, I'm just wondering. The minute Kennedy
took office from a Republican, Eisenhower, did you fire the CIA
Director?
DIRECTOR BUSH: No, no.
SNYDER: I don't think so.
DIRECTOR BUSH: No, no, no, no.
SNYDER: And when Nixon took it from the Democrat, Mr.
Johnson, did he fire the CIA Director?
DIRECTOR BUSH: No. But in fairness....
SNYDER: And I'm not trying to dictate....
DIRECTOR BUSH: NO, but in fairness, Tom, there has
never been a Director who has had as active a political past as
I have. And so just as I understood the debate on my nomination
before the Senate, I would understand a review of my position, if.
for no other reason than because I had been actively involved on the
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other side of the political spectrum, you know, should your
hypothesis work out.
But again I come back, not trying to sound holier than
thou, but that's inconsequential. What really is essential is
that the proper relationship be established. And we've-got it .
now. It's working well. The Director of Central Intelligence'
is given access to a President that supports the concept of a
strong foreign intelligence community. And that's what's essen�
tial, whoever is President. And my future, my getting.a job
really is coincidental.
SNYDER: We will continue after these announcements,:
hope you'll stay tuned.
SNYDER: You mentioned that you feel it's proper that
,Carter, the Democratic nominee, be briefed on certain,items.
Who decides how much he will be told?
DIRECTOR BUSH: Well, in the final analysis, the President.
The President's instructions to me, as head of the'intelligence com�
munity, is the determining factor. But the Presiaent took a very
broad view. He said I think that it's most important that the
�7 that Governor Carter be given intelligence briefings. But then
I worked out, as the designee of the President, with Governor Carter
the parameters of the briefings. And we decided that they should
be on intelligence, that they should stay away from policy and that -
they should stay away from sources and methods, which is a certain
code for the things I am to protect under the law. Governor Carter
recognized that he didn't need to know at this juncture .the sources
and methods of the intelligence. And so our briefings-have consisted
of finished intelligence. I've attended the two briefings on intel�
ligence, and fortunately for him with me went some of our very.top
experts in the areas that he was interested in. And we're not
holding back. The President has made clear to me he wants Governor
Carter fully briefed, and this is what we're doing. And the bene�
ficiary is the United States of America.
SNYDER: Now in the briefings -- and if you can't say,
you will just say "I can't say." I understand because I'm a neo�
phyte and I don't want to get into areas of great sensitivity.
But do You brief, the opposition candidate on methodology, per�
sonnel, location, or do you brief him on things that are happening
currently in countries where we operate intelligence installations?
DIRECTOR BUSH: It's'the latter. We don't go into thetho�
Sources and methods of intelligence we don't go into.-
SNYDER: Like in country "X," Mr. "A" is doing such and
such to make sure that political Mr. "B" will not advance. That '
kind of thing?
DIRECTOR BUSH: No. We don't go into the source or
method. What we go into is here's the way one conceives the
istrength of the Soviet Union, for example, where it's up against
NATO, you know.' Or, here's what we think that might happen in
China after Chairman Mao passes on. Or, here's a current intel�
ligence briefing. Here's the status of what might be going on
in come area, maybe the Middle'East or Africa, or wherever it is.
SNYDER: I understand.
DIRECTOR BUSH: We stay out of policy. We give him
intelligence. We respond to questions. And I hope it's working
21)
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to.his satisfaction. The people at the .CIA, the professionals
with whom I work, feel that the briefings have gone reasonably
well.
SNYDER: Will there be more before the election?
DIRECTOR BUSH: That depends on what Governor Carter
feels he requires.
SNYDER: I see. Now what....
DIRECTOR BUSH: The President has authorized me to give
him what he needs in terms of intelligence briefings.
SNYDER: Has he asked for anything you wouldn't tell him?
DIRECTOR BUSH: Now, Tom, you're getting into....
SNYDER: I understand.
DIRECTOR BUSH: No, I don't think so. I don't think
he has. No. And I don't think we had any differences with the
Governor.
SNYDER: What arrangement is there, though, and I'm cer�
tain there must be some, between the President and Governor Carter
in terms of using information supplied by yourself and your associates
as campaign issue or campaign speechmaking source?
DIRECTOR BUSH: Well, I don't -- I don't -- if there is
some arrangement that they've discussed, something between them of
that nature -- certainly I've not been any intermediary on that kind
of an arrangement. I don't expect that kind of an arrangement exists.
I think that any recipient of highly classified intelligence in the
position of Governor and certainly the President recognizes he's
dealing with sensitive information. And I don't expect there will
be an abuse of this information.
But should that have been discussed, it hasn't been dis�
cussed with me, nor should it be. That would be an arrangement, a
policy kind of a thing that would be worked out elsewhere. But I
don't believe there's such an arrangement.
::,SNYDER you..know how good you are. at _doing thiS kind
'Of� ee16,i-sion?-
� :DIRECTOR BUSH: No, I'm trying t
SNYDER: But you really are good. I'm out of time. But
you really are good at this, and you should do it more oftene It
would help you, and it would help your company.
Thank you for being here this morning.
DIRECTOR BUSH: Thank you, Tom.
PIIILADLFHIA INVIR1,13
16 SP.PTEMDER 1 976
; Quotable: A matter of choice
"1 don't lie; I just choose what I say."
.7 7... � �Former CIA director William Colby, speaking to students ,
� � �� � .at the 'University of Pennsylvania Tuesday night
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WASHINGTON POST
1 6 SEP 1976
iiigPL,ne
By Laurence 'Stern
Washingioti Post Staff Writer
Leo Cherne, one of President Ford's
chief intelligence advisers, .is a cen-
tral figure in a Justice Department
national security investigation that NI
,being described by federal officials as
"the green book affair." �
The green book is a. government
Mite pad in :which a staff aide to -
Cherne recorded briefings with diplo-
matic and intelligence officers during
a trip to Europe in March, 1975.
Cherne is chairman of the Presi-
dent's Foreign Intelligence Advisory
Board and a member of the newly
;formed three-member Intelligence'
'Oversight Board.- �
The notebook, officially described
�.as having contained "classified infor-
mation. . . injurious � to. the national
security of the United States," disap-
peared immediately after Cherne and
his aide, Cmdr. Lionel H: Olmer, re-
turned from the European trip.
Here the plot thickens. �liner, an
intelligence officer during his entire
'19-Year naval ;career, says he has no
idea how the little green notebook got
� out of his pessession. He 'is described
by associates as an extremely meticu-
lous professional experienced in the
'�handling of classified material.
-Within several hours after his ar-
rival at his Rockville,: Md.. home; he
called.Wheaton.Byers, executive see-
'retary,of the Foreign ,Intelligence Ad-
visory Board and advised. him .of the
notebook's disapPearance,�he said yes-
terday. � An. investigation. was con-
dueted and the notebook waspre-
sumed lost when � the aircraft cabin
was cleaned. �
:The mystery was solved�to' the
greater consternation of :Cherne and.
Olmer�on July 24, 1975, when the in-
'telligence adviser received a tele-
phone call from Michael James Casey
of Los Angeles.
"He said, 'I have your notebook,'_"
.Cherne recounted yesterday in de-
scribing what he called a "14-month
ordeal." �
� It was during this and subsequent
telephone conversations that Cherne
learned. that Casey had served two
years at �Soledad Prison near San �
Francisco., Casey. further . explained
that he had recovered the notebook'
from sympathizers of Patricia Hearst,
who was then at large.
Casey contended that the finders of
the notebook had hoped that It "might
be 'exchanged for considerations in
their behalf and I -told him that I
wouldn't do it even if I could,"
Cherne said.
Casey, in a relephont int erview
'from Omaha, wil:ire he was acquitted
yesterday of a "felonious entry"
charge, insisted: "I was,not trying to
burn Chernc.1 told him hoW ;1 got the.
Iniok and the interest of the people
who had found it."
Casey is a �32.year-old Californian
who prides himself on his work in re-
setlhIneni. of Vietnamese l'eljigees,
who sought to appear as a witness in
behalf of Hearst at her trial on
Li Qer
-charges of. bank robbery, and who
wound up, in an ironic turn of the
story, working briefly for the Interna-
kional Rescue Committee of which
'-Cherne was chairman of the board.
es ..Early last year Casey persuaded the
:Los Angeles Times to send him and
:two staff reporters to Hong Kong at a
� reported cost Of $15,000 for a prom-
ised rendezvous with Hearst. The
newspaper subsequently described the
episode as a hoax. Casey- acknowl-
edged that ,the Hearst trip "bummed
out."
� Casey's career also encompassed a
Ifine-month period as director of spe-
':;eial projects for Boys Town, the Ne-
hraska community started by Father.
�-Flanigan, from which he was fired in.
a dispute with the administration over.
; the alleged theft of 31 files for an
MGM television production. ("One of
my jobs," he said, "was to get them
publicity.")
When Cherne found out who had
turned up with his notebook, lie noti-
fied the intelligence staff arid was
advised "to play it down and not make
it appear to lie important.", The initial
judgment was that the loss was not
of great security significance.
Cherne maintains . that he first
learned that Casey was employed in
, the Los Angeles' office. of the Inter-
national Rescue Committee as a con-
sultant during an Aug. 22, 1975,' phone
conversation with him. "I said, 'I
don't think terribly much about your'
'association with IRC and when 1: �de-
.cide finally, I'll ask. for your. resigna-
ham' "
The green notebook was returned
on Aug. 26, 1975, and �Cherne turned
it over to. the intelligence, staff. Three
weeks later he called Casey and asked
for his resignation. "He submitted
cheerfully, always cheerfully," Cherne
'reminisced.
On Sept.. 72 Casey sent a Mailgram
to the paesiding judge in the Herst
case, Oliver J. Carter, in the name of
the IRC.
"We prayfully requeSt; that Patricia
Hearst be admitted to bail." the tele-
gram' read. "Please consider that
Patty Hearst was directly and indi-
rectly esponsible for the safe eVaella-
ti on oi' 390 mon, women and childran
wit hat4 regard to lice own safety (lul--
ing last. week 1975,- at
Seieon, South Vietnam."
Ttic telegram was immediately re-
Imitafed by the MC on Cherne's in-
structiona. ;
In Echeuary of this year Cherne
was appointed to the Intelligence
-,Oversi Board by' 'President. Ford
and also named chairman of the For-
eign Intelligence Advisory Board, of
which he was a member at the time of
' his European trip. His offices here
arc in' Pie Executive Office Building, �
and he commutes from New V irk an
averace of twice a week.
in March, a rental or for the San Di-
ego 1.4:veiling Trilume, Robert Dietrich,
coti-d Chortle: e:snla'ning that (;asey
hart showed him the contents of the
notebook.
22
Of CA"
; The notebook, according to in-
formed saurces, contained notes on
briefings with embassy and Central
Intelligence Agency officials about a
number of issues, including reactions
'to news steries about the CIA, the im-
pact of the massive flow of petrodol-
lars .`roin th.e. West. to the Arab states,
as well as "unprecedented unemploy-
meet and. catastrophic inflation" in
' European countries.. . .
; There was an-early reference-in the
notebook, both Cherne and Casey. ac-
knowledge, to New York Times re-
porter Terry Robards. Casey located
'Bollards in New York, he said, and it
was the Times reporter who specu-
lated that the initials "L.C." in the
; notebook must have referred to
Cherne. This, said Casey, IS: how he
� concluded that the notebook belonged
to cherne.,
Dietrich wrote a story in the Trib-
une last April 14 charging that he had
tried to alert the FBI to :his discovery
'of clecutrents "containing the names
of 100 or more :CIA agents" and
that the details "were in the hands
of an ex-'convict with ties to the Ameri-
can underground." .
Dietrich also charged lie had been
intimidated by 1/13iSt'tiOUS phone calls
; and an armed visitor who "asked
'about Cherne and about copies of Ca-,
!sey's" papers in this reporter's posses-,
!siOn." '
! Dietrich's :story raised more ques-
tions at the time than it answered.
Word of the report alSo leaked to New
; Times magazine and was the subject
:of a column by its West Coast editor,
1Ro.bert Scheer.
Cherne said that reports were being
circulated that the -.otcbook had been
!found "in a 'Paris whorehouse�an
'outrageous lic. visited no whore-
houses in any European city or else-
In the churse of these events the se- �
curity priority of the notebook was
substantially upgraded by the CLA's
Office of Security, and a Justice De-
partment investigation was launched
to determine how it was lost and who
:found it. The CIA declined comment
� on the inquiry and the Justice Depart-
ment only confirThed that an investi-
gatien was under way.
; Cherne said he initiated the request
for an investigation of the entire epi-
sode. In the course of yesterday's in-
terview his desk was covered with
documents that detailed the develop-
ments in the extraordinary case.
One of the curiosities is that ()liner,
who took the notes in '"cryptic short-
hand," was never asked to help de-
code them by 'CIA security officials.
He is still baffled at. the disappear-
ance. "Even when I went to the inen'st
room derity the trip I took the note-
book out of my attache case and car-
ried it with me." in" said.
, Cherne, who lamented that he had.
allettessrullY stoimed smoking for sev.
� eral years. had three packs of ciga-
rettes on his desk yesterday, which he
.shared with a� reporter,:
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WASHINGTON POST
1 5 SEp 1976
FU Inquiry
n Leftist
Party ahed
Long Probe Finds
'�No Wrongdoing by
Socialist Workers
By John M. Goshko
Washington Post Staff Writer
The Justice Department reveal-
ed yesterday that it has ordered
the FBI to halt its 38-year investi-
gation of the . Socialist Workers.
Party�a small left-wing political
group whose counterattack helped ,
to plunge the FBI into crisis: � !
The bureau had been pursuing the
SWP � since 1938 without producing
any evidence of wrongdoing by the
party or its members.
The FBI's activities caused the SWP �
In 1973 to file what has become a $40
Million lawsuit against the bureau and
other federal law enforcement agenc-
ies, charging them With illegal harass-
ment and intimidation.
lAs a result of evidence uncovered
by the lawsuit, the Justice Department
has been conducting a seven-month
Investigation into allegations that the
FBI carried out widespread illegal
burglaries against suspected "extrem-
ists" during the past five years.
Justice Department spokesmen con-
firmed that the FBI had been ordered
to stop investigating the SWP after it
was learned yesterday that the depart-
ment had sent letters to the SWP and
to judge Thomas P. Griesa, who is
hearing the suit in U.S. District Court
�in New York, notifying them of the
action.
The spokesmen said Attorney Gen- .
eral Edward H. Levi had issued the
order following a "systematic review".
. of how recently issued guidelines cov-
ering domestic security investigations
apply to the SWP and its youth affili-
ate, the Young Socialist Alliance.
The spokesmen insisted that Levi's
decision came in the course of review-
ing the cases of all political groups
under investigation by the FBI and
had no connection with the still pend-
ing lawsuit. � ./
Levi's guidelines stipulate that' the�
FBI can investigate an organization or
individual only if it has evidence that
they have been engaged in some spe-
cific Illegal act. The guidelines bar the
FBI from maintaining surveillance of
a group solely for the purposes of
gathering intelligence or because it
suspects that the members might do
something illegal.
TBI Director Clarence M. Kelley
also released a statement last night,
saying that the bureau had partici-
pated with Levi in the review. Kelley
added. "We ;agree it is now neceL;sary
to discontinue such investigations."
. In New York, Cathy Perkus. ' a
spokeswoman for the Political Rip.hts
Defense Pend, which is financing the
SWP suit, said:
"We don't believe that this was
dii.'n';` routinely. It's 'no Coincidence
that they picked the one organization
that has been laying bare all the FBI's
'abuses and illegalities. We think they
did it in hopes that we would end our
lawsuit and put a stop to the revela-
tions about what the FBI has done."
.Perkus said the SWP plans to con-
tinue prosecuting its suit. She added
that the SWP will ask Judge Griesa to
issue a permanent injunction barring
any further FBI activity against the
SWP and to order the bureau to turn
over immediately the names of all-
present and past informers infiltrated
into the party.
The SWP, whose national member-
ship is believed net to exceed 2,000,
has its ideological roots in Trotsky-
ism, a revisionist Marxist ideology
based on the theory that permanent,
worldwide revolution is needed to
maintain economic systems beneficial
to the working classes.
The party has insisted for years
that it has no connection with the
Communist Party or movement and
does not advocate violence as a means
of overthrowing the U. S. capitalist
system.
' In its suit, which originally asked
damages of $37 million, the SWP
charged that its pursuit of legitimate '
political activities had been seriously
undermined by an FBI "dirty tricks"
campaign. The FBI activities included
the use Of paid informers, wiretap-
ping, interception and opening of mail
and burglaries of SWP offices and the
homes of its'members, the party al-
leged.
' Also named as defendants in the
suit ;were other federal agencies, in-
cluding the Central Intelligence
Agency, the National Security Agency
and the Internal Revenue Service.
The suit is still a long way from res-
olution. But it already has triggered'a
number-of sensational disclosures that.
Include: "
� An unprecedented admission by
an FBI agent, George P. Baxtrum Jr.,
that, prior to 1965, he participated in
at least 50 burglaries of SWP offices
in New York at the direction of his sti-
.periors.
-� Use ,by another FBI agent, Joseph
Furrer, of his Fifth Amendment
rights against self-incrimination �
the first known instance 'of an FBI of-'
ficial taking the Fifth � when ques-
BA LT IMORE SUN
11 'Sept. 1976
Ex-chief Colby
defends CIA's
worth to nation
by DAVID ZIELENZIGER
Speaking dispassionately and almost as
if he had never been fired as director of
the Central Intelligence Agency 10 months
ago, William E. Colby last night defended
the intelligence community's ability to
cope with threats to national security in
the future.
While he spent most of his 35-minute
lecture at Towson State University de-
scribing the rationale for intelligence op-
erations, Mr. Colby also admitted "we did
do things wrong in the past, but now we
have corrected them."
The former CIA executive refused to.
comment, however, on the merits of a
. ,
tioned about � his knowledge . of 'bur-
glaries against the SWP.
.� Disclosure that an FBI informer,
Timothy J. Redfearn, committed three
burglaries against the SWP � .the
most recent in July � and turned doc-
uments taken in these break:ins over
to the bureau's Denver field office.
" .� A charge by a Portland. Oreg.,
man, Alan 11._Selling, that the FBI
had paid him to join the SWP and act
as an informer against the party. Sell-
ing' also contended that he was 'in-
duced by FBI officials to commit an
illegal burglary, but he said that was
.directed against an organization not
.connected with the SW?.
� � Revelation that the bureau, over
'the years, had used approximately 1,4
600 persons as informers against the
.SWP and still retains 66 informers
posing as members of the party.
The lawsuit also has had repercus-
� .�sions that go far beyond the FBI's in
, eolvement with the SW?. Earlier this
year, Judge Griesa nrdered the bu-
reau to search the files in all its of-
:flees and turn over to the SWP all
documents relating to the party.
: The resulting documents search
turned up a previously secret file in
the New York field .office indicating
that the FBI had committed bqrglar-
ies in the course of domestic security
investigations during 1972 and 1973.
.Previously, the bureau had said it .
ceased such so-called !`black bag jobs"
in 1966.
- This information prompted tire Jus-
Ake Department to launch an investi-
igation, that has spread across the
;country .to a number of cities. It has
:resulted in the empaneling of a fed-
eral grand .iiiry .cew York to.probe
ithe break-ins there '-and consider
'whether the FBI officials involved-
should be indicted on criminal
:charges. �
. Sources familiar with this investiga-
tion said yesterday that the grand
jury should complete the first phase
of its inquiry by the end of.this week
or early next week.
In this initial Wiese, the sources
added, Justice Department lawyers
have concentrated on presenting to
. the grand .jury testimony or informa-
tion from FBI agents who, during 1972
and 1973, were assigned to the New
�York field office's squad investigating
the radical Weather Underground.
gal ease initiated by the Socialist Workers'
party over government spying on domes-
tic dissidents and insisted, in the face of a
hostile questioner, "The em. does not train
people to torture."
Mr. Colby, under whose direction the
intelligence community made public
many of its past controversial activities,
insisted that under new presidential direc-
tives and with adeouate congressional
oversight previous abuses will not have a
chance to be repeated.
"It may be again necessary for the CIA
to assist decent local people suffering un-
der a racist despot," Mr. Colby said, "but
from our mistakes in Vietnam we have
learned that we don't use military assist-
ance. to solve a political problem."
"One doesn't discuss disbanding the ar-
my or the police because of mistakes that
were made in handling a case," asserted
the 56-year-old attorney, "and that same
lesson must be applied to intelligence."
About 500 persons attended the lecture.
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WASHINGTON POST
12 SEP 1976
Alton Frye
The Jr
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, . �
K Ass
sinati in: Curiosity in
.. An inquisitive American learns many things on a
visit to Cuba. One of the most surprising is that high
officials in Havana seem genuinely hopeful that the
investigation of the Kennedy assassination will be re-
opened. They are convinced that there was a Cuban
�factor in the murder.
� Conversations with senior officials of the Cuban
government, including Deputy Prime Minister Carlos
Rafael Rodriguez, make clear that they have followed
closely the disclosures by the Senate Intelligence
Committee casting doubt upon the Warren Commis-
sion investigation The Cubans are well aware that the
doubts center on the failure of the CIA and the FBI to
inform the Warren Commission of the several plots
mounted by the CIA to kill Fidel Castro. Knowledge
of these plots appears to have been withheld even
from the FBI and CIA officials who were responsible
for investigating the President's murder and for sup-
porting the work of the Warren Commission. As a re-
sult, there was no special effort to explore the possi-
ble Involvement of either the Cuban government or.
Cuban exiles in the assassination. Evidence developed
by. the Senate committee makes both hypotheses plau-
sible�and a new inquiry imperative.
:The situation is murkier and more perplexing than
ever. Those who are resistant to conspiracy theories
And who have been prepared�even eager �to be-
lieve that Lee Harvey Oswald acted alone can no
longer rely on the Warren Commission report as an
�� :The writer is a senior fellow of the Council on For-
eign Relations.
adequate prop for their predilections. The commis-
sion did not know that on Nov. 22, 1963, at. about the
very hour Oswald struck in Dallas, an agent of the
Central Intelligence Agency was meeting with a rank-
ing Cuban official (code-named AMLASH and re-
cently identified as Rolando Cubela) to plan the mur-
der -of Castro. Simultaneously. in Cuba, a French re-
porter. Jean Daniel� was spending the day with Cas-
�trt2, conveying to the ,Cuban leader views expressed
by Presidentits.7.4,-:nedy in a brief interview at the
White House-nn Oct. 'V.:, persuading Castro that Ken-
nedy wanted to explore ways to normalize relations.
Thus, .at the. moment. the President was killed, U.S.
policy toward Cuba appeared to be moving not only
On two tracks but in opposite directions, and ?novo-
ment oneithertrack could have provoked violent re-
sponse by one or another Cuban faction. -
Perceptions inside the Cpban government re-
sponded to 'both tendencies. in U.S. policy. There is
good reason to suspect that the AMLASH operation
involved a double agent, or at least a singularly inept
one. Castro almost certainly knew of it. The CIA even-
' � tually concluded that the AMLASH activity was "inse-
cure" and terminated it. Among other discoveries,
within two days of the assassination it was known (but
not, to the Warren Commission) that AMLASH had
been in contact, with Soviet personnel in Mexico City,
where Oswald had gone in September 1963 to visit
both the Cliban atid Soviet consolatos. Whether these
facts are significaLt or merely coincidental, one can-
not tell. In retrospect, Cuban authorities � note with
some relief that Oswald was denied permission to visit
Cuba, implying that, had his request been granted,
the finger of suspicion would surely have pointed at
Havana.
Perhaps more suggestive of a direct leak from AM-
LASH to Castro was the sequence of events on Sept. 7,
1983, when the CIA re-established contact with the Cu-
ban conspirator for the first time since the preceding
year. Late that evening, Prime Minister Castro called
in Associated Press reporter Daniel Harker for an un-
expected interview. Only three Western reporters
were based in Havana at the time and their contact
with Castro was quite limited. Evidently, the Cuban
leader had a message he wished to get on the record
through Harker. He charged that the United States
was aiding terrorist plots in Cuba and warned U.S.
leaders that "if they are aiding terrorist plans to elimi-
nate Cuban leaders, they themselves will not be safe."
This threat of reprisals seems less inflammatory
and more understandable now that we know what
Castro knew at the time, namely, that the United
States was in fact stepping up its covert operations
against Cuba during the summer and fall of 1963. Yet
it seems an exception to the main lines of Cuban pol-
icy as it was then evolving.
For months afer the missile crisis of 1962, Castro
had been displeased with the Soviets, and there are
signs that he" was interested in an opening to Wash-
ington. On Sept. 5, the Cubans quietly proposed talks
with the Americans at the United Nations, and Ken-
nedy soon responded with interest. Also, in early Sep-
tember the Time magazine bureau chief in Buenos
Aires, Gavin Scott, travelling on a Canadian passport,
spent two weeks in, Cuba. Although key U.S. officials
have no recollection of consulting with Scott on that
occasion, the Cubans recall his questions and com-
ments as hinting of American interest in a possible ac-
commodation, much as they were later to interpret.
the discussions between Jean Daniel and Castro.
Then and now the Cubans' attitude toward Ken-
nedy has been a compound of political antipathy and.
personaladmiration. While critical of Kennedy's role
in various counter-revolutionary efforts, Castro and,
his associates voice a warm, almost affectionate re-
gard for the President's courage and realism. They
profess to have seen his death as a grave setback to
more hopeful relations between the two countries.
The John Kennedy of 1963 was not, in their judgment,
the same man who was inaugurated in 1961, but a
more mature, poised and forward-looking leader with.
whom they could have done business.
With this frame of reference, Cuban officials specu-
late that the real origin of the assassination lies in an-
ti-Castro circles, with which Oswald also was in touch.'
They emphasize that assassination is incompatible
with their own revolutionary doctrine and that they
never contemplated it even against Batista, the pre-
vious Cuban ruler. And they volunteer the suspicion
that the recent murders of Sam Giancana and Johnny
Rosselli, the Mafia figures who consorted with the
CIA to kill Castro, surely have some connection with
Cuban exile politics and the Kennedy murder.
Castro has said publicly that he has no proof "count-,
er-revolutionary elements" planned the assassination,
but that is clearly the consensus in Havana. Further
investigation may still be inconclusive, but, far from
seeing it as an impediment to Cuban-American rela-
tions. the Castro regime welcomes such an inquiry.
Their curiosity seems greater than their complicity.
U. S. NF3 WOnD 1?7,PORT
5FTTP.MTVER
One . result of widespread attacks on
the Central Intelligence Agency: Co-
vert operations by the Agency, insiders
say, now account for only 2 per cent of
the CIA's work.
24
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Havana
r.41,51-1ENGTON STAR
IJ SEP 1976
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By Henry S. Bradsher
Washington Star Staff Writer
The Ford administration has be-
come concerned about the extensive
Soviet program for civil defense and
� the lack of any comparable effort to
protect the American people in case
of intercontinental nuclear war.
The first comprehensive official
study of the large Soviet civil defense
program to be made in many years
is now under way at the CIA and
elsewhere around town. A National
Security Study Memorandum is
being coordinated at the Pentagon
� examining U.S. civil defense needs.
The NSSM pulling together differ-
ent agencies" views in order to arrive
at a top-level recommendation to the
President, is due to be completed by
� Sept. 30. It will provide the basis for
a presidential decision whether to fit
' an expansion of civil defense work
into the 1978 fiscal year budget.
But so far the interagency materi-
al focused on CIA work has not pro-
' duced a clear picture of the Soviet
program. There is disagreement on
: whether the preparations to protect
the Soviet people from nuclear war
by shelters or evacuation to the
countryside which are described in
Russian manuals are being carried
out.
THE SOVIET PROGRAM and U.S.
� needs are connected by apprehen-
sions of some American military
� analysts that an imbalance in civil
defense programs would make this
, country vulnerable. In a crisis situa-
tion, the Kremlin could threaten the
American people with destruction
� while sheltering its own people, thus
reducing the U.S. ability to negotiate
from equal strength, these analysts
, warn.
, But this contention that the mutual
' deterrence "balance of terror" has
been eroded is questioned by other
analysts on two grounds.
One is that a protected population
could not long survive if its cities
were destroyed and its air-and crops
poisoned by fallout, so that protection
from nuclear explosions might be
meaningless in the medium or long
term. The other involves whether the
Soviet Union really can, or on the
basis of present intentions will be-
come able to, protect its people from
nuclear attack.
U.S. policy during the 1950s was to
try to protect cities against bomber
attack, and the advent of interconti-
nental missiles led to the backyard
air raid shelter boom in the early
1960s. But by the middle '60s official
doctrine switched under Secretary of
' Defense Robert S. McNamara to an
assumption that cities were indefen-
sible in the missile era, and therefore
the best defense was the assured
ability to retaliate. ,
THIS ADOPTION -of the mutual
deterrence doctrine led to the 1972
Soviet-American treaty banning
antiballistic missile systems for the
defense of cities. Populations were to
be left exposed, hostages to the other
side's retaliatory power. �
Although the treaty permits re-
search, the United States has cut
back on ABM efforts. There are indi-
cations that the Soviet Union is con-
tinuing an extensive, expensive re-
search program seeking a technical
breakthrough to a reliable ABM sys-
tem. This causes worries in some
official quarters here that the Krem-
lin might some day suddenly face
this country with an ability to shield
Soviet cities from missile attack
which the United States could not
quickly match.
"If that happens, they can pick up -
all the marbles and go home, be-
cause we would be at their mercy,"
one defense expert commented.
The more immediate concern,
which the administration has come to,
feel might be more real, however, is
over civil defense. The United States
has virtually abandoned any effort.
But since the 1972 ABM treaty the
Soviets have vastly expanded theirs
� on paper, definitely, and possibly
in shelters, evacuation schemes and
training, too.
A LEADING AMERICAN EX- .
PERT on the Soviet "war-survival
program," Dr. Leon Goure of the
University of Miami, says that "the
Soviet leadership has come to view
civil defense as a critical 'strategic
factor' which, in a large measure,
can determine the course and out-
,come of a nuclear war." Goure sees
in recent years "a new sense of ur-
gency and of realism" in the Soviet
program, as well as an awareness of
U.S. vulnerability to attack.
A special panel of the House
Armed Services Committee held
hearings in February and March on
the two superpowers' civil defense
efforts. Goure and other specialists
described a very real Soviet pro-
gram. The hearings resulted in a
token increase in money for the
standby .Defense Civil Preparedness
Agency in the Pentagon.
The evidence that Goure and
others have amassed of Soviet
preparations has contributed to
warnings of a dangerous imbalance.
One, administration critic, Paul H.
Nitze, a former deputy secretary of
defense, thinks these preparations
have had the same destabilizing ef-
fects as ABMs would have.
BUT SOME ANALYSTS QUES-
TION the findings of people like
Goure on which such warnings are
based. A recent study by John M.
Collins of the Library of Congress's
Congressional Research Service said
Soviet plans "are impressive on
paper (but) how practical they would
be in practice is problematical." Col-
lins thought "no U.S. authority as yet
has satisfactorily answered hard
questions" about the Soviet program.
One senior administration official
handling arms control negotiations
says U. S. Embassy personnel in the
Soviet Union and travelers have fail-
ed to see the kind of evidence that
would be expectable if the paper pro-
gram really existed as workable civil
defense protection. A government
expert on Soviet affairs reports a
widespread suspicion that little more
has been done than earmark re-
sources.
The main realization which had de-
veloped in the administration by last
spring as a result of publicity like the
House hearings was that not enough
was known about Soviet civil defense
efforts. The CIA had not taken a seri-
ous look at the subject for more than
five years � since before the post-
ABM treaty program expansion that
Goure detected.
SO A MULTIAGENCY STUDY
was commissioned. It should have
been finished two months ago. In-
'stead, each draft report had pro-
duced new doubts about the reliabil-
ity of available material.
."The basic problem is that we just
haven't been putting enough re-
sources on this," an informed
observer commented. "It should be
possible for the U.S. intelligence
community to determine whether.
Soviet shelters and evacuation plant
and all that really do exist, but the
subject hav't been getting enough
attention so Tar."
The National Security Study
Memorandum was ordered by the
White House after the study of Soviet
efforts had begun. It is being coordi-
nated in the office of Donald R. Cot-
ter, an assistant to Secretary of De-
fense Donald Rumsfeld for atomic
energy affairs.
An administration official said the
NSSM was the result of accumulat-
ing concern about the U.S. civil
defense posture rather than any
specific alarm over what the Soviets
might be doing.
But even if a gap is found and a
threatening imbalance discerned, the
chances of organizing an effective
civil defense program in this country
in anything less than an all-out war
situation are considered small by
some informed officials. Therefore,
the realistic options open to Cotter's
study team stop somewhere short of
the kind of program which Soviet lit-
erature describes.
gEnea=l911004 1�14.101�16010001.01������0
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pproved for Release: 2018/10/05 CO2623720
THE NEW YORK TIMES, MONLiAY, SEPTEMBER 13, 1976'
The United States, contrary to pop-
ular mythology, has never been an
isolationist country. Almost as soon as
� we became a nation we became inter-
ventionist.
The United States used its armed
forces abroad 159 times between 1798
and 1945; of these, 73 were initiated
under prior legislative authority,
without a declaration of war. Even
between World Wars I and II�said
to be the heyday of isolationism�we
engaged in 19 military actions outside
the Western Hemisphere. Since World
War II we have used military forces
in Korea, Indochina, Lebanon, the
Dominican Republic and the Congo.
What all this ledicates is that since
-its inception the United States has
been unafraid to exercise power in
world affairs.
There is every reason to believe that
military intervention will continue,
-and, indeed, that it may even intensify.
�There are a number of indications that
'we may find ourselves committed to
policies that go beyond the diplomatic,
�economic or covert forms of interven-
tion we have practiced in the distant
and near past. One indicator is a poll
recently taken by Potomac Associates
that points to a growing tendency for
Americans to think in unilateral terms.
The very fact that United States con-
trol the Panama Canal should have
been a major issue in the Presidential
primaries this year demonstrates that
' nationalistic impulses have by no
-:means been quelled. Thus, if there is
a disposition to intervene, the reasons
are not likely to be those we are most
'familiar with, such as a desire to con-
tain the expansion of Communism on
a global scale. In this respect, Vietnam
may well have proved an end game-:-
the cold war is already history. Our
responses will be different because the
international system is different. What
we appear to be entering is a period of
relative disorder, with a greater degree
_ of interdependence among nations;
s this could lead to greater tensions and
more, rather than less, interference by
one nation into the affairs of another.
From an American perspective, mili-
tary intervention might be most readily
occasioned by our fears of resource
, scarcity. As regards our dependence
on foreign oil, for example, in 1975
THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
� Tuesday, Sept. 7, 1976
erican
Intervention
By James Chace
net petroleum imports for the United
States were 36 percent of its total
consumption. In 1970 they were 22
percent and by 1980, according to esti-
mates of the United States Bureau of
Mines, the United States will probably
be buying up to 41 percent of its petro-
leum abroad. In a situation of per-
ceived resource scarcity, intervention
could easily become a demand by the
Congress rather than an assertion of
executive will.
- Another reason for intervention
could be to preserve America's sphere
of influence in the Caribbean. Cuba
remains resistant to United States
dominance, as was most recently evi-
dent in the Cuban military presence in
Angola directed against� the United
States-backed liberation movements.
Mexico has already demonstrated its
solidarity with third-world blocs un-
sympathetic to United States policy.
Panama will not be satisfied with the
status quo. In the Caribbean and
Central America � deemed by most
Americans as essential to United
States security � the possibiilty of
intervention is never far from mind.
A third reason for American inter-
vention would be to affect regional
balances of power. In Northeast Asia,
for example, an embryonic regional
balance comprising Japan, China, the
Soviet Union, the two Koreas and the
United States is already in place. The
very concept of regional balances of
power also demands a willingness of
the great powers to intervene to pre-
vent the balance from being upset. It
is for this reason among others that
any outbreak in hostilities between the
two Koreas is threatening. There are
also at least hints of a balance in South
Asia. Unwilling to put itself in the
position of being a Soviet client, India
wants recognition as a power in its
own right. Moscow and Peking seem
disposed to grant India its wish. And
the United States, far from abandoning
the region, is planning an increased
naval presence in the Indian Ocean.
In other areas no such balances as
yet exist. 'However, nations such as
Brazil and Iran have already shown a
drive for dominance in their regions.
Should such nations embark on an
aggressive course, the very fabric of
interdependencies being created both
in the region and globally could be
ripped apart. In sueh a situation, the
United States might find intervention
�either alone or in concert with
others--desirable in order to tame the
dangerously expanding power.
� Finally, there is often a felt need for
great powers to demonstrate their
global concerns. For the United States,
these would probably include a con-
cern for human rights and the espousal
of liberal, pluralistic democracies.
Realizing that the United States is a
worldwide power with social, eco-
nomic and ideological interests, Ameri-
cans may accept intervention in the
manner of other great powers of the
past by -pursuing activist policies. The
evidence is on the side of the activists.
A recent Harris poll showed that
� support for an activist foreign policy
has hardly changed since 1947.
Does global power, then, lead to
intervention? History suggests that it
does. An anarchic world with shifting
coalitions and overlapping alliances
certainly does not diminish the likeli-
hood. And if wars of attrition and
massive nuclear exchanges are im-
probable, the so-called decisive stroke
of intervention could seem most ap-
pealing. Such interventionism will
often be wrong and almost always will
be dangerous. Yet there seems to be a
certain inevitability to it. The 17th-
century philosopher Thomas Hobbes
was -right when he perceived as "a
generall inclination of all mankind, a
perpetuall and restless desire of Power
after power that ceaseth only in
death."
James Chace is' managing editor of
the journal Foreign Affairs and author
of "A World Elsewhere: The New
American Foreign Policy."
Americ
By B. BRUCE�BRIGGS
The charge that America has imperi�
allstic ambitions is hard to believe these
days, but the truth of the matter is that the
U.S. does have a colonial problem, and not
just in Panama and Puerto Rico either. '
We don't like to think of ourselves as a
colonial power and since we led the way by
granting independence to the Philippines in
(1946 we have actively promoted decoloni-
zation. But as the tide of European empire
has receded, the American empire has re-
mained intact. With the exception of the
ending of U.S. occupation of the Japanese
Ryukyu and Bonin Islands, the Stars and
Stripes are planted as widely now as they
were lin years ago.
Most of the inhabitants of our overseas
s Col ial
possessions share our dislike for the term
"colony,' so the official designation is
"outlying territory." But euphemism can-
not modify the fact that three million peo-
ple live on 5.000 square miles of American
territory, governed by U.S. laws and with
no say in the making of these laws either
through voting for the President or mem-
bers of Congress. What to do with these
people Is a continuing annoyance both to
Congress and the Executive Branch.
Not that the colonies want to be free.
Far from it, Most of then, wish to retain
the status and rights of American national-
ity, hot to mention the protection of the
U.S. military. They want U.S. government
programs but don't want to pay U.S. taxes.
In short, they share the great American
26
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ches
dream of something for nothing.
Take our largest and most important
colony -Puerto Rico, the only one which
could conceivably be a real independent
country. It has a minuscule independent
movement, so lacking In popular support
that it must resort to terrorism to be no-
ticed. The principal issue on the island is
whether to join the union or to continue the
"Free Associated State" status evolved
over the years. Puerto Ricans are U.S. citi-
zens, the island is internally self-governing
(by an act of the U.S. Congress), islanders
pay no U.S. income taxes )"no taxation
without representation") but are subject to
U.S. laws.
The U.S. denies that Puerto Rico is a
colony and refuses to let the United Na-
tions Select Committee on Decolonization
Approved for Release: 2018/10/05 CO2623720
meddle in its affairs. But it is continually
harassed on the issue by Cuba, backed by
� the socialist dictatorships of Syria, Iraq,
Mali and Congo (Brazzaville). Several
times Puerto Rico has voted overwhelm-
ingly in plebiscites to continue the existing
status. Presidents and Congressmen have
indicated American willingness to let the
island go any time it so desires, yet techni-
cally the Cubans are right: Puerto Rico is
not a self-governing nation.
The Economic Benefits
Not that the Puerto Ricans particularly
care. The recent Ad Hoc Advisory Group
on the Status of Puerto Rico slighted con-
stitutional issues and decided to concen-
trate on preparing a menu of economic
benefits for approval by the U.S. Congress.
Two of the status revisions �changing the
nominal designation an Spanish) of Puerto
Rico from a "Commonwealth" to a "Free
Associated State" and the admission of a
non-voting resident commissioner to the
U.S.� Senate �seem reasonable, but the
suggestion that federal courts use the
Spanish language is impFactical. Puerto
Rico's desire to have some say in control-
ling immigration�to keep out those ag-
gressive, successful Cuban refugees, for
one thing�hasn't a chance of approval by
Congress. And even Puerto Rico's staun-
chest friends are appalled by the recom-
mendations that the island be exempt from
U.S. minimum wage and labor relations
laws, not to mention the idea that the is-
land government have the right to decide
which federal legislation will apply to
Puerto Rico.
Of course, the Puerto Ricans want full
I, federal welfare benefits. Although the
commonwealth is one of the richest coun-
tries in the Western Hemisphere, its per,
capita income is less than half that of the
mainland, so federal eligibility standards
entitle much of the population to benefits.
Fifty-five percent are on food stamps.
. Guam, Samoa and the Virgin Islands
are held by the U.S. to be "non self-govern-
ing territories" liable to supervision by the
UN. Each is evolving in the Puerto Rican
direction, but not without considerable
pother. Guam and the Virgins have re-
cently obtained the privilege of electing'
� their governors and non-voting delegates to
the House. Samoa also was apparently
pressured by the Interior Department into
electing its own governor. Bills are before
Congress to allow Guam and the Virgins to
have conventions to write territorial consti-
tutions. Because of the collapse of Virgin
Islands tourism, its only major business,
during the recent recession, that territory
" is asking for an outright grant of $8.5 mil-
lion and the pledge of the "full faith and
credit" of the U.S. in support of a $60 mil-
lion bond issue.
Apart from the tourism in Puerto Rico
and the Virgin Islands, none of the above
colonies is of much economic benefit to the
U.S. But the Panama Canal Zone is an-
other matter. The economic value of the
canal, especially with a toll schedule un-
changed since 1914, is enormous. But we
are more accustomed to think of the canal
in military terms.
Even though it cannot handle super-car-
riers, the strategic utility of the canal con-
tinues to be so immense that the United
States is understandably loath to knuckle
under to demands by the Panamanian Re-
public for the liquidation of the Canal Zone
and eventual transfer of the U.S. govern-
ment-owned Panama Canal Co. to Pana-
manian ownership. The Hay-Varilla Treaty
0( 11103 provided that the U.S. shall hold "in
perpetuity the use, occupancy and control"
of the 'zone "as if it were sovereign," The
U.S. is not sovereign, but how its rights dif-
fer from sovereignty is a matter perhaps
better lett to theologians.
As the tide of European
empire has receded, the
American ern* has re-
mained intact. But not
without a continuous stream
of problems.
The present Panamanian regime Is rela-
tively responsible and pro-American by
Central American standards, but given the
vagaries of Caribbean politics, we would
be foolish to take continued stability and
friendship for granted. The Panama Canal
is precious and we have every right in law
to possess it forever, so what's the prob-
lem? First, continued occupation of the
zone hurts our relations with Latin Ameri-
can nations who see it as evidence of Yan-
kee imperialism. For example, the presi-
dent of Venezuela took the occasion of an
otherwise affectionate Bicentennial mes-
sage to knock our "colonial enclave."
Complaints by Latin American coun-
tries we can easily bear, but advocates of
substantial concessions to Panarna have an
uglier scenario in mind --that the present
Panamanian regime will be replacsd with
one that will tolerate or promote terrorism
or guerrilla warfare against the zone. So
the Panama issue boils down to these ques-
tions: Is continued possession of the zone
worth the risk of "another Vietnam"? Can
the U.S. stand up to such a threat? The
reader is as qualified to answer as any-
body.
Our other colonial enclave in the Carib-
bean is quiet. The Naval base at Cuba's
Guantanamo Bay is nice to have, but
hardly necessary to national defense. But
giving-it up would be seen as knuckling un-
der to Castro. Fortunately, Cuba is making
no effort to pressure us out, perhaps be-
cause of the rumored secret treaty which
ended the missile crisis of 1962.
No foreign nations are meddling with
our Pacific possessions. Our oldest colonies
are a miscellaneous collection of islands
gathered in consequence of the Guano Act
of 1856; the miners scooped up the guano
faster than the birds could lay it down and
now these islands are unoccupied and
worthless. Midway and Wake are military
bases with no indigenous population and
are no problem. Guam is also primarily a
military base and its inhabitants are
firmly connected to the U.S. But there is
turmoil elsewhere in the Central Pacific,
The U.S. controls something called "Micro-
nesia," the last remaining United Nations
trust territory. Its 100,000 inhabitants are
'not U.S. nationals and are subject to direct
U.S. rule, supervised by the UN.
We have been trying to develop Micro-
nesia as a unit, but the natives who live on
100 islands scattered over an expanse of
ocean larger than the United States have
nothing in common save a history of being
ruled successively by Spain, Germany,
Japan and the U.S. Micronesia is coming
apart. The Northern Marianhs have al-
ready indicated their intention of becoming
a "commonwealth." with U.S. citizenship.
but separatist movements against contin-
ued membership in Micronesia are afoot in
other island groups. For the U.S. it's
hardly worth the bother. We have a missile
station at Kwajalein; Japanese interests
are Investigating possibilities of an oil port
at Palau, and there is a little copra produc-
tion and fishing -and that's all.
The Pentagon's Attitude
Obviously, very few Americans are,
aware of the extent of our possessions. The
Pentagon is concerned with those few spots
that are of strategic importance, taking the
position that the interests of the indigenous
peoples are to be subordinated. to the mili-
tary requirements of the U.S. Where the
military rules directly �as on Wake, Mid-
way, Guantanamo and the Canal Zone �the
milieu is that of a military base, benign
but total control. The cavalier attitude to-
ward the natives is .best 'exemplified by
Guam where the Navy grabbed'up much of
the best land on the eve of the granting of
U.S. citizenship and rights to the islanders.
This is a continuing, grievance to the
Guamians.
Surprisingly. the major civilian players
in the colonial game are a tiny band of old-
style liberals. Micronesia has been repre-
sented by Clark Clifford's law firm and for-
mer Supreme Court Justice- Abe Fortas
has a continuing involvement with Puerto
Rico. The maritime lobby is also active.
Its principal interest is maintenance of the
Jones Act, requiring that shipping between
U.S. ports be in U.S. registry bottoms. This
is very costly for our overseas possessions,
especially Guam, which has one of the high-
est costs of living in the world.
' Also on the scene is a tiny band of anti-'
colonialists whose views are shaped by the
"new politics" of the 1960s, They dislike the
military and strategic arguments mean
nothing to them. In every overseas com-
mitment they see another potential Viet-
nam. And they are hostile, to the indigenous
peoples who wish to be Americans, charac-
terizing them as suckers or tools of U.S. in-
terests. Apparently this small group of re-
searchers, politicians and editorial writers
is unable to comprehend what a precious
boon U.S. citizenship is to the ordinary peo-
ple of the world.
Should the rest of us care about our col-
onies?. Excepting the Panama Canal, they
are of little economic value and require a
continual drain on the U.S. Treasury to
provide them with government services..
But the shuffle of history has dealt these
poor and weak peoples into our hands. We
are responsible for them. The optimum
policy probably should be to accede to any
reasonable demand they make on us.
If they wish to be independent, god-
:speed. If Puerto Rico desires statehood,
welcome. For the rest, we will have to con-
tinue to work toward some intermediate
status of internal self-government under
U.S. national law that unfriendly critics
will always be able to label "colonialism."
Mr. Bruce-Briggs is a member of flu'
Journal's editorial page staff.
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NEW YORK TIMES
7 Sept. 1976
Taiwan's A-bomb..,.
�, The American intelligence report that Taiwan clan-
destinely has built a reprocessing facility that is ex-
Iracting weapons-grade plutonium explosive from spent
nuclear reactor fuel rods demands immediate investiga-
tion by the appropriate Congressional committees. Tai-
wan's denials have not impressed Washington insiders.
If the Chinese Nationalists have set out to make
atomic bombs in the first known violation of the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)�and have succeeded in
deceiving the inspection system of the International
Atomic Energy Agency�a profound reappraisal will be
needed for Washington's China policy, its nonprolifera-
tion strategy and its nuclear export controls.
. Under the 100-nation NPT, Taiwan and other non-
nuclear weapons states renounced atomic explosives and
committed themselves to place all their nuclear facilities
and materials under I.A.E.A. "safeguards"---a system of
international inspection. The main supplier countries,
in addition, later agreed that the export of fissionable
materials or key nuclear facility components would be
indicated to the I.A.E.A. to trigger safeguards.
If this system has been circumvented by Taiwan or
.ignOred by some supplier countries, may not other NPT
parties �be evading controls as well? Speedy action to
beef up �and improve I.A.E.A. inspection and supplier
controls clearly is vital.
The effort to avoid nuclear spread has focused recently
on tightened up export controls by the main supplier
countries, but the United States has failed in the most
important task: to obtain the agreement of West Ger-
many and France to an embargo on export of reprocess-
ing plants in the wake of their sales of such plants to
Brazil and Pakistan last year, claiming that I.A.E.A. safe-
guards make such sales "safe."
The Taiwan fiasco blows up that French-German
thesis. It reinforces Congressional arguments for legis-
lation that would call on the President to deny American
nuclear materials ultimately to supplier as well as re-
cipient nations that could not be prevailed upon to coop-
erate in halting the spread of plutonium reprocessing.
That vital legislation is currently bogged down in the
Joint Atomic Energy Committee. A belated White House
study Of the problem, due for release this week, will be
an exercise in futility unless it helps break this log-jam.
THE WASHINGTON POST
2 September 1976
Chinese Denial
�
, � Recent press allegations that the Re-
public of China has been secretly repro-
. cessing spent nuclear fuel for wea-
ponry are totally groundless. �
1. The Republic of China is a faithful
party to the non-proliferation treaty
guarding against the spread of nuclear
. weapons. Besides, Premier � Chiang
Xhing-Kuo has repeatedly made it
known that the Republic of China de-
velops nuclear energy and conducts nu-
Meanwhile, the Congress ought to find out why the
Administration, after refusing since 1969 to sell Taiwan
a reprocessing plant, did not react more vigorously
against Taiwan's open importation and assembly of the
components for a "hot cell" for small-scale plutonium
reprocessing. That so-called "laboratory project," which
Taipei put under I.A.E.A. inspection, may simply have
been a cover for the assembly of a clandestine facility.
. American Guarantee
Taiwan's presumed nuclear violation brings into ques-
tion the American security guarantee. That guarantee, as
in the case of Japan and South Korea, is designed to
provide an American nuclear umbrella in place of na-
tional acquisition of atomic weapons.
' The United States unfortunately has undermined its
security guarantee by talk in Washington and among
, China experts of "normalization" of relations with
, Peking�without first solving the problem of the secur-
ity of Taiwan. Normalization, Peking insists, requires the
United States to terminate its security treaty as well as
its diplomatic relations with Taiwan.
But normalization of relations with Peking is incon-
ceivable without stabilization of the Taiwan situation by,
at the least, a replacement of the mutual security treaty
with a unilateral American guarantee of Taiwan's auton-
omy and continued supply of arms for Taiwan's defense
forces. Renunciation of nuclear weapons is the irreduc-
ible condition for that guarantee.
This Taiwan-American transaction is in Peking's in-
terest. Although Communist China has denounced the
Nonproliferation Treaty as an imperialist device, Peking's
interest in a nonnuclear Taiwan is great.
Taiwan has continued to remain a legal party to the
� Nonproliferation Treaty and to accept I.A.E.A. inspection,
despite its unfortunate expulsion by third world ven-
detta from the I.A.E.A. in 1972. That expulsion does not
justify Taiwan's clandestine evasion of its commitments
�to the I.A.E.A., to the United States and to 98 other
NPT countries�to refrain from nuclear explosives. But
the partial responsibility of Peking and the third world
for the present situation should give Washington some
moral leverage in working out a reasonable solution, one
that makes the security of an autonomous non-nuclear
Taiwan the inescapable condition for normalization of
relations with Peking.
clear researches solely for peaceful us-.
es. -. � � - . �
2. The Republic of China's nuclear re..
actors and all related facilities and ma- .
terials are subject to regular inspection
and surveillance of the International
Atomic Energy. Agency for safeguard. �
In addition to the semi-annual reports
submitted to the IAEA in which every
bit of imported uranium, including tiny
scraps, is accounted for, on-the-spot in-
spects are frequently made_ by IAEA
experts. As lately as mid-July this year,
an inspection team consisting of IAEA
experts from Great Britain, France, �
. Portugal, Italy and Norway came to the
country to take a thorough inventory
and found everything in good order.
They even brought along a gama-spec-
troscope - to measure the radiation of
� spent fuel.
3 There � are surveillance, cameras
_taking pictures. of the reactor top and �
� .the surface of the storage pool which
reveal all operations taking place and
�make records on a log book. . .
All operations of the reactors are....
�computerized..; , '�
:.:;� In view of Vie aforementioned hard
..facts, such. allegations simply do
' hold water. '
.;,, DING NIOU-SHIH,
� � DIrector-fleneral,
:.:'.0overnment Information Office,
�' � 'Republic of Chine.
2B
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=IJ
Washington, : � :-.�t
�
-.Editor's. note:' the Post stands by its
story. Which was reported ovin-severo.t �
weeks and confirmed by a �number of
authoritative sources.: "���
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NEW YORK TIMES
4 SEP :1976
'Hard Line' and Hijackings
State Department Altering Long-Held Policy,
' Possibly to Defer Criticism of Government Role
. By RICHARD WITKIN
The weekend hijacking to Paris of a ' happy? . .. , ...
New York-to-Chicago airliner has accel-
As for the French, were authorities in
erated a process of official rethinking on Paris too quick to incapacitate the Trans
how to deal with terrorits while the lives World Airlines plane? Did they cause
of hostages are regarded to be in jeopardy. what, under different circumstances
- The State Department is expressing its (armed hijackers with different inotiva-
long-held "hard line" policy tions), might have been fatal delays in
in altered terms, contending facilitating communications with the ter-
News that the old way of stating rorists?
� Analysis the policy was often misun-
What Degree of Handling?
derstood. In the past, the
policY has widely been pub- In short, what degree of tough govern-
licized as: "We will not negotiate with mental handling was called for if the only
terrorists." remaining requirement of the hijackers
! � A department official involved in anti- was to verify that their demand had been
'terrorist planning said yesterday that the met for dissemination of their message
preferred way of stating the policy was: in deopped leaflets and news columns?
"Do everything to effect the safe release The captain of the plane, Richard Carey,
of hostages without making any conces_ put it very succinctly when he asked dur-
sions." mg tower-to-cockpit radio exchanges in
There was speculation in the ,aviation Paris: "Tell me, please, what are we being
community that the public change in killed for?" A tape of the exchanges was
emphasis might have been designed to obtained by the National Broadcasting
head off possible criticism about the Company.
role of governments in the maneuvering At another point, the captain told the
that ended the melodrama with no deaths United States Ambassador, Kenneth
or injuries to any one aboard the plane. Rush, who was in the control tower: "All
we know is that these people had a riles-
Only the Hijackers Knew sage that they wanted to put in the
, It must be considered that, while the papers and wanted to drop leaflets on
events were being played out at the cities, and for this you are asking that!
Paris airport, no one but the hijackers this whole ship full of innocent people!
could know whether they had the devices can be killed to prove that you can take'
to make good on threats to blow up a stand against terrorists."
the plane if their demands had not been The hard-line approach to the overall
Met.
'., Several questions were toeing asked
..about the role of both the United States
And French Governments.
'.- Was the response of the State Depart-
ment as rapid and realistic as it might
have been? Or did a misunderstood view
of the "we will not negotiate" stance
cause unnecessary delays that might
have led to tragedy if the hijackers had
had lethal devices and had been trigger-
problem of airline hijacking had received
its greatest public acclaim after the Israe-
li commando raid that freed hostages at
Uganda's Entebbe Airport earlier this
year.
Demands Were Limited � � ,
But was any comparable governmental
toughness called for in Paris? In the end,
it was decided it was not, since the de-
mands of the 'terrorists were limited.
The Washington Star Thursday, September 16, 197
U.S. Vi lated Poky
For Cro San Terrorists
By Henry S. Bradsher
"t) Washington Star Staff Writer
In the aftermath of last week's Croatian nation-
alist hijacking, the State Department has reiterat-
ed administration policy of not making any con-
cessions to terrorists but conceded that the FBI
: violated that policy.
The State Department has in turn been identi-
� fled by another agency involved in the weekend
:drama, the Federal' Aviation Administration, as
'having been involved in making concessions.
The FBI urged some American newspapers to
satisfy the five terrorists' demands for publicity
for their cause. The five, who sought independence
of Croatia from Yugoslavia, released their 92 hos-
tages and surrendered in Paris and are now
. awaiting trial in New York.
� The FAA played a role in the dropping of terror-
ists' leaflets from an American plane on London
and Paris to publicize the Croatian cause. It also
:cleared a flight to drop leaflets over Chicago in
� They were not *asking the release off lel-
-low terrorists in Israeli and in other jails.
What then can officialdom, here and
7 abroad, learn from the latest episode in
the complex, constantly changing, and
too frequently tragic history of aerial hi-
jacking?
�The dominant view among aviation ex.,
pests at the moment is that there is noth-
ing wrong in an officially proclaimed and
normally implemented policy of tough-
ness with hijackers. Anything less would
only encourage other criminals.
But it is counterproductive to adopt
too rigid a stand, many believe. A rigid
"we will not negotiate" stand can be
misinterpreted by middle-level officials to
mean "we will not talk." Even a policy
of "we will not make concessions" should
not be absolute�how do you define "con-
cessions"? Is the dropping of leaflets the
kind of concession that warrants risking
dozens of lives?
Each on Own Merits
In short, the majority view is that the
government should talk and usually act
though but, at the same time, should treat
each case on its own merits at the time.
That is the way, in the final analysis,
that the weekend T.W.A. hijacking was
handled. Even while a strict reading of
Secretary of State Kissinger's "we will
not negitiate" posture was slowing steps
overseas -to gain the release of the
plane's passengers and crew, other
branches of the government were experi-
encing no such rigidities.
Both the Federal Aviation Administra-
tion and the Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation, for instance, were urging news-
papers to comply with the hijackers' de-;
mands for printing the text of their mani-
festo for Croatian Independence from
Yugoslavia.
The policy favoring toughness with
flexibility was endorsed by a spokesman
for the West German United Nations
delegation, which plans to propose new
measures against taking hostages when
the General Assembly meets later this
month.
"In general, you should take a hard
line," he said. "But don't say 'never.' You
can always make room for special
cases."
� answer to theierroriste-demands.
ASKED WHETHER the FBI role had violated
the government ban on concessions to terrorists,
,the bureau issued this statement on Tuesday:
"The decision to release this material (to the
� newspapers) was made solely by the FBI in view
of the circumstances which existed at the time, but
does not represent any change in the U.S. govern-
� ment's policy regarding acceding to demands of
� terrorists."
In reiterating that policy yesterday, a State De-
partment spokesman agreed with a questioner
. that the FBI "as much as said that" it had broken
the policy.
The spokesman said that "the policy, which in-
volves a refusal on the part of the United States
government to negotiate with terrorists, to comply
with monetary or in kind ransom demands or to
accede to any terrorist demands, has not changed
and will not change.
"The maintenance of this no-negotiations, no-
concessions policy is based on our firm belief that
future incidents can be deterred only when it is
widely understood and recognized that such acts
cannot succeed and will not further the cause of
the individual ,terrorist or international terrorist
organization."
29
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Tuesday, September 14, .1 976.
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�
THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
ugozi]aw[is Usa
By Eric Bourne
Special correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor
Vienna
Yugoslav relations with the United
States have taken a nosedive as a result
of the hijack of an American airliner by
Croatian extremists.
It is difficult to recall any time since
the early 1950s when official Yugoslav
� attitudes have adopted so harsh a line-
against the U.S.
� There have been periodic mutual up-
sets since Belgrade's break with Stalin
opened the door to increasingly friendly
relations with the U.S. and the West in
general, but these were rarely long-last-
ing, and they did not approach the level
of the current sharp reaction.
Now Yugoslavia has gone so far as to
accuse the U.S. of tacit support for the
1. hijackers, a charge that a U.S. Embassy
spokesman in Belgrade rejected as to-
tally without foundation.
Surpise voiced
Western diplomats who have sympa-
thized with Yugoslav feelings about the
' apparently unrestricted activities of ex-
treme emigre groups in Western coun-
tries, were surprised by the� uncompro-
mising nature of Belgrade's protest.
It is not .the first time the Yugoslav
Government has accused "influential re-
actionary circles" in America of hostil-
ity to Yugoslavia because ol its nonalign-
ment.
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
16 Sept. 1976
Japan's saleony
SuAsa fea
d&erds
By David K. Willis
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor
Moscow
A new setback for detente between Moscow
'.and � Washington ... the worst diplomatic clash
between Moscow and Tokyo for years ... and
an indication of how deeply the Soviets have
been upset by three highly publicized defec.'
tions in recent months.
This is how Western analysts in Moscow sum
up the Soviet Union's long, angry blast of criti-
cism at both Tokyo and Washington over the
supersecret MIG-25 jet fighter-bomber still in
Japanese hands:
The criticism intensified Sept. 15. A Tass
commentator, noting reports from Tokyo that
the MIG-25 was to be flown by a C-5 Galaxy
transport aircraft to a military base where it is
to be "carefully studied," said that Japan's po-
sition continued to be "unfriendly" toward the
Soviet Union.
This attitude, commentator Viktor Zatsepin
said, was "clearly undertaken with the in-
stigation and support of a third side," and
showed that Japan was disregarding inter-
national law and worsening Soviet-Japanese re-
lations.
(This follows on the heels of a Sept. 14 warn-
Six weeks ago, President Tito com-
plaining of outside "pressures,"' named
U.S. Ambassador in Belgrade Laurence
H. Silberman as the "initiator" of an
anti-Yugoslav campaign. The charge
arose from the imprisonment of an
American citizen and the Embassy's
successful efforts to secure his release.
Escalation
In this atmosphere, angry Yugoslav
reactions to the Croat hijack were pre-
dictable. The present protest, however,
goes well beyond the Yugoslav leader's
criticisms of an ambassador involved in
a single individual case.
The indictment leveled at the U.S. in-
cluded a scarcely veiled threat that
"normal relations" are incompatible
with the circumstances surrounding the
Sept. 16 hijacking.
But, before judgment is passed on the
affair and positions harden, the Yugos-
lav reaction needs to be seen against the
current political background in that
country.
Yugoslav leaders and people generally
are only too well aware that the end of
an era of assured stability is nearing.
Rivalries ease
The leaders who will take over when
President Tito is no longer at the helm
express confidence that the transition
has been secured by establishment of a
collective presidency.
30
ver Uaddng
Talks this correspondent had in all the
Yugoslav republics this summer, with lo-
cal leaders as well as ordinary folk, re-
vealed that -the rivalries and tensions
that flared between various national
groups in the early 1970s have abated.
Republican equality has become a sub-
stantive thing.
Nonetheless, anxiety for the post-Tito
future helps to make Belgrade doubly
sensitive to anything smacking of "inter-
ference" or hostility, or tolerance of its.
extreme adversaries abroad.
Extremist activity
Extremist Croatian emigre groups
have, in recent years:
� Infiltrated a band of' 19 terrorists
into Yugoslavia. They killed 13 security
troops before being slain or captured
themselves.
� Murdered Yugoslav diplomats in
West Germany and Sweden.
- Bombed a Yugoslav train.
� Blew up a Yugoslav airliner over
Czechoslovakia.
� Made a bomb attempt against Pres-
ident Tito only a few months-ago.
These groups are largely remnants, or
sons, of the notorious Ustasha who
headed a Croat puppet regime under
Nazi occupation in World War II and
carried out widespread massacres of the
Serb minority there.
In the Yugoslav view they are not or-
dinary political dissidents and should not
be regarded as such.
ing to Japan that if Tokyo 'pursued its claim to
four Soviet-held Pacific islands it could only
"poison the spirit of good-neighborliness" be-
tween the two countries.
(Soviet authorities seized a Japanese fishing
boat with a crew of six Sept. 12 just a few
hours before then Japanese Foreign Minister
Kiichi Miyazawa made an inspection trip of the
four islands from a patrol boat.)
Soviet pilot Viktor Belenko flew the jet, said
-.to be the fastest of its type in the world, to
_Hakodate in northern Japan Sept. 6. The Japa-
nese press reported that he told authorities he
had wanted to fly directly to the United States,
but lacked the fuel. President Ford decided
that the pilot could have political asylum in the
U.S. if he wanted. Lieutenant Belenko asked
for it and is now thought to be in California.
Moscow does not want its prize aircraft on
Japanese soil a moment longer. It knows that
U.S. and other Western military intelligence
experts have long wanted to take a close look
at it � a point raised by Tass. Analysts here
say tnat Moscow's. latest harsh criticism is in-
tended to hector Tokyo into giving the jet back
before this Can happen.
Judging by the reaction of the Japanese For-
eign Ministry in Tokyo, the Soviet gambit
might fail. A ministry spokesman said Lieuten-
ant Belenko sought asylum of his own free will.
Previously Japanese officials had said that Ja-
pan would return the jet, but only after it had
made an inspection to determine if Leutenant
Belenko had broken any laws in entering Japa-
nese air space. Privately, Japanese officials
reject the Soviet version.
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The Soviets have been using strong language
in private exchanges since the plane landed.
On the night of Sept. 14 Tass distributed a
lengthy statement that gave the Soviet version
of the affair, said the plane had become lost,
condemned Japan for allowing the U.S. to en-
ter the picture, blamed the White House for of-
fering asylum before it had been sought, and
suggested that "electoral considerations" had
been to blame. �
The Belenko defection was the third to make
world headlines in recent months. The first
was that of diver Sergei Nemtsanov at. the
Montreal Olympics. Next was chess grand-
master Viktor Korchnoi in the Netherlands
N" 1E6 SYeOpRtIC 1119"71 ES
DIM'S PENETR6ATION
WORRYING TO JAPAN
Ability of Soviet Aircraft to Fly
- Under Radar Is Said to Show
Country's Weak Defenses
By DREW MIDDLETON .
� The undetected final approach of the
vagrant Soviet MIG-25 to Japan has
brought home to Government circles in
Tokyo the loopholes in the country's air
'defense, according to United States de-
:tense sources.
The first analysis on the high-speed,
high-altitude aircraft, known to the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization as the Fox-
hal; has heightened Western concern over
the regular reconnaissance flights by
other MIG-25's over West Germany,
France, the Netherlands, Belgium and
Norway. According to NATO intelligence
reports, there are 45 Foxbats in East Ger-
many and Poland employed on such pa-
trols.
The landing of the MIG-25 at the corn-
mer airport of Hakodate, on Hokkaido
Island on Sept. 6, supported the American
�argument, hitherto rejected by the Japa-
nese, that their radar system was obso-
lete.
The detection of hostile aircraft ap-
proaching the Japanese islands rests on
28 warning and control units of a base
defense system. Successive Japanese Gov-
ernments have considered modernization
of the system in view of regular Soviet
'reconnaissance flights over the archipela-
go by MIG-25s and other aircraft.
� Jets Ordered to Intercept I
Air defense radars picked up the Saviet
'aircraft short! after 1 P M j
July 27. In each case Moscow has reacted in
strong statements, and with each defection its
irritation has grown.
The MIG-25 statement says Lieutenant Be-
lenko lost his bearings and landed in Japan be-
cause�he lacked the fuel to get home.. Tokyo
then isolated hiM, "which gives grounds for be-
lieving that various methods were used to in-
fluence him."
The Soviets say Tokyo refused permission
for Soviet officials to see the flyer for almost
four days. The Japanese spokesman in Tokyo
said Japanese officials had, in fact, persuaded.
Lieutenant Belenko to see Soviet officials al-
though he had not wanted to.
time and �two Japanese Air Force F-4's
were ordered to intercept. The Foxbat,
flown by Lieut. Victor I. Belenko, did net
'answer 'Japanese requests for identifica-
tion.
Shortly aftet the MIG-25 entered Japa-
;nese air space it dropped from 13,000
.feet to a low altitude and -disappeared
from Japanese radar screens.. In conse-
quence, the ground control stations were
unable to direct the two F-4's toward
their target.
Hakodate was Lieutenant Belenko's
second choice. His first was the Japanese
Air Force base at Chitose, which was cov-
eted by clouds. He, then flew to Hakodate.
According to Japanese information
reaching this country, Soviet aircraft ap-
peared in the area of Hakodate five hours
after the MIG-25 had touched down. Since
then, the Soviet Union's Far East air force
has maintained regular patrols in the
area. And Soviet -diplomats in Tokyo have
demanded the immediate return of the
aircraft.
'Lieutenant Belenko left the Soviet air
base at Sakharovka in Siberia on the
morning Of Sept. 6 in a flight of three
MIG-25. Shortly after takeoff he broke
away from the squadron and dropped to
about 150 feet to escape Soviet radar.
After he was out Of the rauge of the
Soviet radar, Lieutenant Belenko took his
plane up to 18,000 feet. and headed for
'Japan. � ;
It was a near thing. The MIG-25 landed
with about 95 percent of its fuel exhaust-
ed. The plane, according to British intelli-
gence cources, has a normal range of
about 610 nautical miles but this can be
increased by reducing use of Tumansky.
R-266 eligines' aterburners.
: The initial analysis of the MIG-25 by
Japanese and United States experts con-
centrated on the avionics system, the
lookdown radar and the metals used to
sheath the high-speed aircraft. American,
aeronautical sources believe that either
titanium or boron are used for the fuse-
lage and wings.
It is not now known whether the air-,
craft carried electronic countermeasures.
against hostile radar and surface-to-air
and air-to-air missiles, which have be-
come sucli an important element in aerial
warfare.
P.M. Japanese
WASHINGTON POST
1 7 SEP 1975
31
By George C. Wilson
Washington Post Staff Writer
Navy leaders were preparing last
. night to retrieve the highly-secret F-14
Tomcat fighter .that rolled off the
deck of the U.S. carrier John F. Ken-
nedy on Tuesday�sinking intact in in- �
ternational waters about 75 miles
northwest of Scapa Flow, Scotland.
A Soviet. cruiser kept circling the
area where the Navy's F-14 sank; rais-
ing fears in the Pentagon that the
Russians are marking the spot until
they can haul the fighter out of the
North 'Atlantic. This would be a diplo-
matic counter-punch to the current
examination by the United States and
Japan of the Alig-25 Foxhat that a de-
fecting Soviet pilot flew to japan last
week.
The Navy F-14�which settled in 1,-.
890 feet of water�would yield the
Russians more secrets if they recover
it. than Americans expect to get from
their examination of the Soviet Mig.
25.
Not only did the F-14 have a lop-se-
crct,. $500,000 Phoenix missile aboard
when it Plunged into the Atlantic,
sources said last night, hut the tighter
was also equipped with devices so
sensitive that a friendly nation would
not get them if it bought the plane.
Equipment. the U.S. government is
determined to keep from the hussians
includes devieet; in the F-14 kw, coding
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'voice communications and -foiling
enemy jamming attempts; a computer .
system to put the F-14 in the best pos-
ition to shoot down an enemy plane;
and a data link system so sophisti-
cated that someone on a ship could �1
control the F-14's flight.
"We're going to get that plane be-
fore they do," .said one Navy officer
last night. "Or. _else," he added in an ,
� � obvious bit of overstatement, "it's go-
ing to be World War 111."
Sources said the recovery plan had
been put together Wednesday and, yes-
terday but still required a last bit of
coordination with one Navy command. .;
before being implemented.
The water is not deep enough to re--
quire pressing the Hughes Glomar
lx-
Iorer into service, sources said. That -
ship recovered pieces of a Soviet die-
sel submarine in 1974. in water almost .
� 10 times as deep as that now covering
the F-14.
Although Navy divers have been
called to participate in the P-14 re-
� eovery effort, it could not .be learned � I
--last night exactly how they will be
used.. One source predicted a simple
�. seagoing crane and cable system
� would be able to go down the re-
quired 1,890 feet to reach the F-14.
. The Navy could use a seagoing ,�
barge with, a so-called "moon poor=
an opening within the barge leading
directly into the sea. A hook and ea- ,
ble Can be lowered from a .crane on
the deck through this opening�called
a moon' pool because it reflects the
..mOon at night. S�
Although F-14s have crashed into
the sea� before, none has ever fallen
',into it so gently that the plane has re-
mained intact. Navy leaders fear the ,
plane may still be in one piece on the
ocean bottom, adding to their determi-
nation to recover the plane. Another
option would be to blow it to bits on.
the bottom, but sources said this was
not contemplated at present:
The reason the F-14 went out of con-
trol on the deck of the Kennedy on
Tuesday as the pilot was preparing to
take � off, .sourtes said last night, was -
that one of its two jet engines mal-
functioned. The pilot could not throt- '
tie down its thrust because of what was
, termed "a fuel control problem."
With one engine - idling, but the
other putting out a lot of thrust,
sources said. the F-14 went out of con-
trol on the deck and' rolled over-
board�hitting three deck hands as it
, skidded over the side. The Navy said
the three sailors were injured but did
not describe how seriously.
The t wo-man crew of the F-14 a
plane that costs $14 million a copy
and about $18 million if the cost of de-
. vekMing it is including--ejected from
the plane and landed on the deck of
the carrier. They suffered only minor
� injuries, the Navy said.
Iran has ordered 80 F-1.4's but will',
not receive into.11 of IIre lop-secret
equipment, that the Navy fears the,
Missions ;night gel. H. ihe is not
hauled out of the depths soon.
The went erhoard during a
:NATO exereisc eallod Temnworlc 76.
A (}� spy ship. sh:olowing the
rici� Kennedy (Itiriih; exereiw ap-
parently saw tin' 1,'.1.1 ovepho;ii'd.
T,A.-0 Soviet 1,:rcs'ia crtih,er., wore iii
the area, oet, oi Ham !itw, oil near
spot who re ;he F�14
WASHINGTON STAR
L..1_3 .SEP 1975
u. a Ask t afp
(IJismantIeIG
� TOKYO (UPI).� Japan will ask American mili-
tary experts to help dismantle and examine a
Soviet MIG25 fighter plane flown here by a defect-
log Russian pilot a week ago, according to Michita
Sakata, defense administrator.
Sakata, director-general of the defense agency,
I told reporters yesterday it would be difficult for
'- Japanese experts alone to make a thorough study
of the plane, one of the world's most advanced air-
craft.
Technical assistance from the United States is
necessary to dismantle the MIG25 and examine
,secret equipment on board, Sakata said.
Defense agency officials added, however, that
U.S. help would be sought on an "unofficial basis"
, to avoid further straining of relations between
Japan and the Soviet Union.
THE PLANE, REGARDED by Western military
� experts as an intelligence windfall, was flown to
Japan last Monday by Soviet Air Force Lt. Viktor
Belenko. Belenko, 29, who said he wanted to defect
to the United States, was flown to California last
Thursday after the U.S. government granted him
asylum.
The high-flying fighter � known by the NATO
code name of Foxbat � was described in 1973 by
� then U.S. Secretary of the Air Force Robert Sea-
mans as "probably the best interceptor in produc-
tion in the world today."
BALTIMORE SUN
16 Sept. 1976
Tanadia ce' blamed for defectio
Moscow (AP) � A Soviet journal ac-
cused "Canadian intelligence" yesterday
of engineering the defection in Montreal
of Sergei Nemtsanov, the 17-year-old di-
ver who left his Olympic team during the
'Summer Games.
In linking a Canadian government
agency with the case, Literary Gazette
thus expanded earlier Soviet accusations
,that the young diver was forced against
his will to defect July 29.
Nemtsanov later announced he wanted
to return to his homeland, and was sent
-back to the Soviet Union. According to a
�newspaper article here last week, he had
-resumed training in Kazakhstan. and is-
sued a statement saying he had never
twanted to defect.
Literary Gazette, the weekly organ of
the Soviet Writer's Union, said Skip Phoe-
.;,
nix, the Canadian diver who befriended
the young Soviet, "participated at the
Montreal Olympics not only in the capaci-
ty of a sportsman but also as an agent for
Canadian intelligence, being paid 'per
soul' for each he recruited."
Phoenix has denied he helped engineer
the defection.
The latest article on the case portrayed
Nemtsanov as a total captive of Canadian
officials, and said the diver was suffering
from "brain paralyzing drugs" when he
first met with Soviet officials in Montreal.
In his remarks published last week, Nem-
tsanov claimed he was in asonstant "fog"
during the affair.
. Canadian officials said Nemtsanov had
asked for asylum, but reconsidered be-
cause of concern,over his grandmother's
fate back home. �
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WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)
16 SEPTI1MER 1 976
The Greer/Kandel Report
t7,491r1""0"
-
- By Philip Greer.
and Myron Kandel
Sprxial to The Washington Star
. Terrorist groups are shifting their focus from
the U.S. government to American companies in
this country as well as overseas, according to our
sources in private security organizations, who
have become increasingly worried about the devel-
opment.. , . . .
Security at government installations has been
tightened, and as a result, our sources say, terror-
ists are looking for easier targets. The murder of
three North American Rockwell technicians in
Iran last month confirmed. their fears that U.S.
businesses and their employes are becoming sym-
bolic stand-ins for the U.S. government :World-
wide, 40 percent of all terrorist attacks have been
alined at Americans. . . �
ALTHOUGH Americans overseas still are more
vulnerable than those at home.� and those in
arms-related indestries run the greatest risk � the
experts tell us the danger is spreading to the U.S.
The fire bombs recently placed in New York de-
partment stores underline the vulnerability of
ordinary business establishments � and ordinary
citizens �to terrorist activity. . ,
Security officials also fear that parts of the huge
� ransom payments received by Latin American ter-
rorists holding kidnapped businessmen may make
their way to U.S. terrorist groups, enabling them
to step up their activities in this country. A report
� on' terrorism by the Central Intelligence Agency
which has received only limited distribution says it
is likely that terrorist activity "will be more sharp- ,
ly felt in the U.S.*in the years just ahead." The CIA
also raises the possibility of "growing contact and
cooperation" between foreign and U.S.. terrorist
organizations.
The threat of terrorism is so real to American ,
companies that representatives of several dozen of
them are meeting in New York this week with sen-
ior officials from. the State Department. CIA. FBI
..
1. and other agencies at a private seminar organized:.
:
under tight security. . . . .
. BENJAMIN WEINER, a former foreign service..
officer who heads the meeting, says the attacks on.
I� defense-related technicians are a first step in the
shift of terrorism away from/U.S. military and
diplomatic personnel. "Such an attack," he says,',I
.. ..
"is symbolically equivalent to an attack on the
government itself."
CIA officials are also worried about the Security-
of such major installations as offshore drilling.
rigs,- nuclear reactor sites, the computer that runs
the Bay, Area Rapid Transit system in San Frame
cisco. and pipelines (including the Alaska pipe*,
line). They fear that as terrorist incidents multie
ply, headline-hunting groups � such as the.
Croation nationalists who hijacked a TWA jet last -
weekend � will resort to more spectacular acts of
terrorism to give them the publicity they crave.
� Concern is further heightened by the fact theta!
for the most partaAmericans don't take precau-
tions � and, in fact, often play into the hands of:
would-be attackers. One offical tells of an eeecuai
tive of a multinational corporation who, on moving
to a new location in the U.S., was interviewed by-
his local newspaper. The gory told of his practice: -
of jogging every morning and gave the exact time
he left his house,- when he returned (at least partly'e.
fatigued), where he parked his car. at the railroad..
station, and other details that would make him an':
easy target of an aspiring kidnapper or assassin. t
For_good measure, he also described, the club his.
children regularly visited. .� � :a' �
UP.TO NOW, the federal government hasn't-
made any strong efforts to alert the public to the'a
dangers of terrorism at home. Therefore, the ex**-:
perts say, it's pretty much Up to you to watch out.
for yourself, and they pass along some tips. �
Weiner .says that business executives shou'tda
keep a low profile and not draw any unnecessary..
attention to themselves or their families. For
example, he asks, why drive a car with a distinc-
tive license plate that makes you easy to spot?
It's also advisable to vary personal schedules,
instead of strictly adhering to the same routine- �
day after day. Advice along these lines that the.
State Department gives to Americans working in.,.
troubled areas overseas can also apply to those at -
home. .
"Try to avoid keening to the same routine in the',
routes and times of your movements to and from;
work and around town," the department recome-
mends. : ��' '
"Past kidnappings indicate that the Icidnappers
keep the victim under surveillance for a substaraa
tial period to discover travel patterns. Unpredict7:;
ability is one of your best weapons." .
, .
33
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WASHINGTON POST
15 SEP 1976
Secret Swede
Funds Buy
Spy Ileviees
\ By. Bernard'D., Nossiter
Washington Post Foreign Service
STOCKHOLM, Swede
Sept. 14� Secret payments -�
channeled by Sweden to
U.S. .Air Force intelligence
:for a number of 'years are
- being used to purchase elec-
tronic devices that enable
Stockholm to listen 'in on.
military communications in ,
the Soviet bloc, it was learned
� today.
According to informed.
sources here, the payments
were hidden because of neu7 .
tral Sweden's delicate rela-
tions with its Baltic neigh-
bors and because some Swe-
dish opinion would be hor-
rified by any classified deal
�with the 'Pentagon.
�� Diplomats here are con- �
vinced that at least some of . �
� what Sweden learns through
its monitoring devices is fil-
tered back to the Pentagon.
Swedish officials decline,
however, to confirm this, �
presumably because that
would be too naked 'a breach
of neutrality.
The effectiveness of .the
American-supported system, '
was demonstrated last No-�
� vember, when the Defense
'Radio Authority, the user
agency here, picked up Ines-
sages sent, by Moscow" to
THE GUARDIAN (MANCHESTER)
2 SEPTEMBER 1976
Soviet- bombers pursuing a runaway
Soviet frigate.
� With an election here Sunday, the
government is making no apologies
for the affair, although it is obviously
embarrassed that it came to light. Stig
Synnergren, the widely respected and
blunt-speaking 'supreme commander
of the Swedish armed forces, was or-
dered into action today to field hostile
questions from Swedish reporters.
At this press conference, the gen-
eral referred only to the purchase of
"electronic material for the gathering
of intelligence." He and other military
men maintained a discreet silence on
precisely what the device was used
for, nor was anything said at the press
conference about the target area.
It is; he said of the deal, "a per-
fectly legitimate business transaction,
a payment for delivered goods, and
not, as has been insinuated, payment
for services."
"Deliveries are still going on," the
general said. "And we use the
same method of payment. . . no mat-
ter what you write today."
The secret payments were disclosed
In Folket i Bild, a Maoist fortnightly
magazine that � has cracked intelli-
gence secrets here before. The maga-
zine detailed four payments of more
than $250,000 from 1970 to 1973. They
were made by Sweden's then-defense
minister, Sven Andersson, now for-
eign minister, through commercial
banks, with the biggest slice going. to
Maj. Gen. Rockly Triantafellu, then
chief of U.S. Air Force intelligence.
The technique bypassed Sweden's
Defense Material Administration,
which normally does the purchasing.
Gen. Synnergren readily acknowl-
edged that the money came from se-
cret Defense Ministry funds.
Because the payments from Sweden
went to Air Force intelligence, the
U.S. producer of the electronic device
was kept in the dark about his ulti-
mate customer. He would know only
that he received an order from the
Pentagon, not Sweden, an arrange-
ment that apparently suited both
Washington and Stockholm.
Sidestepping the Defense Material
Administration kept the Swedish Par-
liament and public in the dark,' a dis-
closure that may also hurt the govern-
ment party at the polls.
The reasons for all this secrecy, it
was explained here, were these:
0 Stockholm- did not want. its Baltic
neighbors�the Soviet Union, Poland
le a, 'ea
Andreotti..fp,u
From CHRISTOPHER MATTHEWS : Rome, September 1
The month-old government
of Signor Andreotti is being
threatened by a sir near campa
Material Witieli is extremely
damaging, and if true, politically
fatal, to Signor A ndreutti has
recently heen published in
the Italian press. The source
has been the Dalian two-Fast:1st
flight, whose past links with
the CIA are reasonably well
document ed� and the Lockheed
34,
and East Germany�to know that it
had the capability to monitor their
air, sea and ground force transmis-
sions. Nor does it want them to know
that this capability is being used.
� Even, though Synnergren ac-
knowledged in an interview with The
Washington Post that secrecy in these
matters is short-lived, there is an im-
Portant diplomatic difference between
covert monitoring and a blatant an-
nouncement that it is going on.
* Public disclosure of the deal
would have offended many in Sweden.
As early .as 1968, Washington's rela-
tions with Stockholm were already
strained. Olof Palme, who became
prime minister a year later, had
marched in an antiwar parade ,had
the North Vietnamese ambassador
and, in time, Washington recalled its
envoy. The government here would
have had trouble explaining how it
could deal with the Pentagon for a
sensitive device and damn the United
States at the same time.
� AS part of an arrangement of this
sort, almost inevitably the using coun-
try passes on to \ its supplier some of
the fruits of its labors. To give a
NATO leader military information
about the Soviets appears to be an ob-
vious violation of Sweden's neutrality.
The story has been a bombshell for
the media here, headlined on front
pages in three of .the four big dailies
and dominating radio and television
, newscasts. But its political fallout is
: uncertain.
Palme is fighting a come-from-be-
hind campaign to maintain the 44-
.year-old rule of Social Democrats. Pol-.
Iticians in all camps agree that Sun-
day's parliamentary election will be
extremely close, much like the one
three years ago when the government
forces and their opposition ended in a
tie.
'The secret-payments affair has bro-
, ken only five days before the voters
go to the polls. If it influences enough
wavering Social Demoerats to stay at
home, it could turn their party out of
office. ,
[At the Pentagon, chief spokesman
Alan Woods said yesterday that Air
" Force Secretary Thomas C. Reed had
ordered an inquiry into ,'any money
sent from the Swedish government to
the Air Force. Woods said he did 'not
know when the inquiry would be com-
pleted. He declined to comment
further.]
toi-poration in the US.
Some � Western diplomatic
sources say there can be
little doubt that a campaign
is afoot to discredit or even
sabotage Signor Audreotti in
his precarious attempt to govern
Italy on the basis of a tacit
alliance betwetn the Christian
Democrats and Communists.
If successful such a campaign
would have ext remely grave
repercussions, for there is cur-
rently no alternative to the
Andreotti coalition. This partly
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explains why diplomats think
the events of the last few
days arc none of the state
Department's doing. The US
government's view is that Signor
Andreutti's government repre-
sents the lesser of a number
of much worse evils as it
sees Communists holding key
parliamentary posts as prefer-
able to Communists holding
Cabinet portfolios, There is
no apparent reason why the
Stale Department should he
trying to make life bard for
Si.gnor Andreotti.
On Sunday, Mr Ernest:Hauser,
the former. Lockheed executive
'told Turin's La Stanma that
Signor Andreotti was the mys-
terious "antelope cobbler" who
has so, far managed to elude
investigators looking into .the
corporation's Italian activities.'
Antelope cobbler, according
to documents made available
by the Church committee, was
Lockheed's code for an Italian
Piime Minister � who had a
key part in easing the sale
.of 14 C130 transports to the
Italian Air Force.
� Stampa ran the Hauser �story,
without naming names, 'merely
recording that the antelope
was, according to Hauser, none
of the people including
President Leone � himself �
on whom suspicion had pre-
viously rested.
Today's issue of the political
weekly, L'Espresso, runs a
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cover picture of . Signor
Andreotti with the caption
" it was him." Inside, 'it pub-
lishes � photocopies of three
documents, two. of them on
Lockheed 'notepaper,. recording
the payment of a total of
$43,000 to Signor �Andreotti
in 1968 and 1970 to ensure,
his '"valuable assistance" and
that of the Christian Democrat
Party.
LeEspresso itself does not
rule out that the documents,
are , clever forgeries aimed
at nipping �the compromise
between Catholics and Marxists
in the bud.
Signor Andreotti denied the
allegations at length , in an
interview published today,
although � it can hardly be
said he confounded his accusers.
His defence basically rested
.on his unimpeachable record
and on the f a c t. that
he would never be .seen dead
' THE WASHINGTON POST
liiednesday, September 8, 1976
in Via Veneto's Excelsior NAO.
� named by . one of the
documents as a meeting .e!ace
between the Prime Minister
and a Lockheed executive.
Qeje....theory is that it is
,alt_ Pentagon:CIA:NATO-1.;fot
hatched by rightists who oppeise
tlfe7�lideofee-any TeTSiire" of
compromise � with Communists.
Another is that the manoeuvring
is aimed at making it hard for
the-. Communist leadership,
rather than Andreotti himself.
The Prime Mieister h clever
and . strong eneagh to survive �
the. mud-barrage being thrown
at him, but it coule serve
to prise apart the pre cerious
alliance between the Cern-
munists, already under aressure I
from inside their own piny,
and the Christian Democraie
Again, it could be argued .
that the revelations are aimed
at slowing down the work
of the parliamentary committee
�
By Mary Anne Weaver
Special to The Washington Post
'e'ATHENS�The long-simmering dis-
pute between Greece and Turkey over
the Aegean Sea now runs the risk of
worsening already shaky Greek-Amer-
ican relations as negotiations on U.S.
bases here enter their final phase.
Ranking diplomatic sources here
say that some Greek officials are pri-
vately blaming the United States for
the lack of resolution to conflicting
Greek and Turkish claims on the po-
tentially oil-rich seabed of .the Ae-
gean: ,
Since referring the seven-month dis-
pute to the U.N. Security Council in
August, Greece has suffered a number
of diplomatic defeats and Turkey and
Greece, nominally 'partners as NATO--
allies, are still at loggerheads.
"Omission is as deadly as commis-
ion," said a source close to Premier
Constantine Karamanlis. "Though the
Americans finally came around and
gave us an assist in the Security
Council, they have refused to exert
their maximum diplomatic leverage
on Turkey to date. On both a long-
and a short-term basis, this could
prove a catastrophic mistake."
Athens is disgruntled by a compro-
mise resolution 'Ai the council, which
neither chastized Turkey nor urged it
to discontinue exploration in the dis-
puted sea.
"Turkish policy appears mere and
more to be that of expanding their
own territory," a ranking Cabinet offi-
cial said in an interview. -The Ameri-
cans have got to make it: very clear
that this would be catastrophic for
NATO."
American sources here feel that the
Greek criticism is no and
II ey say that: Washington's influence
is limited.
Despite the growing tension, how-
ever, the last leg of the protracted
Greek-American base negotiations be-
gan last. week. The Karamanlis. gov-
ernment has already agreed in princi-
ple to a four-year accord governing
the six major U.S. military installa-
tions in exchange for $700 million in
aid.
Athens denies that it is using the
negotiations on U.S. bases as a bar-
gaining lever with Washington for
stepped-up support on the Aegean
. Sea.
"We heSitate to use cards which
would be construed as blackmail,"
said a government source. "We think.
it unnecessary to engage in such prac-
tices with an ally, as we firmly believe
in the logic, legality and morality of
our case."
But the Americans, he continued,
"must realize that we cannot be
brought to our knees by a dilemma: a
dilemma of humiliation or war."
An American observer here de-
scribes the whole sphere of Greek-
Turkish relations as "Kissinger's most
glaring foreign policy failure to date.
"It endangers the position of the
Karmanlis government. if Karamanlis
becomes the victim of the crisis,
America will have Lost her only hope
for a Greece totally 'Western-oriented,
and the strongest foundation for her
policy in the eastern Mediterranean,"
he said.
, If Greece is lost to the Western alli-
ance, he continued, the position of
Turkey might become greater, but it
would no longer be linked to Europe,
which he said would make it impotent
in the eastern 'Mediterranean.
'Thus, by hesitating, vacillating
neglecting to act, washingt on is fiiir
nine the flames of anti-Americanism
in this country�end this could prove
.3S
investigating the existing Lock-
heed dossier here.. The group
suspended its activities on
the eve of the elections just �
as formal charges were about to
be brought against two former
Defence Ministers, and just. as � .
the then Foreign Minister, Mr �
Mariano Rumor, was coming
under increasing suspicion.
It could all turn out to
be true, in which case the
conspiracy .theiry is part of
a major whitewash attempt.
Things have never been simple
in Italian politics, perhaps
never less simple than now.
O Lockheed approached two
Dtuch MPs to promote sales
of its Orion anti-submarine
aircraft to the Dutch navy,
according to 'Lockheed deee-
ments submitted to the Dun
Parliament. by Prime Minister.
Mr den Del today-
een
ek
les
a powerful, future threat."
Anti-Americanism in Greece hos
subsided markedly on the surface dur-
ing the past two. years, but there re-
mains a latent feeling of bitterness to-
ward the United States.
Bitter that the continuing dispute
with Turkey has. damaged � the econ-
omy, impeded social and economic
programs, and drained much of the
government's time, Karmanlis is re-
portedly willing to compromise with
Turkey, even at the risk of diminish-
ing his own domestic popularity and
prestige.
"But," said one of his ranking aides,
"he cermet negotiate and make com-
promises from a position of weakness.
it's got to be from a position of
strength.
"If the Americans permit the crisis
to deteriorate to the point of hostility,
if the Turks become unreasonable in
their demands, even -Karmanalis will
not have the force on prestige to im,
pose a solution."
A ranking Western diplA at how-
ever, dismissed such criticism as
naive. "The Greeks just expect too
much from the Americans." There is
vi it oal chasm between Athens and
�Vashington on how Turkey should be
handled. In essence, the Greek posi-
tion is that Washington's got to get
tough . to resort to very 'forceful
measures ranging from military and
economic embagoes. to threatening a
lith Fleet intervention in the Aegean
to give the Greeks iron-clad goat-an-
tees. You might say Greek-American
relations have gone through a number
of rhythmic changes during the ores
ent crisis. At the moment, they multi
go. either way,"
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THE WASHINGTON POST
y, Sept, 15,1976
, ��. ,
. "By Patrick Seale
London Observer
TRIPOLI�With the prodigal hospi-�
iality of an oil billionaire, Col. Muam-
lhar Qaddafi of Libya, the enfant ter-
rible of Arab politics, recently flew
.in 2,000 guests to help him celebrate
ihe seventh anniversary of his seizure _
of power: � ..
�;:'. The party included French women
from a splinter group well to the left
lof French Socialist leader Francois
f.Mitterand, a priest from Dublin, black
',.Militants from South Africa and Rho-
desia, phalanxes of unconvivial East
:Europeans, uniformed Soviet top
...brass, a special envoy of Fidel Castro,
And the massive brooding :figure of
;President-for-life Jean-Bedel Bokassa
.�f the Central African Republic, the
only head :of state to. accept the Lib-
*an invitation.
Gargantuan_ meals -.were. -accompa-
nied by limitless supplies of a deli- �
cious nonalcoholic cocktail. � The sky
':�itas flawless and, after sunset, a cool
-breeze blew in from the sea. Oleander
.and jasmine were in bloom.
Could this be the center of world..
:terrorism of which President Gerald
l'ord spoke' the other week? The So:
; viet . Union's new Middle Eastern
(Springboard? The fief of the "madman
,of .as President Anwar Sadat
now describes: the young Libyan
leader?
t There were two high points of the
i.festivities: a midnight tea party given
by Prime Minister Abdul Salam Jai-
i.loud in the gardens of the former
!royal palace, and Col. Qaddafi's own
appearance at the anniversary parade,
where he was mobbed by an adoring
crowd.
The two then could be brothers:
They share an unaffected manner, a
. Plain-speaking candor that has he- �
come the hallmark of the Libyan revo- �
lution. It is striking how little they .
are encumbered by protocol, pomp, or
even security .precautions.
His trouble-making reputation
abroad has perhaps blinded outsiders �,
to what. Qaddaft has achieved at
- home. In seven years, and at a cost of
$20 billion, he has created one of the
world's most lavish welfare states,
scattered schools and universities,
,across the land and begun to turn :
WASHINGTON POST
3 SEP 1976
some of Libya's limitless desert into
an oasis.. Qaddafi has put his country-
men on a seemingly endless escalator
toward a -bigger, better and richer fu-
ture, and they love him for it.
Perhaps because Qaddafi lives rela-
tively austerely himself and sets, the
tone, Libyan society Seems- almost
� classless. It is also humane; since the,
bloodless coup in 1969, no one has
been executed. -
The real puzzle about Libya today
is how to equate this good-natured, _be-
nevolent regime with the undoubted
evidence of its machinations abroad, or
with Qaddafi's political messianism.
He thinks he is a man of destiny, the
trustee of three essential values for
the future of the Arab community at
-large: unity, Islam as the regulatory
principle of society, and the military
defeat of Zionism. As such he is a po-
litical fundamentalist if not a fanatic.
The trouble is that these ideas, to
which Arabs often pay lip service, are
somewhat � unfashionable.. Individual
state-building has displaced the search
for unity of-the 1950s and 1960s, secu-
larism in public life has made' sweep-
ing gains, and most Arab leaders have
come to believe that the Arab-Israeli
� conflict should be-,settled by political
negotiation...
, .
Some argue that the moral and ma-
terial support that .Qadelafi gives to
his cherished causes around the world
is no more than proverbial bedouin
hospitality run riot. It is said that
someone with the right ideological
coloring has only to seek his help to
be �directed to the jihad (holy war)
fund, a sort of vast petty-cash box un-
der religious control.
Libya's population is little' more
than 2 million and the country is far
from the heartlands of the Middle
East, but Qaddafi's ideas, underpin-
ned by an annual oil revenue of
around $8 billion, have made him the .
main pole of opposition to Secretary
of State Henry Kissinger's Pax Amer-
ica.
Qaddafris out te destroy, by every
possible means, the American-spon-
sored peace process, which he be-
lieves is a betrayal of Arab and Pales-
tinian interests. Sadat's �Egypt, the
linchpin of Kissinger's step-by-step, di-
criL
iI1flaIe ttJ 61.47
, TT .0
6,,..C4-1
36
plomacy, is thus cast in the 'role of an' 7
agent .of -Zionism and imperialism.
Qaddafi could indeed. undermine
America's new-found influence over.
the area. With eacIrpassing day it be-.
comes more obvious. that American::
peace-making . has ';� run aground,'
leaving Sadat dangerously exposed..
Moreover; Egypt has not received the
vast financial .aid she needs and
the fires of social unrest burning ,
there ,could well be fanned by .Libyan
propaganda and subversion. �
The open support for Qaddafi
� against Sadat expressed - in Pravda
last week highlights the Soviet Un-
ion's. recognition of the Libyan leader�..
as a valuable anti-American instru-
ment and sets a public seal on the .
growing coincidence. of-Soviet and
yan interests. . � �� �
Qaddafi is,. no puppet of the Soviet .
Union, and his hostility to commu- .
nisrrr is as firm as ever; if not . so
openly expressed. But the Soviet Un-
ion has provided him with a first-class
'Modern arsenal of more than 2,000.
tanks, Migs, surface-to-air missiles,
and � even the dreaded SCUD�a.
'ground-to-ground missile with a range
of 190 miles.
The Soviet Union may see Libya
only as a sort of supply dump, where
weapons may. be stored for future use,
an intermediary to � arm the.
"progressive�. side. Soviet arms have
found their way via Libya to Lebanon,
and they may also he reaching the
Polisario in the Western Sahara.
For Qaddafi, 'however, the mere
presence of his vast armory provides
clout. The truth is that the achieve-
merits that are realistically open to
him are not Sadat's overthrow, nor a.
great blow struck for .distant Moslems.
.or frustrated Palestinians, .-but rather.
the extension of Libya's influence in
the-central Mediterranean. .
He has Malta in his pocket,- and has
guaranteed its security after Britain's
�planned withdrawal in 1979. He is eti-��
couraging Sicilian separatists and is
meddling in Corsica, Crete and Cy- '�
prus. He has patched up his quarrel -
with Tunis and stayed friends�with Al-
geria. Libya is already a Mediterra-
nean power, if not yet decisively an -
Arab one.
� By H. D. S. Greenway
Washington Post Pot-chin tier VICO '
TEHRAN, Iran Sept. 2�SAVAK is worried about
its image.
SAVAK stands for Sazemani Etlaat Va Ammniat
Iceshrar--thc information and security organization
of ,Iran. It is the Iranian CIA and Flit rolled into
one and as such it enjoys a fearful reputation as an
all-pervasive and all-powerful secret police that rules
by torture and terror, and crushes all diss,eat.
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. The weekly Economist of London has estimated
the number of political prisoners languishing in
:SAVAK jails at 20,000 to 40,000, Other estimates
have put. the number as high as 100,000.
SAVAK officials grant interviews relatively infre-
, quently. But its deputy director, Parviz Sabeti, is
Worried about all the bad press his organization has
..been receiving and,, in a rIcent interview, said it is.
unfair.
"These torture charges are pure fabrication and
not at all true," Sabeti said. SAVAK should. get
credit from the Western press for fighting commu-
nism, he contended, hut instead "they are sticking it
tons.
"In 'all Iran there are only 3,200 political prison-
ers. We don't have enough jails to house 100,000
prisoners," Sabeti said at SAVAK headquarters, on
the eastern edge of Tehran.
"Put this in. your newspaper," Sabeti said:
"Article 131 of the criminal code states that any
government official caught torturing anybody will
get six years in prison," he said.
&heti castigated the FBI for not keeping closer
watch on Iranian exile and student. groups in Amer-
THE BALTIMORE SUN
3 September 1976
Indian Par!
/7 ant.hi foe
New Delhi (AP)�The Indi-
an Parliament voted yesterday
i to investigate one of Prime
I Minister Indira Gandhi's most
1 outspoken eritics�Subraman-
Ian Swarny, a .right-wing oppo-
sition leader � and .a former
member of the Harvard Uni-
versity economics faculty. .� �
: � The vote came amid accuse-
tions from Mrs. Gandhi's ruling
Congress party � and pro-Mos-
cow Communists that the Unit-
ed States Central Intelligence
.Agency is aiding the 36-year-
old Mr. Swamy. � *
Political sources said the un-
'precedented investigation could
!cost Mr. Swamy his seat in the
eupper house even though he has
i four years remaining in his
i
term. .. �.:*
, .
- - According to the govern-
ment, Mr. Swamy fled to the
i West in January after evading
e
:
arrest during the 14 months
,since the � government pro-
claimed a national emergency
and detained many opposition
leaders. . � � � -: �
" Ile returned briefly to India
early this month to sign the at-
tendance roster in Parliament
to keep his membership active,
but then escaped abroad again,
opposition sources said. .. .
Om Mehta,..the 'minister of
home affairs, accused Mr. Swa-
my of carrying out "anti-Indian
propaganda calculated to bring
, tea. The CIA, he said, was "no heir) at all."
SAVAK has been "quite successful" in rounding
UI) terrorists in the past, Sabeti said. He expressed ,
confidence that the persons respensible for the mur-
der of three American civilian technicians in Teh-
ran last Saturday would eventually be caught.
SAVAK believes the group responsible for the
killings is the Mujahidden E Khalq which began 'as
curious mixture of Marxism and Moslem con-
servatism. The number of active 'terrorists at large
in Iran may not exceed 100, Sabeti said.
The Americans were involved in "Project IBEX,"
a secret electronic intelligence gathering system
which the U.S. firm of Rockwell International is in.
stalling for the Iranian government.
Sabeti said although there had been anti-state ac-
tivity in the past, political assassinations by killers
trained abroad and supplied with the latest Soviet
weapons was a comparatively new phenomenon for
'Iran.
Before 1970, Iran had not felt it necessary to exec-
ute people for anti-state activities, he said. But the
new wave of terrorism has "caused us to get a bit
rougher," he said, and now terrorists frequently .-ar,e
executed.
arnen.t votes to probe
ex-ilarvard econornisl
the Parliament,' Its members,
the government and the nation
as a whole into disrepute and
contempt." -
In a referenee to an earlier
warrant for Mr. Swatny's ar-
rest, Mr. Mehta said the econo-
mist was guilty of "evasion of
law and fleeing from justice
and legal processes, flouting
lawful orders and generally be-
having in a manner unworthy of
a member of this house." �
.
Mr. � Swamy... has reportedly
traveled in the United States
and Canada since leaving India,
often addressing meetings , and
giving press interviews to de-
nounce Mrs. Gandhi's emergen-
cy rule.
Mr.. Swamy taught econom-
ics at Harvard from 1962 to
1969 and was a visiting profes-
sor of economics there in 1971
and 1973 before being elected
to the Indian upper house in
1974,'
� With Mr. Swamy's own col-
leagues in the right-wing Jana
Sangh party absent from the
chamber because of a continu-
ing boycott by the nee-Com-
munist oppesition, a leader of
the Marxist Communist party
was the only person to oppose
the government's motion to
start the investigation.
"When the democratic sys-
tem is being broken down by
the ruling party, we in the op-
'�� �
� 37
position have every right to say
in and out of this house what we
want," said Vishwanatha Men-
on, a Marxist Communist mem-
ber. "He {Mr. Swarnyl must he
allowed to say what he wants.
We need not spare the ruling
party." . .
Yogendra Sharma of the
pro-Moscow Communists de-
nounced Mr. Swamy for having
said, according to an interview
published in the Toronto Star
in February, that the_ Commu-
nists in India might try to as-
sassinate Mrs. Gandhi.
"We Communists will save
the prime minister at the cost
of our lives," Mr. Sharma said.
"It is the fascist elements in the
country who want to kill de-
mocracy, playing into the hands
of the CIA, while putting all the
blame on the Communists." �
' Haresh Malviya, �
member of the Congress party,
accused the CIA of helping .Mr.
Swamy operate abroad.. e . .
� "I see the invisible hand of
the CIA," he said. "It is the
poli-
cy of the CIA to destabilize gov-
ernments not in their favor, and
-their hostility to India is. well
known.
"I definitely feel Mr: Sub-
ramanian Swami is an agent of
the CIA who has infiltrated into
this house. We should expell
him, the earlier the 1,etter." .
'
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Tuesday, September 7, 1976 The Washington Star
ryTi Indian
One of the storied traits of tyrants is that, no
matter how impregnable they might seem to be,
they never feel safe. Is this one of the explana-
tions for Indira Gandhi's current bid to bury In-
dian democracy under further layers of parlia-
mentary and constitutional assent to her one-
woman rule?
Otherwise, the Gandhi government's demand
for substantial new powers would seem to he un-
necessary. Under the "emergency" authority
she already claims to have, Mrs. Gandhi over
the last 14 months has proven herself completely
capable of jailing thousands of opponents, in-
cluding three dozen legislators, imposing a
sweeping censorship that suppresses news even
of parliamentary debate and cowing a once
proudly independent judiciary. With her major
critics locked up, resistance to her dictatorial
course has been pathetically weak, and the
world's most populous democracy lies dormant.
And since Mrs. Gandhi's Congress party enjoys
commanding parliamentary control, there is no
. question about the government getting whatever
legislative backing it wants � including support
for changing the constitution.
It is by the constitutional amendment route
that Mrs. Gandhi seeks new legal embellish-
ament of her bosshood as prime minister. Powers
of the judiciary to review legislation and en-
force civil liberties would be curtailed. Parlia-
ment would be permitted to ban "anti-national
activities and associations." And the prime
minister, acting through the figurehead presi-
dent, could simply order further changes in the
THE WASHINGTON POST
Friday, Sept. 17. 19 76
:Lfj_..1: Anderson and Les Whitten
SEll les 'usT eet an Iran-
()
ern�erer-ey
constitution without even the need for a parlia-
mentary rubber stamp.
Some members of the parliamentary opposi-
tion still at large were scathing in their
denunciations of the Gandhi regime's constitu-
tional proposals. "All the pillars of
parliamentary democracy are being converted
into pliant tools of an all-powerful executive,"
said H.M. Patel. "The main thrust of the bill is
to establish a totalitarian rule of one-party
dictatorship," said a Marxist member. Mr.
Patel and his supporters walked out in a boycott
of the parliamentary proceeding to avoid giving
"a semblance of constitutional legitimacy to the
move to throttle democracy and impose authori-
tarian rule."
� The parliamentary give-and-take seems to
have a democratic ring until you realize that
only foreigners like us can read about it, and
even our correspondents are hampered. Censor-
ship prevents the Indian people from learning
the substance of the criticism voiced against the
Gandhi program. The opposition also accuses
the government of going back on a promise to
permit public debate of the changes.
As for editorial critiques Of the constitutional
plan by India's once-lively press, we regret to
report virtually nothing along that line. The
nearest an editorialist came to questioning the
proposals was with reference to the plan for
executive amendment of the constitution. An
editorial in The Statesman called this "extraor-
dinary indeed." That may be the most pregnant
"indeed" ever written.
In blunt, blistering language, Saudi
..�Arabian officials have accused the.
United States of building up the shah -
of Iran for an armed invasion of Ara-
bian oil fields. :
The respected Saudi oil minister,
'Ahmed Zaki Yamani, warned that the
shah was "highly unstable mentally."
if the U.S. authorities failed to recog-
nize this, added Yamani, they must be
losing their "powers of observation."
The Saudis confided their fears last
year to James E. Aldus, then the U. S. �
ambassador, who relayed the message
to Washington in startling secret let-
ters and memos.
� One "memorandum for the file"
dated Aug. al, 1975, describes the ex-
plosive conversation with Yamani. The
� oil minister, according to the secret
memo, said "the conclusion the Saudis
were reaching was that we had an
agreement with Iran to let it take over
the entire Arabian littoral of the Per-
sian Gulf."
Yemeni believed he United States
"had urged the shah to make peace
with Iraq," Aldus added, "so Iran
would have a freer hand in the lower
Gulf."
The Saudi oil minister was con-
vinced that the United States was de-
liberately bolstering the shah's mili-
tary power and that "Iran's extraordi-
nary military buildup was quite
clearly aimed at occupying the Arab
states across the gulf, the emirates,
Qatar, Bahrain,. Kuwait and even Saudi
Ar able itself."
The Saudis had become persuaded,
Akins noted, that "in the next Arab-Is-
raeli war, Israel. . . would be encour-
aged to occupy Tobuk in northern
Saudi Arabia, and Iran would be told
to occupy the Arabian littoral."
If such a situation developed, Ya.
maul warned Akins: "Iraq would be in-
volved immediately and so would he
the Soviet Union. But if Iran should
succeed in occupying part of the Ara-
bian coast., it would find only smoking
ruins, and the Western oil consumers
would face catastrophe."
Akins responded, according to Ids
secret memo, that "such a plan would
be sheer madness." Yaloani agreed
that Akins "was quite right" but add-
ed: "We think you may have � gone
mad."
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38
NEW YORK TIMES
17 SEP 1976
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Challenge to the Shuttle4
Kissinger's Tested Style of Negotiating Faces
A Very Different Range of Problems in Africa
�
Special to Tee New York Times
DAR ES SALAAM, Tanzania, Sept. 16-- Secretary said, referring to both whites I
,g4 far, Secretary of State Henry A. Kis- and blacks, is "the reluctance of anybody I
singer's mission to bring peace to south- fo admit that negotiations are possible i
em n Africa has shown only the delicacy, before they know that negotiations will;
Complexity and immensity of the job in- succeed."
vplvede His point as far as black Africa is con-
By JOHN DARNTON �
Following his talks with
President Julius K. Nyerere
. News
yesterday,. two dramatically
Analyses contrasting news conferences
. were held. In one, President
�
Nyerere, sitting on the back�
porch of.his state house, passionately ex-
plained his mixed feelings toward the
American intiative and said, in effect,
that he was less hopeful than ever.
In the other, Mr. Kissinger, braced be-
hinda lectern at the Kilimanjaro Hotel,
suggested that President Nyerere's re-
marks were the kind of thing that accom-
panies negotiations and sought to portray
himself as nothing more than a cOnduit
for relaying views between black-ruled
and white-ruled- countries.
But the fact remains that so far the
Kissinger trip has drawn a good deal of
suspicion and doube from black Africa,
some obviously for appearance sake but
much of it real.
Those who traveled with Mr. Kissinger
during his Middle East negotiations note
that gloom is a perfect curtain-raiser for
his style of diplomacy. With it, even a
relatively. minor advance�in this case,
an agreement for a constitutional confer-
ence on South-West Africa embracing all
sides�takes on the appearance of a mira-
cle and can generate momentum
Some Call Gloom Justified,
But those who have followed events
in Africa feel the gloom justified and
point out the vast differences between
the Middle East and southern Africa in
terms of issues, multiplicity of factions
and personalities.
Mr. Kissinger has said privately that
President Nyerere, whom he greatly re-
spects, is not "another Sadat." The impli-
cation is that unlike the Egyptian Presi-
dent, whom Mr. Kissinger has praised for
courage in negotiating with, the Israelis
despite Arab criticism, there is no African
leader willing to run the risk of appearing
moderate on the question of "liberation."
� "The basic underlying obstacle," the
WASHINGTON POST
0 SEP '075
cerned, is not quite valid. The African
leaders could retort that long before Mr.
Kissinger entered the scene, at the Victo-
ria Falls conference last year, they tried
negotiating for majority rule with the
Rhodesian Prime Minister, Ian D. Smith,
using Prime Minister John Vorster of
South Africa as an intermediary. The fact
that the venture failed�because Mr.
..Vorster was reluctant to apply sufficient
pressure on Mr. Smith, according to the
Africans�has left a sense of pessimism
and even betrayal.
�The repuations of moderates, such as
.President Kenneth D. Kanda of Zambia,
suffered in the growing nationalist fervor
of Organization of African Community
gatherings, and they have changed from
doves to hawks.
In the Middle East, Mr. Kissinger
worked for a peace settlement -after the
fighting had stopped. In southern Africa,
the fighting is continuing and, indeed,
growing.
There is a constituency � among the
blacks that says the fighting should go
on. It stems from the conviction that the
military advantage has swung to the
blacks and that negotiations undertaken
later, when territory is actually won, are,
bound to be more advantageous. That
conviction is running especially strong
now that the rainy season, which will
shift the tactical advantage to the guerril-
las, is about to begin in Rhodesia. To
negotiate, some feel, wauld be seen as
a sign of weakness.
There is also an element of pride and
a sentiment for winning the war. Of all
the African nations that have won inde-
pendence, only two, Algeria and Guinea-
Bissau, can honestly sax they have de-
feated colonial forces on the battlefield.
The slogan of the Zimbabwe People's
Army, the main fighting force of the Rho-
desian blacks, is We are our own libera-
tors."
Mr. Kissinger has stressed that during
his visits in April, every African head
of � state urged .11im to meet. with Prime
Soviet Union, Gabon's Boutgo Blast
U.S. Role in Easing Afyiean Tension
PrOrrrNeWA Dispatches
�
The SCIViCi� Union yest erday accused U.S. Seere.
lacy of Slata I ienry A. Kissinger of using shuttle
negotiations between black and white African lead.
cia to Prop lip racist governments and protest Amer-
ican investments,
ostentatious (fisinterestcdnes of the U.S.A.
is. nothing else but fear of a chain reaction which
was started by the collapse of Portuguese eidonial
ism and has flow spread to othe.r natu of the conti-
Minister VOrster. But in the 'interim, the
riots and killings have occurt ed in South
.Africa, and they have made it difficult
. for African Presidents to explain how
. they can countenance conversations with
a man their own newspapers decry as
a butcher of black children. -
Mr. Kissinger is new to Africa, and
some would say he has yet to acquire
the necessary feel for the politics and
special sensibilities. Days before his arri-
val here he caused a flap because press
reports said that he had been "invited"
.instead of "welcomed"�a distinction
promptly corrected by the image-con-
scious Tanzanians.
Three Conflicts Involved
The African preSidents say they fear
that the United States Is acting out of
self-interest, to contain Soviet influence,
rather than out of a sincere commitment
to the concept of majority rule. If this
is the � case, they say, then America will
drift into an alliance with South Africa,
which claims to be fighting communism,
if the negotiations fail.
But there is also a strong. moral tone
to c�their position. They say they want
someone on their side because it is right,
and not because of fear of another super-
power. The level of idealism clashes
somewhat with Mr. Kissinger's brand of
realpolitik. �
In the Middle East, the Secretary of
State could identify the conflict and the
parties involved. In southern Africa, there
is not one conflict but three�over Rhode-
sia, over South-West Africa and potential-
ly over South Africa. In the case of Rhode-
sia, tile nationalist factions are so splin-
tered,that it would be impossible to know,
whom .to invite to the conference table.
� While.the nationalist leaders are totally
dependent upon the "front African
presidents to wage their struggle, the
presidents listen to ,their opinions. And
each of the presidents�except Joshua
Nkomo, the moderate who engaged in
talks with. Mr.. Smith six .months ago�is
snspicious about Mr. Kissinger.
Most suspicious of all is Robert Mugabe,
the Rhodesian who is emerging as the
most popular politician among the guer-
rillas. Significantly, Mr. Mugabe has
voiced reservations about a key provision
of the Kissinger plan, financial guaran-
tees for whites in Rhodesia under a black
government. "Who will -pay blacks for
all their years of being exploited by the
whites?". he said in an interview here last
week.
nent." Tass, the Soviet news agency, said.'
In Paris, President Omar Bongo of Gallon dis
missed Kissinger's weekend talks with South Afri-
can Prime Minister John Vorster as "nonsense, a
waste oflime."
"Vorstee will not. change his policy. He is a racist
through and through. Since no kind of dialogue can
succeed with South Africa, we will take no arms
and do as we did. in Angola," Bongo said yesterday
when he arrived in the French capital .for a short.
private N. 0.1t
Bongo said he wilt meet French President Vairry
Giscard d"i�:sfaing before flying to Mexico Saturday
for an utfiHal visit,
7,0
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l WASHINGTON POST
!OSED 1975
Southern
oress
By Murrey Marder
Washington Post Staff Writer
Deep distrust of Secretary of State
Henry A. Kissinger's African shuttle
diplomacy was expressed 'yesterday by
black representatives of the Rhode-
sian and Namibian (Southwest Africa)
liberation movements.
A conference of African specialists,
held in the Senate Caucus Room; re-
verberated with suspicion that the ul-
terior motive of Kissinger and the
Ford administration is to protect
white interests and American invest-
ments in southern Africa.
Kissinger's attempt to launch new
negotiations for peaceful settlement
of the guerrilla warfare in Rhodesia
and Namibia was assailed as out-of-
date, ill-advised, a serious subversion
of African aspirations and even a
strategy of racism.
Warfare alone, even if protracted
warfare, is the only solution now for
'Rhodesia, liberation spokesmen said.
The criticisms graphically illustrate
the obstacles confronting Kissinger's
new round of African diplomacy,
which the State Department is ex-
pected to confirm officially today.
Kissinger is planning a press con-
ference Saturday to explain his new
venture, scheduled to be launched
Monday and starting in black Africa.
Sen. Dick Clark (D-Iowa), a co-spon-
sor with Rep. �Charles C. Diggs Jr. (D--
Mich.) of the African panel discussion
yesterday, told the group at a luncheon
in the Senate Office Building that "I
think the chances are one in 25, or
�one in 30," that Kissinger's diplomatic
mission will succeed.
, "But I think it is worth making the
effort," Clark said.
However, while concentrating on
the racial struggle in Rhodesia and
Namibia, Clark said, "I hope we never
forget that the most repressive regime
in southern Africa is the regime in
South Africa."
The Senate Foreign Relations Sub-
committee on Africa, which Clark
heads, is conducting intensive hear:
lags on South Africa. In South Africa,
Clark said, "total U.S. investment is
estimated at greater than $1.7 billion,"
representing "40 per cent of the total
U.S. investment in Africa."
Several hundred spectators at--
tended the Caucus Room discussion,
which was sponsored by the Fund for
New Priorities in America and the
Women's .Division of the United Meth-
odist Church.
To the disappointment: of some of
the white sperialists on Africa, the lib-
eration spokestmni Inc Rhodesia re-
LA/trust ossm
fused to consider any alternative to
expanding guerrilla war.
Callistus Ndlovu, representing the
relatively more moderate wing of the
Zimbabwe (Rhodesian) African Na-
tional Council, led by Joshua Nkomo,
who tried to negotiate with Rhodesian
Prime Minister Ian D. Smith, said:
"We do not see how the talks can be
Presumed ... We therefore believe that
any attempt to resume these talks is
bound to fail."
Eddison Zvobgo, a representative of
the more militant wing of the Rhode-
sian liberation movement, led by
Bishop Abel Muzorewa, said that
"every time the U.S. raises the ques-
tion of negotiations" it is because a
liberation struggle is "about to tri-
umph" somewhere in the world.
"The conference stage is over,"
Zvobgo said. "Negotiations are being
carried out where they belong�on the
battlefield. We should resist any Kis-
singer seduction."
,One white panelist, Alex Boraine,
from Harvard University's Center for
International Affairs, a former mem-
ber of the South African Parliament
for the Progressive Reform Party,
asked the liberation spokesmen if
they saw no course "complementary
to the armed struggle." He asked , if
there is no way to reduce "the length
of the struggle" in Rhodesia, and the
casualties.
Only "by politicizing our people,"
and "by rallying as many interna-
tional forces as possible," replied El-
ton Razemba, another member of the
Bishop Muzorewa faction of the Afri-
can National Council. "Destruction
will be there," he said. "What is war
about? Zimbabwe will be a better soci-
ety" in the end.
Zvobgo, his colleague, interjected:
"The only way of shortening the
[Rhodesian] war or limiting the num-
ber of people killed or injured is to
get the war over as quickly as possi-
ble. It is a kind of 'quick kill' theory,
to put it bluntly."
The Rhodesian liberation spokes-
men insisted that what is going on in
Rhodesia in the conflict between
about 270,000 whites and about 6 mil-
lion blacks is not a racial. war. "We
are not ' just fighting to replace a
white government with black faces,"
Ndlovu said. "We are fighting to bring
about fundamental change."
American-British plans to organize
an international guarantee fund of up
to $1.5 billion to $2 billion to compen-
sate Rhodesia's white settlers for
their property and other assets, said
Ndlovu, represents "guarantees of
40
em
privilege" which the blacks will nere?
tolerate.
This idea "is predicated on the no-
tion that it is impossible for blacks
and whites to live together peace-
fully," he said, and Zvobgo charged,
"This really is racism."
However,, Nigeria's, ambassador to
the United Nations, Leslie 0. Harri-
man, while criticizing much of Kis-
singer's strategy, said, "I believe that
the option of buying off the whites is
realistic."
Harriman said afterward, "We have
done it in our own country [Nigeria]
for independence." But he also said
that, *basically, "the military struggle
is the only option left" for Rhodesian
independence.
Kissinger's diplomacy for Namibia
equally "is bound to fail," said O.T.
Emvula, deputy chief of the South
West Africa People's Organization
(SWAPO) mission to the United Na-
tions.
He labeled Kissinger's approach to
Namibia "a serious subversion" of
commitments made by the United Na-
tions for the independence of that ter-
ritory.
Kissinger, Emvula said,'Aleliberate-
ly complicates" matters by meeting
with Prime Minister John Vorster of
South Africa, which rules Namibia
under a mandate that the United Na-
tions has ruled is illegal.
If there "will be a negotiation," said
Emvula, expressing a more moderate
position than his Rhodesian col-
leagues, "only South Africa and
SWAPO shall be the parties."
However, SWAPO, he said, will not
enter any talks with South Africa un-
til South Africa withdraws its military
forces from Namibia and releases all
political prisoners.
� Panelist Boraine said, "I think Vor-
ster will do a great deal to get Nami-
bia ... off his back."
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log Angtfc5 ar,i1ttC5
Thurs., Sept. 2, 1976
Co munist Forces L5row.in.ThaH
Flabby Government Bureaucracy Fails to Contain Insurgents
13Y GEORGE Ild'eARTITUR
Times Stall Writer � :
I3ANCKOK�Por eight years the
government of Thailand has entrust-
ed its campaign against Communist
insurgents to a semi-clandestine,
rank-heavy bureaucracy known as �
ISOC�the Internal Security Opera-
tions Command. �
And while ISOC grew progressive-
Ay flabbier, the insurgency grew
from a serious nuisance into a hard
jungle army of about 9,000 guerrillas
In the estimate of an American ex-
pert, the Communist organization be-
came "a .quality product, well-
trained, well-armed and largely self-
sufficient." It has, the expert said,
perhaps 85,000 active workers within
the country's political woodwork.
Given the intrigues of the Thai mih
itary structure�where some 6067
generals and admirals vie for power
and its rewards�it would be unfair
. to blame Communist growth entirely �
; on ISOC's failure. � �
The government's regular � armed ,
forces -are made up of more than
� 200,000 men, plus a paramilitary de- .
� fense� corps of. 49,000 and a border
police force of � 14,000. Their effe6-
tiveness is a matter of debate.
' � Gen. Saiyud Kerdphol, the ISOC
� commander, warned i� recntly: "My
- estimate �is: that we have about three
years to put our house. ift order. If.
� not, the eambinatioWof internal and
, external pressures will nialce�the fu-
;ture� of this country ..'very uncertain
sindeed.". : �.
An; Anierican. military adviser feels
s'the test will come sooner:
. expects 'that Within. the. next
two dry seasons4�a span of about IS
months�the insurgency will grow to
. niobile warfare and . battalion-sized
attacks against the ill-organized Thai
military and government structure.
� "They have the troops to do it
now," he said. "They could overrun
any military or police , post in the
� countryside if they wanted to."
The old-school politicians and gen-
erals who run things in Bangkok are
. 'debating what to do. There are belat-
ed plans to reorganize the army, buy-,
more planes and enlarge "pacifica-
tion" programs in the countryside.
But sources with first-hand knowl-
edge of the Thai counterguerrilla
. program say .that despite decades of .
-experience, the government fre-
quently lacks the most basic knowl- �
edge of Communist activity. .
"Intelligence -in the past has not-
been too accurate," admitted Air
Marshal Siddhi Savetsila, secretary
general of the National Security
Council. "We have good hindsight on
what has happened, but we know
nothing about what is about to ham'
pen or what the insurgents are going
to do the next day. But the Commu-
..riists know our movements."
For years of military rule, and dur-
ing the fragile period of democracy
since 1973, the rulers in Bangkok in-
directly have supported the domino
theory by contending that the Com-
munist Party of Thailand was almost
totally dependent on outside help..
Aging Prime Minister Seni Pramol,
ill-suited to control the traditional
turbulence of Thai politics, has tried
to play it both ways. Until June he
contended that foreign aid was mak-
ing the insurgency more serious than
ever. Last month he admitted before
the parliament that he had little
proof of direct aid from Peking, Han-
oi or Moscow for Thailand's Commu-
nists.
Then he basked in the "diplomatic
victory" when Foreign Minister Pi-
chai Rattakul returned from Hanoi,
where the two countries agreed to
exchange ambassadors, and reported
a pledge froni North Vietnamese Pre-
mier Pham Van Dong not to inter-
fere in Thailand's domestic affairs.
(The Chinese had. made a similar .
pledge earlier). .
� But Seni knows better. The flow of
aid from Hanoi and Peking is a fact
of life along the border.
More important is the dismal fact
that� during the decade of heavy
American involvement in Vietnam,
while the Thais largely wasted $1.7 .
billion in aid, the Cofnmunists were
building a force heeding little outside
help.
A diplomatic source cited the
government's record recently in the _
distant southern provinces, which
the least important of three major in-
surgency areas. In little-noted
clashes, insurgents there have cap- '
tured more than 300 weapons in. six,
months.
The government is planning a $600
million military budget this year. A
Western expert figured abstractly
that the Insurgents could fight for
roughly 130 years on that. amount. It
lakes only 75 cents a day to feed and
clothe a Communist soldier and keep
him in the field. In time, the insur-
gents doubtlessly will need more am-
munition and guns, but they need lit-
tle right now.
"This is not tho classic domino__
theory. This is the Communist Party
of Thailand at work," a Western clip.'
lomat said.
Still,. the outside help is available
now. There are three fairly well de-
fined supply routes through Laos
from Vietnam, organized and
manned by North Vietnamese. The
Chinese send supplies on an all-
weather road extended through Laos
to Pak I3eng, just across the northern ,
Thai borfier.
The level of this aid is indicated by
the light traffic on the Chinese road.
In one recent month, an official ado
'milled, only two Chinese trucks
came down with material for the in-
� surgents:
The Thai army has done little to �
seriously disturb the Communists in
their growing "liberated zones."
While the generals make pro-
nouncements and schedule "suppres-
sion" drives, the actual strategy has :
been one of "containment." The Corn,
Inimist bases are largely centered
� around tribal peoples in-jungles- and
mountains, but there are relatively
few government soldiers in a position
to bar the insurgents from moving
into more populated�and. ethnic
Thai�districts. . �
Government offensives are rare.
The only major battle of the year
came about by accident. It started
June 11 when the jet pilot son of a
Maj. Gen. Yuthasorn ICarsornstik
� crashed his F-5 in the rugged moun-
tains of Petchabun province, about
300 miles north of Bangkok and mid-
way between the insurgent areas in i
the north and the northeast.
An immediate operation was
launched to find the plane. A pare-
troop unit was put in, got into a hea- �
vy battle, sand called for reinforce-
ments. For the next two weeks major
fighting raged in the district, com-
plete with .jet strikes. At least 200
Communist troops, and probably
more, were killed.
Although government 'casualties
also were heavy, the few "activist"
generals . in Bangkok were elated.
ifver the battle. A lot of intelligence'
'kvas picked up and there were signs.
he insurgent forces were being bad-.
ly disrupted. In addition, this was a�
Vital area where the shadowy Cen-
;ATM Committee of the Communist
Tarty of Thailand had been meeting
4.ccently.
in the end, the missing plane was.
)ncver found and the operation was
r, ailed off despite the claim of...the' _
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commanding general that "we will
never stop fighting."
"They never would have started in
the first place if a general's son had
not been lost," said one disgusted
headquarters official in Bangkok. .
This attitude gradually has permit-
ted the, insurgents to enlarge, their
areas.
Gen. Pralong Veerapriya only this
month stirred a public storm by say-
ing that perhaps 10% of the popula-
tion was under the sympathetic sway
'of, the Communists. Western experts
consider this .a high estimate, but ev-
eryone admits that the Communists
now control large base areas with
plenty of manpower for recruitment.
They long since. have matured from.
an organization dominated at the top
by Chinese or Sino-Thai leaders, with
the foot soldiers recruited from tribal
"buffalo boys."
. Since 1952�when the first batch
of 20 trainees was sent to southern
China�about .2,500 military and po-.
Mica' cadre have been sent to China;
North Vietnam � and camps in Laos
(often supervised by Chinese), ac-
cording to intelligence sources.
An efficient command structure
� has been built, now based around 15
- "provincial" areas where the local
� commander corresponds roughly to a
regimental or .divisional commander,
with attached political officers. :
Unlike the Vietnamese Communists
who had a proclivity toward putting
things in writing (and having them
captured)/the Thai CommuniSts com-
municate less and enjoy wide local
autonomy. Although they have cap-
tured plenty of radios, they seldom
. use 'them except to monitor govern-
ment posts. ,
it is a force, Westerii experts say,
already capable of considerable ex-
pansion and growing at a relatively
slow but very steady pace.
The leaderShip�always myster:
bus�is the party's Central Commit-
tee, which stayed for years in the
safety of southern China. Lately, it:
has been coming back to Thailand,.
according to some evidence. At any
rate, the three major members of the
. Central Committee also are the three
Main regional commanders in Thai4
land.
t,
� Two of the regional commander....
� Song Nopakun in the north an
Udom Sisuwan in the northeast�are
old Bolshevik Sine-Thais who attend-
ed the Party's congress three decade'
ago. The third, in the south, is Prasit.
Thiansiri, an ethnic Thai believed to;
be much younger. The Central Com-
mittee is now believed to number
about a dozen men, several of whom:.
are ethnic Thais, and the first.:
among-equals is said to be CharoerY
Wanngam, also an ethnic Thai, who,
is in his .50s and was trained in Hanoi
and possibly China.
' THE WALL STREET JOURNAL,
1 - Tuesday, Sept. 14, 1976
New,Sig
By RoaritT L. BARTLEY
PEKING�The doors to the Great Hall
�of the People stood open, and after 15 min-
' utes waiting in the pleasant autumn sun,
the force of the air conditioning struck the
face like a cold breeze. It was a fitting sen-
sation as one came into the presence of the
remains of Mao .Tse-tung, one of the most
, historic figures of our century.
James Schlesinger, formerly U.S. Sec-
retary of Defense and now in Peking as a
guest of the Chinese government, led the
party of 12 Americans into the antecham-
ber where they signed official registers,
and into the receiving line of nine of the
fop officials of the People's Republic of
China �headed by Premier Hua Kuo-feng,
and Politburo standing committee mem-
bers Wang Hung-wen and Chang Ch'un-
.ch'ia.o.
Slowly walking 80 steps beyond the re-
ceiving line, the party spread into a re-
spectful line before the glass coffin holding
the remains. Motion pictures were taken
under shining light, and the party passed
alongside the bier, three feet from the late
chairman. Mao's face was somehow more
square, more gray, and more . wrinkled
than one would expect from photographs.
But eyes closed /111(1 expression peaceful, it
radiated a sense of serenity and power.
The procession passed behind one row
oi wreaths as the next group of foreign vis-
itors canie through the receiving line, then
down the steps past a separate line of blue
and green clad Chinese workers, and fi-
nally hack to Its proceselon of autos/rwen-
ty-tive minutes after the party had left its
hotel, the solemn :Mil dignified ceremony
Wert over. The former American Defense
gocrotary had paid his last respects to the
-Vhatever the makeup of the corn4
mittee� analysts say it is totally
Maoist. The Party radio station oper-
ating from Kunming in south China
never varies from Peking's lil, al-
though it steers clear of comment on
international Communist squabbles.
The domination of the Thai party's
_ideology by Maoists may have come ,
as a slight shock to Hanoi in the eu-
phoria that followed the fall of Sal-
gon in April, 1975. Some analysts feel
that Hanoi's leaders attempted at
that time to enlarge their influence
in the party.
"The old party hands in Thailand
are not going to let the Vietnamese
run their 'revolution' for them," said
a European diplomat whose Asian
experience dates back many years.
"Vietnam gave them a tremendous
lift but the CPT has been building to-
ward the same goal for.years. They
are following good Maoist principles
in preparing to encircle the cities
from the countryside, and that con-
tinues to be their strategy."
Another Western expert feels that
the Thai party will alter the strategy
somewhat to take advantage of the
political weaknesses in Bangkok.
"What they are after here is a col-
lapse from within," he said. 'Those
guerrillas are not going to come
marching into Bangkok like the
North Vietnamese marched into Sai-
gon. The way they figure it, they
won't have to."
*ficance to .a China
_
leader and saint of the People's Republic
and the Chinese Communist Party,
Mr. Schlesinger, and for that matter the
other 11 Americans present, had certainly
not come to China with the idea of passing
by Mao's .bier, but for a spectacular 5,000-
mile tour of the nation's most remote and
fabled regions. Upon the chairman's death
the trip was cancelled. The wreath-laying
was something of a symbolic substitute, for
clearly the. invitation was intended as a
great honor for Mr. Schlesinger. Now the
rest of the trip has suddenly been rein-
stated as well, an intriguing commentary
on the post-Mao regime and Chinese priori-
ties in foreign policy.
An 'Exceptional Regard'
Obviously the Chinese government has
what one of its spokesmen calls "excep-
tional regard" for Mr. Schlesinger., who
since his dismissal as Defense Secretary
by President Ford has been at the Johns
Hopkins University Washington Center of
Foreign Policy Pesearch. During the
mourning period, when, Peking's Museums
were officially closed, he and his party
were escorted to the Great Wall, the Ming
tombs am! the fantastie Summer Palace,
Members of his party were told that the
original invitation for the visit came at the
personal direction of Mat), and that the
dying chairman knew Mr. Schlesinger was
In Peking.
The trip's itinerary was from the first
the Moat. SpeetttcUlar ever accorded a for-
eign visitor. Mr. iiehlesinger and those of
party who have iniastsi the Chinese
health exams for a 12,a00-foot idtitude will
visit th'e Dahl! 1.,:t11)1CS ottl capital of 1,11icla
In TibtA, lifter pending the balance of the
mourning Willa quietly in China's scenic
4.2
rip
Jewel of Kueilin. They will also visit the
Central Asian region of Sinkiang, another
fabled land which also has a sensitive bor-
der with the Soviet Union, and the almost
as remote Inner Mongolia. Any one of
these stops might be the highlight of a nor-
mal China tour.
Why should the People's Republic of
China pay such attention to a former offi-
Mr.' Schlesinger had cer-
tainly not come to China
with the idea .of passing 4
Mao's bier. Now the rest of
his trip ,has Suddenly been
reinstated, an 14 itriguing
commentary on the post-
Mao regime and Chinese
pr-
orities in foreign policy.
�
dal who is now an academic? It is true
that China did entertain former President
Nixon and former Walsh Prinne Minister
Edward He with' high lienors after they
left office. But when pressed for a reason
for the "exceptional regard" for Mr.
Schlesinger, an official says, "His views�
it is no secret.''
hi other words, in being solicitous to
Mr. Schlesinger, the Chinese are aupport-
Mg the It policies Is,, ittiVOcilled as
Defense decretary,. and ltt,phIclLty 1rit1OZ-
ing the policies oi the administration that
diaanissed Calls tor t-h0 U.S, to be
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more' stalwart in opposing the RUssians
� have been a' standard theme of Chinese di-
plomacy for some time now. Their propa-
,. geode. refers to new Munichs," particu-
" !arty applied to the Helsinki agreement.
, One China-watcher back in the United
States viewed the thete:inmending Schlesin-
ger trip as an attempt to "inject anti-de-
tente, anti-Soviet themes into the American
political campaign." The trip had in fact
been originally scheduled for June, but Mr.:
' Schlesinger postponed it until after the Re-
publican Convention to minimize the impli-
cations for domestic politics. The same
. China-watcher remarks that since 1974 the
Chinese have been trying to build up Mr.
Schlesinger at the expense of Secretary of
State. Henry Kissinger, and in.: the last*
e three or four months have started to erne- .
� cize Secretary Kissinger by name in their
press outlets in Hong Kong.
- The trip will do little to dampen that
particular tendency. Those who listened to'
the toasts at the going-away party for non-
journalists held at the Chinese liaison of-
fice in Washington report that Chief of Of-
flee Huang Chen stressed that the invita-
tion for Mr. Schlesinger to visit China had
been first extended two years ago, while he
was still Defense Secretary. Mr. Schlesin-
ger is reported to have replied that he
never received the invitation, apparently
because there were "filters within the U.S.
government."
The Chinese Dilemma .
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The Chinese expectations' of an ariti-Scie
viet posture from Mr. Schlesinger were not
disappointed, for he expressed the theme
in such events as the public toast at a ban-'
quet with Foreign Minister Chian Kuan-
hua, with whem he held five hours of pri-
vate conversations prior to Mao's death.
But at other points, the ex,:11;tiges caught
the dilemma of Chinese relations with the
U.S.
In particular, there was an exchange
with Chen Shien-ta, political commissioner
of the Chinese army's Third Garrison Divi-
sion. visited bv, the group. Mr. Olen gave a
long history of the division that included
the elimination of 10,000 "enemy troops"
while fighting "American imperialism" in
Korea. Mr. Schlesinger replied that the ref-
erence to Korea "strained the historical
record and the rules of hospitality."
Other American representatives visiting
Chinese military units have suffered simi-
lar and even harsher lectures about Korea
without responding. The problem for the
Chinese is that an American who takes a
tough line with the Russians is not likely to
take a soft line with China's own claims. In
choosing which Americans to encourage,
the People's Republic has to sort out its
priorities. And one thing the Schlesinget
visit suggests is that it has sorted'them out
pretty well.
. .
By now the visit, and particuhu.;y its
reinstatement after Mao's death, may have
taken on. a new .significance. Even before
WASHINGTON POST
8 SEP 1G:3
Rowland. Evans and Robert Novak
the chairman's death, the.nation WEIS buf-
feted by the passing of Premier Chou En-
lid. It has also suffered major earthquakes
in three regions, and a huge meteor fell in
a fourth �regarded in Chinese superstition
as marking the loss of "the mandate of
heaven" and the passing of a dynasty.
There have been indications, including a
heavy emphasis on law and order in the
Chinese press, of a decline in social disci-
pline.
In these circumstances, the elaborate'
trip for Mr. Schlesinger can be seen as a
sign ,of continuity. It suggests business as
usual. The decision to reinstate Mr. Schles-
inger's trip, at a time when foreign digni-
taries are explicitly not invited to China,
would seem rather nicely to demonstrate
that someone in the hierarchy of the
People's Republic has the power and will
- to make decisions that are, if not exactly
bold, at least unconventional.
And of course, if the trip's reinstate-
ment suggests there will be a continuity of
the regime after Mao, it also suggests con-
tinuity in its implicit foreign policy priori� -
ties. So it is perhaps well to remember that
Mr. Schlesinger was invited to China to
make the point that what Peking wants
most from the U.S. is a military balance
against the Soviet Union.
Me. Bartley is editor of .thc Journal's
editorial page.
e Korean incident: An Orchestrated
Contrary to hints from the State De-
partment that Moscow and Peking se-
cretly helped avert a new Korean war,
non-political government experts be-
lieve the recent crisis was a ploy or-
chestrated by North Korea with limited
. political goals in mind.
There is no hard intelligence of any
Intervention by either the Soviet Union
Or Communist China that prompted the
North Korean expressions of regrets
for the murder, of two U.S. army offi-
cers. Rather, there is a strong feeling
among Pyongyang-watchets here that
North Korean dictator Kim Il Sung
never wanted the provocation of Aug.
18 to escalate into warfare but intended
it for political effects, both in Korea
and the U.S. �
Thus, instead of triumphantly dem-
onstrating the value of detente, the
events in Korea were part of continued
Communist pressure on one of the
world's most dangerous flashpoints.
The reaction on Capitol Hill, conthined
with the overall political climate here,
should encourage North Korea to keep
up that pressure.
The most obvious goal of the Aug. 18
Incident was to draw attention to Korea
at the recently completed non-aligned
nations confercuee in Colombo, Sri
Lanka, and the forthcoming United Na-
tions General Assembly session. For the
longer range, however, K iat's targets
were political opinion, at home and
among his enemies.
Troubled by grave economic prob-
lems in North Km-ca, Kiln is believed
by experts to have fomented a criais to
firm up national morale.
At age 04, the Korean despot is in
questionable health, troubled by a vlst-
ble growth on his neck which is getting
alarmingly large. The designation of
his eldest son, 36-year-old Chong Il
Sung, as heir apparent has not proved
popular with the party apparatus; the
succession is now in doubt. According-
ly, the time-tested device for diverting .
attention from domestic discord is to
generate a unifying foreign threat.
In the hermit state of North Korea,
there is no quick way to determine
whether Kim's bloody ploy fulfilled its
domestic goals. It is clear, however,
that it largely achieved its foreign pur-
pose: to raise new doubts among Ameri-
cans about their seemingly endless Ko-
rean commitment.
Beneath public expressions of out-
rage over Pyongyang's latest atrocity
were private complaints on Capitol Hill
that American blood was too precious
to spill for Park Chung Bee's authori-
tarian South Korean regime. Indeed,
events following the Aug. 18 incident
Indicate development of an anti-South
Korea congressional bloc on the model
of the old anti-South Vietnam )loc.
Just as the House international af-
fairs committee was about to -adopt a
resolution condemning North Korean
actions, Rep. Don Fraser of Minnesota
proposed an additional paragraph con-
demning South Korea's sentencing of
political prisoners. Amazingly, the com-
mittee adopted it. Fraser, who has be-
come the scourge of Seoul, on Sept. 1
won committee approval to subpoena
South Korean diplomats and their doc-
uments.
That same day this question was
raised by Rep. Robert Drinan of Massa-
chusetts in a House floor statement at.
the sentencing: "Should the
United States that gives massive eco-
nomic and military assistance to South
Ploy?
Korea confess that it has no sanction
for this type of indefensible cot duct?"
While the Erasers and Drinans propose
ending all aid as a sanction, Jimmy
Carter talks of a staged withdrawal of
all US. ground forces from Korea
(though lately he has promised to first
consult Japan).
Enjoying this favorable political cli-
mate, Pyongyang-watchers believe Kim
.never had any intention of escalating
the murder of the Americans into a
war for the entire peninsula. Besides,
his notions of attempting a lightning
seizure of Seoul last year following the
fall of Saigon were vetoed by both
Cornmunist superpowers.
� Nevertheless, some close students of
the Korean scene deduce that Kim, au-
thor of so much bloody mischief in East
Asia for a generation, would never is-
sue his first apology for anything with-
out pressure from the Russians or
Chinese. That deduction, however, is
not backed up by facts. Officials at the
highest level say there is simply no in-
telligence of any such intervention.
In his declining. years, Kim Il Sung
may have moved from sheer brute
force to a mixture of brute force and
political maneuver. Experts here be-
lieve his immediate goal; will be to en-
courage sentiment, ieside the U.S. ao ye-
eating a Korean pullout while seeking
bilateral U.S.-North fantasia neetala-
tions, leaviog out the South Kok
That may prove more difficult for U.S.
politicians to refast than a naked mili-
tary threat.
43 cilF nlFntenpria:athc,
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THE ECONOMIST AUGUST 28, r978
Left right right right...
.Bad days for Latin American radicals.
.Every to CO 20 years the continent's
left wing attempts to find a new way
of �bridging the extremities of wealth
and poverty that bedevil most Latin
American countries.. In the 194os and
19505 democratically elected dema-
gogues had their day in. several of
the larger states: , most of . them
disappeared .. Juicier the. treads of
right-wing tanks. .In the 196os insur-
� rectionary guerrilla armies attempted
to imitate Mr Fidel Castro's Victory in
Cuba; but efforts to export Cuba's
.-revolution came to nothing and the
guerrillas, or many of them, were
.hunted down by the military
governments they had helped to pro-
voke into seizing power. Next came
left-wing military governments; but
, these too are sputtering out. The left
is ..fading�and so, too, is democracy.
In Peru, General Velasco Alvarado,
who followed the radical-soldier tradi-
tion of Ataturk and Nasser, was
dropped last year, and his left-wing
prime minister, General Jorge Fer-
nandez Maldonado, was sacked last
*month. The more timidly reformist
president of Ecuador, General Rod-
riguez Lara, lost his job in January.
The only avowed soldier-radicals still
around are the flamboyant' ruler of
Panama, General Omar Torrijos, and
a clique of quarrelling colonels in Hon-
duras led by Colonel Melgar Castro.
Never upset a landowner
But General Tnrrijos's left-wing bark
has always been fiercer than his bite.
Panama's liberal banking laws, for
example, have made it a haven for
'foreign capital. And land reform,
touted . by the general as his main
achievement, has been moving along
, on a tiny annual budget of kim. The.
Honduran government took office last
� year in the wake of charges that the
previous president had been bribed by
an American banana company. It is
�already cutting back on its land re-
form programme for fear of upsetting
� the nearly independent power of the
country's big landowners. The left-
wing head of the country's agrarian
reform institute was fired in October,
'and the it seems to have lost control
of large areas where scores of people
have beer) killed in 'clashes between
peasants and landowners. �
Neither in Peru nor in Ecuador was
the reform experiment a complete
failure. About 20M acres of land in
Peru were expropriated, and a start was
made towards a crude distribution of
wealth through profit-sharing schemes.
The Peruvians also nationalised their
fisheries, banks, mining and oil indus-
.tries, although some of these are now
being given back to private industry.
They were careful not to frighten
away foreign investment, which stayed
at a high level until the economy
began to get into trouble last year.
:But the expectations aroused by the
reforms in Peru -were largely disap-
pointed. Government � overspending
pushed inflation � up to an annual rate
of ao%, provoking riots 'and strikes.
The agencies supervising the -reform
programmes were all too often corrupt
and inefficient. And only about a third
of Peru's people were actually affected
by the changes. Three quarters of the
government's budget this year con-
tinues to flow into metropolitan Lima,
which contains only a fifth of the
cbuntry's population. More than tm
peasants�most of them the mountain
Indians whose plight had fired General
Velasco's revolutionary ardour when
he did a tour of duty away from Lima
as a young man�remain landless.
Ecuador's 'more timid reforms hardly
got off the ground. They were largely
financed by the country's oil revenues,
which are not very big. Nearly half the
country's population is still unem;
ployed or underemployed; half the
land is still owned by 2%; of the people.
Peru's and Ecuador's new rulers
seem to have accepted the blunt fact
that it is hard to have a social revolu-
tion without making money first. They
are also beginning to talk about hand-
ing power back to the civilians.
Ecuador's leader, Admiral Poveda, has
promised to hold elections by t 977.
President Morales Bermudez of Peru
has taken civilians into his cabinet, and
was starting to ease restrictions on the
press until he was checked by a bout
of rioting in July. In Honduras, the
,government says it will hand over
power by 1979.
The South American map would
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be enlivened by some patches of demo-
cratic colour. Buried in the political
graveyard are long-established Latin
American democracies such as Chile
and Uruguay, as well as the countries
that have ricocheted between demo-
cratic and authoritarian rule, such
as Argentina and Bolivia. The drive
by left-wing guerrillas helped to
impel South America's lurch towards
.right-wing army rulers. Few democratic
governments could enforce the authori-
tarianism needed tostampout guerrillas.
Economic instability, however, was
the prime cause of Latin America's
drift to dictatorship. Radical govern-
ments followed each other to the
scaffold, as programmes multiplying
workers' wages, nationalising indus-
tries and expandinpublic spending
generated massive -rates of inflation.
Brazil started the ball rolling after the
short and disastrous presidency of Joao
Goulart in the earlyi196os. His efforts
sent inflation up to t00% and brought
in the generals in 1964. In Bolivia the
radical military government of General'
.Torres sank into economic Chaos and.
was overthrown by 'the ,right-wing
General Banzer in 1971... In Uruguay,
government corruption and overspend-
ing brought in the army in 1973. Sal-
vador Allende's Marxist government in
Chile hit the inflation jackpot. When
the rate reached about i000% in
1973, General- Pinochet launched his
military coup. Chile's inflation records
were reached, and possibly beaten, this
year in Argentina when the soldiers
stepped in to save the country from
near-anarchy. � . �
In the past', a lurch towards auth-
oritarian government in South America
Just one big barracks
The switch to army rule
since 1964
DOMINICAN
errveuc
4 lioNamAs
"S:71 CC.)STA iticA
V.g. ,c:.... %VENEZUELA
jL�V Itsv. COL0f..111tiA
r S., .
co. leo .;d1.
t -
ECUADOpiptipiltillilkl 1 1 11 13,11111AI illik i!il
i'''17 .::%11 1111: ' I I ll 11!'Vr11171,
(.1 C.2.c.,?. Nr.
�,.. c
�' yll' .'l 11IVIIJ1 1
Countries that:
I.', AAC11
i'l'in Pill :trillg il IIIill 1111111
have been under pi lilli ! pa,, v; jAy
army rule since �IL
64
I
�I . rilli I
1964 CHILE
ran have been taken lif�
I uc
UAY
over by the army ii UR
since 1964 It �
it
L____I have alternated Ili
,l
since 1964
between democratic it
and army government rt! it. ARGENTINA
PP
2E] aro under or
party rule
17e3 are democratic
rt.
was followed by a swing back to demo-
cracy as soldiers found that they were
no better able to cope with social and
economic problems than the civilians
were. Not this time. In Brazil and
Chile, both countries where the army
had previously intervened only to
restore order and then bowed out, the
generals have stayed put.
Professionals have their use
Western-style democracy is out of
fashion. Instead the military rulers, of
Brazil in particular, have been taking
their cue from Mexico, Latin America's
most successful one-party state. The
Mexican Institutional Revolutionary
party has used professionals to run its
economy�the most recent of whom,
the finance minister, Mr Lopez Portillo,
takes over as president in December.
� The soldiers running Brazil, Chile,
Argentina, Bolivia and Uruguay
handed the job of economic manage-
ment to civilians, all of whom were
largely foreign-educated and all of
whom pursue broadly similar policies.
Most of Brazil's successive economic
managers spent long periods in the
United States. Jos�artinez de Hoz,
Argentina's finance minister, went to
Eton and Harvard. Bolivia's finance
minister, Carlos Calvo, was educated in
Britain. Uruguay's finance minister,
Vegh Villega, went to Harvard.
The old school tie has not done
badly. It helps, naturally, to have
soldiers in the background to shoot
anyone who strikes against wages
policies or price rises. The most recent
.example of tough confrontation was in
Bolivia where the regime spent the
past two months cracking the demands
of strikers sitting it out in the tin mines.
At least four miners and several sol-
diers were killed and the government
cut off electricity and water supplies
to some of the men underground.
But the economists have not lived
by the gun alone. The Brazilians pion-
eered an imaginative mix of. economic
policies, including the encouragement
of large-scale foreign investment, in-
dexation of prices, wages and savings
in line with inflation, big state invest-
ments, and a crawling-peg exchange
rate. Bolivia's orthodox monetarist
policies�and its self-sufficiency in oil
�have brought inflation down to about
15% this year. Monetarist policies have
taken longer to work in Chile, but in-
flation has fallen fast over the past six
months. Uruguay's inflation rate has
fallen slowly to about 50% a year.
The most dramatic turnabOut was
in Argentina. In June, three months
after the military coup, monthly infla-
tion had dropped from 38% to 2M%.
THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE
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Wages have been firmly clamped down.
At the same time the government has
mobilised Argentina's enormous agri-
cultural resources by raising food
prices from the unrealistic levels at
which they were pegged under the
Peronist governments: a 40% increase
in the prices paid to producers for
grain led to an extra 5m acres of wheat
being planted in July.
This kind of economic management
marks the newer military governments
out from die older, more static and
impoverished dictatorships. General
Stroessner has ruled Paraguay as a
personal fiefdom for 22 almost growth-
free years; the Somoza dynasty has run
Nicaragua, on and off, for 40 years.
In other respects the soldiers, old or
new, use many of the same methods.
The map, a necessarily sketchy guess at
political prisoners, gives one very
rough idea of the levels of repression
exercised by the different militan;
governments. And political prisoners
are only part of the picture of dis-
appearances, torture and killings in
many Latin American countries.
Nothing succeeds like success
Many of the economic ministers and
officials claim that economic viability
will pave the way for a return of the
soldiers to the barracks. On the con-
trary. Their very success seems to
strengthen the army's resolve to stay
on in office. Even the most moderate
of Argentina's present soldier-rulers say
that the army will have to Stay in office
indefinitely. The half-hearted promises
of Brazil's successive presidents over
the past 14 years to restore democracy
have never been kept. In Chile,
General Pinochet's sole concession to
the scattered forces of the democracy
that was once the pride of Latin
America has been to consider allowing
local elections. The army's grip on
Uruguay seems, after the dismissal of
its civilian front man in June, to be
tightening. Bolivia's military govern-
ment has set a paper deadline for a
return to civilian rule by ig80. Nobody
believes it.
. Nor is there much evidence that the
generals and the economists working
for them are trying to resolve the
social problems that lie at the heart of
Latin American political. instability.
Under. President Geisel, thazil has in-
creased its social budget, but up to
40% of Brazilians remain outside the.
moneyed economy. Economic recovery
in Uruwitay, Bolivia and Chile has been
largely achieved by depressing real
wages and balancing budgets; low rates
of taxation leave little room for social
spending, Mr Carlos Calvo says that
MEXICO
/ �
GUATEMALA\
*VENEZUELA
EL SALVADOR
NICARAGUA
1 in 5000
PANAMA
Who locks up how many
Political prisoners as proportion
\S :CUBA of population
.04,41:li.n 1800
_ DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
HONDURAS (numbers unknown)
COSTA RICA*
/ COLOMBIA
ECUADOR
PERU.
CHILE.477.7
tin 200W
One in: ,
mg less than 1000
population
Ea 1000-2000
F71 2000-10,000
1--1 10,000- 100,000
LJ 100,000 -500,000
� ,/'
URUGUAY
I in 600
%ARGENTINA
; in 1200
A
* No known political
prisoners
Main source:
Amnesty International
now that Bolivia's economic house is
in order, " we will place a high pri-
ority on social spending ". But manana
seldom comes.
Political soldiers tend atter a period
in government to become politicians.
In Brazil the political arguments that
stopped when the generals came in
have simply surfaced again in the
army. So too have other civilian habits,
including corruption. Argentina's mod-
erate president, General Videla, is
fighting for control against his more
extreme colleagues who encourage a
policy of indiscriminate repression.
Neither military discipline nor econ-
omic recovery is helped by the fact that
several Argentine industries are owned
by the armed forces. Divisions within
the Chilean junta led to the dismissal
in January of the relatively moderate
chief of staff, General Lopez Arellano.
Bolivia has been plagued by the
attempted palace coups of left-wing
army factions.
Most Latin American countries
would be better off if their armies
could be put back behind a glass win-
dow, only to be broken in case of. fire.
Too often democratic experiments have
been stunted because they grew in the
shadow of armies who Ated as alter-
native governments instead of the final
guarantors of order and democracy.
The three exceptions that disprove the
rule that Latin Americans are inher-
ently incapable of democracy are Vene-
zuela, Colombia and Costa Rica. And
perhaps it is tiny Costa Rica that has
the safest formula for a centre course
to democratic survival. It disbanded
its army in 1948.
MONITOR Thursday, September 9, 1976
Chu
Th uch
rch state ties fry
T Latin Amer ca
By James Nelson Goodsell
Latin America correspondent of
The Christian Scitlice Monitor
The Boman Catholic Church is increasingly
at (kids with a number of pivcroment:.; in Latin
America. The signs are many:
45 0 When three Chilean Catholic bishops, re.
..SC,IraiSA7iii�gaTi.,.
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tin ning from a church conference in Ecuador
last month, were hostilely greeted by crowds
� at Santiago's Pudahuel Airport, that country's
Catholic hierarchy accused the government of
authoring the violent demonstration. It also ex-
communicated four government officials.
* Earlier in August at the session in the
Ecuadorian city of Riobamba, 37 churchmen
from around Latin America were arrested, de-
tained overnight; and then expelled from the
country for taking part in what the government
termed "a subversive plot." Ecuador's church
hierarchy promptly accused the government of
illegally interfering in church nctivities.
o Argentina in recent months has been ar-
resting churchmen and young seminarians, in-
cluding one United States priest, on charges of
subversion and of possessing Marxist-Leninist
literature. The U.S. clergyman was released,
but the fate of 11 others is unknown and the
Argentine hierarchy has issued a series of pro-
:tests.
o Meanwhile, Brazil's Dom Helder Camara,
a longtime opponent of the Brazilian Govern-
ment and bishop of Recife and Olinda, issued a
new criticism of governments in Latin Amer-
ica, saying they "no longer serve the people."
Behind these and other developments is a
sharp ideological dispute that has led to the
most serious deterioration in churchlstate rela-
tions in years.
Not since Cuban Prime Minister Fidel Cas-
tro tangled with that country's Roman Catholic
hierarchy has there ,been such a Church-state
clash.
In that struggle, which eventually resulted in
a standoff, the church took a basically conser-
vative approach, Dr. Castro a much more lib-
eral or radical one.
.31-0g Migits' arms
Thurs., Sept. 2,.1976-
a
lb
n
t1
ec Teens
Middle-Class Youths
Prime Candidates for
Guerrilla Subversion
�� BY. DAVID P. BELNAP
Times Staff Writer
BUENOS AIRES�One of the most
striking aspects of the war against
subversion in Argentina is the kind
of people in the terrorist ranks.
It has become clear that the shock
troops of subversion are not the har-
dened guerrillas of the Latin Ameri-
can stereotype, but young people of
the middle class. They are youths in
'their 20s recruited by terrorist orga-
nizations while in their teens.
They come from some of the most
respected families. Among recent ex-
amples:
-----Th ron of a former army com-
mander in chief who was killed while
fighting with a band of rural guerril-
las.
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The current church-state cleavage in at least
six nations reverses the positions of church-
men and governments. It is not lost on observ-
ers also that the governments in question are
all rightist military regimes.
The Catholic Church in Argentina, _Brazil,
Chile, Ecuador, Paraguay, and Uruguay is on
the liberal side, the state on the conservative,
even reactionary side � although the dispute is
not being stated in such terms.
Part of the confrontation involves a new
militancy on the part of the churchmen who
believe they have the right, even the duty, to
speak out on national issues, particularly those
relating to human rights and political liberties.
This certainly is the case in Chile where the
Roman Catholic hierarchy is increasingly op-
posed to the hard-line, conservative tactics of
Gen. Augusto Pinochet Ugarte's military domi-
nated government.
Chile's influential Raill Cardinal Silva
Henrfiquez, the Archbishop of Santiago and
Chile's leading churchman, has frequently tan-
gled with General Pinochet. While he has tried
to keep the dispute out of _public view, their
disagreements are becoming common knowl,
edge.
Excommunication of four� Chileans, one of
them a government official, for the airport ha-
rassment of three returning bishops was a
clear sign of Cardinal -Silva Henrfiquez's atti-
tude. A statement, accompanying the ex-
communication order and issued with the Car-
dinal's approval, warned against he danger of
abuses under the military regime and of "om-
"nipotent police state" governments across
Latin America.
That also seems the preoccupation of Dom
Helder, the Brazilian bishop Who has long
chafed under the restraints placed on him by
The nephew of a .closely guard-
ed, high-ranking navy officer who
furnished access to his uncle for
young terrorist friends. They kid-
naped the officer and later killed him.
�The son of a wealthy provincial
governor, doing his compulsory
miii-
tai'y service at an air force staff
headquarters, who led a terrorist
, band that ambushed and severely
wounded the air force chief of per-
sonnel and his chauffeur.
There has been a great deal of
parental � anguish, and teen-agers
have become the subject of a spate of
I magazine articles, -newspaper series,
television documentaries and public
seminars.
All seek to learn what drives
young people to get involved with an
extremist organization of the far
Left. Neither terrorism nor its appeal
� to privileged youth is an exclusively
Argentine phenomenon. But there
; are few places where the movement
46
fellow churchmen who did not want to rock the
boat of church-state relations in Brazil. But
more and more bishops and archbishops in
Brazil are protesting repressive measures by
their country's military-dominated govern-
ment.
\ This repression, often aimed at leftists, has
meant large-scale abridegements of civil rights
in the countries with military governments.
Churchmen, meeting in Ecuador at the pas-
toral conference in Riobamba, were in fact dis-
cussing this issue � hence, the Ecuadorian
Government charge that the conferees were
engaged in subversive activities.
An Ecuadorian Government source, explain-
ing the arrests and deportations of the foreign
bishaps, said that "the clergy must abide by
the laws of the nation and to question govern-
ment actions is a crime."
This goes along with an Interior Ministry
statement in Argentina, following the arrests
in Ecuador: "When priests have been detained,
it has been for fully justified reasons."
. But churchmen, while not disagreeing with
the philosophy that they are subject to arrest,
argue that repressive military governments do
not have legitimate cause for many of their ac-
tivities.
This increasing social and political ori-
entation of the Roman Catholic :clergymen is
what arouses the ire of governments, particu-
larly military regimes, and the outlook for the
future is for increasing tension in church-state
relations. .
The reason is obvious. As archbishop
Vicente Faustino Zazpe, of Santa Fe in Ar-
gentina said recently: "we [churchmen] have
no intention of letting up on our social in-
volvement.
!3-1,as been marked by such violence.
Two groups have been operating in
Arrntina since 1970, the People's
� Revolutionary Army (called the ERP
after its initials in Spanish) and the
Montoneros, named for the bands of
"patriotic irregulars" that roamed Ar-
gentina's pampa In the mid-19th-cen-
tory.
The ERP is Marxist-Leninist, for-:
.3tally allied with the United Secreta-
riat of the Fourth international in
I Paris. The Montoneros are Peronist
renegades with Marxist inclinations.
The ERP, smaller, better organized
and originally more effective _than
the Montoneros, suffered a crippling
setback recently with the death of its
,top leaders, killed in confrontations
with the authorities. -
In fewer than eight months this
year, the death toll of political vi-
olence has topped 850.
In the search for motives, investi-
gators haVe traced the steps involved
in recruiting middle-class teen-agers.
The process generally follows a pattern like this:
�Recruiters, including some teachers and student acti-
vists at high schools and universities; attempt to set
potential .recruits against their parents, their society and
the system through ideological argument.
--Recruiters then try to separate the potential recruits
from then. background, to get them somehow away from
home. This is not easy in Argentina, where traditionally
sons and daughters live at boom until marriage, even well
into adulthood. But it can be done. Guerrilla bands are
well sul)plisd with loot from kidnapings and robberies and
can pi O\ idc housing and expense money for remits.
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�Recruits are started along the road to commitment =
through assignments to perform such tasks as handing
out leaflets on street corners and in other public places.
This is followed by hanging posters and painting slogans.
�Promising recruits are then involved in some illegal
acts�shoplifting, for example, graduating to burglary.
�Assignment to an armed assault group is the final
step. Once a recruit has taken part in a shooting incident,
he or she is considered to have passed the point of no re-
turn.
Coercion can be a factor, too. A 16-year-old high school
boy told a reporter:
"My dad switched me to a private school last year be-
cause there was Montonero indoctrination and training
ping on (after classes at the public school). If you didn't
'stay for indoctrination, you got beat up."
Why the recruiters are able to subvert youngsters is
another matter. The magazine Gente recently sponsored a
seminar on the subject, with a broad cross section of mid-
dle-class parents taking part.
The number, of theories put forth was almost equal to
the nuMber of participants, but blame was placed gener-
ally on. two factors: some aspect. of home life and too
.much leisure time and money for teen-agers.
There was no agreement on just what might be wrong
in the home: Some thought youngsters should be more
tightly controlled; others thought controls should be loos-
ened; some thought parents did not make enough effort
to understand their children; others thought parents were
trying too hard to be their childrens' "friends."
Moreover, it became clear that *while everyone was
deeply concerned and groping for answers, no single an-
swer was likely to satisfy everyone. Some typical re-
sponses:
Maria Antonieta Ingster, manager of a motion picture
distribution firm�"I think the phenomenon is caused by
'It's essential that parents know
what their children are doing.'
middle-class teen-agers having absolutely everything they ,
.want., causing them to be bored and wanting to draw at-
tention to themselves."
Enrique Wilkinson, a retired air force captain and fath-
er of four teen-agers�"I attribute the problem exclusive-
ly to the moral formation within the home, complemented .
AO. some degree, within the schools. The economic factor �
'
THE WASHINGTON POST/PARADE
5 September 1976
rimuffm El In :the "Past .
dirjama six. months a:
wave c of.avsio-
e. z
struck. Jamaica, the va-
-CittioraO. randin-, the ',car ib
..bean. fore:thousand:3r of am
. Americans. At-least'. 100
-oeople , including 17 po-�-� �
.licemen, have been mur�
dered. And in 'one ghastly
incident; a gang ..of youths
set fire to a tenethent.
'block in Kingston. As the
. tenants � fled. they were
gunned down. Whon . the
, firemen and tolice ar� �
rived,- they, ,too, were
� fired upon. At least � I ls�
'people were killed,'
while the .police' -
-killed one member
. � �
contributes, but it's not the most important." �
Beatrice Lacoste de Vercesi, a social worker�"It's es-
sential that parents know what their children are doing,
that thcy speak with them and above all listen to them.
Speaking, to them is easy; but listening to them often is
much harder."
Fernando Sabsay, an attorney and professor of law�"I
believe the fundamental psychological failure in the home
! is pretending to be excessively 'a friend' to the children.
Some fathers even accompany their sons on amorous ad-
ventures, and some psychologists say this is beneficial. I
believe it creates a great vacuum for the son; for whom
no one is occupying the place of father." � � �
I A 19-year-old woman told an interviewer that she
agrees with the point of view expressed by Sabsay.
"My father would like to be my friend," she said, "but,
being my father, he can't be a friend: He must be my
father." - �
1 Regardless of how young Argentines are recruited into
',.the guerrilla gangs, and regardless of the reasons, there is
iid question about what they do once committed. The case
/ of Ricardo Omar Snag could be typical.
Six years ago Felipe Sapag, the wealthy governor of
Neuquen. province in the Andean lakes region, told a
magazine interviewer that one of his sons, Ricardo, then
17, "is the family hippie who smiles only when he comes
to me for money."
Five years later Ricardo was serving as a conscript in a
secretarial office at air force headquarters in Buenos
Aires' having elected to do his year of compulsory service
after college.
Dec. 10, 1975, Maj. Gen. Aly L. I. Corbat, chief of air
force personnel, and his 14-year-old son entered the gen-
eral's car in front of their suburban home. The son was
going to school, the general to his office. '
Before the car could get under way it was attacked by
terrorists, approaching in a station wagon and firing sub-
machine coins. �
The chauffeur jumped from the general's car to try to
defend his charges and was struck by the station wagon,
suffering a shattered leg as well as multiple bullet
wounds. Corbat was seriously wounded. The general's son
was not injured although, according to an air force com-
munique, "the attackers threw a grenade against the gen-
eral's car in an effort to eliminate his son."
The communique identifiedRicardo Omar Sapag as "the
finger man and leader of the assault." He remains at large.
Coy. Sapag offered his resignation, which the provincial
legislature refused to accept.
of the gang, a
1.3-Year-old boy.
What's going on
Jamaica? Michael Manley,
who has been running the
government for the past
four* years, is leader of--
the Peoples National
Party. .He is a democratic
socialist. His- opponents,
who represent the Jamaican,
Labour Party, want him
out. So, too,- does the
commercial element in
Jamaica, which has always
had strong ties to Ameri�
can business and financial'
interests. Manley.. supports
Castro of Cuba, which'
makes him suspect in the
eyes of our CIA. � a. �
It is highly doubtful
that the U.S. is going to �
permit another socialist
regime to be established
in our Caribbean sphere
of influence. �
Jamaica the -word is .
widespread that-the- CIA -
is -supplying. money -for
the, purchase of armaments
that go to ManleY" s po-
litical opponents. Man-
ley' s policy is based on
redisbribution of land and
wealth, government control
of the economy, and a
restricted role for
private .enterprise. �
CasEro started. out with
the same political
tenets..
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