KGB EXPLOITATION OF HEINZ FELFE SUCCESSFUL KGB PENETRATION OF A WESTERN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02606328
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 130
• Document Creation Date: March 8, 2023
• Document Release Date: March 1, 2019
• Case Number: F-2016-02521

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KGB EXPLOFIATION OF HEINZ FELFE
Successful Knn. Penetration
of a Western Intelligence Service
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
I. Introduction and Summary 1
II. Soviet Operations Against Gehlen Organization
In the Early Post-War Years
a. Background Information on Felfe
b. Background Information on Clemens
c. Soviet Recruitment of Felfe and Clemens
d. Alternate Versions of Recruitment by KGB
and Hiring by Gehlen Organization
e. Early Stages of KGB Operation -- the BALTHASAR
Deception
III. Operations of the Early 1950's
a. Efforts to Discredit the Gehlen Organi
b. Felfe Settles In -- the LENA Deception
IV. KGB Work in West Germany as a Sovereign Country: 1956-61 SO
a. Targeting of CIA, Provocation, Tactical Deception 53
b. Support of Soviet Policy and Political Deception 62
c. Methods of Communication 65
d. New Directions? 68
V. Investigation and Arrest 80
VI. The Aftermath 89
ANNEXES
A. The HACKE Story 92
B. LILLI HARLEM Case 96
C. The Sokolov Case 101
D. ZUVERSICHT Case 112
E. IMERKATOR Case 115
F. Glossary of German Words and Abbreviations 117
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Ion 33
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Iast happens id# the NSW hen a high level penetration of
a Western intelligence service? Row does the EGB exploit the
voluminous informetion received on enemy, operations, while at the
same time protecting the seenrity of its source? More importantly,
does the NOB handling of such an agent leave tell4a3.s signs
*la would permit an alert and knovledgeable Newton counter-
intelligence officer to surmise the existence of such a penetration?
It vould be presumptuous to generolixe on the heels of OM case,
but study of the 10333 handling of "elm Pelf. NW hap provide
questions.
successfnl Pelf's vas an officer of the West
intelligence ifiervice (AND)** for ten years, a
en
ioreigp
as deputy
chief of the section responsible among other things for countering
Soviet espionige. le vas &dedicated Soviet agent throughout this
period, and4remm4ned loyal to the Soviets even after his arrest
in Nevem:her 1961. Nevem detected as a result of aimed provided
by a CIA-run penetration of the Folla Intelligence Service CUB).
Pelts vas more than &simple penetration agent; he became, in
effect, &consultant to the NOB on mow of its operations in West
Serumny. Through Fate, the Soviets pursued three objectives:
protect the security of Soviet
Paper, gm=
terminology
JOBm be
of the
ty
** Pros 1947 to 1956, vhen it had no legal status, this we
know as the Goblin orgethettoo. In 1956, after West GUMMY
had regained its sovereignty, it became the BID, OhiCh is the
Gems abbreviatiimillor Federal Intelligence Service. For con-
venience sad simplicity it is freqpently referred to as the END
evenVItt the earlier period is meant.
SSC=
ND 1POR=N DTEISMI
�/ �
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b. To confuse, disorient end, discredit the Wait German
e service. The aim is not only to
penetrate the service, but to manipulate it to serve Soviet
interests.
o. To
e on Vest
objective of political
importance as the case
/regressed end y have u1t1it1y become the most important
in Soviet eyes, as a supportto Soviet foreign policy
objectives.
The reader will not find here a colste history of the Pelfe
that would require ammch larger volume. Tb. broad lines
of the story are here, and one chapter in particular is devoted
Prialirily to background information, presenting the dramatie
"7-4144,A4,/ge_r
moon**. Ah4descklbes how the KGB recruited first Hans Clemens
and then, thru Clemens, Felt.. They had been colleagues in
Iasi intelligence during the war, motivated after the eaT by
revenge artinst the Americans, moneys and a desire to be on What
they considered the most powerful side. it this IS essentially
a selective and interpretive account, for the purpose of illustrating
methods of h41 1'g and importing a vell*place4staff penetration of
strnservice. The lessons to be learned lie in the various
ption and diversionary operations run by the NAB to build up
015 tion in the END, expand his access, protect his security,
end ores 'illusion that the German service was effectively fulfilling
its CZ mission, While the Soviets were generally ineffective.
There are many woos by which Felfe might have been unmasked
earlier than he was. Even &thorough namedbeek might have done
the trick. He could also have been caught earlier if more
Te
in West Germany and in Zest Germany, and to detect Western
operations inside the Soviet Union. To this and, the KGB
ran deception operations designed to expand Felfel's access
to information not only from his own service, but also from
other West Sermon and Allied services including CIA.
foreign
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been given to evidence which clearly
vas amiss, rather than vatting to be sparred to action by a report
ilvai car ovn semsitive penetration source. Indications of Soviet
penetration of the AND yore to be fad in the deception end
diversionary operatives ran by 4us Xels for the express parp3se
of supporting or protecting Pelf*. Although smart avid protection
of penetration llesAtli IA Western services is not the may reason
deception and 41.1.1 operations, it Aik
the principal reasons far each operations. AWAY
me sugseets that shen assember of Soviet deception
operations are concentrated in one area, or
yea41kacel-e
A %MOO operations meetate be carefalyanal4zed
determine vhether thitIndicate Soviet pemetretion,in that area
that service. May examples of deception and diversionary
rattcn are dismissed in detail in this study; the mast important
IA the folloviag peragripha
deception operation IA support of Yelfe vas the
"Mz*sAr cases As far as the AND bats/ at the time, BAMNASAR
ens of its bettor positive intelligence operations, produalag ier-
eation on Soviet of uranium in Nast Garman end its Mhipmeat
to the T. Tbe egaftlIALNAASAN was overtime friend of Clemens
contact with his mod then *llama himself
to be recruited b lemons for the AND. Actmally, BAINNANAThas a XGB spat
frc the b.� The= initiated the operation to provide
-conspirator, Clemens, with an official reason for repeated tripe
to W lin (to meet =NAGAR), from where he could easily
Cr0.11 to Zest Berlin to meet with itis sal Telfeks IGUI ease officer.
option opera
illed wizir came --
the most important eingLe contribu to Felfeks career as a West
Gamlen intelligence officer, and probe:a/also to his career as a
Soviet agent. It geve him status and stature within the AND, and
maneuverability as a Soviet agent. It vas the vehicle for many
waits to broaden Felfe4s access to oollect information, especially
political intonation, and sometimes to disseminate disinformation.
yo
pen
sarily
s doe � ces$4ri Y
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!,TO FORFTrri riTSSIM
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LENA was the BNO cryptonym for an East German political
functionary and publisher. He travelled frequently to West Germany,
where he was well received in certain West German socialist circles
as an apparently independent, outspoken East German. His role as
a BUD agent, doubled by the KGB, goes back to the early fifties.
But in January 1954, shortly after Felfe's assignment to the BNO
Headquarters CE Group, LENA suddenly turned from what had been
(from the German point of view) a positive intelligence operation into
a CE case. LENA reported to the BNO that he had been introduced to
a KGB officer, and that after a flurry of meetings he had been
formally recruited by the Soviets and irtriediately assigned the
task of creating a net of agents to produce information on the
West German Foreign Office and the Chancellor's Office. The Soviet
plan, as related by LENA, was highly ambitious. LENA was to be the
"German net director." to. recruit two principal agents, a political
advisor and. spotter, several support agents, and to provide names of
potential penetration agents. As a developing CE case, handling of
LENA was then transferred to the CE Group, where the newly arrived
Felfe became the Headquarters case officer. His assignment to
this case was probably not accidental; Felfe's Immediate superior
at the the time eses�eileeeedeezecartialEW another KGB penetration of the BUD.
With KGB assistance, LENA developed rapidly into the END'S most
important CE case, and it made Felfe's reputation as an authority on
Soviet counterespionage.
LENA's talkative KB case officers revealed Information n
other Soviet operations in West Germany. compromising severe
bona fide Soviet and East German agents in the process. LENA
was "such an intelligent man" that his KGB case officers
ostensibly enjoyed talking politics with him, and these long
conversations revealed occasional g1irpses of the true" Soviet
policy on Germany. On the surface. LENA's operation to penetrate
the KGB
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on ba1t of the D ems far more essful that the soviet
operation using LA to penetrate the Donn Somemtment. Although
potential recruits to the KOS, the only real
pentretion actually rutted ions an wiling and incompetent
t3 in the Press Office, who contented himself with the
product of waste baskets as his nource material. To same Observers
it seemed incredible at the time that the 1G3 should go through
many -motions just fir this. Them we created an impression of
ND incompetence, and= failure to Obtain important information
from Vest Sermon government offiees.lk At the same time, LIRA was
passing the DOD detailed and comprehensive information on personnel
and installations at the IOMS's Nast Osman Headquarters in
Isaashorst. So that this information could continue, Felfe
decided it was necessary to provide the 11:015 with build-up
materiel to keep =A's faltering Vest German net alive � For
this purpose, Felts pioneered procedures within the Vest Oen=
governmant for the clearance of build-up material. Be obtained
from the Federal Attorney General a statement that any materiel
alammely damonetrebly, known to the opposition vas automatically
no longer secret. By extension, that Ada vas no longer Secret
cos* be passed to the eppositicri as build-up meteriel. Thus
thee al= ease officer told UNA, or any other double agent
reporting to the END, that certain areas of information were
already covered by the NOS Felfe could argot the virtue of
providing this information to LENA as build-up, to satisfy pre-
seed X= mods-checking) or to make out the presumed Soviet
source. Th this wen Felts vas Able to nmneuver vide variety
of iaformation legellar into Soviet bands. Discussion within
the West Sermon government ofidhat could and could not be cleared
for passage In response to Soviet requirements greatly broadened
Felfe's access to positive intelligenee otherwise inacceesible
to Illo; information which could not be cleared for passage as
build material vas passed clamteramaybylelfe.
also providel Fel
ss fbr inveetige
SOB. The 1D1S
44-
ffice'would instruct
im to try to attet, obtain certain oottoeLnislit ,E,t4West .44
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German official. LENA reported this to the BNB, and the reported
Soviet interest then provided Felfe with cover for namechecking the
official in West German and Allied files. The results went to the KGB
directly, through Felfe's own clandestine communications channels, and
at a later meeting LENA would report that his KGB case officer was no
longer interested. To make this exercise more thorough, Felfe eventually
arranged permission not just to namecheck the West German targets of
interest to LENA's KGB handler, but to conduct his own detailed investi-
gation of them. Felfe argued that if the KGB was interested in certain
West German officials and was seeking vulnerability data on them, then it
was necessary in order to protect West German security for the BK0 to
conduct its own investigation of these persons to determine if they were
In fact vulnerable to Soviet recruitment. This was done, with the results
of investigation passed by Felfe to the KGB.
The LENA operation also helped Felfe break ground for liaison between
the BND and CIA Berlin Base concerning operations against Soviet instal-
lations in East Berlin. BND information on these installations had been
checked in Berlin Base files since 1954, but in l9S3 Felfe began a
concerted campaign to collect detailed information from CIA on its
operational program to penetrate KGB Headquarters in varlshorst. The
urgency of KGB attention to Berlin Base as a CI target as heightened by
the arrest in late 1958 of a CIA penetration of Soviet military intelli-
gence in East Germany (Lt. Col. Popov) run at the time from Berlin Base.
Two years earlier, CIA's Berlin tunnel operation had been detected, as
well as an apparently successful CIA attempt to recruit a member of an
RU -.d* intelligence point in East Berlin. It was clear to the KGB
that CIA's Berlin Base represented a major threat to its security.
LENA provided the BND with sizeable amounts of information on KGB off
iCPS,
*An RU is a Soviet tactical military intelligence unit n this case,
it was the RU subordinate to the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany (OSFG).
The RUs are distinct from the qRj, which is on the 0 General Staff level
and am concentrates on strategic intelligence.
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safe houses, and license and telephone numbers in the Karlshorst
Headquarters compound. This information was then checked against
Information available to CIA Berlin Base, with the results going back
to Felfe -- and to the KGB. LENA also met a number of KGB officers
under their full true nameand these too were nametraced by Felfe
with friendly services, providing the KGB with a mechanism for name-
tracing some of their personnel in CIA files. In addition to LENA,
the KGB created other operations producing information on Karlshorst
Headquarters, and arranged for these operations to fall under Felfe's �
Jurisdiction. Through manipulation of these operations, and his personal
role in engineering a number of crises in CIA-BNO relationships, Felfe
was able to force a reluctant Berlin Base to give him a general briefing
on the status of CIA operations against Karlshorst. Over a period of
several years, Felfe with the assistance of KGB operations, was able to
achieve ever-closer BND-CIA cooperation in operations against Karlshorst.
In one case when he - or the KGB - suspected CIA had an agent in an
East Berlin housing office, Felfe, with KGB assistance, boldly provoked
confirmation of this fact by trying to recruit one of our agent's colleagues.
He placed an ad in a West Berlin newspaper designed to attract secretarial
, �44
- A
help from the East Sector. Our agent's secretary answered the ad KB "
behest), and Felfe informed us that he intended to recruit her as a
source. We then told him that we already employed her chief and asked
him to stop his approach since it right endanger our agent,. As a result
of such activity by Felfe and the KGB, the hitherto unilateral Berlin
Base program against Karlshorst wasitoMPromised.
There mm were also other cases of provocation to identify CIA agents.
One involved mm a West German businessman, recruited by Berlin Base to
report on Soviet trade contacts, then approached by the KGB and targeted
against the West German and U.S. Embassies in Moscow. He was suspected
by the KGB of Western intelligence contacts. Therefore, the KGB closed
out all the agent's KGB requirements except one, namely to spot, recruit
and maneuver into place a West German girl suitable to be a German Embassy
secretary. By introducing a CE factor urgently affecting German security,
the KGB succeeded not only in forcing revelation of the case to the BO,
but an actual turnover of the case to the BND.,
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by the IMB of
with Pelt. beco*in theMID Neadrinarters case offtee. In another
case, a West Gez'msn run by CIA,FeLfe provoked revelation of our
interest by seudi us reports awnsdrq; her of seriously insecure
behavior.Idaila in Moscow. Subsequently, the became the object of .A
sit -re ,Ce
INS "dangle operation .. a Soviet laver
4rAMPmcmgab potentially recraltable.
lttegral part of the Felts
el occurred in 1954, and the related ease of Ludwig
year. TAILLi HARM is the Geresn cryptonye
which involved the bteatione3 compmeise
that it had a more* in the BID field base
for CM operations.* To carry out this
comprehensive xfteat on the personae
the operations of the BID tees.
�
ration, the KGB prepared
rgeninatioe and some of
June l9514, a NIB agent
was sent to pleas this report in a deaddrop in West Germany.
A second UM agent is then sant to confirm that the drop was in
place, thau go to the local police and recite a pre-arranged story
of observing a man hid* something at this spot. (This agent woo
subsequently arrested and conformed his vole in the deception.)
wab dispatched on e. mission
Three days later, a third. 133B agent
to "recover� the drop, with the intention that he unwittingly
walk into a police stakeout and be arrested. The le Judged
(correctlyithat this particular agent would quickly confess to
being dispatched by the ZOB, thus confirming KOD control of the
"penetration." Through asttte pollee work, the operation was
urieseked as a Soviet deception but the fact remained that the
Soviets did have a complete and accurate rundown on the activiteen
of this field base end suet therefore have actually had. a. Penetration
reporting this informmtion. Subsequent investigation in which
alfe played an important role cantered on identification of this
t. The report itself provided. several,clnes andZNSB provocation er
a week after the report was flcuma =wham, been designed to
additional clues pointingto Lt
base,
*seed Zest German agent 4_ingero1
designation for tLia base vas Orr,
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senior officer
A year later,
others, as an
N
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aborted In addlAct as
Thismes a oonvuluted triple-think, a
A
tbottan
The IZILLT KARIM
erain's defection,
.V55tit1 of his Int
1; 1
,44-4,41, eao
t bev4xti Ilria,C10.G11:13314thatte-d %Iris
prAMIU
bit, circumstantial evidence suggests
ame. Albert Was arrested and later committed suicide;
-a"
trend
knowledge and bard evidence
LILLI NAHUM and Albert cams
First, initial Impetus for
deftetion of KGB officer Pstr
tthe German GE branch in KG3
NOB operations
icb came just
have been &wiped
By creating
circumstances and feeding informotion which eventually Iel to the
arrest of Albert, the KG3 appereatly hoped to shield amaze
important or more reliable moot, ?elf�, from inventigation A
*mood purpose ja.LJq elimination of Albert wbc_5altbough
an actuallimelet agentobad tkpparently berme* dispensable to the
(therm are several possible explanations fbr thin. ingest-
them relates to the fact that Albert bad become a bitter enemy
of Felts and had accused ?elf. a belag a, Soviet agent)))0211111*-
dete.e
third objecti was to further the 131Bis overall
reedy.'
,a
"eat in thee1-130 who 'cad
Zke
means the
deliberately exposed far
A and T. -LT
no.1 deception was e MCI case, *lab
s arrest in 1961.
within a plot
far too complicated to summarize here. It is discussed in detail
4.
Deryabin knew the fla c
relfe anki his co-coesp �
provide details which would 114.4
r
(j. ri� _
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In Chapter IV. Its purpose may have been ter
AO& /2-efeeeereei)
44144-14wri to ,,leceive the BND
2 �Jae,gc244'606 r Ze-,- ::eXar 8
about its own securityj,1/4 btit the operation e Prem- aturely the
KGB rationale and specific objectives are by no means clear. Felfe
exposed himself to many risks to get the operation- started, so it
must have been destined for an important role.
BALTHASAR, LENA, LILLI MARLE14 and BUSCH are all cases run on Soviet
Initiative for the purpose of improvine communications, increasing the
access of Felfe weetitlareettieet=lettratieme., or otherwise deceiving the
BND. There is also an entirely different category of cases which merits
study. These are apparently clean operations, primarily double agent
Aele
operations, initiated by some West German service,Awhich took curious
turns after their compromise by Felfe. Two of these, 7UVERSICHT and
MERKATOR, are described in annexes to this paper. 7.UVERSICHT was an
RU urG operation and M .RKATOR an East German foreign intelligence
(MfS/HVA) operation, both initially doubled by the BfV. They are
selected from among many such cscs because in these two instances we have
confirmation from It. Col. Popov and an East German MfS/HVA defector
(Max Heim) that the KGB informed the handling services that their agents
had been doubled by the West Germans.. The KGB sirbaftoptly asked the
RU and HVA to neither drop nor re-double these agents, but to continue
running them for source protection or deception purposes. We know the
date this happened and can trace the. change in handling which occurred
after this date. In the case- of ZUVERSICHT, the RU continued running
the case for four more years, but devoted minimum effort to carrying
out the KGB instruction to keep the case alive. Because of this minimum
effort, RU communications_ with UVERSICHT became more 3ne more "insecure,
from the agent's point of view. Felfe used this case to help create the
an abbreviation for the Office fo
of the Constitution, the principal West German interne
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he iktection
ecurity service.
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impression within the BNO that the RU GSFC is generally an incompetent
organization. The MERKATOR case, however, illustrates more imaginative
use of an agent known_ to be controlled by the opposition. When the
KGB advised the HVA that MERKATOP was a. double agent, responsibility for
the case within MfS/HVA Headquarters was transferred to a CI component
which apparently also handled other cases known to be controlled by
-Ze'ee
Western SCrYICeS.A
became to disseminate political disinformation, to observe West Germa
CE handling of a double agent, and to divert West German counter-
- eeee�
intelligence by creating suspicion of amosark West German
'eaeeeeee:&u:eleeeee.
A fascinating example of KGB exploitation of such an opposition-controlled
double agent is the Sokolov case. This started as a V. S. Army CIC
double agent operation. The case officer on the Soviet end of the
operation was an RU GSFG Major (who used the alias Sokolov) in East Germany.
ee
In 1959, after several uneventful years. C IC turned the case over to the
ee
BfV. BfV study of the case reveled that Sokolov was a drunkard, an
insecure talker, and a flamboyant and promiscuous type. Further
Investigation revealed he was known to various Western services under
various aliases. At this point the operation apparently became known
to the KGB., whether through Felfe or some other penetration is not known,
and it took an interest in exploiting the case.. The purpose was probably
primarily investigation of an insecure and possibly treasonous R9
officer (Sokolov). but in the course of its investigation the KGB
pursued a secondary objective. This was to promote, and then to
monitor -- with Felfe in the middle -- a tour de force of interservice
liaison. The method used by the KGB was to create or elaborate upon
existing double agent operations involving Sokolov, so as to provoke
operational interest in him and in his agent networks in West Germany
on the part of the BfV, two LfV's,e the BNB and CIA (on its own and in
its capacity as liaison representative for CIC and OSIinterests). From
An L V is the security service of a Land or province. It is
subordinate to the Land administration and while not directly subordinate
to the BfV, cooperates closely with the latter.
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the Western point of view, the Vise eventually came to involve
several interrelated double agent operations which resulted in
Investigation of roughly 200 security suspects, a seemingly excellent
operational lead to an RU Major(Sokolov) in East Germany, and the
participation of nearly every German and American intelligence and
security service in West Germany. By inserting into MO spotting
channels an agent who claimed to be Sokolov's mistress as well as his
agent, and who hinted that he mieht be recruitable, the KG! maneuvered the
BUD (and Felfe) into a controllinj position in the operation. The BND
inspired an interservice task force to work on this case; a CIA liaison
officer worked full time, for si< months, exclusively on this case.
CIA provided traces, guidance, and information on RIS modus operandi and
organization.
Felfe's behavior on the task force was uncharacteristically passive
the case was pursued in the direction he and the KGB) desired without his
customary railing at the incompetence of his colleagues, although during
one period he did try to persuade the task force to try to recruit Sokolov
In place rather than defect him. Eeit most of the time. Felfe simply sat
back and allowed himself to be briefed by all par icipents, The executive
action phase of the operation proceeded smoothly: five RU agents arrested,
many more suspects identified, considerable espionage equipment, including
one of the newest Soviet WiT sets. captured, The West German services were
very pleased with their 'success.' CIA was impressed by the proof that
close operational liaison with the German services could be effective and
amicable. But the KGB was also very pleased, and Felfe w even receiver,
a rare cash bonus for his work. The kGq achieved the probable arrest of
Sokolov and obtained a wealth of information on the operational and
liaison procedures of Western services. Only the R' was left out in the
cold. Felfe's co-conspirator, Clemens, who was slower and less
sophisticated than Felfe, was shocked that the KGB deliberately allowed
an RU agent from East Germany to walk into a West German trap and be
arrested. Felfe was merely amused.
In Summary, the Soviets achieved through their various deception operations
a far broader exploitation of Felfe than would normally be considered possible.
By rigging an operation especially for Felfe, the KGB could free answers from
eissawftway element5of the West German government in the guise of build-up
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By having double aenti report Soviet interesi
Pelf* was a cover Ibr zeseoheck
ed agencies. B./creating
west Carman
situations and complexities, the gag could help 7
bilreeleretie 111123iplittiOnsi,
def
factor' into acySSD
be transf to the
a Soviet Ci factor
of any other ageeol; Goma or
pc to bring away earthier case under Pelf's iceman
and versatile source ems endimpored by the
officer able to report on IDS penstretion Of
00.044 the BO the IDS protest Felfeie ***tatty by aommting
a deception operation which eonfirmed the existence of penstrat
and which wee &tended to divert the inveetiestion to
scapegoat selectni by the B.
operational
his
There are certain common ileneidactors
the major deception operations discussed in this study. These
areas follows
a. In pursuit of tbemlbews ob3ectires, the
e413,rg to sacrifice agents (their ova as
end gest Garman agents), came officer time moneys good
interaction, and apparently new eguipmmit and procedures
b.nal= had a well.placed penetration
In a talon to monitor the target service's resetion to
eM tag of eaCh deception. Pregnantly, this penetration
benefited from the deception.
c. The *vexations vez5 aggressive, imaginative
at times esdIose In caption and gleaning
their erscutioa ye frspeut3y Inept by comparison They
=tad only because of the naivete of many BID officers
sod Ste rigid compartmectation within the BED, which In this
cue was a disadvantage as it prevented pieces of the puzzle
from aCidna together In one Plage � Quite a few CIA officers
liaison with the BM felt at the time that theee operations
rIe peculiar." TkeICWO4misoon officer responsible for
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BID assuritr during pert of the period in westion frankly
thought they "smelledr and were luminat4ve of penetration.
Particularly In the light of Guagwhb knowledge of AIM nodes
owemeedi (including this study of the Pare cam), it is
vitro possible for en alert CI officer to detect *Mb deception
kind diverelonari oparationn.
en scums mmterlal for this pmger is voluminous and
Even though Pelts never confessed to anything more than could be
demeastrablY Proved *dolma his, same of his statements have been
halpfel. He was supported througK%nt his it career byte)
other agent* Mho have been more frank and AIDS* toestlamony bias been
fonnd emereally reliable. lbw* agents were less imporimt
and lass knociedgmible than Pere, but their information has been
tumoral in reconstructing the ease. =Alai intimate liaison WA
the aND GIANT concerting the operations dismesol in this paper
and vas directly involved in several of them. Additional Insieht
into BID built* of these eases was received unoffic1i417 through
close personal contacts with several of the FIND officers. !his
imendes informtion m disownment* within the 310 concerning
the interpretation and handling of these operations, and the enact
role plegelbyFelfe in the Intru.georvice neneuvering. In several
instances we know the facts frets defectors or from a CIA-acatroUsd
penetration source. CIA was also intimately involved lathe
investlention of Felts both before idg after his arrest.
while there ere some imps in or information, our knowledge of
this period or intelligence history in dersmny Is probelay Most
as complete as it ever could be without a fell confession by
Felfe or a firct.aand account from his IS come officer.
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Api
Ifi.th,==Teara
The history of the Felts penetration boa its bedanniwg
in the early post-vow years. The spotting of people like Melom
Felts by the Soviet istalispoce services was not accidental,
but** result of $well-targeted, well-developed recruithest
campaign directed against former police and intelligence officers
of the Masi Belch. the tiese. was simple: old intelligsommt bends
vill flock together, vill seek to return to the work they know
best. Some ofthese people might be susceptible to a Soviet
appromeh because of their general symyethies. Others, =eh as
formeresissas Elite Guard (OS)* and Hecurity Service (Be) members
of *an were .now weir criminals able to mike their wag 0117 by
hiding a pact Idlieh had once int them among the would
be vulnerable to blackmail. The Soviet spotters were to be found
almost everywhere in Europe . Fast and West - in the POW camps,
in the war crimes screening ccendendous, in the courtrooms. The
future West German intelligence and security services could be
penetrated almoht even bef tliey mit: created.
In the losing days of the war, Goma' ReShard Oeblen
of the Frsaie Hoeft Ost (410)** hod brougort the =manta\
files sad perecentel to 0-2, V.V. Army, for *bombe,
le awl relatively unitise source of information on
battle. Under 0.2's gads his /row turgeonsd
by l9I9 t had beeome recognized as the primary Western
for the collection of Soviet CB and eventually of CI information
in the Soviet occupied zone of Germany It was a loosely knit
orgnIzation emde up predominertly of Zorn*: military intelligenee
(lbvehr) and FHO officers nho wove held together by the officer's
�ode of honor and individual tends of friendship. Pram en institutional
point of view, however, the problems of control, responsibility
and security were serious. agivatropftwi,
0.4a Mod CIA to
assume the responsibility for the organization and thus14;41/49v"
tubmgel trusteeship Which was tc last for seven years
MEW
*See Annex F for a glossary of 0111VMAN terms used inthis paper.
** FRO - General Staff victim deftling with information concern- ,
ing,xmies of countries to the East of Gessmnyr,,e4.1a-c-,trke.-.ge
epn...4erv-uit:
T
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TO the outsider and to its enemies, the Gehlen Organization looked much
more like an American puppet than it actually was.
00
-,tive4ipanatratilen=afifaptoft- By mid-19 . tire work against various of Gehlen's
field bases had been successful. but an agent working on Soviet operations
inside the headquarters organization in Pullach was reportedly still
lacking.* Particularly successful had been the KGB work against Gehlen's
field base for CE and CI operations which was located in Karlsruhe.
Within the Gehlen Organization t isfrOase was designated as GV"L".** and it
will be referred to by that designation throughout this paper. GVnle� was
especially attractive to the KGB. The major part of its work involved the
recruitment and handling of informants in other German agencies for the
ostensible purpose of protecting the security of these agencies. The
same base was also responsible for running double agent operations
against the Soviets, a function which brought its personnel into direct
contact with Soviet controlled agents. It was especially vulnerable
because it was heavily staffed by former SO and SS personnel who in
order to maintain their jobs were obliged at least orma to conceal
their background, and who sti.11 suffered to some extent from old social
and professional caste rivalries which kept the former Abwehr and FHO
officers in astendeecy, In reaction to this situation there had gradually
cn
*Primary source of informationAearly KG8 work in Germany is Petr leryabin.
who was assigned to the State Security headquarters desk responsible for CE
work in Germany from May 1952 to September 1953. He read the Headquarters file
on the Gehlen Organization in July 1952 and has stated that as of that date
there were Soviet agents in the field bases but no evidence of a Soviet agent
in the Gehlen headquarters; however, we cannot rule out the possibility that
there may have existed restricted files to which he had no access. Ernst WORM,,
a Gehlen Headquarters officer working on Czech operations, came ender very
strong suspicion of being_ an agent for some Eastern service in the/rall of 1952.
The GV stamds fpr General Ver�iiiittuno -- General The
n arbitrary designation.
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developed within GV"L" a sort of mutual aid society of ex-SS and SD
personnel for self-protection and professional advancement. This
group was particularly susceptible both to simple blackmail and to the
somewhat more complicated appeals of revenge or vindication.* It was
through this base, GV"L", that ioe-e41-44-fritat-ei0e-eietts---
was launched.
a. Background Information on Felfe
Heinz Felfe was born in Dresden in 1918, the son of 4 crmlna1
police inspector. He started his own police career at the age of 13 as a
volunteer in a border unit. In 1938 he was inducted into an 55 reserve
unit and from then on his schooling, legal training, and subsequent assign-
ment to a job in the Criminal Police was guided and fostered by the SS.
In 1943 he went into the foreign intelligence section of the Reich
Central Security Office (RSHA), where he worked first in the Swiss section
at headquarters, then in Holland - for a while under Schreieder of "Nordpol"
fame. He finished the war as a 1st Lt. (Obersturmfuehrer) in the
militarized branch of the Nazi Elite Guard (Waffen $S) and as a prisoner
of the British. He was an average looking individual with no distinguishing
physical characteristics. Of the many recorded impressions of him from
various stages of his career, certain personality traits dominate: a
highly intelligent man with very little personal warmth; a person with
a high regard for efficiency, and for authority, but susceptible to
flattery; venal; and capable of almost childish displays of vindictiveness.
Naturally a devious person, he enjoyed the techniques of engineering a
*A variety of formal and informal secret Naz nizations have existed
since the end of the Second World War. The KGB WSA a aMuch-success in
penetrating and controlling these groups from their inception, and using them
as recruitment pools and as propaganda weapons. One of the most interesting
reports on this subject was provided by the senior Polish Intelligence (UP)
officer Michel Goleniewskl, and concerns an organization which he called
HACKE. Information on HACKE is in Annex A. It shows how early and how
thoroughly the KGB penetrated and manipulated hard-core Nazi groups, especially
the former intelligence and secerity officers. These operations were the logical
outgrowth of the KGB's wartime operations and began even before the war was
over. They still have ramifications indiamp areas of the world where- former
NarI5have settled..
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good deception in his profession. He was brilliant as an elicitor of
information, an: excellent listener and an operations officer of such
generally recognized capability that from time to time he was given
special "vest-pocket" operations to manage for the chief of his
German service. Infinitely cool and brazen in the face- of danger,
thoroughly aware at all times of what he was doing,
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-cold calculator" as he once ringly described
ble in his
disdain for
The only klitsdtgr e*)tiona
.srehisAMSHeirigeritie, enjoyment of the gems
his fellow man. These, together with his great admiration for
Soviet 'over and efficiency, seem U.', have sustained his throughout
his career and imprisonment His attachment to his wife and two
children seems to have been :elatively perfunctory As for his
colleague in espionage for ten years - and friend in adversity
of even longer standing, Hans ,lens -Faro found his in the end
merely a convenient scapegoat.
An a British W, Felfe is inter
interrogation center near Utrecht, whi
interrogation of former German intell
poseible that his name came to Sevint
ten on
among the rutch interrogators. One of Felfess
a former SD officer named Helmut Proebsting, r
Dutch
authorities in 1946 that he and Pelfe had been pproaChed by
Mix WesserPf the interrogators, to work for the Soviets. Bet
Felts denied that any such incident had occurred, When confronted
with thin infonmition after his srrest. This is one of anumber
of suspicious o1nta in raft's background Which could have been
uncovered by an aggressive investigation long before bils arrest.
settle in
tly been
Dresden
946 with thedeter-
any, although his home
Soviet occupied sone.
His wife and child joined him at the end of the year. Seven
difficult months followed until he finally found work as an agent
for a British military intelligeneq. unit (Sixth Area Intelligence
Office, BAOR). His task was to develop information on Communist
student groups at the University of Bonn. Under British instruction
he settled himself in the D,nr., area, registered in the Faculty of Law
and Joined the Ccemonist Farty(VD). In the course of his work
he made several tripe to East Berlin and to Beat Oermsny to
observe student rallies', from Which he took off on his own
Initiative to visit his mother in Dresden. Here again the
possibility of Soviet tprgetineelliss. Felts mays that on
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one of these trips, in 1948, his mother warned him that someone in the
town had recognized him and reported him as a former 55 officer. On
another occasion, he says, he was arrested by tfeib police, but quickly
released at the intervention of his host, an official of the East
German Ministry of Public Education.
The British finally dropped Felfe in April 1950 for serious
operational and personal security reasons, none of which unfortunately,
came to the attention of the Gehlen Organization in any very detailed
or forceful form until long after Felfe was entrenched in it. British
files on Felfe were received by the BND in 1961 and by CIA in 1962;
These revealed that early complaints against Felfe included attempts
to sell inforeetion collected for the British to several other
Intelligence agencies, two West German news services and to the East
German Socialist Unity (i.e., Communist) Party (SED). They also
contained an account of Felfe's attempt to involve the British in a
double agent operation with the Soviets, as well as various agent reports
showing that he had blown himself as a L'eltish agent to all and sundry,
Including the West German Communist Party he was supposed to be
penetratingand that he was guilty in general of "sharp practice" and
"varnishing of the truth. � As specific grounds for dismissal, the
British told Felfe that his refusal to give up undesirable contacts
with former S personnel could no longer be tolerated. Specifically.
they named Helmut Proebsting and Hans Clemens. Clemens was an old
Dresden friend and former colleague from the foreign intelligence
arm of the RSHA.
After leaving the British, Felfe continued to work against the
West German Communist Party for the Land security office (LfV) in
Nordrhein-Westfallen, to which he had already been reporting on the
side while a British military intelligence agent. He incurred the
wrath of this organization on at least two serious counts for
having sent a report on it to a contact in East Germany l and for
having tried to peddle the plans for the BfV charter, which he had
somehow acquired from someone in the Finance Ministry, to a West
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German newsman. From the LfV Felfe went to the Ministry for All-German
Affairs,* where he worked as an interrogator specializing in refugees
knowledgeable on the East German People's Police (VW). He remained
at this job, eventually writing a study of the VOPO for the Ministry
until his recruitment into the Gehlen Organization in 1951.
b, flackround Information on Glens
Anyone who has tried to understand Germany knows that bonds of common
local origin are often far stronger than the larger national concept. The
fellowship of former Dresdeners is a thread which runs very heavily
throughout this story. Both Hars Clemens and Felfe were from Dresden,
and their recruitment by Soviet intelligence was directed by the KGB
office in Dresden.
Clemens had been chief of an SD field office in Dresden in the late
thirties, when he had worked agdinst the German Communist Party (KPO).
Later he was posted to RSHA Amt VI (foreign intelligence), where he
learned to know Felfe well, and subsequently he went ta the SD command
in Rome. At the end of the war he was captured by Italian partisans
and interned in various Critish and U.S. POW camps. In 1948 he was
indicted, and acquitted, during the well-publicized trial of his chief.
the Nazi Police Attache Herbert /appler, notorious for the murder of Italien
hostages in the Ardeatine Caves, At some point during his captivity he
learned that his wife Gerda, in Dresden, with whom he had been
corresponding, had been sleepira with Soviet officers. He claimed that
this knowledge severed his already weakened affections for her and decided him
in favor of resettling in West rather than East Germany after his release
from POW camp. He settled in West Germany in October 1949, but continued
to remain in loose correspondence with his wife, through whom he had
learned the whereabouts of some of his old friends. One of these was
*At the time, this organization was known as the Kaiser Ministerium.
It became the Ministry for All-German Affairs when Germany regained its
sovereignty in 1955. The latter name is used here for simplicity and
clarity.
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Erwin Tiebel. a fellow-Dresdener then practising law quietly in
a small town in the Rhineland. Tiebel had at one time been a
confidential informant for Clemens in the Dresden SO. Later1 he
had been assigned to the Swiss Desk of RSHP- VI. where he had also
known Felfe. He was to become a support agent for Clemens and
Felfe in their work for the Soviets.
Felfe had already looked up Tiebel in 1947. Clemens wrote
to him from
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PO/ camp in 9
Clauses' wire 4ati Womb=
liebelo suggests that these old thr
wart 441//sr# with Incognizance
accused of kV"
his
3
A letter from
and mentioning
hostages in den, 51g .there is acne susses tics that
Clams=was similarly listed. Gorda Clemens was working as a Soviet agent
(eTilia;ikAgvaleceibler 194, and probably Lad beams/nee the end of the
we:roes Pelf, later told his Britt& case arficer. ller cover name was
"Wilma% She reported to a =Colonel called "Me in an office in the
Soviet Cammand Dresden Whivb, according to Clemems, was concerned with
tracking down farmer police end intelligence officers frau the Dresden
area who vere liable for war crimes.
older
ag pernicious
and asking Ma a
as
a
E sen
4pI.Ine
-Wel Inferior which is
x' his arrest, he pretended that the
'a aenier - bedexercieed a daminetdng
&rawi bin into the Soviet service
t their s however they remaimed wood
friends, and Clemens in his post-arrest tatemart claimed that there bad
Al', er been any friction or rivalry between time in their Soviet work.
C.
*ere.
I C
�nsani relit)
hort time after Clemens return to Germany -
t Garda Clemons to Meet Germany with a recrutt
This occurred just at the end of-l949 or
1950. Clemons claims that the situation wee
face Charges. Moreover, he bad no
be was also intrigued by the idea of
ussei the attuation with both Pelf, and Tiabel.
three seem to have opposed outright the ides of accepting
PG.
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the Soviet approach, they did emtertain the notion of trying to offer
Clemens to someone as a doUble-agent. Clemens evea tsikel to an official
In the Ministry of interior. Uhfortunattly, the latter bruthalhin off
without giving him any concrete advice. Felfe may have offered Clemens
to the IfV; Britieh files Show that he told his <d.& case officer in
early 1.950 that he intemded tOfto so. Fall* bad already tried zisuceess-
fully
in Bever 1949, upon Clemens' arrival, to aell hit to the British
as an agent. (BO also tried to persuade then to recruit Tiebel4) This
effort had nerely earned him the admonition to stay away from his old
S, friends, Vho were bed medicine far someone eupposed to penetrate the
Corm-mist Perty. in January 1950 Fife tried again, this tie' offering
Clemens as a British-Soviet double Nowt. A letter dated 25 41e-emery 1950
from Tiebel to Fells states that Clemens had alreedy agreed in priocUls
to cooperate with the Soviets La Dresden. The Britith files contain a
ammo �revisit by Pelf* to his ease officer on 29 %Ternary 2959, during
which he reported that Garda Clemens had arrived two days earlier and
vas planning to return Shortly to Dresden with Ler huaband in order to put
him in touch with the BM The British lingerea oray briefly over the
decision of vhsther to play Clemens as A double agent. Shortly after
Felfe's proposal, evidence of his double-iinalitg with the UV became
evident, and he confessed to having sent a report on that organization
to an Bast German Commuslet Party contact :tallest Berlin. Aga Frau
Clemens appeared in Germany again in early April, and Felfe tried once more to
persuade his employers to undertake an operation., the British case officers
came to the decision that they Should drop, Felfe and list Clemons as
a security rift". By this time, of course, Clemems vas no longer Just a
security risk; be had already gone to Dresden and became a Soviet agent.
In February 1950 Clemens vent to Dreeden, Where he vas led by
his vita to meet Colonel hex in the Soviet "Weldschlossechen" Compound.
Bere, Max debriefed Clem�, on his life history and present contacts
lectured Mil on his culptbdlity an au SD criminal, probed his feelings
of confusion and resentment, listened constructively *bile Clemens deliver-
ed himeelf of a long pent-up statement of his hatred for the Americans.
(They had been Wide the cause of German defeat, etc., had emaShed his
home town and caused the death of at least five of his relatives.) Max
at this point took Clemens on a tour of bombed-out Dresden and, at the
tide of Clemens' emotional reaction, offered bin an opportunitY of
revenge againet the Americans. The pronsalmis clear cut and precise:
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as a Soviet agent Clenens was to return to the Western zones, seek out
old police and SD contacts and through them try to penetrate the Oehlen
Organization. The Gehlen Organization was an "Amiladen" (an American
shop), and any blow aimed at it was a blow at the Americans. Clemens
agreed: for money, for a personal cause, and to be on the side of
power, but not, he insisted, because of any special svmnathy toward the
Russians. (Here, as in many other cases. re strains of the old Nazi
theme of German superiority to Russians.) He signed himself on as a
Soviet agent with the cover name "Peter-" later he used German girls'
names. At this first meeting Clemens provided Max with a list of
potential recruits in which he included the names of both Felfe and
Tiebel. Clemens says he was very impressed by Max and by his
psychological adroitness: Max was civil, sober, authoritative,
knowledgeable. but most important - as both Clemens and Felfe have
stressed many times - he never pushed or threatened directly. His
watchwords were to proceed slowly and naturally.
When Clemens returned to West Germany he told Tiebel and Felfe
the whole story and was able without much difficulty to recruit them,
in turn, for Max. (Clemens states it was perfectly clear to his
friends that Max's target was the Gehlen Organization. Felfe claims
that he did not understand that this was the case until much later.)
When Tiebel paid his first visit to Dresden some months later, he
received much the same treatment as had Clemens, with perhaps
greater emphasis on the threat of war crimes indictment. He
received the cover name �Erich, hici- he kept throughout his agent
career. Felfe, who by this tire emi working as a refugee interrogator
in the Ministry for All-German Affairs, resisted making the trip east
for another year. He did, however, submit reports to Clemens. Tiebel
was later to be used as a courier.
Clemens was able to carry out his assignment for Max with mewing
rapidity. In March 1950 he came across an old acquaintance from the
Uresden police named Wilhelm Yrichbeup who was then employed in e
sub-unit of GV1." in Bavaria. Through him Clemens wds able to Join
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the Gehien Organization in June of 1950 as a registry clerk and
courier for the same unit. (Clemens' Gehlen Organization alias
was "Cramer.") Krichbaem himself was later to become highly
suspect as an early MGB/Oresden penetration of the Gehlen
Organization, but it is not known whether or not he wittingly
maneuvered Clemens or Felfe in the organization for the Soviets.
Clemens remained in Krichbaum's unit for two years, during which
time he reported on the organization and personnel of both the
Bavarian unit and its parent base. GV1.:, and on anything else
that came his way. His reports were typed on thin paper and hidden
in cans of powdered milk which he sent periodically to his wife in
Dresden. Re collected reports from Felfe whenever they had the
opportunity to meet and sent them on in the same way. (Since Felfe is
reported. in British files, as having made a trip to Southern Geneany
within a few days of trying to sell the plans for the BfV charter to a
news service, it is a good guess that these documents might also have
found their way into one of Clemens milk cans.) There was relatively
little communication from Max; what there was was handled by Gerda
Clemens, who served as courier ane, mail drop.
When Felfe's work for the inistry for All-German Affairs drew to
a close in September 1951, he aereed to myke his first visit to Max in Dresden.
At about the same time Clemens recommended him to Kriehbaum as a reliable and
experienced Intelligence officer and Krichbaum arranged for his employment
by the Gehlen Organization. Although Felfe will not admit it, it seems
likely that there was a definite cause and effect relationship between the
timing of his availability for work .in the Gehlen Organization and his trip to
Dresden. Max was primarily interested in the Gehlen 0rganization as a target,
and presumably it was at the point when Felfe was actually able to penetrate
his target that Felfe became of importance. There is some suggestion in our
records - no evidence - that Felfe might really have neen recrulted-earlier,
but even if this is so his serious Soviet work probably did not begin until
he wasoroperly accredited West German intelligence officer.
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Around the firs, of September 1951 Felfe flew to West. Berlin where
he was met by Gerda Clemens, who conducted him to Max in the East Sektor.
Max drove- him to the Soviet Compound in Karishorst, where he questioned
Felfe on his background Felfe iaid he appeared to be very
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bti tarloadY end 'gavehia tile't.:6.31: arriaLl
,
laratton
he did, not � ISA a tsle4*0
snob*, 'Ne received tbe",coviter nevus
a
friendly* eodiable�!.,
- .
OS
Itit tit( LI* 111010t1IW �
events TikAayed theass2.ves out exactly wish*** ami-
work tor Soveet
et wee well vine sat d.ined
26th,ot October� Falfe VAS dolled to Xerleruhe far a persoael�