ARGENTINA - POLICE AND SECURITY SERVICES

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Argentina Declassification Project - The "Dirty War" (1976-83)
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02613921
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 134
• Document Creation Date: April 3, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 12, 2019

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5'ECRET
ARGENTINA - POLICE AND SECURITY SERVICES
1. Organization
The following organizations comprise the Argentine police and security
services:
a. Secretariat of State Information (SIDE). A staff of about 250
(mainly military). SIDE has overall coordinating responsibility for the
Argentine intelligence community but lacks enforcement powers. An anti-Communist
section investigates Communist and Sino-Soviet Bloc activities within Argentina,
coordinates the anti-Communist activities of other Government agencies, anl
prepares intelligence studies on Communism. SIDE also has a psychological action
department which prepares and distributes anti-Communist propaganda, departments
concerned with other subversive movements, and a limited foreign intelligence
capability represented by several staff officers stationed abroad.
b. Federal Police. A force of about 20,000 with nationwide responsibility
for the maintenance of public order. An internal security component, the Coordi-
nation Department, is concerned with the investigation and control of Communist
activities, labor agitation, and espionage and subversion by foreign powers.
c. Provincial Police. Maintained by each province for routine law enforce-
ment.
d. National Gendarmerie. A force of about 11,000 responsible for policing
the land frontiers and for quelling internal disturbances.
e. Armed Forces. The Army (72,000), Navy (291000 plus 8,000 Marines), Air
Force (161000), and Coast Guard (9,000) may be used to suppress disturbances
which the police and gendarmerie cannot handle. The Army, Navy and Air Force
each maintains a separate intelligence service.
2. General Capability
The Argentine police and security services have shown a strong capability,
by Latin American standards, to detect and neutralize subversion and insurgency.
The promulgation in January 1963 of the first of four proposed new security
laws has strengthened the authorities' hand by providing more severe sanctions for
subversive and extremist activity. Providing they act in concert, the Argentine
police and security services can cope successfully with any internal security
threat Short of a general popular uprising.
3. Limitations and Weaknesses
No serious deficiencies are apparent in the training, equipment, administration,
discipline, or morale of the Argentine services.
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Riot Control Capability
The Federal Police, the primary force for suppression of civil violence,
have proved to be well-trained, well-equipped, and effective. As noted previously,
the National Gendarmerie and, if necessary, the Armed Forces are available for
this purpose.
5. Cl/CE Capability
SIDE, the Coordination Department of the Federal Police, and the military
intelligence services have relatively well-developed Cl/CE capabilities. These
services are known to have low-level penetrations of the Argentine Communist
Party, physical surveillance teams, technical penetrations of Soviet-bloc in-
stallations. The Federal Police, with the cooperation of SIDE, the National
Gendarmeries, and the Coast Guard, have energetically exploited these capabilities
by rounding up Communists, seizing propaganda materials, and closing Communist
and Communist-front printing facilities and meeting sites. Enforcement will be-
come more effective with the enactment of stiffer laws against subversion.
6. Technical Capabilitz.
SIDE and the Coordination Department of the Federal Police, and to a lesser
extent the military intelligence services, have and exploit technical capabilities
which include microphone plants, telephone tapping, mail intercepts, and photo-
graphic surveillance.
7. Liaise with Other Central and South American Countries
SIDE 1.6 believed to be the only Argentine service that maintains liaison on
security matters with other Latin countries. SIDE has representatives in at
least the following countries: Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru,
Mexico, and Uruguay.
9. communist Penetration of Services
3.3(b)(1)
No Communist penetrations of the Argentine police and security services are
known to have been discovered, although these services are an obvious Communist
target and some degree of penetration must be presumed. An investigation is
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currently in course of a leak within the Federal Police involving the Czech
Mission in Buenos Aires.
10, Coastal Patrol Capability
The Coast Guard, an all-volunteer force of some 9,000, is well-trained,
fairly well-equipped, and effective within the obvious limitations imposed by
Argentina's extensive coastline.
3.3(b)(1)
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ARGENTINA
I. The Communist Party of Argentina (PCA)
A. Manpower and Organization.
The Communist Party of Argentina (PCA) has 40, 000 to 50, 000
members and some 100, 000 sympathizers. Its main strength lies in the
Federal Capital and in the urban centers of the provinces of Buenos 'Aires,
Santa Fe, Mendoza, and Cordoba.
Another important group, the orthodox Trotskyist Workers Party
(POT) and other Trotskyist splinter groups number about 10, 000 members.
The POT reportedly has won from the PCA some of its members who sub-
scribe to a more active and aggressive revolutionary role than that which is
currently espoused by the PCA, and continually chides the PCA for its lack
of direct action. Ties with the Trotskyist movements of other Latin American
countries are maintained by the POT in part through the Latin American
Bureau of the Fourth International.
The Socialist Vanguard, an extreme leftwing group led by David
Tieffenberg which broke from the Argentine Socialists (itself a splinter
group of the old Argentine Socialist Party) in May 1961, appears at times to be
farther to the left than the PCA. This group joined the Communists in enthu-
siastic support of Peronist candidates in the March 1962 elections. It can be
counted on to hew closely to the Communist line even though it disavows any
allegiance to Moscow. Its strength is estimated at less than 50, 000 votes
under its own party banner.
B. Condition of the PCA
Although well organized, the PCA is not considered a strong party
by international Communist circles. Other Latin American Communist
parties believe that the PCA involves itself too much with theoretical leader-
ship and too little with grass-roots action and some pressure has been exerted
by them to have the PCA become more directly involved in Argentine labor,
student, and political activities. Reporting, however, is inadequate to support
reliable judgments on the extent of the party's indirect influence among
existing opposition forces. In the circumstances which have existed since the
fall of the Frondizi government, this is obviously of critical importance.
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Once quite powerful the PCA has declined in strength and is
now only nominally legal. It is increasingly harassed by the military-
supported Guido government, and is prohibited from carrying out
propaganda and other normal overt political activities. Arrests of
party officials continue, although these have been confined largely to
medium and low-level members. High-level leaders continue to
travel throughout Argentina and to other countries with relative free-
dom. The party's financial campaigns have not done well and on many
occasions funds were not available for propaganda during crucial
periods. Many party members never were and still are not active.
For prestige purposes the PCA is concerned with the loss in member-
ship and is currently conducting an enlistment campaign. There appears
to be little evidence of dissension in the PCA despite the fact that many
of the top leaders are over sixty years of age and a national party con-
gress has not been held since 1946. The party has virtually unanimously
supported the CPSU in the current Sino-Soviet controversy.
C. Para-Military and Intelligence Activities
The PCA is reported to have initiated a guerrilla training pro-
gram. Although specific details regarding numbers being trained, equip-
ment, and group locations are not available, there has been sufficient
reporting to establish that a guerrilla training program by the PCA is
under way. Recent raids by Argentine security officials have brought
to light maps, weapons, and other items indicating that the PCA does
have some type of guerrilla program. The party is known to have trained
and equipped some "shock groups" for sabotage and riots, but so far
there has been little evidence of their employment.
II. Political Assets
Incapable of seizing control of Argentina independently, the PCA
continues to work toward a united democratic front with other political
parties, especially the Peronist, to take advantage of their greater strength
and appeal. The Peronista, especially those active in labor, although not
willing to accept leadership from the Communists, are not withdrawing
their support from CP-endorsed plans and programs which they believe
will be beneficial to the Peronist movement. An agreement in principle
allegedly reached among the Tieffenberg faction of the Argentine Socialists,
the Peronist leftwing faction, and the PCA, demonstrates that the party
has gained some ground in this effort at rapprochement with other opposi-
tion forces.
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The party bases its hopes on the cumulative disruptive effect
of continued disturbances, particularly within military and labor groups,
The PCA apparently has taken few initiatives in this regard, realizing
that it stands to gain more from the polarizing effect of the military,
political, and labor groups' continued revolts, counter-revolts, labor
strikes, and political bickerings that show no sign of letup. By standing
back and remaining a strong, though small, united force, the party
hopes that it will be the only organization which can furnish leadership
for Argentine labor and left political groups if a crisis is precipitated.
The party holds a strong although not dominant position in the
powerful General Confederation of Labor. It continues to exert consid-
erable influence among students, particularly within the universities.
Communist front organizations continue to function on a moderate scale
and with limited scope, and although not numerically strong, do maintain
the potential to combine with other leftist groups, to draw in individuals
and students in favor of mass movements, and to form a national front for
specific causes. These fronts include the Argentine Peace Council, the
Communist Youth Federation, the Union of Argentine Women and the
Argentine League for the Rights of Man.
Notwithstanding suppressive measures the PCA continues to
publish various newspapers and periodicals such as the official weekly
party newspaper Nuestra Palabra, Nueva Era, the voice of the Central
Committee; and Revista Internacional, edited in Prague, another Spanish
language edition of Problems of Peace and Socialism, the theoretical
periodical of the international Communist movement.
The pro-Castro organizations such as the National Movement
for Solidarity and Aid to the Cuban Revolution, the Brigade of Volunteers
and Friends of the Cuban Revolution, and the various committees in
support of Cuba, remain sporadically active, but with the rupture of
diplomatic relations with Cuba on 8 February 1962 and the advent of the
Guido government, visible evidence of pro-Castro activities has de-
creased appreciably.
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