PRINCETON CONSULTANTS' MEETING 23-24 JANUARY 1957

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02619592
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: August 9, 2018
• Case Number: F-2013-02252
• Publication Date: January 30, 1957

Approved for Release: 2018/07/24 CO2619592
%1�00
II
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
30 January 1957
STAFF MEMORANDUM NO. 8-57
SUBJECT: Princeton Consultants' Meeting 23-24 January 1957
The Consultants taking part for both days wee Messrs. Armstrong,
Black, Hoover, Knorr, Langer, Lincoln, Linder, Milliken, Mosely,
Reitzel, and Strayer. Participating on 23 January only-0as Young. From
ONE, Messrs. Cooley, R. J. Smith, Harris, and Billington. were present
for both days, and Admiral Schuirmann and Mr. Matthias for 24 January*
The Consultants felt that the economic factor was particularly
Important in deterydning the prospects for national Communism, and that
emphasis should be placed on the role of Yugoslavia and China in the
current Soviet-Satllite crisis and on the broadened range of alternative
possibilities in the present situation.
The.Consultents felt the Soviet position was strong and would
almost certainly gr.: rw stronger in the Middle East, and that Saudi Arabia
was a critical focal point in the current situation.
The Consultants thought that emphasis should be placed on the
growing strength of Communist China both internally and internationally
although reservations were expressed about actual Chinese accomplishments
in agriculture. They felt that greater allowance should be made fot the
possibility of a return to a hard line in Asia.
The Consultants considered the prospects of either neutralism or
extremism in Western Europe not alarming at present. They thought that
Europe was showing some signs of slowly moving toward a more unified and
realistic position in world affairs, but agreed that the psychological
and political problems of adjusting to new relationships would be
formidable,
4=1E1
DOCUMLNTNO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. ,ri
t I DECLASsinED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: IS S 0
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 15110
AUTH: HR 71-2
DATE:3126 10 REVIEWER
Approved for Release: 2018/07/24 CO2619592
Approved for Release: 2018/07/24 CO2619592
mirpe
STABILITY AND COHESION IN THE SOVIET SATELLITES: (NIE 12-57)
1. In discussing the basic factors affecting stability and cohesion,
LINCOLN and ARMSTRONG felt that the attitudes of the free world should
be included, and that the demonstration of unwillingness to accept risks
in aiding a UN member appealing for aid would have profound repercussions
in the area. MILLIKAN suggested that the influence of nationalism and
of anti-Communism should be separately considered, though it might be
impossible to assign a relative weight to each. HOOVER felt that nationalism
was only the garb and rallying banner for anti-Communism, and that this
anti-Communism in Eastern Europe had remained undiminished. He considered
the lack of a larger protest vote in the Polish election explainable only
in terms of the regime's use of intimidation and repression. However,
most of the Consultants agreed with ARMSTRONG that the Poles simply
thought Gomulka was the best they could get in the wake of the Hungarian
experience. LANGER thought that fear of Germany was an important factor
in producing the rally behind Gomulka.
2. Economic factor: KNORR questioned the relative lack of emphasis
in the paper on economic factor) which he considered the critical one
in terms of future prospects for the area and possible US courses of
action. The Consultants generally agreed with the argument advanced by
MILLIKAN that the degree to which a national Communist solution of the
Polish type proves viable may depend on its ability to solve economic
problems) and that solving these problems may require destruction of
some of the guts of the Communist system. MILLIKAN and BLACK felt that as
the image of the Hungarian experience wanes) it will be a diminishing
force for inducing stability and conformity in the area and that economic
conditions will become increasingly determining. MILLIKAN thought that
a special paper should be written analyzing the economic debate in Poland
and the implications and political overtones of the reorganization of
the Polish economy. BLACK felt that attention should be paid to the non-
Communist liberals and modernizers in some of the Satellites who might
be able to work for a phased liberalization from within.
3. MOSELY thought that the possibilities of improvements in Poland's
economic situation were better than implied in the estimate. He thought
that increased incentive to work for an independent regime among the
workers and the substantial pktential of Poland's managerial class might
bring about considerable progress. He pointed out that Poland has a'
higher productivity in coal per worker than England and France, and that
it had a basically rich and balanced national economy. Many of its
Approved for Release: 2018/07/24 CO2619592
Approved for Release: 2018/07/24 CO2619592
'Noe
problems might be solved by Western aid and lowering of military
expenditures. HOOVER and KNORR were more pessimiotic about Polish
economic prospects. HOOVER pointed to continued inabilities to
increase production under Gomulka; KNORR doubted that steps such as
wage concessions would prove even as successful as Stalin's more
repressive methods in effecting economic improvement.
L. WithdrawaLl_prospectss Although the Consultants generally
agreed with the basic estimate that the USSR is not now genuinely
seeking a formula for pulling out of Eastern Europe, they felt that the
paper ruled out too summarily the possibility that the USSR would give
more serious consideration to some kind of offer. LINDER and LANGER
suggested that the Soviets would probably pull out of Eastern Europe
if we pulled out of Weetern Europe; STRAYER thought the USSR might even
look with favor on Poland getting grants from the US to help it out of
its current economic situation. MILLIKAN felt that the categorical
estimate about Soviet doterminabion to retain conteol in Eastern Europe
(last sAttence of paragraph 19) oversimplified the picture and gave
insufficient weight to tha tremendous costs the USSR faced in maintaining
that control. He felt that although a flat withr'rawal proposal would
not be accepted, stress should be placed on the fact that a new context
had been created in which the range of alternatives had necessarily
broadened.
5. Yugoslavia and China: There was general agreemont that more
mention should be made of the rile of Yugoslavia and Communist China.
ARMSTRONG thought that the palitical considerations which were paramount
in inducing the USSR to reject, reaccept, and then re-reject Tito must
also be operative in their policies toward Poland. LANGER agreed that
prestige was a critical Soviet consideration and thought it degrading
for the East Europeans and unparalleled for the USSR to call in Chou
En-lai to smooth things over in the Satellites. BLACK felt the use of
China as intercessor was not resented and was probably an effective
way of convincing in the Satellites that despite temporary problems they
Aro part of a much larger bloc which is still the wave of the future.
BLACK suggested Finland might prove a better example of an eventual
outcome in some of the more troublesome Satellites than Yugoslavia. In
some respects, a Finnish solution was preferable to a Titoist one since,
despite its non-Communist government, Finland was more subject to Soviet
dictation on foreign policy than Yugoslavia. STRAYER thought that
Soviet relations with Communist China might be the pattern that the Soviets
had in mind for future dealings with the East European Satellites.
- 3 -
E`re,K
Approved for Release: 2018/07/24 CO2619592
Approved for Release: 2018/07/24 CO2619592
Nise
SE
6. Permissible variation; On the question of what and how much
variation the USSR will be able to tolerate in its Satellite empire,
there were three positions put forward by the Consultants.
a. ARMSTRONG tented to think that Soviet policy had to be
toward the area as a whole, and that the same considerations of
prestige and political power will have to stiffen Soviet attitudes
toward the region as a whole. ARMSTRONG pointed out that the
Bloc has been almost as uniform in its pattern of rehabilitation
and partial reexcommunication of Tito as it was in its original
denunciation and purges of 1948-49. MOSELY tended to support this
position by suggesting that the Soviets suffered no real hesitation,
only a necessary tactical pause waiting for reinforcements before
crashing the Hungarian uprising. Most of the Consultants agreed
with the estimate that any defection from the Bloc except by
Albania would be unacceptable to the USSR.
b. STRAYER felt that the USSR would have to continue to
insist on uniform responses to the outside world, but can and will
allow for considerable and increasing variations in domestic policy.
c. BLACK felt that the USSR would Allow for general divergence
between countries, wherever unavoidable, rather than attempt to
distinguish between domestic and foreign policies, which would be
difficult in key issues such as foreign trade and aid. LINDER and
LINCOLN favored. sore discussion of the Satellites as individuals.
LINCOLN got little support for his idea that a soft neutral area
to the South might be sanctioned by the USSR; but there was
considerable sympathy for the idea that the USSR might fell that
it could continue to sanction divergences in some of the Satellites,
because of the national interest of countries like Bulgaria and
Czechoslovakia in maintaining close contact with the USSR and the
inability or disinclination of most Satellites to follow the
Polish example at present.
7. Military Significance: On the military importance of the area
to the Bloc, MILLIKAN thought that while the ussil continued to value
Eastern Europe for defensive purposes, it must have written off the
area for possible offensive use against Western Europe. LINCOLN thought
the area was still considered usable as a base even if local forces
could not be trusted, and MOSELY thought the technological strength of
Soviet forces had so increased that the Satellite forces had lost much
of their impNrtance in Soviet planning anyhow. LINCOLN thought that the
4
Approved for Release: 2018/07/24 CO2619592
Approved for Release: 2018/07/24 CO2619592
\A"
building up of Satellite military forces had probably contributed
to nationalism in the area -- and would probably inevitably do so if
(1) conscription was used and (b) high professional standards were
attained.
8. Attraction of West: The Consultants thought some mention should
be made of the attractive force of Western Europe in both the economic
and ciultural realms to many of the Eastern European Satellites. MOSELY
said that the Polish government has urged the Rockefeller and.Ford
foundations to open contact and that exploratory missions have already
been sent to Poland by both foundations. (A fact still being kept
secret.) He thought that the experience of Yugoslavia in 1950 (when
90% chose English and only 2% chose Russian as their second foreign
language after the choice was made elective in Croatia) would probably
be repeated in other Eastern European Satellites if a choice was
permitted. There was general agreement not to expect much from the
Czechs, however, who were thought to be faring well economically under
the current arrangements and enjoy about as much contact with the West
as they probably wanted.
MIZE EAST
9. Soviet strengths: In answer to COOLEY's introductory question
on the strength and weakneeses of the Soviet position in the Middle East,
the Consultants agreed that the Soviet position was strong and would
probably become stronger. MOSELY related Soviet stvength in the area
to the fact that they are interested at present in getting the West out
rather than getting themselves in. He .suggested that the USSR did not
intend to send in volunteers, but that they were thrown off base by the
US censure of the UK and France and felt they had to establish for
future propaganda purposes the fact that they were willing to go even
farther in supporting the victim. MOSELY thought the situation was
somewhat analogous to that of 1938 in Czechoslovakia where the Soviets
built up much credit by implanting in the minds of the people that only
the USSR was willing to help them militarily when the chips were down.
YOUNG agreed with MOSELY that the USSR had succeeded in establibhing
this distinction in the eyes of the people of the area, and that in
pressing for any kind of a reasonable settlement the US will necessarily
become aligned even more with the UK, France, and Israel. Most
Consultants agreed with MOSELY that the USSR was not being strained
economically by aid to the Middle East, and that they were getting
disproportionate psychological returns for their obsolete arms and
unsaleable surpluses.
10. Against LANGER's suggestion that the Soviets might exploit
the =mint Middle Eastern situation to better their position in the
5 -
h'st5.13
Approved for Release: 2018/07/24 CO2619592
Approved for Release: 2018/07/24 CO2619592
'slow
Turkish straits, MOSELY and YOUNG pointed out that Soviet acceptance of
the principle of national soverignty in the Suez crisis would handicap
any such efforts. MOSELY thought the USSR would prefer bilateral
dealings with the Turks in any case. He speculated that the USSR would
probably fly large numbers of speoialists to Syria if Jordan were
attacked. ARMSTRONG Amentioned that Nun i was not urging US adherence
to the Baghdad Pact in December, but rather increased US aid, particu-
larly to Iran, which Nun i considered the weakest link in the Baghdad
Alliance. MOSELY speculated that Nun i might have taken this position
because the Baghdad powers preferred not to be inhibited by direct ties
to the ES if they decided to initiate action against Syria in collusion
with the Turks.
11. Saudi Arabia: There was general agreement to STRAYERrs
assertion that Saudi Arabia was a critical fecal point in the present
situation. YOUNG commInted that Saud was playing up to Nasser to check
Iraq, but that he doesvrt want to be completely committed to Nasser and
has been hurt by the closure of the canal. Saud is dependent on
opportunistic Palestiniars for administration; and they support Saud
bucause they feel that he alone has the financial potential to help them
get. Palestine back. Saud deesnrt realize that he is building up a class
that might eventually overthrow him; he seeks to solve everything by
spreading his wealoh around a little more thinly. In answer to YOUNGrs
speculation that some groups in Saudi Arabia might eventually try to
call in the Russians to run Aramco, LINDER pointed out that the problem
was marketing the oil; and that so long as petroleum Was available from
Iran and Kuwait a shut-off of Arabian oil would not seriously hurt the
West.
12. Settlement Prospects: The Consultants agreed that there was
no other practical way but through the UN to take the first steps toward
an Arab-Israeli settlement. YOUNG thought that, with world attention
focussed on the area, now was a good time to press for some sort of
settlement, or at least to create a context in which final settlement
could ultimately be worked out. ARMSTRONG felt that a settlement could
be achieved if the US was willing to apply pressure on all parties.
STRAYER thought that the value of a settlement ohould not be exaggerated,
since the Arabs would almost certainly believe they had been cheated and
become further alienated from the US. HOOV1d thought that a substantial
quid pro quo would have to be arranged for the Arabs, since any settlement
would seem to have improved the Israeli position as a result of their
military action. MILLIKAN thought no solution to the problems of the
area was feasible unless the focus and frame of reference for a solution
were broadened and the impression countered in the area that the US was
seeking to buy people off on a short-term basis.
6 -
Approved for Release: 2018/07/24 CO2619592
Approved for Release: 2018/07/24 CO2619592
COMMUNIST CHINA (NIE 13-57)
13. International Posture: There was general concurrence with
MOSELY's suggestion that a five-year estimate should emphasize that
the Chinese may suddenly revert to a hard line once they have neu-
tralized international opposition, consolidated their position at home,
and built up mass support abroad. MOSELY thought they might revive
guerilla fighting in Southeast Asia, try setting up a Yunnan in India,
or attempt to capitalize on political confusion in Indonesia. He felt
that having switched to a soft line, the Chinese Communists have to
hold it for a while to consolidate their gains, but that a straight
push for power night take place in the Far East once a genuine atomic
stalemate has been reached in Europe.
14. Taiwan and UN: There was a general desire for more and better
intelligence on the sf:ivation in Taiwan. ARMSTRUCT thought the mainland
population was large13, reconciled to life in Taiwan and against a return
to the mainland. MOSELY thought the Soviet pattern of playing on the
Sine-American talks to show that Chiang was throeEh and at the same time
offering comfortable posts to nationalist officials was bound to have
increasing effect, particularly in making the succession problem dif-
ficult. The Consultants agreed that the USSR did genuinely want Com-
munist China in the UN at present, that admission to the UN was of
great importance to the Chinese Communists, and that they could count on
growing Afro-Asian support for admission. LANGEd thought the Chinese
would make concessions on issues like the American prisoners and the
status of the Chinese in Southeast Asia in order to gain admission, but
would make no concessions on Taiwan or the issue of renouncing force.
REITZEL thought that the Chinese would make no important concessions,
believing that the Afro-Asian bloc will eventually get them into the UN.
15. The Consultants agreed with BLACK that the effect of the
Hungarian situation has been to increase markedly the importance of
Communist China to the USSR. MOSELY thought that the estimate should
develop the line that the call for different roads to socialism and
popular front tactics was primarily directed to Asia. Attention should
be paid to the use of local Communist parties to influence non-
Communist governments even without a popular front -- as in Japan where
a small Communist party has forced the left socialists to accept issues
popularized by the Communists and the left socialists in turn have
created pressure on the conservative government over these issues.
MOSELY felt that nationalism and socialism were being increasingly
paired together in Asia, and that the constant prodding of the Com-
munist Parties was combining with the surprisingly effective co-existence
410
SE
-
Approved for Release: 2018/07/24 CO2619592
Approved for Release: 2018/07/24 CO2619592
Nkat"
'Nevi
propaganda of China to induce increasingly favorable attitudes toward
the Bloc. He considered the decline of Western-type socialists in
India and Indonesia a serious development contributing to this outcome.
16. Agriculture: MILLIKAN urged that the anlaysis of the Chinese
agricultural situation be sharpened to explain (a) the degree to which
productivity changes have been explainable solely by the weather,
(b) the kinds of investment being made in agriculture, and (c) the effect
of collectivization on productivity. MOSELY said that, except in the
Northeast, farming methods had not changed much, and wondered if the
displacement of small wholesalers has caused the inefficiencies that
resulted from this step in Russia, and what the Chinese will be able to
do to overcome the ap[arent decline in livestock production. He
suspected that the increase in consumer goods referred to in para. 9
of the draft estimate did not take account of the decrease in handicraft
industries, HOOVER thought there was frequently a tendency in the
estimate to impart a "God-like quality to the decisions and purposes of
the regime."
WESTERN EUROPE
17. Neutralism: SLItIMI.t an' LANGER. began the discussion on the
memorandum "Thoughts on Europe" by commenting that we appear to be at
the beginning of the period of "atomic blackmail" and may expect a
series of threats aimed at weakening our base structure. KNORR felt
that the European powers would increasingly insist on having their own
atomic stockpiles to avoid the necessity of involvement in a US-USSR
conflict. LANGER said that the Germans are unlikely to press seriously
for a position of :neutrality which would practically rule them out as
a great power; and LINDER thought it oven less likely that England and
France would seek neutrality. ARMSTRONG thought that the example of
India which has become a great power without atomic weapons might have
a seductive effect on Europeans reappraising their role in the world
today. MOSELY also thought that, since Europe would presumably not be
needed by the US to deliver nuclear weapons to the USSR in five or ten
years, European counties might feel able to explore policies at some
divergence from the US in the confidence that we would not let them
collapse.
18. Germany: The Consultants generally agreed that Germany was
rIlikely to, give up much to attain reunification. KNORR felt the
West Germans were wrapped up in their own prosperity and anxious to
avoid rocking the boat. He said that the socialists in private were
surprisingly uninterested in the reunification issue and planned to
concentrate on the rearmament question in the forthcomine elections,
8 IMP
Approved for Release: 2018/07/24 CO2619592
Approved for Release: 2018/07/24 CO2619592
.*ss? NNW
SE
and that the political position of the CDU had not declined sharply
although Adenauerts personal position had. He pointed our that the
Germans might rely on developing imtermediate range missiles for
retaliatory power against the USSR, by-passing altogether the plane
delivery stage. LANGER thought that the Germans, by developing a
military establishment of hiehly trained specialists using missiles
and atomic artillery, could do as well as they did after 1920.
19. Economic Prospects: The Consultants generally thought that
economic problems would not be a major source of difficulty in Western
Europe unless the Suez Canal stays closed. They agreed that the growth
rate was flattening out, but that actual growth and expansion was
surprisingly vigorous. MOSELY suggested that in getting rid of over-
extended obligations around the world, the economic position of
Western European countries could actually be placed on a sounder basis.
ARMSTRONG cited Italy end Holland as examples of countries whose
trading positions have actually improved with the loss of colonies.
LANGER cited post World War II Germany as an example of economic
prosperity without extensive political control. There was general
agreement that the loss of political control would matter greatly
psychologically, however, and that the problem of coming to terms with
the new situation eelitJellly would be acute, paeacuaarly in the case
of France. LINDER felt lekat the case of England, where wages are
outstripping produivity, any government - administering the necessary
economic corrective would be likely to fall. REITZEL suggested that
the Labor Party was not interested in coming to peJer at present. There
was a general agreement that growth of extremism was unlikely in
European politics, but ARMSTRONG and REITZEL were anxious that the
possibility of some new form of nationalist extremism not be written off.
20. European intelzation: There was a general agreement that
further steps toward European integration were likely, but that this
would only be possible to the extent that colonial positions and
policies were gracefully abandoned. BLACK sug,ested that Western Europ&
in some degree recoup its economic position by cooperating in developing
Africa; but it was thought that divisions among the European powers
and the French position in Algeria would make any such development
unfeasible. MOSELY thought that the Africans would, in any case, prefer
to deal unilaterally with the West European powers.
21. Against the general proposition that the peoples of Western
Europe have run out of steam and lost their desire to find new answers
and move toward integration, the following arguments were made:
MOSELY and LANGER: The rising generation in Western Europe
is non-nationalistic in focus, and its interest in efficiency and
9
SE
Approved for Release: 2018/07/24 CO2619592
Approved for Release: 2018/07/24 CO2619592
Now/
, � -
streamlining may lead it to desire to overhaul many divisive and out-
moded practices in Western Europe.
KNORR: Civil servants in their forties and fifties have now
begun for the first time to push integration.
ARMSTRONG: The recent choice for NATO secretary-general of
Speak, who is known as a proponent of closer intra-European co-
operation willing to step on people's toes, may be an indication of
the way Western Europe may want to move.
22. There was a general agreement that, in the words of KNORR,
"the hankering after tile old world will be the biggest obstacle in
the way of the new" in harope. The Consultants agreed that individual
countries had lost mew% of the psychological incentive to continue
playing a big role, but felt that Europe as a whole could play a role
of great and increasing importance and would probably feel it had to
in the light of economic necessity and the political reminder of
Soviet hostility contained in the Hungarian experience.
10
tWMET-
TIAL
Approved for Release: 2018/07/24 CO2619592