CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1952/03/11

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02623671
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: May 24, 2019
• Document Release Date: May 30, 2019
• Publication Date: March 11, 1952

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SEC INFORMATION
11 March 1952
Copy No. 43
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO. 1
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Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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POP CHET
SUMMARY
� FAR EAST
1. Political tension in Thailand continues (page 3).
2. Indonesian official recommends trade talks with Soviet Union (page 3).
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
3. Iranian Shah reportedly prepared to dismiss Mossadeq and seize power
(page 4).
4. Iranian Communists plan sabotage of Abadan refineries (page 5).
5. British Foreign Office studying revision of Anglo-Iraqi military treaty
(page 5).
EASTERN EUROPE
6. March plan for Bulgarian petroleum imports exceptionally large (page 6).
7. Italians in Trieste plan demonstration favoring Territory's return to
Italy (page 6).
8. French and British Ambassadors oppose pressuring Yugoslavia on
Trieste issue (page 7).
SCANDINAVIA
9. US Minister fears Icelandic political crisis (page 7).
LATIN AMERICA
10. Comment on Cuban coup (page 8).
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FAI EAST
1. Political tension in Thailand continues:
3.3(h)(2)
police Director General Phao was primarily
responsible for forcing the King of Thailand
to sign tha new constitution and thereb ca- 3.3(h)(2)
pitulate to the ruling military clique,
The American Embassy in Bangkok,/ states
that although the militarist group is "only one step away" from the ultimate
goal of complete power, competition for Phibun's office between Phao and
his chief rival, Assistant Army pommander Sarit, would create a serious
Internal conflict, possibly resulting in violence.
Comment: The Phao-Sar it r i va 1 ry ha q lnner
been a threat to Thai stability.
as a result of events in the past few days, the chances of violence between
followers of these two leaders before 12 March are "even."
In the past, compromise agreements on
Phibun as Premier have prevented the outbreak of violence between rival
political groups.
2. Indonesian official recommends trade talks with Soviet Union:
unty n a ti
The chief of Indonesia's delegation negotiating
an agreement on West New Guinea in the
Netherlands advised his government on 9 Febru-
ary to "discuss the procurement of goods from
Russia" in view of the impasse at The Hague.
y a op ng such tactics, in his opinion, could Indonesia influence the
United States or Britain to force the Netherlands to make necessary con-
cessions.
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The delegate emphasized that Indonesia must
make the New Guinea problem appear to be a dispute between the "new
nationalism of Asia" and Western Democracy as represented by the Dutch.
He further kitr,ted that Indonesia should act as an Asian power occupying
an important position in the East-West conflict and capable of establishing
political or economic relations at any time with Russia or China.
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
Iranian Shah reportedly prepared to dismiss Mossadeq and seize power:
The Shah will seize power in Iran if Prime
Minister Mossadeq refuses to rest.
Mossadeq is
"terrified" by threats of assassination from the terroristic Fedayan-i-
Islam and may resign.
Comment:
Although the Shah is opposed to Mossadeq and wishes him removed, there
is no indication that he intends to initiate drastic action to bring this about.
The Fedayan-i-Islam, which is credited with
several killings and attempted assassinations, has in the past made whole-
sale threats against Iranian Government officials. Although Mossadeq
may fear these terrorists, there is no evidence that their threats alone
would force his resignation. His past expressions of interest in resigna-
tion have been political maneuvers.
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4. Iranian Communists plan sabotage of Abadan refineries:
The Tudeh Party reportedly is planning to 3.3(h)(2)
sabotage the Abadan refineries if Iran and the
International Bank reach agreement on the oil
problem. The Chief of Iranian Intelligence has
been sent to Abadan to organize security precautions. 3.3(h)(2)
rnmrracinto
the Tudeh planned to sabotage the
refineries there if the government employed foreign technicians. Arm
units were alerted azainst Tudeh-inspired disorders at that time,
the army's anti-Tudeh measures have Seldom
3.3(h)(2)
been effective.
The present status of the International Bank
negotiations with Iran and Britain does not suggest that an agreement is
imminent.
5. British Foreign Office studying revision of Anglo-Iraqi military treaty:
The British Foreign Office is now formulating
tentative proposals for a revision of the Anglo-
Iraqi Defense Treaty in case the Iraqi Prime
Minister should feel compelled by domestic
pressure to initiate discussions on the subject. The Foreign Office is
considering modifications which would turn the two air bases now operated
by the RAF over to the Iraqis who would then invite Britain to use them.
Other suggestions are also under study.
Comment: The Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, which
provides Britain with the use of two air bases in Iraq and any necessary
facilities in time of war, expires in 1955. In 1948 the Iraqi government
which initialled a revision of this treaty was forced out of office. Since
that time the issue has been dormant except for sporadic outbreaks of
nationalist agitation, specifically following denunciation by Egypt of its
treaty with Britain.
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EASTERN EUROPE
6. March plan for Bulgarian petroleum imports exceptionally large:
More than 30,000 metric tons of petroleum
will be shipped to Bulgaria from Orbit sources
in March ancordinff to a
This total includes
ilzuu tons ot to- tz octane gasoline, 990 tons
of 95 and 100 octane gasoline, 900 tons of jet fuel, and a large number of
other specialized petroleum products.
Comment: The total planned for March is
almost double that of February, and has been surpassed only once, in
September 1951, when large quantities of tractor kerosene and diesel fuel
were shipped to Bulgaria, presumably for use in harvest operations. Only
700 tons of 95 octane fuel were shipped to Bulgaria during 1951, and ship-
ments of 100 octane gasoline have not been noted since 1950 when 3,784
tons were received.
Included in the March shipments will be ethyl
fluid, toluene, and iso-octane in quantities sufficient to boost some 1,550
tons of 70 octane gasoline to a 95 octane level. office ethylated gasoline
deteriorates more rapidly than unblended fuel, Bulgarian stock-piling
operations might possibly be indicated.
7. Italians in Trieste plan demonstration favoring Territory's return to Italy:
Pro-Italian elements in Trieste are planning
a demonstration for 20 March to mark the
fourth anniversary of the tripartite declaration
calling for a return of the entire territory to
Italy.
The American Political Adviser comments
that this action is obviously designed to commit the United States and
Britain to support of the tripartite declaration through the local Allied
Military Government's approval of the demonstration.
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Comment:
1 Premier de Gasperi is undoubtedly giving unofficial sup-
port to the proposed demonstration as a means of strengthening popular
support for his Western-oriented government in face of the forthcoming
Italian elections.
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. French and British Ambassadors oppose pressuring Yugoslavia on Trieste
Issue: 3.3(h)(2)
According to the American Charge, the French
and British Ambassadors in Belgrade are very
much opposed to the employment of economic
pressure on Yugoslavia in order to bring
about a solution of the Trieste issue. They believe that the application of
pressure woald undermine the current Western policy of buttressing
Yugoslav independence by supplying aid with no political conditions.
SCANDINAVIA
9. US Minister fears Icelandic political crisis: 3.3(h)(2)
The American Minister to Iceland reports that
party conflicts within the Conservative-Pro-
gressive coalition government over the balance
of payments situation have become so bitter
that "a serious political situation must be anticipated. " A withdrawal of
the Progressives, particular4 on the eve of Admiral McCormick's visit
to Iceland next week, would gravely prejudice current US efforts to con-
clude detailed arrangements for additional defense facilities.
The Minister strongly urges granting Iceland's
request for immediate American economic aid.
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Comment: The Progressive Party, which
has for some time been seeking an issue on which to withdraw from the
Cabinet, violently opposes the imposition of additional import restrictions to
meet the balance of payments crisis.
LATIN AMERICA
10. Comment on Cuban coup:
The almost bloodless revolt precipitated by
General Fulgencio Batista is still in progress. Batistais success cannot
be determined at this time, inasmuch as he controls all communications in
Havana. All police and military officials in the Havana area appear to on
his side.
Batista, former dictator of Cuba, and a
senator since 1948, has been a candidate for the presidency in the coming
June elections. He headed the United Action Party, which placed third
In the October 1951 party listings with less than 10 percent of the total
registered voters. Since that time, his chances for attaining the presidency
had diminished considerably, and it may have been his deteriorating position
which impelled him to strike this sudden blow.
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