FOCUS ON TERRORISM, ORBIS, VOL. XIX, NO. 4 - 1976/08/26

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Argentina Declassification Project - The "Dirty War" (1976-83)
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02604801
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 69
• Document Creation Date: April 3, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 12, 2019
• Publication Date: August 26, 1976

AVM"'
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FEATU
"Focus on Terrorism," ORBIS, Vol. XIX, No. 4
Ranter 1976 edition); five articles
The attached series of articles examines different aspects
of terrorism, including: responses to terrorism by individual
governments, at the UN and through the processes of international
law; the effect of political violence on the quality of life in
the non-communist world, where it has curtailed certain freedoms
heretofore taken for granted; the problems of controlling terrorism,
including the role of the news media; the special problems of
situations involving hostages and an examination of the U.S. role
in countering the terrorist campaign against civil aviation.
The articles not only provide considerable factual information
on the nature and development of international terrorism, but also
analyze the motives underlying terrorist actions and the responses
to these actions. They also offer thoughtful suggestions, same of
which are adaptable for covert action treatment, for dealing with
the many facets of this problem. This series should be useful for
briefings, discussions, etc., depending on local circumstances,
as well as for stations' awn reference purposes.
�.�
This issuance contains artides from domestic and foreign
publications selected for field operational use. Recipients are
cautioned that most of this Material is copyrighted. For repub-
lication in areas where copyright infringement may cause prob-
lems payment of copyright fees not to exceed $50.00 is authorized
per previous instructions. The attachment is unclassified when
detached.
.26 et&
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THE POLITICS OF
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
by Andrew J. Pierre
INTERNATIONAL terrorism is a new, growing and increas-
ingly important phenomenon in present-day world politics.
Hardly a week now goes by without the hijacking of an airplane
across national boundaries, or the kidnaping of a diplomat or
foreign businessman, or some other violent incident in the name
of a political cause.
Lydda Airport, outside Tel Aviv, May 30, 1972: A group of Japanese
terrorist belonging to the Rengo Sekigun, or Red Army, stepped off a
plane and indiscriminately killed twenty-seven people, most of whom
were Puerto Ricans commencing a Holy Land pilgrimage. First con-
tacted by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine in North
Korea, the Japanese had been flown from Tokyo to Lebanon for several
months' training in guerrilla camps, and were then sent to Paris, Frank-
furt and Rome to await their mission. They were equipped with
Czechoslovakian automatic weapons acquired in Italy but financed
with Libyan money.
Munich, the Olympic games, September 5, 1972: Members of the Black
September organization attacked the quarters of Israeli athletes, result-
ing in the death of eleven, some as they were to be flown out as hostages.
Campana, Argentina, December 6, 1973: A Marxist guerrilla group
known as the People's Revolutionary Army kidnaped the American
manager of an Exxon refinery, releasing him four months later for a
ransom of $14.2 million in cash purportedly to be distributed to the
poor for food, clothing and medicine.
Amsterdam, July 24, 1974: A Japanese jumbo jet en route to Tokyo
was hijacked by Palestinian terrorists and blown up in Tripoli, Libya.
Dubai, November 21, 1974: A British Airways VC-I0, on a stopover
between Brunei and London, was hijacked by the Matyr Abou Mali-
moud squad, a Palestinian splinter group opposed to Yasir Arafat.
After asking for the release of jailed terrorists in the Netherlands and
Egypt, and killing one German passenger, the hijackers and some re-
leased terrorists surrendered to authorities in Tunis and were subse-
quently turned over to the PLO.
Cordoba, Argentina, February 28, 1975: The U.S. consular agent, John
Patrick Egan, was shot to death by leftist Montoneros guerrillas in an
abortive plot to force the release of imprisoned colleagues.
Kuala Lumpur, August 4, 1975: Five Japanese Red Army terrorists shot
their way into the American Embassy and seized fifty-three hostages.
The incident was terminated three days later after another five ter-
rorists were released from jail in Japan and all made their way by air
to asylum in Libya.
These examples are only some of the better known among hun-
dreds of such incidents. To give an approximate idea of the growth
of international terrorism, in the twenty years before 1969 there
was an average of five hijackings per year; in the early 1970s the
average was over sixty annually. The past six years have witnessed
more than 500 major acts of international terrorism including over
sixty-five kidnapings with international ramifications.
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There is nothing new about terrorism per se. The term first came
into modern usage during the Reign of Terror in revolutionary
France. It commonly refers to the threat of violence and the use of
fear to coerce, persuade or gain public attention. Terror has been
used by ideblogies of both the Right and the Left, by the former
to repress a population and by the latter to win self-determination
and independence. Terror has been used by governments as an
instrument of state as well as by guerrillas or insurgents as an
instrument of subversion.'
The concept of international terrorism is more difficult to endow
with a universally accepted definition. In this analysis it will refer
to acts of violence across national boundaries, or with clear inter-
national repercussions, often within the territory or involving the
citizens of a third party to a dispute. Thus it is to be distingushed
from domestic terrorism of the sort that has taken place in Ulster,
the Soviet Union or South Africa. Admittedly, the line is often thin
between terror which is essentially domestic and that possessing a
clear international character.
International terrorism is usually, though not exclusively, politi-
cal in intent and carried out by nongovernmental groups, although
they may receive financial and moral support from nation-states.
Many of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) terrorist
activities have taken place outside the boundaries of Israel, have
been financed or abetted by some Arab states, and have affected
nationals of third countries. Most of the victims have been inno-
cent bystanders, such as the American tourists machine-gunned in
the waiting room of Athens airport. (The terrorists thought the
tourists were bound for Israel, although in fact they were about to
board a plane to New York.) Targets are often selected because of
their connection to a foreign state, i.e., diplomats and foreign busi-
nessmen, or because they have become symbols of international
interdependence, such as airlines with overseas routes or multi-
national corporations.
Due to its international character, this form of terrorism is of
particular concern to the world community. Repressive or violent
activities totally within national boundaries may be of real and
valid concern, but they are obviously less amenable to pressure and
change through international action by means of diplomacy or law.
Moreover, the motivations of international terrorists are often re-
lated to the world community and public opinion abroad. The
attacks upon Maalot and other towns in northern Israel in 1974
were designed, by the admission of the Al Fatah, to gain the Pales-
tinians a place at any forthcoming Geneva negotiations on the
Middle East.
It is unlikely that international terrorism is a passing and transi-
tory phenomenon. The trend toward the weakening of central
authority in governments, the rise in ethnic and subnational senti-
ments, and the increasing fractionalization of the global political
process point toward its growth as a form of political protest and
The best theoretical work on terrorism remains E. V. Walter, Terror and Re-
sistance: A Study of Political Violence (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969).
Most other studies only touch on terrorism in the context of internal conflict or
guerrilla war. See, for example, J. Bowyer Bell, The Myth of the Guerrilla (New
York: Alfred Knopf, 1971); Robert Moss, The War for the Cities (New York: Coward,
McCann and Geoghegan, 1972); Harry Eckstein, Internal War (New York: Free Press,
1964). "State terrorism" is discussed in Barrington Moore, Jr., Terror and Progress
in the U.S.S.R. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1954). For two recent
studies, see Richard Clutterbuck, Living with Terrorism (London: Faber and Faber,
1975) and Brian Jenkins, International Terrorism: A New Mode of Conflict (Los
Angeles, Calif.: California Seminar on Arms Control and Foreign Policy, Research
Paper No. 48, 1975).
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persuasion. Classic balance of power diplomacy is of little utility
in dealing with it, for violent acts of small groups of people, or
individuals, are difficult for governments to control. International
terrorism is likely to continue and to expand because in the minds
of many of its perpetrators it has proven to be "successful."
Technological change and growth account for much of the new
strength and disruptive capacity of terrorist groups. Television
gives the terrorist instant access to the world's living rooms, thereby
enabling him to draw global attention to his cause. The mobility
offered by the modern jet aircraft allows him to strike at will almost
anywhere in the world and then move on to safe asylum. Hence,
advances in technology have made it possible for 'a large society to
be directly affected by a small band of terrorists.
Yet the increasing frequency of international terrorism is only
beginning to be understood and has thus far received relatively
little sustained, analytic attention. We are at the rudimentary
stages of learning to cope with it. In this article we will examine
the response to international terrorism as it has evolved in ,the
practice of governments, at the United Nations where it has been
identified as a major item of international concern, and through
the processes of international law. Policy suggestions will be made
for the future. But first, in order to understand him better, we must
look at what it is that moves and motivates the terrorist.
ONE MAN'S TERRORIST IS ANOTHER MAN'S
"FREEDOM FIGHTER"
There is no simple explanation for the causes of international
terrorism, nor is there common agreement on its purposes and ends.
Perceptions about the legitimacy of the means vary dramatically.
What to one man is an outrageous act of lawlessness and immo-
rality � e.g., the shooting of innocent passengers on a hijacked
Pan American plane in Rome, the assassination of the German
ambassador in Guatemala, or the murder of apartment dwellers
at Qiryat Shemona � appears to another as an unfortunate but
necessary step toward achieving a political goal rooted in existing
or perceived injustice and deprivation. As we will see later, these
differing perceptions have been transformed into the diverging
attitudes of governments at the United Nations and elsewhere.
Motivations for international terrorism vary from case to case
and are often complex, but their roots can be discerned in one or
more of the following profiles:
(1) The terrorist is dedicated to a political goal which he sees as
one of transcendent merit. The aim of the fedayeen (Arabic for
"self-sacrificers") has been to gain political salience for the Pales-
tinian cause. By making their goal appear viable to the Arab world,
they have received financial and political assistance from Moslem
states that support, or feel compelled to support, their cause. The
Tupamaros in Uruguay and the People's Revolutionary Army
(ERP) in Argentina have sought popular support through the
widespread use of terrorist tactics that induce the government to
react harshly and therefore appear oppressive in its response.2
(2) The terrorist seeks attention and publicity for his cause. The
world becomes his stage as contemporary media enable him to
See Maria Esther Gilin, The Tupamaro Guerrillas (New York: Saturday Review
Press, 1972); Jack Davis, Political Violence in Latin America (London: International
Institute for Strategic Studies, Aclelphi Paper No. 85, 1972); Robert Moss, Urban
Guerrilla Warfare (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi
Paper No. 79, 1971).
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dramatize his goals effectively and attempt to win over public
opinion. A display of determination and devotion to the cause
focuses world attention upon it and may induce sympathy. In an
age seemingly lacking in heroics, a cause for which an individual
is prepared to sacrifice his life appears to some as worthy of support.
Without the flamboyant terrorist acts of recent years the Palestin-
ian issue would probably have remained relatively neglected and
would be ranked lower on the international agenda than it is today.
In this sense the PLO has achieved considerable success.
(3) The terrorist aims to erode support for the established po-
litical leadership or to undermine the authority of the state by
destroying normality, creating uncertainty, polarizing a country,
fostering economic discord and generally weakening the fabric of
society. Attacks on foreign business firms, such as multinational
corporations and their executives in Latin America, have forced
them to reduce or close down their operations, as in the case of
IBM and the Ford Motor Company, thereby creating unemploy-
ment and fanning discontent among the population that can be
channeled into activities against the government. Attacks on civil
aircraft and in the lounges of airports have sought to reduce air
travel and tourism to Israel through psychological disruption and
the spread of fear. Sometimes the intent is to provoke a government
to ill-judged measures of repression that will alienate public
opinion.
(4) The terrorist's actions can be a measure of deep frustration
when there is no legitimate way to redress grievances. It may be
an act of desperation when a political impasse has been reached.
As such, terrorism can be a sign of fundamental weakness as
well as of momentary strength. Zeal and determination often
compensate for an inherent position of weakness, for not having
full backing for one's political aims. At the same time terrorism
can be perceived as a patriotic deed. Palestinian perpetrators of
terrorism those who survive � return home as heroes to their
people.
(5) The terrorist may seek to liberate his colleagues in foreign
jails. Aircraft hijacking appears to be an especially popular way of
securing the release of prisoners. In September 1972 three mem-
bers of the Ustashi, a Croatian terrorist organization, by hijacking
an SAS airliner forced the Swedish government to release from
prison six Croats who had been convicted in the murder of the
Yugoslav ambassador in Stockholm. The next month, a Lufthansa
flight from Beirut to Ankara was hijacked to Zagreb and the plane
released only after Arab terrorists in West German prisons had
been set free.
(6) Finally, the terrorist may desire money so as to buy arms and
finance his organitation. Some claim that they want to distribute
food and shelter to the poor and needy. The kidnaping of foreign
executives for ransom has become endemic in Latin America in
recent times. Because corporations are willing, if forced, to pay
substantial amounts to secure the release of their executives or
avoid the sabotage of their plants, terrorism can be lucrative. Such
companies as Amoco, Peugeot and Pepsico are reported to have
paid large ransoms to terrorists in Argentina. Some demands are
for perceived just causes, while some, as in Mexico, can take on the
form of banditry. Sometimes appearance is deceptive: at the Bank
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of America in Beirut a representative of Douglas Aircraft was shot
by ordinary bank robbers posing as fedayeen.3
Modern society has become highly vulnerable to the terrorist
deed. The crowded environment of the urban metropolis presents
a "soft" target. Mass disruption of ordinary activities could be
readily achieved through tampering with the electrical grid sys-
tem, or by poisoning or polluting a city's water supply. In case of
a more limited aim, the new sealed-window office building is sub-
ject to chemical and biological contamination through the air ven-
tilation system. Poisonous powder on subway tracks can spread
noxious germs throughout parts of a city. Such activities could be
highly successful in generating mass fear and social disintegration.
Technology is making efficient tools available to terrorists. In-
genious timing and detonating devices are increasing the capacity
for selective violence. Particularly worrisome is the prospect of
civilian airliners being shot at by portable hand-held surface-to-air
missiles as they land at or take off from airports. In January 1975,
Arab terrorists with bazookas attempted, to destroy El-Al airliners
while on the runway at Orly field in Paris. Heathrow Airport in
London was twice surrounded last year by tanks and troops follow-
ing reports that Arab terrorists planned to use Soviet-made SAM-7
missiles to bring down an aircraft. These missiles, which are only
fifty-four inches long and can be dismantled and packed in a small
suitcase, had reportedly been smuggled into Brussels from Libya;
some were also found in an Arab apartment just three miles from
Rome's Leonardo da Vinci Airport. Another danger is terror by
mail � on one occasion the secretary of the defense attach�t the
British Embassy inIVashington was maimed by a letter-bomb.
The risk of nuclear materials being stolen and used by terrorist
groups is also to be taken seriously. The growth in use of nuclear
reactors to generate electrical power will yield large amounts of
fissionable materials in the form of plutonium that can be used to
manufacture nuclear explosives or weapons with relative ease.
Should terrorists succeed in diverting such materials to their pur-
poses, not to speak of the real possibility of stealing nuclear weap-
ons, they would acquire fearsome means with which to threaten
communities and governments.4
Clearly, the vulnerability-and fragility of contemporary society,
in combination with the availability of sophisticated technology,
increases the potential for disruptive activites. Moreover, modern
communcation aids the terrorist in his search for publicity by mak-
ing possible detailed, on-the-spot coverage of his acts even when
they occur in remote parts of the world. His ability to count on
the media to dramatize and instantaneously inform the world of
his activities � and thereby his cause � should not be underrated
as a stimulus and an incentive.
COPING WITH INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
Dealing with terrorism has become a problem of some magni-
tude and urgency, and is increasingly recognized as a challenge to
the community of nations. Yet the political dynamics of inter-
national terrorism make coping with it an extremely difficult and
'Fascinating insights into the terroriSt's frame of mind are to be found in a
"minimanual" written by Carlos Marighella, a Brazilian terrorist, five months before
he was killed in an ambush. For extracts see Survival. March 1971, pp. 95-100.
'For the best exposition of this problem, see Mason Willrich and Theodore B.
Taylor, Nuclear Theft: Risks and Safeguards (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Press,
1974).
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subtle task. The need will not be limited to responding to terror-
ism or deterring it with the threat of punishment. Of equal im-
portance some would argue, far greater � is the need to pre-
vent it by treating its underlying root causes.
This is the clear lesson of the debate on terrorism in the United
Nations. Following the tragedy at the Munich Olympics, Secretary-
General Kurt Waldheim asked the Twenty-seventh General As-
sembly to consider "measures to prevent international terrorism
and other forms of violence which endanger or take innocent hu-
man lives or jeopardize fundamental freedoms." The Asembly
agreed to his request, but amended it to include "the study of the
underlying causes of those forms of terrorism and acts of violence
which lie in misery, frustration, grievance and despair arid which
cause some people to sacrifice human lives, including their own,
in an attempt to effect radical changes."
Debate in the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly and in
a specially appointed thirty-five-state Ad Hoc Committee on Inter-
national Terrorism brought out wide divergencies in perceptions
of the problem. The principal interest of many of the developing
countries was to avoid anything that could be used to suppress,
or deny the legitimacy of, national liberation movements. Because
many member-states had themselves been born out of rebellion
and revolution, it was argued that condemnation of others who
might be following similar courses, e.g., Palestinians, would be
wrong and incongruous. This view was widely shared by African
and Arab as well as many Asian countries. Some insisted that any
consideration of international terrorism must begin with the con-
demnation of "state terrorism" as practiced by governments. Thus
the Syrian Arab Republic said it was convinced "that the main
cause of violence is the colonialist and imperialist policies and
practices, as well as the crimes, of racist regimes against peoples."3
The principal proposal placed before the United Nations has
been an American draft of a "Convention for the Prevention and
Punishment of Certain Acts of International Terrorism." Wisely,
the convention is narrowly drawn and does not attempt to deal
with all acts of terrorism. In no way does it cover domestic terror-
ism designed to alter the political order within a single country.
Rather, it focuses on the "export" of violence to third countries
and innocent parties, undertaken by persons who kill, seriously
assault or kidnap other persons in such a manner as to commit an
offense of "international significance." According to Article I, it
would be limited to acts in which each of four separate conditions
apply: The act is committed or takes effect outside the territory
of a spte of which the alleged offender is a national; is committed
or takes effect outside the territory of the state against which the
act is directed; is committed neither by nor against a member of
the armed forces of a state in the course of military activities; and
is intended to damage the interest of or obtain concessions from
a state or an international organization. � It would therefore not
apply to acts of terrorism committed by a "freedom fighter" strug-
gling within his country in a war of national liberation, but would
United Nations General Assembly, 27th Session, Ad Hoc Committee on Inter-
national Terrorism, A/AC. 160/2, p. 16.
8 United Nations General Assembly, 27th Session, Sixth Committee, A/C.6/L.,
p. 850.
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be pertinent to most of the major international terrorist incidents
of recent times.
Despite its limited approach, the convention failed to receive
general support at the United Nations. The more radical view,
most often espoused by African and Arab governments, held that
terrorism was part of the struggle for national liberation and the
right of self-determination, and therefore should not be consid-
ered an international offense. This argument was also made by
Yasir Arafat in his speech at the UN when he equated his struggle
with that of George Washington against the British colonialists.
Moderate countries acknowledged the need to address the problem
but emphasized the necessity to deal with long-term solutions and
the grievances that lead to terrorism. Even West European govern-
ments were reluctant to take action. Debate within the United
Nations has thus far led to no productive results. Experience sug-
gests that while the majority of countries in the world body ac-
knowledge the danger spreading terrorism poses for international
order, the politics of international terrorism are such that many
countries are still more willing to condone than to condemn it.
SKYJACKING
It may be that progress can be more readily made in coping with
specific types of international terrorism, such as aerial piracy or the
kidnaping of diplomats. The case of aircraft hijacking is instruc-
tive, for within the past year incidents have decreased considerably
as a result of security measures taken unilaterally by a number of
countries, as well as a bilateral agreement between Cuba and the
United States. Progress achieved in this way, however, has been
outside of efforts to deal with terrorism on a worldwide level.
The rash of skyjacking that began in 1968 produced two con-
ventions on this aspect of terrorism: the Hague convention of 1970
for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft7 and the Mon-
treal convention of 1971 for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts
Against the Safety of Civil Aviation.8 Both are concerned with
aerial piracy, the former requiring that countries either extradite
or prosecute hijackers; the latter requiring that any kind of sabo-
tage of aircraft, such as blowing up planes on the ground, also be
dealt with by prosecution or extradition. An earlier accord, the
Tokyo convention of 1963,8 requires countries to return a plane
and its passengers after it has been hijacked.
These conventions have proven to be weak legal instruments,
and a considerable number of states have not signed them. Some
of the nonsignatories provide safe haven for hijackers. The exis-
tence of sanctuaries, or "hijack havens," primarily in the Middle
East, encourages political terrorists to assume usually correctly
� that they can escape punishment."
Accordingly, Canada and the United States have urged the 128.
country International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) to adopt
sanctions against states that grant asylum to hijackers or fail to
penalize them. At a meeting of the ICAO held in Rome late in
'U.S. Department of State, United States Treaties and Other International Agree-
ments, Vol. 22, Part 2,.1971, pp. 1641-1684.
'Ibid., Vol. 24, Part 1, 1973, pp. 565-602.
'Ibid., Vol. 20, Part 3, 1969, pp. 2941-2958.
I� Interestingly, the Soviet Union, which has its own hijacking problem, has signed
the above conventions and generally endorses Western attempts to tighten inter-
national laws dealing with aerial piracy. See Y. Kolosov, "Legal Questions of the
Security of Civil Aviation," International Affairs (Moscow), April 1074, pp. 42-46.
7
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1973 for the purpose of protecting international civil aviation and
strengthening existing conventions, special attention was given to
hijacking; yet, while various proposals were made to curb aerial
terrorism, the conference terminated in stalemate. As in the case
of the UN deliberations on international terrorism, hijacking was
seen as more of a political than a criminal act. The Arab-Israeli
dispute unfortunately overshadowed the conference, which con-
vened shortly after Israel intercepted a Lebanese commercial air-
liner outside Beirut and forced it to land in Israel; the Israeli
action was condemned by the ICAO. In its dismay at the failure
of the ICAO conference, the International Association of Airline
Pilots threatened a pilot boycott of its own on nations tolerating
hijackers. At its annual conference in March 1975 in Vienna it
called for the adoption of a "no sanctuary" policy so that hijackers
would know that they would be arrested, tried in court, and
punished wherever they went.
A large proportion of the American aircraft that have been suc-
cessfully hijacked since the mid-1960s have been taken to Havana.
This recourse has now been effectively eliminated by an agreement
reached between Cuba and the United States through the good
offices of Switzerland. The reception a hijacker can now expect will
be less hospitable, the Castro Government having agreed that such
persons will be either extradited or prosecuted. Presumably Fidel
Castro became tired of serving as host to ordinary criminals and
psychopaths acting without political commitment. A little noticed
exception, however, provides for "persons . . . being sought for
strictly political reasons . . . in real or imminent danger of death
without a viable alternative for leaving the country.'11 Another
set of measures that has reduced hijacking in the United States and
some other countries has been the screening of passengers and lug-
gage for hand weapons, and additional airport security programs.
KIDNAPING
Another form of international terrorism that has grown dra-
matically has been the kidnaping of diplomats. Officials represent-
ing their governments -abroad become elite targets. Host gov-
ernments feel a special obligation toward their well-being, an
obligation firmly rooted in diplomatic custom and international
law. Terrorist groups are therefore effectively able to use diplo-
mats as hostages in seeking the release of jailed colleagues, or in
publicizing their domestic political struggle around the world. A
kidnaping may give a small group leverage with a government out
of all proportion to its true significance.
The first important diplomatic kidnaping in the present era was
that of C. Burke Elbrick, the U.S. ambassador to Brazil, in 1969.
He was released in exchange for fifteen political prisoners who
were flown to Mexico and subsequently made their way to Cuba.
Since then there have been several dozen diplomatic kidnapings,
usually of West European (Germans and Britons are particularly
in demand) or American officials, almost all in Latin America, and
especially in Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and Guatemala; some
have ended in assassination. In the past decade thirteen American
diplomats have been assassinated; twelve have been wounded;
twenty others have been kidnaped and later released. Particularly
striking was the kidnaping and death in 1973 of the American
ambassador to the Sudan, his deputy and a Belgian diplomat at
Department of State Bulletin, March 5, 1973, pp. 260-262.
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the hands of Black September terrorists following their demand
for the release of Arab guerrillas held in Jordan and Israel, the
freeing of Robert Kennedy's assassin, Sirhan Sirhan, and the
liberation of members of the Baader-Meinhof gang in jail in
West Germany.
As it became evident that Latin America was specially susceptible
to this type of international terrorism, the Organization of Ameri-
can States in 1971 drafted a convention for the protection of diplo-
mats. The desire to give it universal application subsequently led
the United Nations International Law Commission to suggest a
similar convention, which was adopted in amended form by the
General Assembly in December 1973. Under its provision, the kid-
naping, murder or attack of diplomats and other "internationally
protected persons" is to result in either extradition or prosecution
of the offender.'2 This convention is now open for signature and
is without doubt a forward step. The limits of its usefulness in
helping to resolve the entire problem of terrorist kidnaping and
assault are evident, however, when one considers that the majority
of such incidents occur not to diplomats but to businessmen. 'Be-
yond common-sense precautionary measures, no effective way has
been found to prevent the kidnaping of businessmen.
WHAT IS TO BE DONE?
The remedies for international terrorism sought at the United
Nations and through international legal conventions, though com-
mendable, are of only limited utility. The problem is not so much
one of law as one of politics. The evidence suggests that there are
a substantial number of states, or groups within them, that view
terrorism as an acceptable answer to perceived oppression � or feel
politically restrained from saying otherwise and are therefore
prepared to condone it. Because international terrorism is a form
of political violence and ultimately requires political solutions, an
effective response must come to terms with its political dimensions.
Steps for coping with terrorism will therefore need to include both
measures of prevention and measures of deterrence. Only through
a combination of the two, consciously pursued in parallel, can we
hope to reduce and eventually eliminate this spreading epidemic.
Prevention would require giving more attention than we now do
to economic, social and political grievances and sources of frustra-
tion. Individuals are more likely to turn to violence if they lose
hope, if life seems not worth living, and if the "system" appears to
be unresponsive to legitimate protest. Prevention would attempt
to eradicate the conditions that spawn terrorism by looking for
long-term solutions. It would seek to find and strengthen common
interests, and constructively channel remaining discontent. At a
minimum, it would seek to offer alternative� nonviolent forms of
protest.
This, quite obviously, has implications for the whole spectrum
of U.S. foreign policy, ranging from our relatively modest level of
foreign aid to our seemingly close relations, on occasion, with
unattractive political regimes. With specific respect to alleviating
international terrorism, we should in certain cases encourage our
embassies abroad to know of, and where possible give a fair hearing
to, dissident groups which are not outside the law, for example in
Latin America. This would involve showing proper regard for such
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally
Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, ibid., January 28, 1974, pp. 91-95.
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groups without necessarily giving them official endorsement. We
should be specially sympathetic in countries where dissident groups
are seeking social justice and other ideals with which we can asso-
ciate. This would be a way of rewarding dissidents who have a just
cause and who do not resort to-terrorist activities. At the same time,
we should bear in mind that terrorism may also be used by govern-
ments. Measures to curb international terrorism would be given
wider acceptability and be considerably enhanced if they were
coupled with concern for "state terrorism" by nondemocratic
regimes that use such tactics to remain in power or to repress
dissidence.
It may be instructive to ponder the case of the Palestinians, the
most conspicuous producers of international terrorism. Until re-
cently they were, or felt that they were, forgotten men. After
Israel's victory in the 1967 war, the world seemed to have lost
interest in their cause. At the same time, many Palestinians re-
mained year after year in crowded, squalid refugee camps. Little
attention was paid to their economic and political grievances. The
Arab states did little to further their interests; Israel in effect
refused to admit of their existence. To this day, the United States
has not opened a real dialogue with Palestinian leaders. Although
there may have been valid overriding reasons, the Palestinians are
only too aware that neither Dr. Kissinger nor his top aides met
with them during their repeated swings through the Middle East
while conducting step-by-step negotiations in the aftermath of the
Yom Kippur war.
Spectacular acts of terrorism, reprehensible and tragic as they
have been, have now helped in focusing the world's attention on
a solution to their problem. For the first time, there is serious atten-
tion being given to the creation of some type of Palestinian state
encompassing the West Bank of the Jordan River and the Gaza
Strip. The need to preserve. the "national rights" of the Palestin-
ians in a peace settlement is now acknowledged by the Arab states.
Acting out of frustration and with relatively little to lose, the
Palestinians have effectively used terrorism to their advantage.
Meanwhile, unfortunately, the habit has developed. On the one
hand, terrorism has been used to support the demand that the
Palestinian Liberation Organization be invited to any Geneva
talks. On the other, the radical Palestinians, who reject an Arab-
Israeli settlement except on their own terms, have used terrorism
to disrupt an accommodation. This was the avowed purpose of the
Al Fatah extremists who landed on the beach and seized a Tel Aviv
hotel in March 1975. Following the second Sinai disengagement
agreement, PLO extremists displayed their displeasure with Anwar
Sadat by seizing Egypt's envoy in Madrid.
Looking back, one can justifiably ask whether farsighted mea-
sures of preventive diplomacy might not have succeeded in keeping
the terrorist genie in the bottle in the Middle East. To the extent
that concern over terrorism is a component of our Middle East
policy, it. would seem desirable at some stage to open channels of
communication with Palestinian leaders � in particular, the more
moderate ones � with the hope that this might create pressures
among the Palestinians either to isolate the extremists or keep them
under control.
Prevention, however, is a long-term process that must be con-
tinuously pursued. In the short run, measures of deterrence are
more likely to be effective in coping with international terrorism.
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There are a number of specific measures that should now he
undertaken by nations acting in concert.
First, and most important, acts of terrorism, especially those in-
volving random killing, should not continue to go unpunished.
Although hard data are not available, it is quite clear that Arab
terrorists have been repeatedly set free by governments in Western
Europe and the Middle East. Of the more than 150 Palestinian
terrorists who have been arrested in Western Europe in the past
five years, all but nine, according to one estimate, have been quietly
released with or without trial. ;Terrorists who make their way back
to the Middle East, either on hijacked aircraft or by transfer to
authorities in Kuwait, Libya or South Yemen, have been repeatedly
released, sometimes with a vague but unconvincing promise of a
trial by the PLO, which at present has no legal basis to set up a
Court.
There are perfectly understandable Teasons for this pattern of
nonpunishment. Governments fear acts of reprisal. They are aware
that imprisoning terrorists invites new acts of terrorism, including
the seizure of hostages designed to secure the release of collea'gues
in jail. This has already occurred. Moreover, given the present oil
situation and the risk of a selective boycott, countries dependent
upon Middle East sources of supply are likely to wish to avoid
offending Arab sensibilities and will give priority to such types of
considerations. Within the Arab world, where there is admiration
for the courage and determination of "freedom-fighters" even
among those who disapprove of their tactics, governments tend
to back away from the difficult political decision imprisonment
would involve. Accordingly Sudan, after giving repeated assur-
ances that the eight Black September terrorists who murdered the
American ambassador and his deputy in Khartoum would be pun-
ished, eventually bowed_ to Arab pressure and released them in
spite of a court sentence to life imprisonment.
Washington was right, in my view, to make a vigorous protest
in this case and recall its new ambassador. We should seek to con-
vince governments in Western Europe, the Middle East and else-
where that terrorism is a threat to the safety of international society
and must be dealt with through due process of law, judiciously; but
firmly. If terrorists are detained, others may be discouraged from
following the same course. Once terrorists see that their activities
will be costly, they might be persuaded to seek less violent means
of venting their grievances.
Second, deterrence would be enhanced if specific sanctions were
imposed against countries that shelter hijackers and saboteurs of
planes by granting safe asylum. These could include a suspension
of commercial air traffic to countries that let hijackers off scot free,
or a boycott of their airliners by withholding permission to land.
Since the ICAO has failed to take effective action, this could be
accomplished by a series of bilateral accords providing for extradi-
tion or prosecution, using the Cuban-American agreement as a
model. If a consensus could be reached that countries protecting
hijackers will be boycotted by civil aviation, and that hijackers
will be punished, a major step would be taken toward deterring
this form of terrorism.
Related to this is the question of the availability of aircraft in
response to terrorist demands for transportation out of a country
and the granting of landing rights for refueling purposes. It has
become the custom of terrorists to expect that they can flee by
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demanding a plane and a crew. This should now be reversed, with
governments agreeing among themselves, and publicly declaring
beforehand, that they will not provide aircraft for the use of ter-
rorists or even temporary landing rights. The Japanese government
has recently moved in this direction, following its embarrassment
in having made available a Japanese Air Lines plane to transport
five Red Army terrorists and five colleagues, who had been im-
prisoned, from Malaysia to Libya.
Third, countries that believe in the need to control international
terrorism should cooperate on practical precautionary steps that
might be undertaken together. Chief among these is the sharing of
intelligence data and other information about terrorist organiza-
tions, their membership, structure, leaders, motivations, and so on.
The United States has established a cabinet-level committee and
appointed a Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Combat-
ing Terrorism. His activities involve both contingency planning
and coordinating action once a terrorist incident develops; a few
other countries, including West Germany, have now established
similar offices. Like-minded governments should be encouraged to
set up bureaus for this purpose and develop cooperation among
them. Technological aids, such as devices for improving airport
security throughout the world, should also be shared. Nations pos-
sessing atomic reactors should tighten existing precautions to safe-
guard against the theft or diversion of nuclear materials. Some
international cooperation along this line is already in progress, but
it should be broadened and deepened. Most important, the states
that share a common perception of the dangers of international
terrorism should act now to concert their efforts, without waiting
for the agreement of all member-states of the United Nations.
This intergovernmental cooperation is especially important in
light of increasing evidence of transnational linkages between ter-
rorist groups with varied purposes, even located in different con-
tinents. Such collaboration often exists to facilitate the flow of arms
and information. The Japanese Red Army, for instance, has estab-
lished ties with the PLO, and in Europe it has had contacts with
a number of terrorist groups, including the Baader-Meinhof group
in West Germany, while operating for a time out of a perfume shop
in the center of Paris. There have also been reports of close con-
tacts between the Irish Republican Army and the ETA, a Basque
separatist group in Spain. International linkages of this type can be
of considerable practical significance to terrorist organizations in
increasing their outreach and effectiveness. Although one cannot
yet speak of a "brotherhood" of terrarists,-in the past two years a
number of "networks" have been uncovered. They should be com-
bated through international cooperation among as many countries
as possible. In this manner the very internationalism of terrorist
movements might contribute to their undoing.
Fourth, the communications media have a special responsibility
in taking care not to encourage acts of terrorism and violence by
giving them undue publicity. Such acts often possess a particular
aspect of sensationalism designed to attract public attention out of
proportion to the real importance of the event. Terrorism is usu-
ally directed at the watching audience, rather than the real victims.
Although, obviously, newsworthy incidents of terrorism cannot
and should not be suppressed, television and the press must avoid
being manipulated by terrorists for their own advantage. This sug-
gests a need for restraint and prudence by the Fourth Estate in its
reportage of terrorism.
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Fifth� in regard to American policy, we might re-examine our
present blanket "no ransom" policy in dealing with international
terrorism. After the Khartoum incident President Nixon firmly
stated that the United States would not pay ransom, reasoning that
"the nation that compromises with the terrorist today could well
be destroyed by terrorism tomorrow." But the evidence is hardly
available or clear that this would be the case, and the analogy
between political terrorism and ordinary criminal blackmail ("ex-
tortion breeds extortion") may be somewhat misleading. If a Boe-
ing 747 filled with 350 American citizens was about to be blown
up, would Washington still refuse to buy their safety? If the chair-
man of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee was kidnaped by
Tupamaros, would the U.S. government not be willing to release
a few foreign terrorists, or urge another government to give in to
such terrorist demands?
Many countries have shown greater flexibility in the face of a
grave situation, as France did in ransoming her ambassador to
Somalia for $100,000 last March. Even 'Israel, which also has a
"no ransom" policy, was prepared to set it aside in order to save the
lives of eighty-five children at Maalot, Premier Golda Meir ex-
plaining that she would not resist "on the backs of our children."
We might therefore be more flexible than our declared policy
would indicate, judging each case on its own merits and negotiat-
ing when the situation seems to call for it. The former U.S. Am-
bassador to Tanzania, W. Beverly Carter, was penalized after he
assisted in the release of four American students in August 1975
by helping a private rescue team make contact with the kidnapers.
Surely some latitude should be accorded the ambassador on the
scene so that he can draw a sensible balance between the require-
ments of general policy and the need for humane action. It should
be noted, moreover, that American corporations have concluded
that they will pay ransom, if necessary, in order to save the lives of
their executives overseas. Large sums have indeed been paid in
recent years � sometimes, it has regrettably turned out, to extor-
tionists masking their aim in political rhetoric.
Finally, the community of states should seek as broad a consensus
as possible establishing that acts of international terrorism � es-
pecially indiscriminate violence when the victims are innocent
third parties sitting in planes, walking the streets or resting at
home are, regardless of motive, beyond acceptable norms of
behavior. It should be made clear that when the terrorist deliber-
ately inflicts death and destruction on the innocent, rather than on
the enemy, he is crossing an ethical threshold and committing a
crime against humanity as a whole. Even if political reasons dim
the prospects for a UN convention on the "export" of terrorism,
or early ICAO action on hijacking is unlikely, it should be possible
to create a moral climate that will help to deter random violence.
In this connection, it might be useful to reexamine a proposal first
made in 1937 after the assassination of King Alexander I of Yugo-
slavia and French Prime Minister Louis Barthou at Marseilles, for
the establishment of an International Criminal Court to be granted
jurisdiction over terrorist crimes of international character in lieu
of national judicial process.13 Such a court might, in some circum-
stances, be an appropriate and less political means of handling
modern terrorist crimes.
ia Manley O. Hudson, International Legislation, Vol. VII (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.:
Oceana Publications, 1941), pp. 878-893.
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Responding successfully to international terrorism will require
both the balm of prevention and the sting of deterrence. It will
involve piecemeal coping rather than comprehensive solution. The
enduring difficulty will be to reconcile the imperatives of inter-
national order and safety with the legitimate grievances that give
rise to despair and violence. Moral dilemmas will abound.
NeVe must be prepared to accept the fact that terrorism could
become a new form of warfare. With the increasing availability of
relatively small and inexpensive means of destruction, a handful
of men could have an enormous impact upon states and societies
anywhere. Some countries might even prefer to arm and use ter-
rorists to pursue their foreign policy objectives, rather than
accept the stigma of direct and visible involvement in a conflict
with another state. They might view terrorist activities as a con-
tinuation of warfare by other and more effective means, in which
the constraints applying to conventional warfare under accepted
standards of international behavior and law could be conveniently
disregarded. Thus terrorism could be intentionally used to insti-
gate an international incident, to provoke an enemy, to carry out
acts of sabotage, or to incite a repressive reaction against a group
in a country.
Terrorism is a relatively inexpensive and efficient way of doing
a great deal of harm, and doing it without the political embarrass-
ment that can be attached to many overt state actions. In some
ways, therefore, it could become an alternative to conventional
wars � not necessarily an undesirable step. It is not too early to
think creatively about arms control � in the political sense � for
international terrorism. Should terrorism continue to grow, as
appears likely, it will enter the mainstream of world politics. Then,
even more than today, it will present a major political, legal, arms-
control and, perhaps above all, moral challenge to us all.
1
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POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND THE
"CORRELATION OF FORCES"*
by W. Scott Thompson
THE study of political violence now has become fashionable.
From being a stepchild of the social sciences, the study of
civil, international and transnational violence has come to be part
of the cutting edge of the discipline,' not only from a methodologi-
cal point of view, but also in a policy-oriented sense. In contrast,
a decade ago presumptions of order reigned in the industrial
West, a sufficient preponderance of power over the communist
(specifically the Soviet-led) camp existed, and an illusory con-
fidence remained that decolonization not only would continue
smoothly in the Third World, but would usher in, if not proto-
type Western-style parliamentary regimes, at least reasonably
responsible centers of government. The three mutually-supportive
legs of the stool a Western perception of stability and process
� have been removed one by one.
What we refer to as "political violence" would in the conven-
tional reference be called "terrorism," but it is not confined to
that alone. The problem with the term "terrorism," as Professors
Franck and Lockwood have argued, is that it is "historically mis-
leading" and is a "politically loaded term which invites con-
ceptual and ideological dissonance."' One nation's terrorism is
another's national liberation. Important questions of a normative
sort may be passed over in the definitional confusion.
In speaking of political violence generically, we refer to the
extralegal use of force for the direct or indirect purpose of affecting
the political decisions (and fates) of constituted authorities. Several
dramatic forms of political violence � kidnaping, hijacking,
bombing, assassination � have been selected by their perpetrators
for a similar purpose: to condition a target audience (whether the
civil authorities or an international milieu) and only incidentally
to harm the victim. - - --
Much progress has been made in separating the different geo-
graphic forms of such violence: many of the interlocking transna-
tional links of militant groups have been identified, and growing
knowledge exists about how techniques and weaponry are spread.
Progress has also been made in subjecting at least the underlying
causes of political violence to scientific analysis.
On the other hand, the nature of the qualitative effects of
political violence on the noncommunist world has seldom been
addressed.' Nor has there been a systematic effort to investigate
*This article was written in the author's capacity as a member of the Fletcher
School of Law and Diplomacy faculty at Tufts University. The views and argu-
ment are his alone and do not necessarily represent those of the US. govern-
ment, in whose employ he was at the time of publication. He would like to thank
Brian Jenkins, Wynfred Joshua, David Milbank, Alan Springer and Phyllis A.
i
Thompson for their helpful suggestions n the essay's preparation.
,See, for example, John V. Gillespie and Betty Nesvold, editors, Macro-Quanti-
tative Analysis: Conflict, Development and Democratization (Beverly Hills, Calif.:
SAGE Publications, 1970); Gurr, Feierabend and Feierabend, Anger, Violence and
Politics: Theories and Research (Chapel Hill, N.C.: Preston-Hill, 1972); and espe-
cially Ted Robert Gurr, "A Causal Model of Civil Strife," pp. 184-222 in the latter
volume.
'Thomas M. Franck and Bert B. Lockwood, Jr., "Preliminary Thoughts Towards
an International Convention on Terrorism," in US. House of Representatives,
International Terrorism, Hearings before the Subcommittee on the Near East and
South Asia of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 93rd Congress, 2nd Session, June
1974, P. 109.
'Their continuing coverage has made two journals, Encounter and The Econo-
mist, conspicuous exceptions; since the wave of violence began they have com-
mented closely and perceptively on the relevance of the phenomenon to the sur-
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the cui bono question: apart from the immediate, particularistic
benefits that revolutionary groups reap in carrying out their acts,
are there intended or unintended benefits of a more general
nature, redounding to either of the two major alliance systems, or
to an ideology or ideological system? Is there harm, intended or
unintended, to any of these systems? Disaggregation of the different
forms of violence rarely points to the corresponding beneficiaries,
or any consideration of whether there are any. In the absence of
much serious thought on this dimension of political violence, we
lose an important indicator of where the world as we know it is
tending.
The question of the qualitative effect of political violence on
the noncommunist world breaks down into further considera-
tions: what societal characteristics coincided with the surge of
terrorist activities during the past decade, what set the stage for
the surge, and how were different dimensions of society affected
by the violence? In the first instance, this violence is a function
of both the weakness of the noncommunist states within whose
boundaries dramas of terror have been acted out, and of the
strength of the terrorist forces themselves. However strong the
impetus from without, states whose regimes govern on a basis of
an enduring consensus will not long suffer illegal acts. But in
political vacuums all manner of forces will grab for power; for
this purpose the cohesion of states can be envisaged on a con-
tinuum, with states like Portugal or Lebanon in 1975 at one end,
and with Switzerland or Bulgaria at the other end. It is important
to remember that suppressive authoritarian regimes, however
stable internally, will export their opposition, and hence add to
the pool of international gunmen able to work against more
tolerant regimes.
&Ales affected by political violence can readily be divided be-
tween those of the third and first worlds. "Second world" states,
that is, communist states (whether autonomous, Moscow- or Pe-
king-oriented � or a combination), at present have no significant
problem of anti-regime violence, 4 though the possibility always
looms as one of the great uncertainties in the future of world
politics.
For Third World states, four generally valid observations can
be offered. Firstly, the conclusion of the often long struggles for
independence in Africa and Asia, whether violent or not, brought
to the new ruling elites enthusiasm and confidence that progress
would ensue, and a sense of direction which made their first few
years relatively stable ones, with considerable economic develop-
ment. But the consensus that had come with independence, and
its attendant momentum, broke down widely by the mid-1960s.
*How long they will remain so must be a question of more than passing
interest to the student of world politics. Hijacking in its first manifestation was
undertaken by defectors from behind the Iron Curtain in the 1940s. Since then,
uprisings in Poland, Hungary, East Germany and Czechoslovakia, a tightening of
the screws against dissidence in the Soviet Union, continuing but suppressed
nationalism in the USSR's Muslim colonies of Central Asia as well as in the
conquered and incorporated Baltic states, raise the question whether a loosening
in one part of the sphere would have a "demonstration effect" for another. A
less determined group of rulers in Moscow than the present one, for instance,
might ease the pressure in the event of another crop failure leading to widespread
violence throughout the empire. Although in the long run the West might benefit
from this insofar as it weakened the coherence of the communist world, the
short-term effects might be profoundly destabilizing at the central nuclear level in
relations between the two superpowers. The surprisingly vigorous dissidence that
has continued in the recently conquered territories of Indochina is another con-
sideration.
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By the end of the decade, political scientists were already talking
about the revolution of "declining expectations," about decay
rather than development. True, the problems then coming to the
fore were not new, but they had theretofore been successfully
suppressed. Although the Nigerian civil war ended in a united
Nigeria in early 1970, there were dozens of other ethnic groups
demanding or fighting for greater autonomy throughout the
Third World. It was becoming an age of particularisms. The
capabilities of the regimes at the center were correspondingly
lower, both in expectation and reality, and their problems were
exacerbated by the effects of the October 1973 war in the Middle
East and the subsequent increase in petroleum prices. High
energy prices and the attendant worldwide recession tended to
lead to greater tension and regional demands within the poor
Third World states. _ _
Secondly, and not unrelatedly, norms were evolving on actions
deemed legitimate by the state in pursuit of its goals. As crisis,
ethnic tension and deep recession spread in the industrialized
West, the perception ended that the old "big brother" or former
colonial power was watching; Indonesia could invade Timor in
1976 with far less international protest than India suffered in
1960 over her seizure of Goa. Indeed, states with similar goals �
like Malaysia, in this case � cheered the bold states on. India
could play the key role in breaking up Pakistan in 1971, and
Morocco could, with some bravado, good organization and even
greater cynicism, gobble up the important part of the Spanish
Sahara. The atmosphere had become permissive. The oft-heard
assertions, that the new states had forsworn the tradition of power
politics bequeathed them by their colonial masters and that they
did not resort to force, were thrown to the winds.
Thirdly, what had seemed to the Third World in 1960 to be
an unstoppable wave of decolonization slowed down as the decade
progressed and the next began. To Arabs, certainly, the decade
registered net losses, with the Six-day War of 1967 spurring on
violence throughout the Middle East and Europe as the argument
spread that any means were justified in changing the direction
of the trend. Measured in terms of combat deaths, Portugal's
counterinsurgency in her African territories was largely successful
by 1973, in an exceedingly short-term sense; so, too, Rhodesia's.
Hence, radical Africans and Asians sensed a reversal of the wave.
But the October 1973 Middle East war and the coup in Lisbon in
April 1974 changed all that. Where failure had previously pro-
voked violence, now success prompted it. The key variable was
dearly not deprivation, but opportunity.
Finally, in the absence of large arsenals and armed forces,
Third World states with irredentist or ideological aims were
learning that state-sponsored violence was an attractive form of
poor man's imperialism. Sukarno could disrupt all of insular
Southeast Asia with his policy of confrontation. On a small scale,
toward the end of the decade, the Philippines could aim at much
the same thing with her aborted plans for Sabah. As early as 1962
Ghana could (with Soviet and then Chinese assistance) establish
camps for "freedom fighters," who were ostensibly to go off to
struggle in the racist redoubt in the South. But they went in
equal numbers to such allegedly neocolonial states as Niger or
Ivory Coast, attempting highly unsuccessful covert action against
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them all on a minuscule budget!' True, this sort of effort
generated its own counterthrust, as happened to Ghana on the
eve of Nkrumah's overthrow. By the mid-1970s it appeared that
more and more pressure could be mobilized to counter such
specific threats as hijacking, for example. But no amount of pres-
sure could affect the determination of states like Libya to support
extremists among the Palestinians, and international saboteurs as
well. There was no generalized world learning curve in the area
of political violence, no general lessons from which young states
could benefit where their own causes were deemed just.
Trying to find the internal correlates of political violence in
the West is trickier. For one thing, violence in the United States
and in Western Europe was not wholly in phase or of identical
character, despite the many similarities. In America a wave of
civil disobedience and student rebellion washed over the polity
in the 1960s and early 1970s; first in protest to continued segrega-
tion (or, more accurately, in response to the loosening up of the
whole fabric of black-white relations), next against the Vietnamese
war, and then, somewhat randomly, against any symbol of national
authority. Both the internal and extern-al capabilities of the
American government were overstretched, perhaps permanently
disfiguring the structures of the society. In the civil rights move-
ments, which brought great and positive gains, techniques of pro-
test were mastered, to be used against any government policy
to which exception was taken. In this area radicals in the United
States were ahead of those in Europe. In the late 1960s, Weather-
men and a bewildering array of other groups struck out against
a variety of targets, at the same time as student movements peaked
in Europe.
It was really only with the growing opposition to the Vietnamese
war that radicals on both sides of the Atlantic came into phase.
Moreover, the war sapped American strength without bringing
corresponding gains, especially as, after the 1968 TET, it looked
to most like a losing proposition. In the ensuing five years, the
defensive manner of the search for a peace settlement, with all the
bloodshed continuing in the interim, guaranteed that the co-
herence of American society would continue to suffer. The war
highlighted the question of means and ends in the increasingly
prosperous societies of the West at a time when their security
could be taken for granted, given the balance of power between
East and West then obtaining. It helped to bring protests to the
fore against all government in every Western society, as a new
generation came into its own, distinguished by the extent to
which it refused to accept the values and standards of those
preceding it.
The position of leadership the United States had taken was
steadily weakened; something had snapped, and with it the Amer-
ican role as world policeman. This was not merely because allies
would no longer take their cue from Washington (a develop-
ment of which de Gaulle had been the critical symptom), for that
was just another result of the same cause: Washington's will had
declined and its direction had become uncertain. The fact that a
5 For examination both of Nkrumah's attempt to subvert West African regimes
and of the counterattack. see W. Scott Thompson, Ghami's Foreig,It Policy:
Diplomacy, Ideology, and the New State, 1957-66 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 1969).
�See "Colonel Qaddafi 'uses oil revenues to finance terrorism,' " The Times
(London), January 4, 1974, p. I.
18
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victory by American forces in purely military terms could be
turned into a psychological victory by their enemy was not lost
on any incipient adversary.
The first Mansfield amendment, for the withdrawal of American
troops from Europe, was introduced in 1971. Uncertain of their
own security, leaderships in the countries on the western tip of the
great Eurasian land mass drew the appropriate strategic inference
and began wondering how long it could be before Finlandization
� which Moscow touted as a good and advantageous thing �
spread westward, while the communist parties of Western Europe
grew. This greatly interfered with Europe's attempt to master its
economic malaise, as its leaders hesitated to take the bold steps
needed to arrest the decline of their economies.7
So there was a crisis of values and purpose in the West even
as the strength of the 'Western allies declined in relation to that
of the Soviet Union (measured in defense budgets, deployed
forces, and most pertinently in the will to use them). 'Western
Europe, for its part, suffered from three additional factors. One
was simple geography. Its open and porous societies, close to the
powder-boxes, were utterly vulnerable to the revolutionaries
emanating from Africa and the Middle East; the United States,
with a tradition of tighter visa requirements and its greater dis-
tance, enjoyed a period of relative grace from that sort of menace
until December 29, 1975, when LaGuardia Airport was bombed.
The second factor was the residue of colonialism. Problems
such as that of Ulster and Ireland, or of TvIoluccans in Holland,
were reminders that the costs of the great movements of trade and
people in the age of imperialism extended long after the benefits
ceased. In combination with the ethnic separatism of Basques,
Flemish, and even Scots, whose causes were no different from
similar movements in the Third World, Europe had serious
problems indeed.
Third, European prosperity had brought to Germany and
France in particular, but to other West European countries as
well, emigres from Portugal, Yugoslavia, Greece, Turkey and
other less-favored rimland countries. These emigres were a natural
quarry for gunmen.
Violence in the noncommunist world is a symptom of the
distress of a civilization, and could well be the critical medium of
its decline. This is so because of the immediate opportunity-costs
of dealing with terrorism: the curtailment of freedoms in some
democratic states, and the abandonment of democratic institu-
tions in others. Whether such developments occur depends on the
degree of coherence of the society as a whole and on its geographic
vulnerability.
The opportunity-cost of violence is bad enough. Consider the
British government's preoccupation in December 1975, during
which police bargained with IRA gunmen for the release of their
hostages, Mr. and Mrs. John Mathews. Fortuitously, this episode
_
T The interrelationship between security and economy is seldom studied� though
the fact that it exists should be obvious from Europe's postwar recovery, when the
formation of NATO combined with the Marshall Plan instilled confidence in the
European future and stopped the outflow of money and people. In the past half
decade, however, Western leaders have been incapable of taking the bold steps
needed to arrest the decline of their economies, while at the same time their socio-
political institutions have been under siege for different, if not wholly unrelated,
reasons (American-exported inflation which began with Vietnam, for example).
The relationship of these trends to a perception of declining security should be
self-evident.
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took place during a debate in the _House of Commons on the
restitution of hanging for such crimes, and only two months after
a similar siege in Knightsbridge. The government's instruments,
the police, it was reported, "are badly overstretched . . . they are
simply not able, for example, to provide protection for most of the
people believed to be on the IRA's assassination list, including a
number of politicians.'" Given its economic woes, the British
government could ill afford the diversion. But if the British prob-
lem was great, that of the Dutch, with two squads of South Moluc-
cans holding hostages in the same period, was worse.
Political violence has curtailed freedoms heretofore taken for
granted � freedom from search, for example. No one interested
in civil peace objects to this, but it is a price to be paid, a blow
against, not for, liberty. Freedom to travel is also impeded. Would
a prudent American political scientist interested in Africa be
willing to visit one of the historically, sociologically and environ-
mentally most interesting countries, namely, Uganda? The list
of Latin American countries where Western businessmen must
tread warily is growing, and African states are joining the
Diplomats now live always at risk.� To go to a pub, to open a
letter, is to take a risk. Positive identification may soon be needed
at all times in most Western societies, so that citizens may prove
who they are � and, more important, who they are not.10 Per-
ceptibly, if slowly, life in the West sacrifices some of its values in
order to protect the remaining ones.
With the erosion of freedom, life begins to approximate exist-
ence in an authoritarian state. As governments are forced to defend
themselves and impose more stringent rules, the gap that au-
thoritarians or totalitarians of left or right must bridge, for
popular acceptance of their proposed coup or electoral sweep,
becomes that much narrower. In less cohesive Third World states
the abandonment comes easily, both because of the relative ab.
sence of order and because of the shallowness of the institutional
roots. But again we speak of a continuum, with these effects
moving roughly from the less coherent to the more coherent
polities. What happens in Uganda today might happen in the
Ivory Coast tomorrow; what happens in Argentina tomorrow
might happen in Italy the next day.
Consider, for example, what happened to the robust demo-
cratic institutions in the Philippines, owing to seemingly endernic
violence of right and left. That state was best characterized by its
limited amount of government of any sort, in proportion to
differentiated societal activity � a situation in which rebellion
and brigandage prosper. Something of an equilibrium evolved
after formal Hukbalahap resistance to the government ended in
1951, though Manila tolerated considerable racketeering by the
old "Huks" around the U.S. bases.
Ferdinand Marcos, elected in 1965, sought to tighten up gov-
ernance and make policy more coherent. In the short run at least,
this proved counterproductive. In the late 1960s a Maoist group,
the New People's Army, broke off from the old Huks and en-
trenched themselves in Central Luzon, where in one province
they remain dominant to this day. Radical groups in Manila,
6"Gun for a Gun," The Economist, December 13, 1975, p. 16.
�In December 1973, the UN passed a convention on crimes against diplomats,
but only nine countries have ratified it and it is not yet in force.
See David B. Wilson, "New Hazards of Terrorism," The Boston Globe, Janu-
ary 2, 1976, p. 7.
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armed both from outside and by domestic critics of Marcos on
the right, made virtually an armed camp of the capital by 1970.
Paid by enormously rich tycoons who could benefit from a
radical atmosphere,1 mobs challenged the state's authority at
every turn, and were reinforced by a hardened criminal core.
Marcos' own contribution to the state of affairs was substantial,
but the fact remained that the Philippine state's writ did not
extend very far between 1970 and 1972, when Marcos, after careful
and lengthy preparation, proclaimed martial law and ended the
archipelago's lengthy experiment with democratic institutions. By
the time he did so, most people a random sampling would in-
dicate � were ready for it, so dangerous had life become. But a
genuine attempt to get rid of loose guns (which ended many a
threat to the state) backfired in Muslim-dominated areas of
Mindanao, where the long-exploited Muslims saw their last guar-
antees threatened. They went to war. Thus did a relatively stable,
relatively democratic polity (by Third World standards) become
an authoritarian state, fighting a civil war.
Three years later India made a transition that was similar in
many respects as have others before and since. In such cases
democracy suffers, though the communist world does not neces-
sarily benefit immediately. In the longer run, such developments
render differences between the new forms of totalitarianism and
authoritarianism of left and right increasingly tenuous, harming
the democratic cause to which the security of the West is tightly
bound. We now turn to those considerations.
II
The matter of who benefits from violence in the world today
may beg several questions. The first is whether such a notion does
not contradict the terms and basis of the superpowers' relationship,
as codified in the understandings purportedly composing "d�
tente." (As a term, "d�nte" has been repudiated by the Ford
Administration, but as a concept it is still in vogue.) Along with
the assumption that detente was necessary to prevent nuclear
war, an intellectual assumption developed in recent years in the
West positing that the world was working its way toward greater
overall coherence in any case. One view, cogently argued origi-
nally by Pierre Hassne-r, would have it that, even if the units
of the international system were becoming less stable, the inter-
national system itself was becoming more stable; the system was
adapting at the regional and international levels. There was more
chaos, but less war; more anarchy, but less revolution.'2
As for d�nte, the concept began with an assumption . that
through it the suspicion and ill will that had pervaded Soviet-
American relations for so long had dissipated. These views came
to be the conventional wisdom in the West, nowhere more so
than on the campus. The notion that a relationship existed be-
tween civil violence and great-power beneficiaries could and did
provoke hostile reactions, as if the act of contemplating a different
perception of reality could compromise the position on which our
" "Nationalism" in the Philippines has always had an economic flavor, as some
businessmen were thought to benefit from an atmosphere in which American
investments could be sold as in a fire sale. See W. Scott Thompson, Unequal
Partners: Philippine Thai Relations with the U.S., 1965-75 (Lexington. Mass.:
D.C. Heath, Lexington Books, 1975).
"See Pierre Hassner, "Civil Violence and the Pattern of International Power:" in
Civil Violence and the International System. Part II: Violence and International
Security (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelpht Paper
No. 8.3. 1971), pp. 16-26.
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fragile peace was based and culminate, in a massive self-fulfilling
prophecy, in war." Little attention was consequently paid in the
expanding literature on violence to the question of cui bono. With
the civil war in Angola, where a Soviet-financed Cuban expedi-
tionary force was the determining element in defeating much
more numerous and more broadly-based adversaries, the assump-
tions governing d�nte, and hence the "who benefits" question,
began to be open to doubt; the original proponents shifted their
ground accordingly, and began defining d�nte as a situation in
which the United States must "manage the emergence" of the
pre-eminent new superpower, so as to soften the harshness of its
imperium."
The view from Moscow was always asymmetrical to the popular
one in the 'West. The Soviets, particularly since 1973, have been
writing about the change in the "correlation of forces," a per-
vasive term indicating the balance between the two parties at not
just the military level, but in the economic, political, and most
emphatically the psychological, dimensions as well. Anything in
this view that undermined the coherence of the West would
definitionally be a gain for communism, given the irreconcila-
bility of interests as seen from Moscow and the relative absence
of political violence by nongovernmental actors within the com-
munist bloc. But Moscow would have nothing to gain by making
the point explicitly: the fact that the West's disarray and vulnera-
bility to widespread violence benefit communism is obvious and
not as such to be boasted of. The significance of such victories as
that Won in Angola and its bearing on the "correlation of forces"
only needs explication, apparently, in Western circles�for the
notion that such actions violate the spirit of d�nte has been
routinely but firmly rejected in Moscow. D�nte in the Soviet
view is, after all, something to which the West was forced to
subscribe owing to the shifting "correlation of forces"; this is a
hardheaded assessment devoid of the sentiment and wishful think-
ing pervading Western thought and leadership during the past
few years."
A second question begged is whether widespread violence,
assuming that it benefits one set of forces in the world, is inci-
dental, secondary or important to the aims of the gunmen them-
selves. It is customarily judged to be incidental; foremost in the
minds of the actors is obviously the directly sought goal. Latin
urban guerrillas wish to obtain a ransom and to publicize their
cause, those of the Middle East also wish to elicit attention, and
all are usually successful. For most of these people it might be
supposed that the balance of world power would be at the periph-
ery of, their concerns, low in their hierarchy of interests.
32 At a National Security Education Seminar held at the Fletcher School of Law
and Diplomacy in April 1975, several political scientists accused one speaker, who
presented a paper similar to the present one, of "McCarthyism," of "being unaware
that this was not 1950," and so forth.
"See especially Theodore Draper, "Appeasement and D�nte," Commentary,
February 1976.
"See, for example, the Soviet-Syrian communique of April 13, 1974: "The
continuing alteration in the alignment of forces_ in favour of peace, socialism and
national liberation is increasingly and favourably influencing the entire interna-
tional situation, and facilitating detente in the world." (International Terrorism,
Hearings, p. 3320.) For an incisive analysis see Wynfred Joshua, "D�nte in
Soviet Strategy," Defense Intelligence Agency, September 2, 1975; and Foy D. Kohler.
Leon Goure and Mose L. Harvey, The Role of Nuclear Forces in Current Soviet
Strategy (Coral Gables, Fla.: University of Miami, Center for Advanced Inter-
national Studies, 1974). See also "Western Observers Misread Soviet Views on
Angola." Soviet World Outlook, February 13, 1976, pp. 2-4.
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But is this too pat? Most gunmen, owing to the way political
authority is presently distributed in the world, are radicals fight-
ing an uncongenial status quo.16 As Professor Bell has argued,
"Even if there is not a specific organizational structure for world
revolution, the conviction of the committed is that there is a
world revolutionary society, perhaps organized by national parties,
perhaps in ideological disarray, but nevertheless real."1'
The background of revolutionaries conduces to radicalism.
Years in the mountains, in desert camps or in exile, give a twist to
theory and offer circumstances congenial to the development of
all-encompassing ideologies, of which Marxism-Leninism, bent to
their own needs, is the most readily available. The dictates therein,
that power be maximized, and that any form of violence is justi-
fied to obtain it, are convenient. It is not surprising to find, as a
result, that most revolutionaries would have no difficulty with the
proposition that terrorism in the world brings more benefits to
East than to West, and that it should be so.
In any event, the West is the revolutionary's symbolic enemy,
the East his support. The Soviet Union, for so long a "haveliot"
and a revolutionary by ideology (if often more pragmatic in prac-
tice), has been in a position to hand out guns and to provide
support at the United Nations, as elsewhere. There has usually
been a complementarity of interests � hence the not unimportant
Soviet role in many forms of contemporary political violence.
True, much of the evidence is difficult to come by, and, for reasons
that are not simple to discern, is closely held by Western govern-
ments. Nonetheless, this much is clear: the Soviet Union has
shipped vast quantities of materiel to such theaters as Angola and
South Yemen, enterprises heretofore limited by insufficient trans-
port capacity.is Moscow has trained thousands of "freedom fight-
ers" and "terrorists" in a number of centers and has also de-
veloped training facilities abroad. It has played an indirect role
in numerous major European incidents of violence, and in the
view of several West European governments has been supportive
of "Carlos," the Venezuelan "superterrorist" sought for the kid-
naping of OPEC ministers in 1975, among other things. East
European weapons and materiel are often found in the hands of
IRA and other gunmen in Europe, suggesting a surrogate role for
Czechoslovakia, for example. Through the explicit surrogate,
Cuba � Havana's role is increasingly obvious and compelling �
further entr�is gained in Latin America, as well as in numerous
African and Middle East countries where Cuban soldiers are
stationed in substantial number. "The greatest potential incre-
ment of dissident military capacity is external support," Ted
Robert Gun- writes.19
The United States has also hired gunmen, mobs and private
armies with which to protect her foreign policy interests, but
American efforts have been consistently reactive: for instance,
liThere are, to be sure, exceptions: e.g., Phalangists in Lebanon, who tried to
preserve a status quo whose demographic base had eroded; or right-wing terrorists
in Brazil and Argentina, arrogating to themselves the distribution of "justice,"
which they see the state incapable of meting out to its extralegal opponents of
the left.
11J. B. Bell, "Contemporary Revolutionary Organizations," in Joseph Nye and
Robert Keohane, editors, Transnational Relations and World Politics (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972), pp. 156-157.
"Though previous airlifts� to Egypt in 1967 and Laos in 1960, for example �
were not modest in scope, Soviet capability was a fraction of America's. The
addition of the fleet of Cock AN-22 cargo planes, whose utility was demonstrated
in Angola, increased this capability by several orders of magnitude.
"Ted Robert Gum Why Men Rebel (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press,
1970), p. 269.
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Washington authorized support of Cuban exiles to overthrow
Castro after Cuba had begun moving to the communist side;
support of Diem's regime in South Vietnam after it had begun to
collapse in face of communist forces; support to Iranian mobs in
1952 after Mossadegh had nationalized 'Western oil interests; and
support to newspapers and unions whose autonomy was threatened
by Allende's regime in Chile. This reactive posture flows from the
terms of engagement as advanced and accepted by the West,
namely, that all noncommunist territory is a hunting ground for
communist-influenced, -financed, -fronted, or outrightly -led or-
ganizations permitted to compete in the elections of some demo-
cratic states, to reveal the names of CIA agents (and murder them),
and to organize "peace" fronts, unions, student movements, and
the like. But the reverse is not true; the accepted terms prevent
all but the most marginal clandestine efforts to organize known or
incipient anti-communist forces (for example, nationalists in the
Soviet Union's Central Asian colonies). Can one imagine an
organization with general Western interests in mind assassinating
a KGB chief of station in Sofia? Or throwing bombs at officials in
Riga who serve the Soviet state?
But can we not differentiate between "terrorists" and "freedom
fighters," considering the former essentially irrational in their
objectives, the latter fighting against a colonialism that all rea-
sonable men would condemn? Firstly, we come up against the
question of rationality. David Fromkirr argues that terrorists
"seem to thrive and multiply everywhere in the world, bomb or
machine gun in hand, motivated by political fantasies and hallu-
cinations, fully convinced that their slaughter of the innocent
will somehow usher in a political millennium for mankind.""
But most gunmen have no such delusions: they are primarily
working for the goal of power in their particular region or state,
or to affect the process of government or the conditions of gov-
ernance. Recent experience has taught them that they probably
will succeed � though historically this is not true.2' Their mission
is a practical one, for practical goods � flags, mansions of state,
votes at the United Nations, obeisance of the masses in short,
the products of power.
Is the distinction between terrorist and freedom fighter one
that can be sustained in the 1970s? The difference (and lack of
connection) between the Congress Party in India during the 1930s
and the assassination by anarchists of King Alexander of Yugo-
slavia in 1934 is an easy one to see. But is the difference between
Naxalites in Bengal or Algerian-supplied members of the Pola-
sario Front in the Spanish Sahara on the one hand, and Black
Septembrists in Europe on the other, so great? What analytically
is the difference between political violence practiced, for example,
by IRA gunmen in London, or Palestinians in Munich, and
that of Soviet-supplied guerrillas in Dhofar? They are all fighting
for control of territory with which to take over or establish a
state, or part of a state, and they are nearly all radicals hostile to
the West as presently constituted. International communications
media enable them to copy each other's tactics, especially since
the beginning of television communication by satellite. Shared
contacts enable them to pool information or to pass weapons.
"David Fromkin, "The Strategy of Terrorism," Foreign Affairs, July 1975, p. 698.
"This point is well argued by J. Bowyer Bell, in The Myth of the Guerrilla
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1971). Since 1973, however, Bell's argument has
lost much force, as group after group, fighting with what was previously seen is
little hope, has come into its own.
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More important, the seeming "oneness" of the noncommunist
part of the world means that sabotage by one rebel helps to create a
climate for another terrorist or freedom fighter � in which his
act becomes just another outrage. We are all, at the least, part of
one another's range of consciousness.22
True, guerrillas waging a struggle in situ against colonial
authorities have always elicited more general international sup-
port for their cause. But there are no more important colonies,
other than those within the Soviet Union � which, by the curious
double standard upheld not only at the UN and in the Third
World but in the American consciousness as well, do not count.
The struggles remaining are residual, consequences of the break-
down in state authority; the activists derive from colonialism (e.g-.,
the Moluccans or Palestinians), are ethnic separatists (e.g.,
Basques, Quebecois, Baluchis), or are resisting local imperialisms
(e.g., Dhofar � sponsored by the People's Democratic Republic of
Yemen [PDRY]). As far as eliciting external support is concerned,
these are distinctions without differences; the critical variables are
occasion and opportunity. The Soviet Union has supported guer-
rilla struggles of each sort, operating either through communist
parties (as in Portugal), or state authorities (the PDRY), or simply
in aid 'of noncommunist factions in a position to embarrass a
'Western state.
The Soviet position is that any attempt to demonstrate the
interrelatedness of terrorism and freedom fighting is really only
an attempt to
accuse the leaders and active members of national liberation move-
ments on the pretext of combating international terrorism. Bourgeois
propaganda very often strives to lump together the terrorist acts of
individual extremist elements which exist in certain national libera-
tion movements and the peoples' just struggle for their independence>
self-determination and progress."
The classic and official communist formulation has not changed
since Lenin characterized terrorism as a form of "infantilism."
Thus in 1974 it could be said that
Marxism-Leninism rejects individual terror as a method of revolution-
ary action since it weakens the revolutionary movement by diverting
the working people away from the mass struggle. "The first and chief
lesson," V.I. Lenin wrote, "is that only the revolutionary struggle of
the masses is capable of achieving any serious improvements in the
life of the workers. . . ." International terrorism is radically different
from the revolutionary movement of the people's masses, whose aim is
to effect fundamental changes in society and which alone is capable
of so doing. The terrorist act, however, even if its main point is to
awaken public opinion and force it to pay attention to a particular
political situation, can only have limited consequences: say, lead to
the release of a group of prisoners, increase the financial assets of an
organization. . . .24
Thus the distinction is merely functional and quantitative, not
22 The- Economist noted the "wider internationalising of the phenomenon which
tends to be described, according to one's sympathies, as terrorism, freedom-fighting,
guerrilla action, liberation struggle, revolutionary or counter-revolutionary ac-
tivity. When groups conspire in Sydney with their eyes on Zagreb, Arabs seize
diplomatic buildings in Bangkok, IRA guns are shipped from the Mediterranean
and guerrillas are trained in China for action in Rhodesia or Mozambique, the
_ thing has got far-flung." "Gunpowder and Plot," April 7, 1973, p. 13.
" V. Terekhov, "International Terrorism and the Struggle Against It," Natioye
Vremyn, March 15, 1974, pp. 20-22; in Foreign Broadcast Information Service,
USSR International Affairs, III, March 28, 1974.
25
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qualitative. The advice is to "do nothing that would provoke the
reactionaries at this level"25 � unless, of course, it be successful.
For in that case it is no longer considered individual terrorism or
criminality, but the inevitable and just struggle of the masses.
The meaninglessness of the distinction is underlined when one
considers the number of people involved in the acts condemned �
the Japanese Red Army, for example. It is further underlined by
noting which acts are condemned. Andrei Gromyko made the
position clear in an address to the UN General Assembly:
On the basis of positions of principle, the Soviet Union opposes acts
of terrorism which disrupt the diplomatic activities of States and their
representatives, transport communications between them and the
normal course of international contacts and meetings, and it oppose's
acts of violence which serve no posi-tive end and cause loss of human
Gromyko listed precisely those functions of state-to-state diplo-
macy in which the Soviet Union has almost as much stake as
any other nation. Acts of violence by revolutionary movements,
however, have a "positive aim" and therefore are not condemned.
Terrorism and freedom fighting, as presently manifested in the
international system, are by and large part of a seamless web.
Soviet doctrine remains unchanged, which helps to preserve a
fiction it is in the USSR's interest to preserve. But what of
changed times, where the capitalist oppressors lack the will they
possessed when the doctrine was formulated? Would communist
doctrine turn out to be merely tactics? So far the answer is an
ambiguous no; the distinction has been sustained, but presumably
for a practical and tactical reason, namely, continued Soviet bene-
fit from leaving doctrine as it is.
The benefits are several. Political violence of factions and
guerrilla groups has led some states to trade Soviet aid off against
base facilities for Soviet forces � as in Somalia and Syria � open-
ing the door to Soviet influence. Political violence more generally
has weakened the coherence of the Western alliance. The very
fact that such a notion would be routinely rejected in the 'West is
further evidence of a gain in the semantic warfare waged so suc-
cessfully by Soviet propaganda.
Two remaining questions must be considered. Are we wit-
nessing an ephemeral phase of history that must inevitably work
against the West, as that collectivity has been envisaged in this
essay? Is there anything we can do about the violence, whether or
not it is a permanent fixture of our scene?
The argument in favor of ephemerality would point out that
much of the political violence in the world has been generated
by a relatively few generic causes, and the solution of these
problems would end the trouble. No one can gainsay the central
role of the Palestinians in generalizing political violence as art
important phenomenon of our time. If and when a Palestinian
state is established, it would presumably absorb the best energies
of its former terrorist leaders, much as creation of the new state
of Israel a generation earlier put the leadership of the Irgun to
constructive work. It can be argued that if one stamps out the
Palestinian element, the states of Europe can deal with the rest.
23 The parallel with the Soviet attitude toward detente is instructive. There, the
rule would seem to be to take advantage of Western receptivity toward detente,
up to and including the point where the asymmetry is noted on the Western
side, at which time concessions can begin to be made.
" Address of Andrei Gromyko, UN General Assembly, 27th Session, Plenary
Meetings, 2.040th Meeting, September 26. 1972, p. 10, par. 116.
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The same may hold for racism in southern Africa. Once the great
wave of decolonization has washed over southern Africa down to
the Cape of Good Hope, the instability and insecurity in that
continent will be terminated; Africans can focus their energies on
development, rather than on exporting commandos to Rhodesia-
Zimbabwe or Southwest Africa-Namibia.
On the other side of the argument are two points. Firstly, the
past decade's wave of violence came at a time of great technological
developments in weapons systems and explosives whose use might
otherwise have remained enshrined in the mythology of the state.
As it is, major terrorist groups, even if they were to disappear
tomorrow through a satisfaction of their demands, would have
passed on to their successors everywhere the learned capabilities
at this new level of technology.
Secondly, as yet untried techniques of violence could hold entire
societies at ransom � without a guarantee that some James Bond
would save the day. We hear more and more about nuclear
terrorism, about which there is an increasing sense of inevita-
bility, but less about actual measures to 'prevent it, at least in the
private sector. (At the governmental level, substantial and inten-
sive efforts have been undertaken to make nuclear arsenals invul-
nerable.) We hear still less about the possibility of CBR (chemical,
biological, radiological) threats, which may be equally serious.
This is an area where Soviet capabilities are vastly greater than
those of the United States.
Nor, given the "correlation of forces" as they are and the will-
ingness of major segments of Western society to rationalize away
the benefits to one party of the instability, chaos and violence in
the world, should we count on Soviet willingness to refrain from
stimulating further violence even if the Palestinians and black
Africans were to attain all their demands.
At a more systemic level, a question that might be posed is
whether the world is merely witnessing a phase in a cycle. Indeed,
interest has been revived recently in the Kondratieff cycle," named
after the great Russian economist who in the late 1920s described a
recurrent, roughly fifty-year cycle of activity in industrialized
society; its downward slope was characterized by turbulence as
political institutions lagged in adjusting society to the technologi-
cal change that had generated the upward swing at the cycle's
start. If we accept Kondratieff's theory, it is clear that we are on
schedule in the late 1970s, heading into a predictable period of
unrest and violence. Yet previous cycles occurred for the most
part in an industrialized world that was not polarized, with no
great power ready and able to take advantage of those vulnerable
down-side moments. Today for the first time 'Western society is at
risk.
What is to be done, if the analysis herein is correct? A num-
ber of practical measures, discussed in other articles in this issue
of ORBIS, can be taken in order to render more difficult the com-
mission of terrorist acts that are disrupting our lives, and to
affect the world balance of forces in a manner advantageous to
the West. But these are palliatives only, dealing with symptoms,
however important. Dealing with causes may not only be more
difficult, but also impossible.
"See in particular James B. Shuman and David Rosenau, The Kondratieff Wave
(New York: World Publishing Company, 1972), and W. W. Rostow, "The De-
veloping World in the Fifth Kondratieff Upswing," Annals of the American
Academy of Political and Social Science, July 1975.
'77
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Year after year the question of political violence has been
brought up at the United Nations, for example, only to be rou-
tinely postponed to the end of the session, when little attention
can be paid to it. Still, in December 1972, on the recommenda-
tion of the Sixth Committee, and after heated discussion, an
Ad Hoc Committee on International Terrorism was appointed by
the General Assembly president. It met from July 16 to August 11,
1973 in an attempt to draft a report, but because it was a micro-
cosm of the assembly from which it was appointed, it got no
further. The report observed:
Two main trends emerged with respect to the orientation to be given
to the measures the Ad Hoc Committee was required to elaborate.
According to the first trend, the measures should essentially be di-
rected against acts of international terrorism which were occurring
with increasing frequency. . . . According to the second trend, the
measures to be elaborated should be directed against the situation as
the very root of acts of individual [sic] terrorism. . .28
Some on the committee thought it might be possible to "borrow
from each of the two trends," and some noted that states, unlike
the international community, did not "wait for the underlying
causes of crime to be identified before enacting penal la.ws."2�
Clearly the solution will not come from the United Nations.
In view of the West's disarray as seen in 1976, neither will it
come from that group of countries with the most to lose, at least
not in any formal and coherent manner. No particular develop-
ment is in sight which would dampen the ardor of revolution-
aries � whether ethnic secessionists, Marxist-Leninist ideologues
or Libyan-sponsored commandos. Because the "appetite comes
with the eating," in this situation as elsewhere, we should expect
great increases in political violence, in proportion to its success,
until the international system has found new form and a new
balance. The fact that it is human nature to look for hopeful
developments does not in itself make them occur. A sober view of
how bleak the position is, shared by free men throughout the
world, is a necessary first step before anything can be done about
political violence within the structure that permits it, the inde-
pendent nation-state.
" Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on International Terrorism, General
Assembly, Official Records, 28th Session, Supplement No. 23 (A/9028) (New York,
1973), p. 17, par. 54.
29 MI&
28
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CONTROLLING POLITICAL TERRORISM
IN A FREE SOCIETY
by John B. Wolf
SKYJACKINGS, abductions, bombings, wanton slayings and the
seizure of hostages and government buildings are among the
tactics employed by political terrorists, whose victims range from
helpless school children, religious pilgrims, vacationing travelers
and business executives to diplomats, government officers and dig-
nitaries. In the first three months of 1975, acts of terrorist brutality
came in swift succession: in New York City in late January; then
in Israel, West Germany and Argentina as the winter progressed.
During the spring and early summer, terrorist episodes included
the seizure of the West German Embassy in Stockholm, the abduc-
tion of American students in Tanzania and the kidnaping of a
U.S. military officer in Lebanon.
Later, terrorist acts perpetrated in December proved to be the
most awesome of the year. During that month armed East Asian
terrorists, attempting to gain worldwide recognition of South
Molucca's right to independence from Indonesia, held a total of
forty-nine hostages on a hijacked train in northern Holland and
in the Indonesian Consulate in Amsterdam. Also, shortly before
Christmas, a cell of Irish Republican Army (IRA) gunmen sur-
,rendered to British police after being involved in a protracted
�hostage situation in a residential section of London.
STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS
Political terrorism may be defined as the threat or use of de-
liberate violence, indiscriminately or selectively, against either
enemies or allies to achieve a political end. The intent is to regis-
ter a calculated impact on a target population and on other groups
for the purpose of altering the political balance in favor of the
terrorists. Thus, terrorist activities, when directed against demo-
cratic states with a plethora of minority groups, or against states
that contain historically antagonistic peoples�Israel, Northern
Ireland, Cyprus and Zaire, for example�seem to be aimed at dis-
crediting the existing government by provoking it to concentrate
its coercive power on a particular segment of the population with
which the terrorists try to identify.
Phrased another way, the terrorist's strategic intent is to destroy
the confidence a particular minority group has in its government
by causing that government to act outside the law. Always, ter-
rorist strategy aims not to defeat the forces of the incumbent
regime militarily � for the terrorist this is an impossible task �
-but to bring about the moral alienation of the masses from the
government until its isolation has become total and irreversible.
The terrorist therefore strives to implement a protracted campaign
of violence designed to make life unbearable for a democratic
government as long as his demands remain unsatisfied. Unfortu-
nately, some governments submit to terrorist demands, thereby
obtaining a temporary respite, in preference to risking a counter-
terrorist campaign that might serve only to isolate them further
from large segments of the population. Later, many of these same
governments find themselves confronted with additional terrorist
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demands.1
Although expensive in terms of both human life and property,
the most effective counterstrategy for a liberal democratic society
seems to be one that ignores these demands, since submission to
terrorists only serves to reinforce their behavior. Attempts to rea-
son with individuals committed to the principle of "direct action"
(bombings, kidnapings and the like) as the only effective way to
bring about the instant change they demand are extremely risky.
Furthermore, many terrorists are impatient, impulsive young peo-
ple who are infused with an unrealistic idealism bordering on the
irrational, and who consequently view all mechanisms of peaceful
change with contempt.
COORDINATION AND COOPERATION AMONG TERRORISTS
The rapid progress of technology in the past decade has con-
tributed its share to the growth and danger of terrorism world-
wide. Equipped with fraudulent credentials of excellent quality,
terrorists use regularly scheduled jetliners to transport themselves
by way of circuitous routes to the target area; there, prearranged
contacts with other terrorist organizations provide them with site
information, surface transportation, plastic explosives and auto-
matic weapons. Safe-house networks, which afford cover and con-
cealment for covert activities, have been established for their use
in American and European cities. Additionally, there is some evi-
dence that elaborate "exchange attack systems" and "joint action
commitments" have been concluded among terrorist groups of
various nationalities.2 The Cuban Intelligence Service, believed to
be dominated by the Soviet KGB, is allegedly responsible for the
development of a liaison network used by some American and
European terrorist organizations.3
The first signs of an international exchange and pooling of
weapons and information among terrorist groups emerged about
five years ago, when information filtered into the press about
American Weathermen, IRA gunmen and Turkish Dev Genc
terrorists attending summer training sessions at Palestinian com-
mando bases. In May 1972 additional evidence came to light when
members of Japan's Red Army Group, acting in behalf of the
PLO, removed weapons from their suitcases and opened fire on
a group of pilgrims at Tel Aviv's airport. Moreover, Cuba has
trained both Palestinian and Irish terrorists and has established
secret relations with the Quebec Liberation Front (FLQ) and
various German terrorist groups.4
TUPAMARO TACTICS AND THE POLICE OFFICER
The urban guerrilla tactics of Uruguay's Tupamaros and the
widespread publicity generated by their more spectacular propa-
ganda actions have made them the most emulated revolutionary
group in the world. The Weathermen, the West German Baader-
Meinhof Gang, the Symbionese Liberation Army (SLA) and other
groups all imitate Tupamaro methods. The established Tupamaro
propaganda tactic of hijacking trucks from food stores and dis-
pensing their contents to slum dwellers, for example, was used by
1 Martha Crenshaw Hutchinson, "The Concept of Revolutionary Terrorism,"
Journal of Conflict Resolution, September 1972, pp. 383-396.
'John B. Wolf, "A Mideast Profile: The Cycle of Terror and Counterterror,"
international Perspectives, November/December 1973, pp. 29-30.
3 Marta Rojas and Mirta Rodriguez Calderon, Tania: The Unforgettable
Guerrilla (New York: Random House, 1971), pp. 32-79.
4 John Barron, KGB: The Secret Work of Soviet Secret /Agents (New York:
Reader's Digest Press, 1974), p. 22.
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the SLA about two years ago when it demanded that a multi-
million-dollar food handout be undertaken in selected California
cities.
Most terrorists choose targets similar to those favored by the
Tupamaros: large international corporations with facilities in
Third World countries, diplomats and other representatives of
North American and West European states, and police officers,
whom they regard as tools of the "capitalist forces of repression."
Also, techniques for urban operations have been demonstrated by
the Tupamaros to others who now realize that the urban terrorist
"can work through so many thousands of people [that] . . . the
enemy is made to feel him as an impalpable presence, until every
ordinary pedestrian seems like a guerrilla in disguise."5
Terrorists know ,that this uncertainty has a profound psycho-
logical impact on the police officer, who is constantly open to
harassment and feels he can trust no one, as a seemingly innocuous
person or event may deal him a fatal blow. Added to the police
officer's anxiety is the extreme frustration he experiences in trying
to implement terrorist-control measures 'without incurring the ire
of the citizens he inconveniences.
Under these circumstances, the police agencies of democratic
states should anticipate an escalation in the number of direct ter-
rorist attacks, which will probably include attempts to disarm,
kidnap and assassinate police officers. They must train their officers
to react rationally and objectively, even in that most trying situa-
tion when a fellow policeman is slain by a terrorist. Otherwise they
play into the hands of the terrorist, who aims at breaking police
morale and discipline, especially when a member of the news
media is present. The Black Liberation Army (BLA), which killed
police officers "because of their color, which was neither black nor
white, but blue," tried (but failed) to employ these tactics success-
fully against the New York City Police Department in 1972.6
Police Education and Integrity
Although terrorists usually avoid communication With the po-
lice, except to obtain information on plans and events from indi-
vidual policemen or through police informants working as double
agents, they actively seek to identify and exploit the "contradic-
tions, weaknesses and fissures" of the police force. Police com-
manders should be aware that acts of intimidation and reprisals,
genuine or fabricated, will be manipulated by terrorists such as
the BLA, who are also known to carry out "revolutionary justice"
by executing selected police officers. The Tupamaros, particularly,
are convinced that this "vigilante approach to police brutality
gives excellent fruits and must not be abandoned."
Police agencies, therefore, should develop and implement a
comprehensive program of in-service training geared to provide
every police officer with the skills in interpersonal relations and
survival that are needed to cope with this aspect of political ter-
rorism. Furthermore, "since the policing service in a free society
is almost entirely a personal service, every condition in a police
organization and its environment is traceable in a large measure
to the acts of policemen and to the success or failure of their
operations." Hence, internal investigation units must be estab-
.
5Raymond M. Momboisse, Blueprint of Revolution�The Rebel, the Party,
the Techniques of Revolt (Springfield, Ill.: Charles C Thomas, 1967), p. 282.
g Robert Daley, Target Blue (New York: Delacorte Press, 1973), pp. 402.445.
'Arturo C. Porrecanski, Uruguay's Tupamaros: The Urban Guerrilla (New York:
Praeger, 1973), P � 21.
'0. W. Wilson, Police Administration (_New York: McGraw-Hill, 1972), p. 197.
31
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lished or expanded in order to monitor police integrity; through
a process of periodic inspections, failures and errors can be identi-
fied and corrected before they become serious and subject to
manipulation by terrorists, who are always on watch for ways in
which to discredit the police.
THE LAW AND THE DETERRENCE OF TERRORISM
Nationwide Uniform Penal Codes
There is some evidence that both the court and correctional
components of the American criminal justice system lack a well-
developed and coordinated program designed to handle the ter-
rorist who operates within our free society. Managers of these
components seeking a solution to this problem would do well to
take note of the British approach to terrorism. Once confronted
with terrorism, the British strengthen social sanctions and act on
the supposition that counterterrorist operations should be a part
of normal police work and not a kind of social engineering.9 This
approach seems more sensible than the current American method,
which is to undertake long-overdue preventive measures as a con-
sequence of immediate terrorist pressure; indeed, the American
response is counterproductive since it can be manipulated by ter-
rorist propagandists to aid their cause. A prerequisite to the adop-
tion of the British approach is nationwide enactment of uniform
penal codes, which many of the fifty American states presently
lack. Pending before Congress, a 753-page bill known as S. I would
give the nation its first real criminal code: Bill S. I seeks to restore
the death penalty for certain federal crimes by amending federal
law to take account of the Supreme Court's 1972 decision, which
held that the death penalty was unconstitutional because it was
capriciously imposed.
The Discretionary Death Penalty
On August 5, 1975, the United States moved toward legal uni-
formity with the enactment of Public Law 93-366, which re-
imposed the death penalty � subject to a special hearing and
assurance by a jury that there were no mitigating circumstances �
in hijacking cases involving death. This law should now be ex-
tended to cover other acts of terrorism and should no longer be
restricted to hijackings, which are on the decrease. Although no
one knows the exact deterrent value of capital punishment, a dis-
cretionary death penalty is of benefit if it saves the life of even one
person.
The discretionary death penalty has other advantages worthy of
consideration. Factual information pertaining to a terrorist organ-
ization's infrastructure or membership is not usually forthcoming
from the terrorist who has received an unequivocal and unrevok-
able death sentence. Whereas the mandatory death penalty stops
the flow of information, the discretionary death penalty can ac-
tually encourage it. Furthermore, if the penalty for aircraft hijack-
ing, for example, is a mandatory death sentence, the terrorist has
little to lose by killing everyone aboard. And yet, even capital
punishment is not a deterrent for some terrorists, the totally
fanatic, who are already prepared to die as martyrs to their cause."
' Lucian W. Pye, Aspects of Political Deilelopment (Boston: Little; Brown, 1966),
pp. 129-131.
" U.S. House, Committee on Internal Security, Terrorism Hearings, 93rd
Congress, 2nd Session, May 8, 14, 16, 22, 29-30, June 13, 1974, Part 2, pp.
3222-3223.
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Improved Court Management
It is important that terrorists be brought to trial within sixty
days after apprehension so that maximum benefit may be derived
from the discretionary death penalty laws. Consequently, court
management procedures. and policies must be devised to reduce
the delay presently eighteen to twenty-four months � between
the apprehension and trial of those few terrorists who finally do
stand before a jury. Terrorists are acutely aware that only a few
of the Arabs responsible for the hijackings, kidnapings and execu-
tion of hostages over the past few years have suffered meaningful
punishment after capture. Many, incarcerated for extended pe-
riods pending prosecution, were freed in compliance with the
demands of their compatriots, who meanwhile held innocent
people as hostages. It was this sort of extortion that forced the
West Germans to release the three surviving members of the
Munich team of killers late in 1972.
West Germany has also been subjected to numerous demands
and onslaughts by resurgent members of the Baader-Meinhof Gang
who seek the release of their leaders and about thirty gang Mem-
bers captured in 1972.11 Clearly, terrorists must be made to realize
that if found guilty they will be swiftly punished, and that demon-
strations, petitions or violence in their behalf will be futile.
Ransom Laws
A federal law making it illegal to pay ransom could serve as
another deterrent to terrorism. True, it would be most difficult,
perhaps counterproductive, to prevent people from paying ransom
to obtain the release of loved ones. But, at a minimum, income-tax
laws could be revised so that American corporations could no
longer deduct ransom payments as business expenses. If this mea-
sure should prove impracticable, perhaps the companies them-
selves will come to recognize that ours is a difficult world and will
make nonpayment of ransom a matter of corporate policy.
Terrorist propaganda tactics, such as the SLA demand for dis-
tribution of food to the poor in the Patricia Hearst case, can help
to create a "Robin Hood" mystique.r2 Therefore, Congress might
also consider passage of a law making it a crime for a third party
to receive the benefits of a ransom payment.
THE HOSTAGE PROBLEM: WHAT IS To BE DONE?
The Official Hostage Policy of the United States
For law enforcement officials around the world, terrorism and
its effects have become a recurrent nightmare, particularly when
"nonnegotiable demands" are issued for the release of prisoners,
ransom money, or safe passage to another country. Is the safety of
hostages to be secured at any cost? Or must their lives be risked
to discourage other terrorists and save future victims? Forced to
confront the problem through a heavy overlay of politics, emotion
and history, different countries have found different answers. The
Israelis argue that hijackings and other extortion attempts would
escalate if they complied with terrorist demands. This refusal to
deal with terrorists is a difficult decision, however, for Israel is also
concerned with the hostages' well-being. It is nevertheless a neces-
. Melvin J. Lasky, "Ulrike and Andreas," New York Times Magazine, May II,
1975, pp. 73-79.
" U.S. House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, International Terrorism, Hearings,
before the Subcommittee on the Near East and South Asia, 93rd Congress, 2nd
Session, June 11, 18-19, 24, 1974, pp. 68-69.
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sary choice: when one sees assassins released by the authorities in
order to protect hostages, it becomes obvious that terrorists will
thrive on the common decency of peoples and governments.
America's official hostage policy closely resembles that of Israel;
namely, "no deal" with terrorists. The United States formulated
her policy in 1973 when several persons, including an American
diplomat, were kidnaped by Arab terrorists in the Sudan. At the
time, President Nixon declared that the United States would not
meet any demands to secure the release of the hostages, on the
grounds that this would encourage political kidnapings and other
terrorist acts. The U.S. diplomat was killed, but the federal gov-
ernment has not strayed from its decision to refuse to yield to
extortion or blackmail anywhere in the world. A corollary to this
policy is that it is the host country's responsibility to assure as far
as possible the safety of American diplomats and American citizens
in its jurisdiction.'3
The argument against acquiescence is persuasive. Still, there is
little hard evidence that the tough approach is best. Psychiatrists
have found, in fact, that political terrorists are often paranoid
schizophrenics with overt suicidal tendencies � a deadly species.
To this kind of mentality, death is not the ultimate punishment;
it is the ultimate reward. Consequently, law enforcement agencies
should realize that in many cases a terrorist does not take hostages
in order to achieve some preconceived goal; rather, he dreams up
a goal in order to take hostages." He seeks a pretext to stage a
production for all the world to see.
"The Hostage Must Live" Concept
One big gap in the existing American public-security system �
one which should be narrowed if terrorists are to be discouraged
from operating in this country � is the lack of a nationwide uni-
form hostage policy. Generally, the hostage policy adhered to today
by local and state police departments is in substance that "the
hostage must live." This is in direct opposition to official federal
policy, but it seems unlikely that in practice the two policies would
come into conflict. If, for example, Arab terrorists hijacked an
airliner at Kennedy International Airport and demanded the re-
lease of Sirhan Sirhan in exchange for the lives of the hostages they
held, the entire event would fall within the jurisdiction of the
federal government. The FBI would handle enforcement within
the FAA's jurisdiction, and a federal official would most probably
reject the demand to free Sirhan, who is held in Sari Quentin
Federal Prison.15
If, to take another example, a terrorist group seized a hostage
within New York City and demanded safe passage to the nearest
international airport, the New York City police, in compliance
with the city's hostage policy, would submit to the demand, assum-
ing that the only alternative would be the hostage's death. Once
the terrorists and their hostage entered FAA jurisdiction, what
would happen is not clear. Would the federal authorities who take
over jurisdiction bargain with the terrorists, or would they refuse
to deal? It is assumed that they would not deal, and that New York
City's hostage policy would be negated. But no one knows for cer-
tain how such cases of overlapping jurisdiction will be handled.
Consequently, discussions should be held among federal, state and
large-city officials in order to resolve all possible points of conflict
and confusion.
Terrorism, Part 2, pp. 3153-3138.
"Gerald Arenberg, Hostage 1%.,`ashing,ton: American Police Academy, 1974),
pp. 22-26.
13 Ibid. ^ I
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THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE NEWS MEDIA
The political terrorist depends on supportive publicity to help
him convince the public of the urgent need to correct societal con-
ditions that he finds wanting. He must therefore get across the
point that moderate measures and the extended democratic proc-
ess are not sufficient to bring about the immediate change and
social equality he demands. To this end, he must beguile the press
into seeing his use of terrorist tactics as a clear response to the
denial of basic freedoms to a politically identifiable group that
must be "liberated." 'Without credible publicity skewed to this
consideration, he risks rejection of his activities as illogical and in-
tolerable behavior and could find himself temporarily neutralized.
Thus, a public relations assessment is a prerequisite to any ter-
rorist plan and serves as the factor controlling its intensity, direc-
tion and duration. This evaluative process is called, in the rhetoric
of the Tupamaros, a diagnosis of the coyuntura; that is, "the politi-
cal, economic, military and organizational conditions of both the
society and the social movement." In this context, the release of
the British ambassador to Uruguay, Sir Geoffrey Jackson, after his
capture by the Tupamaros in January 1971, suggests that his cap-
tors realized that there was nothing further to be gained and much
to be lost by killing or retaining the ambassador. The news media
were already well acquainted with the Tupamaro program, the
British government would give nothing to save Sir Geoffrey's life,
and at the time they kidnaped him the "Robin Hood" Tupamaros
were already a Uruguayan institution."
Since freedom of the press is basic to our concept of a free
society, however, it is difficult to devise any kind of restraint that
would be accepted voluntarily by the news media. The media
have, on occasion, reported terrorist activities in such a way that
the practitioners were encouraged to believe they were extremely
important persons. A greater degree of cooperation between fed-
eral intelligence agencies and the news media, in the form of an
educational effort, might alert all concerned to the contagious
nature of terrorism and to the fact that terrorists are not reformers
and idealists but criminals, who should be treated as such in news
tel eases.
In crisis situations television crews should practice objective re-
porting, free of embellishment, so that they do not exacerbate a
situation the police are attempting to control. They might also
voluntarily agree not to provide their audiences with specific loca-
tions of violence until it has been contained by the police. This
practice would reduce the large numbers of people drawn to such
sites by news reports, thereby creating additional problems of
crowd control and taxing already overextended police manpower
� or even serving the terrorists directly by expanding a mob
already under their control."
All in all, the media might strive to strip terrorists of their self-
delusions, instead of providing them with several million dollars'
worth of free publicity. To protect against this sort of inadvertent
cooperation by the press, the British have subjected thei+ news-
papers to the "D-notice" system, under which the press is notified
"Sir Geoffrey Jackson, Surviving the Long Night�An Autobiographical Ac-
count of a Political Kidnapping (New York: Vanguard Press, 1973), pp. 208-211.
In June 1975, within ninety minutes of the crash of an Eastern Airlines
passenger jet in New York, NBC was on the scene with electronic cameras ("mini-
cams"). Half an hour later, the NBC broadcast of the event was being watched by
nearly three times the normal 6:00 p.m. audience (1.5 million versus 500,000).
John Corry, "Many Moods at Scene of Crash," New York Times, June 25, 1975,
13- I.
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prior to publication when a particular news item could violate
security laws.1� For a free or "open" society like the United States,
however, media self-restraint and not the institution of censorship
seems to be the best approach. This openness is one of our strong-
est weapons, for it accelerates mutual understanding and reduces
barriers to rapid social development.
THE POLICE TASK FORCE
Although pressured by news publicity to respond dramatically
to a terrorist situation, the police of a free society must be careful
not to overreact and enhance the terrorist's popular image. An
example of carefully calculated police response to terrorism is pro-
vided by events on the island of Bermuda in March 1973; namely,
the muTder of the governor general, Sir Richard Sharples, and his
aide. Although the media reported the possible implication of a
politically motivated insurgent group known as the Black Cadre,
the British felt that a team of detectives from Scotland Yard should
investigate the matter calmly and prepare the normal reports.
These police reports were then used tO assess the situation 4nd
shape future response if any should be required. Meanwhile, the
Black Cadre did not benefit from any publicity it might have been
seeking, nor were its activities considered by the media as a formi-
dable factor in Bermudian affairs.20
Essentially, the value of the task force approach is that it con-
centrates specially trained manpower on a single case. In May 1975
the West German government created a terrorism-control branch
within the national police, the Federal Criminal Office, to search
for members of the Baader-Meinhof Gang who are still at large.
A few years earlier the New York City Police Department had also
used the task force approach in order to counter and eliminate
attacks by the BLA on its personnel. In the latter case, a team of
detectives was assigned to collect information on individuals asso-
ciated with the BLA and to coordinate the activities of police offi-
cers working undercover within that terrorist group. Only detec-
tives actively involved in the investigation were privy to all field
reports, and sensitive information was consequently not leaked to
the press.'
In the United States today, a few police vice-control units have
considerable expertise in the ties among organized-crime figures
on which the syndicate relies to extend its criminal conspiracy.
Many of these organized-crime structures and networks are akin
to those maintained by political terrorists. Consequently, police
methods used in organized-crime control might also be used effec-
tively against terrorists. For years the police have tried unsuccess-
fully to eliminate the Mafia; they have not failed because their
methods are ineffective but because it is difficult to conduct a pro-
longed intelligence operation unjustified by the kind of perform-
ance statistics that elicit higher budgetary appropriations. Thus,
only a few detectives in a handful of large, urban police depart-
ments have the training and experience needed to control organ-
ized conspiracies or to handle the public security aspects of
municipal-police intelligence operations.
'� Alvin Shuster, "Secrecy Veils British Intelligence Service." ibid., October 28,
1974, p. 7.
" john B. Wolf, "Terrorist Manipulation of the Democratic Process," Police
Journal, April/ June 1975, p. 110.
2' Albert A. Seedman and Peter Hellman, Chief (New York: Avon Books, 1975),
pp. 419-498.
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THE CABINET COMMITTEE WORKING GROUP
After the 1972 Munich tragedy, which illustrated that inter-
national terrorism had reached the point where innocent people
anywhere could be victimized, President Nixon directed Secretary
of State Kissinger to chair a Cabinet Committee whose assignment
would be to identify the most effective ways to prevent both
domestic and international terrorism. Responding to the presi-
dent's order, the secretary of state formed such a committee and
established a Cabinet Committee Working Group, composed of
senior representatives or agency heads of the groups represented
in the Cabinet Committee. Although members of the working
group are in close contact as issues arise and incidents occur, the
committee itself rarely meets.22
The working group's function is (1) to ensure collaboration
among U.S. agencies and departments with domestic and foreign
responsibilities and (2) to recommend countermeasures that can
close gaps in the security screen around Americans at home and
abroad, as well as foreigners in the United States, whom the agen-
cies represented in the working group help to protect. With re-
spect to the task of protection, the working group relies heavily
on the customary local and federal agencies. Thus, it is kept in-
formed by the FBI of the international potentialities or implica-
tions of domestic terrorist groups and uses the CIA as an important
tool in foreign incidents.
The working group devotes most of its efforts to the collection
of information on terrorism, which it uses to improve deterrent
procedures in the United States and overseas, and in this area it
performs quite well. It is active in pressing for the ratification of
important multilateral conventions on hijacking and for the adop-
tion of International Civil Aviation Organization standards de-
signed to improve the security of international airports worldwide.
The group also works with the United Nations; however, its dis-
cussions with groups of UN members often get bogged down in
debate over the issue of justifiable versus illegal violence.
Unfortunately, working group members do not handle terrorist
matters on a continual basis but rather provide input into the
group from their respective agencies and obtain information in
return only as incidents occur. Task forces have thus been estab-
lished by the group to study incidents after they take place; this
was the case with the unsolved murder of the Israeli attach�n
Washington (July 1973) and the assassination of two Turkish
diplomats in Santa Barbara, California (January 1973). Some
events occur so quickly, however, that the working group does
not respond. In cases where the group becomes involved, its task
force is disbanded once the incident is over.23
THE COUNTERTERRORIST ASSESSMENT AND RESPONSE GROUP
Although the American public is largely against surveillance,
data banks, dossiers or any other facet of a long-term intelligence
operation, intelligence is still the only way we can learn about
terrorist plans and predict terrorist acts. Consequently, there is
a definite need for legislation to establish a Counterterrorist As-
__
in Ibid., pp. 13-30.
--
'The members of the Cabinet Committee are the secretary of state, the attorney
general, the secretary of defense, the director of the FBI, the director of the CIA,
the secretary of the treasury, the secretary of transportation, the president's
assistants for national security and domestic affairs, and the U.S. ambassador to
the United Nations. The working group includes the senior representatives of
Cabinet Committee members listed above and nineteen other agencies; other par-
ticipants are included on an ad hoc basis. International Terrorism, pp. 13-14.
17
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sessment and Response Group at a high level of the national
government. The activities of this group would supplement the
work of the Cabinet Committee Working Group and serve as
an immediate information resource for other authorized agencies.
It would not duplicate the work of the CIA, which is restricted by
law from performing internal security functions. Nor would it
supplant the FBI, which does not collect intelligence abroad or
employ analysts with sufficient expertise in international politics
to function in a strategic public security capacity. This new group
would be staffed with people who know how to gather and analyze
public security information from both domestic, and foreign
sources for regular dissemination to law enforcement agencies on
a "need-to-know" basis.2'
The Counterterrorist Assessment and Response Group should
contain three primary units: an assessment unit, a teaching unit
and a response unit. The assessment unit would receive informa-
tion on terrorists from members of the Cabinet Committee Work-
ing Group, municipal law enforcement agencies and the response
unit. It would then process this information for its own use ,and
for dissemination in strategic reports to other agencies. The teach-
ing unit would provide training for local law enforcement agencies
in subjects relating to terrorism that are not currently taught by
the FBI. Initially, the teaching team would concentrate on devel-
oping the skills of persons assigned to existing public security in-
telligence units, which were established by many large urban
police departments when they realized that their detective bureaus
could not handle the work.
The response unit, composed of experts in such disciplines as
management, law enforcement, psychology and public relations,
would travel to the site of a terrorist act whenever an American
citizen or corporation is involved. Although fully respectful of the
sovereignty and sensitivities of other nations, the jurisdictions of
other agencies and, of course, the wishes of the victim, the response
team would urge other governments to accept all the American
resources that could be put at their disposal, including intelligence
and communications. Additionally, the response unit would col-
lect specific field information for the assessment team on foreign
terrorist groups with the capability to infiltrate highly trained
teams into the United States.
Computerized information Systems
To accomplish its mission, the Counterterrorist Assessment and
Response Group would have to be provided with data from so-
phisticated information systems such as the CIA's "Octopus" bank.
"Octopus," a computerized file maintained at the CIA's head-
quarters in Langley, Virginia, can match television pictures of
known terrorists and their associates against profiles contained
within the system. The television pictures are taken in various
overseas airports, bus terminals and other transportation centers.
In microseconds, "Octopus" can analyze a picture along with the
information already in its file on targets in the area and the
equipment and skills required to attack them successfully. Within
a few minutes after the analysis, a radio alarm can be transmitted
to a counterterrorist team who can in turn apprehend the
terrorists. Thus detected and accused of criminal intent, terrorists
have often been "flabbergasted at being presented with plans
24 Terrorism, Part 2, pp. 3086-3190.
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they hadn't yet made."25 To be sure, the use of television and
other forms of surveillance in a free society must be carefully con-
trolled and tightly monitored. Also, the managers of these informa-
tion systems must be extremely careful that they are not used for
purposes abhorrent to a free society."
LIAISON BETWEEN FEDERAL AND LOCAL
LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES
Federal agencies, though aware of the threat posed by terrorism,
have found it most difficult to cooperate, even with other federal
agencies, to put it down. It is understandable, therefore, that they
have been unable to develop any lasting and mutually beneficial
liaison with local police departments. A properly organized and
legally empowered Counterterrorist Assessment and Response
Group could help to remedy this situation, since its teaching and
assessment teams would be working constantly with municipal
police agencies. �
American law enforcement's deficiency in the realm of co-
operation is plainly evident. Eighteen federal strike forces have
been established to combat Mafia-dominated organized crime
throughout the United States. The record of these forces can be
described charitably as "mixed," and until recently U.S. attorneys
have urged their dissolution on the grounds that the various fed-
eral agencies pooled in the strike forces tend to compete with
and distrust each other. Among the federal agencies normally
grouped into these strike forces are the FBI, the Drug Enforce-
ment Administration, the Immigration and Naturalization Serv-
ices, and the Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms Division of the
Treasury Department. Many of these agencies are also included
in the Cabinet Committee Working Group.
There is some justification, however, for this competition and
mistrust. One strike-force attorney, asked by a reporter to show
FBI charts on the Mafia, replied sardonically, "They'll hardly
show them to us." When asked why, the attorney replied, "Well
the bureau has the attitude that one day you're a prosecutor, and
the next day you're a defense attorney." This is frequently true
of the young attorneys who work in the federal strike forces and
in the U.S. Attorney General's Office, where a prosecutor's term
averages three years.27
LOCAL POLICE FORCES AND PUBLIC SECURITY INTELLIGENCE
In a free society, a public security intelligence unit must be
particularly responsive to the legal principles and public policies
that develop with respect to the collection, storage and dissemina-
tion of domestic intelligence. At the same, time, it is imperative
that such activities be continued because they are critical compo-
nents of other operations undertaken to control both terrorists
and covert, organized criminal groups. Intelligence operations
also enable law enforcement agencies to make the informed judg-
ments and preparations required to police adequately the dis-
orders, meetings, rallies, parades and strikes that take place in
their jurisdiction. Therefore, to ensure that this vital task is com-
pleted without violation of civil rights, certain measures must be
carried out.
"1 Miles Copeland, Without Cloak or Dagger: The Truth About the New
Espionage (New York: Simon gc Schuster, 1970), pp. 16-24.
""Palestinians Planning to Review Tactics," New York Times, November 24,
1974, p. 3.
"Mary Breasted, "Gallos n--.-*- � - -
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All police working in intelligence units, including undercover
agents, must be given intensive instruction in relevant con-
stitutional principles, especially those embodied in the First,
Fourth and Fourteenth amendments. This training should take
place on initial assignment to the unit and periodically thereafter.
It is urgent, also, that intelligence units draft, adopt and enforce
guidelines and procedures for the recording and storage of infor-
mation in public security files and for the intra- and extra-depart-
mental dissemination of these data. Perhaps the most critical of
the guidelines are those having to do with the use of informants.
The steps to be followed in the processing, registering and pay-
ment of informants must be clearly spelled out, and all intel-
ligence units must have a legal adviser who will evaluate and
continually review the unit's procedures to see that they keep up
with current legislation and judicial decisions. It is important,
too, that a Criminal Source Control Office be created to legitimize
and ensure the most efficient use of intelligence obtained from
informants.
In order to control political terrorism, police intellikence units
must have strategic and tactical analytical capabilities, as well as
traditional field-information collection units and sources. These
requirements can be met by establishing public security in-
telligence modules. The module concept works in the following
manner. A team of field investigators and a public security desk
analyst work together as a unit, concentrating on a specific area
of concern, such as right-wing or left-wing extremist groups; this
enables police officers to become expert in a specific problem
within a relatively short time." The module would also facilitate
the instruction of public security analysts by the Counterterrorist
Assessment and Response Group.
Once a public security intelligence module is established, it is
important that the supervisor keep its activities focused on the
strategic aspects of its area of concern (for example, such things
as target analysis or propaganda techniques in the case cited
above). At the same time, he must ensure that its work is current
and yields recommendations with regard to tactics. Thus, each
module should be organized according to study area (dignitary
protection or terrorist groups, for example) and not according to
function (strategy or tactics). Also, the various modules should be
placed within the framework of a unified intelligence division to
which all intelligence, department-wide, is directed. Information
can then be exchanged efficiently � a goal further facilitated by
uniform filing techniques that enable cross-referencing among
all areas of concern." It follows that another task for the Counter-
terrorist Assessment and Response Group could be to establish a
uniform, nationwide reporting and classification system to ex-
pedite intra- and extra-departmental dissemination of terrorist
information. The system used by the FBI's National Crime In-
formation Center might serve as a model for such standardization.
Because of the complex political, economic, sociological and
psychological factors surrounding the problem of terrorism, many
police officers lack the education and training needed for pro-
ficiency as public security desk analysts. Consequently, urban
police departments with a shortage of desk analysts should obtain
29 Howard A. Metzdorff, "The Module Concept of Intelligence Gathering,"
Police Chief, February 1975, pp. 52-53.
�Arthur Grubert, "New York City Task Force," in International Narcotics
Officers' Association, 19th Ar:nual Conference Report (New York: International
Narcotics Enforcement Officers Association, 1974).
41)
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qualified specialists from outside sources. Local or regional col-
leges and universities can often provide suitable personnel, and
the Counterterrorist Assessment and Response Group could help
to train them.
The police department's patrol division should remain the pri-
mary collector of "street information." Complementing this serv-
ice, a uniform field-reporting system, compatible with data
processing equipment, should be designed and implemented. Such
a system will make it possible to process reports of terrorist in-
cidents and terrorist plans without delay.
In order to enhance the ability of the ordinary patrolman to
gather information, on groups with terrorist potential, a series of
pertinent lectures should be added to in-service training programs.
In addition, recruit-training schedules should include a block of
time devoted to political terrorism. The development of curricu-
lum and related materials could be accomplished by the Counter-
terrorist Assessment and Response Group. All of these educational
programs would supplement, not replace, existing specialized pro-
grams conducted by other agencies (for example, the training in
protection of dignitaries provided by the Secret Service).
A BATTLE PLAN TO MEET THE TERRORIST THREAT
Confronted with proliferating and increasingly sophisticated
terrorist groups at home and abroad, on the one hand, and the
necessity to maintain the basic constitutional freedoms and safe-
guards that are the hallmark of a democracy, on the other, the
United States must develop new programs and policies to combat
political terrorism. In America today, by virtue of a process of
governmental debate and freedom of the press, it is fortunately
almost impossible to undertake a program of pure repression. If
we examine the political culture within which Americans func-
tion, it is evident that there exist well-defined convictions about
what the government may or may not legitimately do and a broad
consensus on the fundamental rights of man.. Our democratic
system is thus both a necessary and a sufficient limitation on the
use of repressive force. Moreover, any illegal action by a demo-
cratic state is undertaken with peril since it can be manipulated
by the terrorist to serve his own purposes. But Americans' desire
to maximize individual freedom also blinds them to the dangers
presented by political terrorism and at times prevents them from
seeing the necessity for deterrent action.
Consequently, the federal government should embark on an
educational program designed to inform the public about all
aspects of political terrorism, particularly the difficulty of combat-
ing it within a free society. Once made aware of the seriousness
and extent of the problem, the American people might give their
support to the institution of uniform penal codes, the discretion-
ary death penalty, improved court management programs, laws
constraining the payment or receipt of ransom, and other measures
necessary to control terrorism. Such a program would also help
Americans to understand the rationale behind the government's
official hostage policy and thus accept it as a painful necessity.
The program would be aimed additionally at heightening the
news media's awareness of terrorist tactics intended to obtain
publicity and public sympathy and could serve to warn the
policeman on the beat to guard against being manipulated by the
terrorist into violating his code of conduct.
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Apart from educational measures, the government should ex-
pand the scope of the Cabinet Committee and its working group
and battle for legislation that would establish a full-time, highly
specialized Counterterrorist Assessment and Response Group as
described above. Units of this new group would perform several
vital tasks: education of police agencies' public security analysts,
assessment of the domestic and international aspects of terrorism,
development of a consolidated terrorist-information system, study
of significant terrorist incidents around the world, and support of
the Cabinet Committee and its working group. Once the counter-
terrorist group is established, however, it is mandatory that proper
safeguards be implemented and that procedures be established to
regulate its computerized intelligence system. Moreover, the group
must make its information available to local law enforcement
agencies and to other federal agencies.
Meanwhile, it is imperative that public security operations be
continued by local police agencies and that they be made respon-
sive to the legal principles and public policies developing in the
United States today. Police intelligence units should be upgraded
in the areas of personnel selection and training, information-
handling techniques and organization. Furthermore, the men and
women of the press and in Congress who relentlessly investigate
the activities of the American intelligence community must take
care not to undermine the effectiveness of the CIA as a global
collector of information on terrorist matters, or that of the FBI
as the nation's primary guardian of internal security.
In our highly politicized age it would appear that the dangers
posed worldwide by political terrorism are likely to continue into
the immediate future. Americans must therefore be prepared to
cope with terrorist acts that will almost certainly occur in their
cities. No doubt some will argue that there is no way to guard
against the unknown and the unseen and will oppose the ex-
penditure of tax dollars for preventive measures. This sort of
fatalism can result in terrorist incidents that might otherwise
have been prevented � incidents that will be both costly and
internationally embarrassing. It would be foolish to pretend that
the tide of sabotage, extortion, bombings and hijackings can he
totally turned back. But if we are not to surrender to lawlessness,
we must expand present efforts to make terrorism less effective
and less attractive as a political weapon.
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NEGOTIATING FOR HOSTAGES:
A POLICY DILEMMA*
by Edward F. Mick�lus
T N THE past decade the world has seen the rise of a new type of
actor on the global stage: the international terrorist group. To
gain headlines and increase public awareness of their cause, these
bands have engaged in the assassination of government leaders,
the sabotage of critical facilities, the bombing of embassies and
foreign corporations, assaults on military installations, skyjack-
ings, kidnapings of diplomats and businessmen, and takeovers of
embassies to hold their staffs for ransom. The latter three situa-
tion-types, which involve the taking of hostages, will be the con-
cern of this article. How great a problem do we face? Are there any
trends we can discover? Is the problem worsening? Can any nation
consider itself safe from such attacks? Are certain nations being
singled out for terrorist assaults of this kind? What groups are
engaged in this activity? What is it they want? Finally, what can �
and should we do when faced with such situations?
THE SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM
The barricade-and-hostage scenario produces the first situation-
type in which a nation or corporation may find itself faced with
the question of negotiating for hostages. In it we find terrorists
seizing one or more hostages but making no attempt to leave the
scene of the crime. Negotiations are carried on with the perpetra-
tors themselves effectively being held hostage, unable to leave the
scene when they choose. This situation frequently climaxes an
incident in which the seizure of hostages is not the terrorists' pri-
mary aim: e.g., a bank holdup in which the robbers are discovered
by the authorities before they are able to escape, whereupon the
group seizes any persons who happen to be handy, or an attack on
an airport lounge or a residence, in which hostages are seized in
order to secure the free passage of the terrorists = or murderers
� away from the site.
The second type is the more stereotyped kidnaping, in which
a diplomat or businessman is taken to an underground hideout
and held for monetary ransom, release of prisoners, publication
of the group's manifesto, and the like. Our third type is a special
case of aerial hijacking. We can distinguish among those situa-
tions in which the hijacker is merely seeking a means of trans-
portation to a nation giving him asylum (the old "Take this plane
to Cuba" skyjacking), situations in which the hijacker forces the
pilot to land the plane, releases passengers and crew, and blows up
the plane without making any ransom demands (engaged in for
shock value), and incidents in which the skyjacker makes specific
demands on governments or corporations, threatening the safety
of the passengers and crew. This last type of hijacking is included
in our discussion.'
� The author thanks Bruce Blair, Raymond Duvall, Linda Kay Florence, William
Foltz, Brian Jenkins, Robert E. Lane, Bob Mandel, David Milbank, Nicholas Neu-
mann, Bruce M. Russett and H. Bradford Westerfield for their useful comments
during the preparation of the manuscript.
1In general, one finds that more hostages are taken in aerial hijackings and
barricade-and-hostage situations; kidnapers usually limit themselves to one or two
persons. However, in late June 1958, Ratil Castro kidnaped forty-seven Americans
and a number of other foreigners in a series of raids in Cuba.
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We can see some trends in occurrences like these in Table I,
which gives a breakdown of yearly incidents from 1968 through
1975.2 Kidnapings are by far the most prevalent hostage incident,
showing a wavering but increasing trend-line over time. In 1975
more kidnapings were perpetrated than in any other year in recent
memory. Moreover, the probability that the kidnapers will suc-
cessfully seize a hostage has grown dramatically since the begin-
ning of the 1970s. A steady rise in barricade-and-hostage incidents
includes no known failures to take hostages in eight years, and
an annual record was established in this category during 1975.
The situation changes with respect to aerial hijackings. Improve-
ments in security procedures made in 1973, together with the
unwillingness of countries to grant asylum to hijackers, have led
to this type of incident becoming a rarity. Overall, we have seen
an erratic rise in the total number of such terrorist incidents,
NEGOTIATING FOR HOSTAGES
TABLE I
YEARLY NUMBER OF INCIDENTS INVOLVING THE SEIZURE
OF HOSTAGES',
Year
Total
Barricade
er Hostage
Kidnaping
Aerial
Hijacking
1968
1
o
1
0
(1)
(1)
1969
3
o
3
0
1970
35
1
27
7
(7)
(6)
(1)
1971
13
1
11
1
(2)
(2)
1972
25
3
11
11
1973
46
8
29
9
(2)
(1)
(1)
1974
23
11
10
2
1975
51
18
31
2
(1)
(1)
TOTALS
197
42
123
32
(13)
(11)
(2)
2 Unsuccessful attempts are shown in parentheses.
marked by the increased probability of successfully seizing hos-
tages.
Table II shows where the incidents occurred3 and is sum-
marized regionally in Table III.
Barricade-and-hostage incidents are most widespread in the
Atlantic Community and the Middle East, and aerial hijackings
also fit this pattern. Such incidents, can be considered a curiosity
2Our survey includes only those events that transcend national boundaries,
whether through the nationality or foreign ties of the perpetrators, their location,
the nature of their institutional or human victims, or the mechanics of their resolu-
tion. Episodes of interstate terrorism (e.g., kidnaping by government intelligence
agents) are not included. Seizures occurring during the Vietnam conflict are also
excluded.
The data were obtained from chronologies provided by the U.S. Department of
State, the Federal Aviation Administration, the U.S. Information Agency, the RAND
Corporation, and the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives; staff reports prepared
for congressional committees; Facts on File; reports found in the Associated Press
ticker; the New York Times, the Washington Post, the Chicago Tribune, the Detroit
Free Press, The Economist, and various books on terrorism. Due to omissions in
the reporting of some incidents, grand totals for the tables presented may be
�incomplete. The 197 incidents cover the period extending from January 1, 1968,
through December 31, 1975. . .
The location of an incident is considered to be the place in which it began. In
the case of hijackings, the location is the nation in which the plane last touched
ground before the hijackers made their presence known. In cases where the em-
barkation point is not known, the location is considered to be that nation in which
the plane landed and the negotiations took place. If both of the above guidelines
are inapplicable, the nation of registry is used.
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in Africa, but they are beginning to be suffered in Asia and Latin
America. The pattern does not hold for kidnapings, for Latin
America is plagued by 60 per cent of the world total. Argentina
is clearly a special case, with kidnapings of domestic or foreign
business leaders becoming almost a daily occurrence.4 Ethiopia
accounts for most of the African kidnapings, because of numerous
raids on U.S. installations by the Eritrean Liberation Front.
Lebanon has seen a dramatic increase in kidnapings in 1975, with
more than 100 attempts being reported in one November week-
end during the battle for Beirut. No discernible variances appear
TABLE 11
SITE OF HOSTAGE INCIDENTS BY COUNTRY, REGION AND TYPE
Barricade
Aerial
Location
er Hostage
Kidnaping
Hijacking
LATIN AMERICA
Argentina
1
38
1
Brazil
0
6
0
Bolivia
0
4
0
Colombia
0
4
2
Costa Rica
0
0
1
Dominican Republic
1
2
0 '
Guatemala
0
4
0
Haiti
1
0
0
Mexico
0
3
1
Nicaragua
1
0
0
Paraguay
0
1
0
Uruguay
0
9
0
Venezuela
0
2
1
ATLANTIC COMMUNITY
Austria
2
0
1
Canada
0
2
0
France
3
2
1
Greece
9
0
0
Ireland
0
1
0
Italy
0
1
1
Netherlands
3
0
1
Northern Ireland
0
2
0 ,
Spain
1
2
0
Sweden
2
0
1
Switzerland
0
0
1
Turkey
0
4
2
United Kingdom
3
1
0
United States
1
0
2
West Germany
1
1
2
for Asia or the Atlantic Community, but it is notable that the
communist nations are absent from the table. Aside from this
major exception it appears, in looking at the recent historical
pattern, that no nation can consider itself completely safe from
some such attack.
Region
TABLE III
SITE OF HOSTAGE INCIDENTS BY REGION AND TYPE
Barricade Aerial
er Hostage Kidnaping Hijacking Total
Latin America 4 73 6 83
Atlantic Community 18 16 12 46
Middle East 13 12 6 31
Africa 1 20 1 22
Asia 6 4 5 J5
TOTAL 42 l25 30 197
In ifie period under survey, Uruguay claimed nine kidnapings but has not had
a problem of international kidnaping since it was able to destroy the Tupamaro
organization.
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Location
MIDDLE EAST
Algeria
Bahrain
Dubai
Egypt
Iran
Israel
Jordan
Kuwait
Lebanon
Sudan
Tunisia
AFRICA
Angola
Chad
Ethiopia
Somalia
South Africa
Spanish Sahara
Tanzania
Uganda
ASIA
Bangladesh
Burma
India
Japan
Malaysia
Nepal
Pakistan
Philippines
Singapore
Thailand
TABLE II (CONTINUED)
Barricade
6- Hostage
Aerial
Kidnaping Hijacking
1 o o
o o 1
o o 1
0 0 1
o 1 o
6 o 1
1 2 o
1 o o
2 9 2
1 o o
1 o o
o 3 o
o 1 o
o 11 o
o 1 o
1 1 1
o 1 o
o 1 o
o 1 o
1 o 0'
o 1 o
o 0 2
0 o 1
1 o o
o o 1
1 o o
1 2 1
1 o o
1 1 o
But while they are apparently willing and able to strike in
virtually any nation, terrorists have been somewhat selective in
whom they choose to take hostage, as shown in Table IV.
Nations ranking high in per capita GNP, with large amounts
of capital invested overseas, are most frequently chosen as hostage
TABLE IV
HOSTAGES BY REGION AND NATIONALITY
Region
Incidents with
One Nationality
Incidents with
Multiple Nationality
Total
Asia
10
10
20
Africa
3
3
6
E. Europe
3
0
3
Middle East
12
14
26
Latin America
12
8
20
W. Europe S.: U.S.
116
42
158
Other
4
23
27
TABLE V
TARGETS OF DEMANDS BY REGION AND TYPE
One of Many
Region
Sole Target
Targets
Total
Africa
1
1
2
Asia
9
3
12
Latin America
26
2
28
Middle East
11
10
21
Western world
30
24
54
Other (e.g,., corporate,
unspecified)
51
5
56
contributors. The United States finds itself singled out in one-
third of all incidents. Nationals of the poorer countries who are
seized are ordinarily their government's ambassador to another
country, or a manager or president of a multinational corpora-
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tion's subsidiary. Again, the communist nations are rarely ter-
rorist targets, the exceptions being Yugoslavians attacked by
Croatians and the Soviet ambassador being attacked by MANO,
an Argentine right-wing group. Hence, although at times na-
tionals of Third World nations are taken as hostages, the problem
is primarily one for Westernized, capitalist nations.
Table V shows the regional location of nations, corporations
and other entities that have been targets of terrorist demands, as
well as whether or not they have been the sole target of demands
in a given incident.
Despite the United States' susceptibility as a provider of hos-
tages, the U.S. government is rarely the target of demands.
Terrorists have tended to single out corporations or make unspe-
cific demands (e.g., "We want $4 million for his safe return") when
holding Americans. Again, we find communist and African gov-
ernments virtually exempt from demands. Even terrorist groups
have not been immune: in 1970, the Jewish Defense League
demanded that the PFLP (Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine) release hostages it was holding at Dawson Field. Western
nations most frequently are involved when the terrorists single
out more than one target for demands.
THE POLICY DEBATE
With this background, what should be the response of a govern-
ment when faced with a hostage situation? The choice has been
somewhere on a continuum ranging from never negotiating,
which is the stated policy of the United States and Israel, to giving
in to the terrorists' demands. Each approach is based on implicit
theories regarding the driving mechanisms of terrorist behavior,
but such theories have never been adequately spelled out. Various
propositions have been used or can be used to justify the State
Department's "no ransom" position; the same is true for a flexible
response position, in which the characteristics of the situation
determine whether negotiation can solve the problem. In both
cases the proponents point to the advantages of their approach
and the overriding disadvantages inherent in the competing
view.3
The "No Ransom" Position
In essence, this viewpoint holds that all terrorists will respond
in the same way to perceived positive or negative reinforcements.
In order to deter further attacks, one must not give in to what
they demand; thus one makes future operations not worth their
while. Arguments supporting this position may be outlined as
follows.
(A) Terrorists are all the same, prompted by a generally leftist
ideology, and they employ the same tact,ics. They tend to have the
same views toward their own lives and the lives of others, i.e.,
little respect for either. They cannot be trusted to keep their part
of the bargain and will kill the hostages no matter what the
government's response. They may even increase their demands if
the government complies with the original bill of particulars.
There is no reliable guarantee that the kidnapers will release the
hostages if their demands are satisfied.
No one individual or agency recommends all of the propositions mentioned
below. It would be false to maintain that people advocating one of the positions
necessarily agree with all of the arguments that can be cited to support it. Rather,
this exercise is designed to serve a heuristic function in bringing to light some
ramifications of these positions that often go unstated.
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(B) Due to their links, we are seeing the creation of a Terrorist
International. When we deal with one terrorist group holding
hostages, we are actually rewarding all members of this general
conspiracy. Consider the evidence:
(1) They have the same funding sources, including the Soviets,
Chinese, Arabs, Cubans, North Koreans and each other.
(2) They have held many worldwide meetings, among them the
recent meeting in Trieste of a score of European separatist groups,
the confederation of four major Latin American guerrilla groups,
and the frequent meetings of the PLO, which at times has served
as the forum for ten separate groups.
(3) They have conducted many joint operations, such as the
skyjacking and barricade-and-hostage episodes engineered by the
Japanese United Red Army and the PFLP, as well as kidnapings
engaged in by coalitions of the MR-8, ALN and VPR in Brazil.
(C) Even if we were to grant that terrorists are not all alike,
we are unable to get enough data at the scene of an incident to
help us determine how we can gear our bargaining to these
differences.
(D) In a form of the contagion hypothesis or demonstration
effect, we can state that capitulation to the group presently facing
us will only encourage others to engage in future, similar acts.
Terrorists are motivated by the prospect of reward, and what we
must do is remove the source of reward by refusing to pay mone-
tary ransom, release prisoners or grant asylum. For example,
Guatemala, Spain and numerous multinational corporations have
granted the demands of terrorists, only to be faced with mounting
demands in subsequent situations.
(E) In isolated incidents, however � especially those receiving
the most publicity � the converse has been true; some govern-
ments and corporations that gave in to demands have not been
faced with further incidents. Nevertheless, these cases have led to
a building up of the expectations of the terrorists, who now believe
that the overall tendency of their targets will be to grant demands.
(F) Article 29 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Rela-
tions states: "The person of a diplomatic agent shall be inviolable.
He shall not be liable to any form of arrest or detention. The
receiving state shall treat him with due respect and shall take all
appropriate steps to prevent any attack on his person, freedom or
dignity." The best way to uphold our duties and responsibilities
under this convention is to remove the temptation to kidnap
diplomatic officers by denying rewards for such behavior.
(G) It is morally wrong to give in to the demands of groups
engaging in terrorist acts that range from the Munich massacre
to the machine-gunning of innocent persons in airport lounges
and the random bombing of buildings. Orderly societies cannot
long endure when leaders encourage this resort to violence to
settle political differences. Our national prestige vis-a-vis other
nations will be damaged if we negotiate with such murderers, and
our people will lose faith in their government's ability to protect
them from such attacks.
(H) Although this point is rarely mentioned, one should con-
sider the government's responsibility to protect political prisoners.
Do the terrorists wish to liberate those whose release is demanded,
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or is some other motive involved? In the von Spreti kidnaping, the
Guatemalan government claimed that four of the guerrillas named
in the demands were on the kidnapers' death list for disclosing
information to the government. Abu Daoud, who allegedly re-
vealed a great deal of information about the Black September
organization, was frequently mentioned in the demands of subse-
quent hostage-takers. In the recent barricade-and-hostage incident
in Malaysia, several members of the United Red Army refused to
leave prison, claiming that the perpetrators were members of a
rival faction.
(I) Finally, stated policy cannot countenance giving in to the
demands of terrorists. While we may have to face the gruesome
consequences of many incidents, including the loss of hostages'
lives, before terrorists come to believe that we are serious in not
negotiating under any circumstances, it is absurd to believe that
any other policy could act as a deterrent. While we may lose the
lives of a few people now, we are saving the lives and the sense of
security of our citizens in the long run.
The Flexible-Response Position
In a nutshell, the flexible-response view questions the funda-
mental assumptions of the "no ransom" policy and advocates an
ad hoc response to each instance. Based on an essentially different
analysis of the motivations of terrorists, the function of deterrence
and the value of hostages, its propositions include these judgments.
(A) Terrorists are not all the same, and they cannot be expected
to react in the same way during hostage situations:
(1) They differ in ideology and purpose in their choice of
terrorism. What we are dealing with is a group of people who
have chosen a common tactic. We cannot infer from this that their
motivations are commonly held. To illustrate, we could classify
terrorists in the following manner.
Group Type
Separatists, irredentists
Fedayeen
Ultra-left anarchists
Latin guerrillas
Criminal gangs
Psychotic individuals
Hoaxes
Examples
Basques, Eritreans, IRA, Corsicans
PFLP, Black September, Al Saiqa
Japanese Red Army, Baader-Meinhof Gang
and its splinters
ERP, Montoneros, ALN
Mafia; groups who publicly cloak their ac-
tions in political rhetoric, but whose real
purpose is personal gain
The security guard who seized the Israeli
Embassy in South Africa in 1975
Brian Lea's kidnaping in Uganda
(2) Terrorists differ in their tactics. Interestingly, many of the
major groups have not engaged in hostage-taking � e.g., the
Weathermen in the United States, the Baader-Meinhof Gang in
West Germany and the Argentine Anti-Communist Alliance.
Moreover, it appears that some groups tend to "specialize" in one
type of incident (the ERP has a taste for kidnaping businessmen),
whereas others have an expanded repertoire and employ various
tactics (e.g., the PFLP and Black September). These differences
may be due to the group's ideology, the availability of targets,
regional cultures of violence, societal norms, group strength in
terms of firepower, logistics and personnel, public support for the
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group (real or perceived), security systems of potential targets,
and the preferences of the group's leaders.�
(3) They do not hold the same views on the sanctity of life.
Some are genuinely suicidal and totally indiscriminate in their
choice of victims; others are willing to sacrifice all their demands
for safe passage from the scene of the crime. Among the variables
we can consider in determining the terrorists' views are these. Are
they apt to practice the incremental release of hostages � i.e., do
they allow wounded, sick, women and children to leave the scene
of the incident? In previous incidents, was a warning given by the
group before the bomb exploded, or did they attempt to kill as
many people as possible? Were booby traps involved in the bomb-
ings? Were letter-bombs, which involve the least public risk to
the terrorists, used? What kinds of victims were selected (e.g.,
Latin American groups rarely kidnap women or children)? What
was the timing of the incident: was the bomb set to go off at
midnight, or during the noon rush hour, guaranteeing many
casualties?
(4) Terrorists rarely double-cross bargainers by increasing
their demands, and they also rarely kill hostages without provoca-
tion. Of even greater rarity is the killing of hostages after demands
have been granted. Terrorists have their own credibility to pro-
tect and can assume that their behavior in an incident will have an
effect on the expectations and behavior of government negotiators
in any future incident. If they renege on their part of the agree-
ment, they can be sure that the government will not concede in
the next incident.
(B) The links between groups do not necessarily lead to com-
monality of tactics, strategy, perceptions or motivations:
(I) In the past decade, not even a third of the groups who have
engaged in incidents of transnational terrorism have attended
relevant international meetings.
(2) Even the PLO, composed of groups of common nationality
with a common purpose, has suffered from splintering and fighting
among factions who disagree on tactics, strategy, the sanctity of
life, types of demands, methods of negotiation, and so on.
(3) Many terrorist groups were established to fight "primary"
terrorist groups. Examples of such pairings include the Ulster
Defense Association versus the IRA, the Anti-ETA versus the
Basque nationalists, the Jewish Defense League versus the PLO,
the Argentine Anti-Communist Alliance versus ERP and numer-
ous other Argentine leftist groups.
(4) Nation-states have many links, such as trade and communi-
cations, but they do not necessarily share the same outlooks and
may even go to war because of these multiple ties.
� The nationality patterns found in
groups engaging in such actions can be
summarized as follows:
Nationality of Groups
Claiming Responsibility,
by Region
Type of Incident
Barricade Aerial
Hostage Kidnaping Hijacking
Total
Latin American
3
48
7
58
Middle Eastern
24
9
13
46
Western
4
14
3
21
Communist nations
0
1
2
African
0
17
0
17
Asian
9
4
3
16
Other
3
36
7
46
In broad terms, it appears that Latin American and African terrorists prefer to
attempt standard kidnapings, where they can rely on extensive underground or-
ranizations. Middle Eastern groups, who have taken their operations beyond the
immediate borders of the Arab-Israeli conflict, have been forced to use tactics
leaving them open to attack by security forces. Such actions have, however, allowed
them to take many more hostages, which may be an added incentive.
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(C) Data obtainable at the site of an incident can provide clues
as to how we should conduct our negotiations. Relevant con-
siderations may include previous behavior of the group in similar
situations, logistical constraints, age and sex of the perpetrators,
existence of communication with the group's headquarters, choice
of the government's negotiation-team representative or inter-
mediary, size of the attack force, number of terrorist groups in-
volved in the incident, choice of targets in terms of their symbolic
value, as well as the nationality of the victims, targets and
terrorists.
(D) The contagion hypothesis rests on shaky evidence. At
present, we are unable to test whether terrorist groups are aware
of "no ransom" policies or whether they base their behavior on
knowledge of such policies. Furthermore, many governments
have publicly stated beforehand their refusal to deal with groups
who take hostages yet have been faced with incidents on their
soil, involving their nationals as perpetrators or as targets. Such
nations include Argentina, Israel, Turkey, Uruguay, West Ger-
many and Japan, not to mention the United States, whose strict
"no ransom" policy has not saved its nationals from being the
most sought-after hostages.
(E) Governments have a moral duty to protect their nationals
and should make every effort to secure the safe release of hostages.
We should not sacrifice innocent individuals to prevent incidents
that might not occur. Governments may feel that if tranquillity
can be achieved � even temporarily � by the release of a few
prisoners, they are justified in negotiating. The prestige of a
nation, both at home and abroad, will most certainly be smirched
if hostages are killed due to government inaction.
(F) Terrorists care most about what happens to them after an
incident, rather than whether or not their demands are fulfilled:
(1) They are concerned about what happens to the attack squad,
and they may be deterred from further incidents if the group is
harshly dealt with as a consequence of their actions. More and
more it is argued that the death penalty should be imposed on
those who engage in such actions, both as a deterrent and to ensure
that those who are captured cannot engage in even worse actions
in the future. Many terrorists who have been released from prison
as a result of demands being met have indeed engaged in subse-
quent terrorist acts.
(2) They are concerned about the fate of the group as a whole,
and may reconsider sequels if a nationwide crackdown on terrorist
activity is instituted. Since Uruguay and Canada were able to
wipe out the Tupamaros and the FLQ, respectively, they have
not been victimized by radical incidents.'
(G) The granting of asylum is a time-honored practice in Latin
American international law. Government leaders recognize that
one day they may be requesting asylum, when and if they are
I However, many reservations attend to arguments regarding guaranteed punish-
ment for specific acts. First, if we wish to save the hostage, a certain death penalty
for the kidnaper gives him no reason to spare the captive's life. Second, the conse-
quences of governmental repression of public freedom should be considered; such
repression may be precisely what the terrorists are seeking. Finally, if the roots of the
terrorist's grievance are deep, he may believe that even death is better than the
existence he and his people now lead. The prospect of apprehension and punish-
ment may not be an effective deterrent in such contexts.
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ousted from power in a revolution. It is not in their personal
interest to restrict this practice in any way, and any proposals to
place a global or regional ban on the granting of asylum to
political prisoners (either the terrorists instigating the incident
or the prisoners whose release is demanded) will be met with great
resistance in Latin America. Hence, we are unable to deny
potential terrorists this avenue of reward.
(H) Terrorism has frequently been called the politics of desper-
ation, the last refuge of the weak. Thus, while the actions of the
terrorists themselves are reprehensible, and should be condemned,
are the grievances they express necessarily at variance with con-
cepts of justice? In many societies, the possibility of ventilating
grievances is denied to certain groups. Resort to radical actions
may be the only way these individuals can articulate their inter-
ests. Is it possible that we are approaching the problem incorrectly?
Instead of attacking the manifestations of the problem � i.e., the
expressions of despair � should we not rather tackle the under-
lying causes of terrorism: poverty, injustice, inequality, lack of
political participation, and the like?
(I) The fundamental question to be answered in the "no
ransom" versus negotiation argument is this: does deterrence
deter? In other words, what are the rewards to terrorists who seize
hostages? Are they seeking the ransoms they demand publicly, or
do they aim at other goals? In Table VI, we note the demands
publicly stated either to government and/or business negotiators
or to the hostages themselves. As is immediately evidenced, not all
incidents involve the public demand of ransom. But this does not
tell the whole story. The granting of stated demands may be only
an added bonus to terrorists. Even, if they believe that all govern-
ments and corporations will adhere to their publicly stated "no
TABLE VI
TERRORISTS' PUBLICLY STATED MOTIVES
Barricade Aerial
Stated Demands 6- Hostage Kidnaping Hijacking
Release political prisoners (only) 15 23 16
Monetary ransom (only) 1 41 8
Release prisoners and monetary ransom 3 8 5
Publish manifesto 0 8 1
No demands mentioned 1 15 0
Questioning and/or instruction of hostages 0 7 0
Retaliation 0 2 4
Other (including free passage from scene of
incident, specific political changes) 18 12 6
ransom" policies, they might continue to engage in hostage
operations for a number of reasons:
(1) Those who demand the freedom of prisoners may be at-
tempting to focus adverse publicity on the government. The
kidnapers may be endeavoring to show that it is impossible for
the government to release the prisoners, because they have been
poorly treated, tortured or secretly executed. The prisoners de-
manded may also have been involved in events highly embar-
rassing to the government, and the terrorists may wish to jog the
public's memory of such episodes and thus increase hostility to
the government.
(2) Those who demand ransoms may likewise be attempting to
put their targets in a bad light. Many terrorists have demanded
"Robin Hood" ransoms, in which a corporation is requested to
provide food and other goods and services to a segment of the
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nation's poor, rather than hand over money for the terrorist
organization's coffers. Targets faced with this type of demand are
placed in a disconcerting position public exposure of their
refusal to aid in fulfilling a charitable goal. Even if the ransom is
intended to bolster the organization's own funds, refusal of such
demands makes the target appear to value money more than the
life of the hostage.
(3) Many attacks have been made in retaliation for govern-
mental moves against terrorist organizations. This is especially
evident in the cycle of assassinations conducted by and against
members of the Israeli security agency and the Black September
organization. Some kidnapings in Latin America have also been
undertaken solely in retaliation for government actions against
terrorists.
(4) The group may engage in kidnaping to publicize its overall
ideology. Terrorism attracts great interest from the media, and
the views of those who have taken over an embassy can be expected
to fill the headlines. While some nations may be able to bar press
coverage of these incidents for a time, curbs on a free press Care
bound to meet with strong resistance in many countries. The
terrorists will be determined to get their message across in some
way, and their real targets may be the audiences of the Western
media covering the incident.
(5) Some kidnapings may be attempts to disrupt society's ex-
pectations of security and order. Those who engage in particu-
larly brutal incidents are publicly stating that there are no lengths
to which they will not go to fulfill what they believe to be justice.
Such terrorists will not be deterred by the prospect of receiving
no tangible reward, and a "no ransom" policy may simply doom
the hostages.
(6) The terrorists may be deliberately attempting to provoke
government repression against themselves. A government's coun-
termeasures must generally be applied nationwide if it expects to
hit all of the group's cells. Unfortunately, many innocent indi-
viduals will be harmed by such measures, and they can be
expected to resent such incursions on their liberties. It is the
terrorists' hope that this animosity will surface and that the
government will be faced with a nationwide revolutionary move-
ment with broad popular support.
(7) The hostage may himself have some value to those who
have seized him. The literature on terrorism frequently asserts
that the targets of such incidents transcend those who are its
immediate victims, and that one hostage is just as good as another.
But the group may believe that this particular hostage has infor-
mation of value to them, whether it be government intelligence
about the group, classified information about weapons systems,
or knowledge of his corporation's links with negative reference
groups (e.g., secret funding of the corporation by foreign intelli-
gence organizations or any military research under way). Depend-
ing on the substance of the information, the group may then use
it as propaganda against the corporation or government, or employ
it in other operations.
(8) The incident may represent the individual's personal affir-
mation of solidarity with the norms of the terrorist group. Espe-
cially in operations involving more than one terrorist group, the
perpetrators may feel that the group will consider them traitors
if they settle for anything less than the original set of demands.
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Should the government call their bluff, the group's credibility
will be damaged if they do not carry out their threats to kill, the
hostages.
(9) Finally, Regis Debray, one of the major theoreticians of
Latin American guerrilla warfare, argues that the threat of
kidnaping is part of the urban terrorist's overall strategy. Such
operations must be considered in the wider context of the revolu-
tionary struggle. In Revolution in the Revolution? he argues that
such a threat
immobilizes thousands of enemy soldiers ... ties up most of the repres-
sive mechanism in unrewarding tasks of protection: factories, bridges,
electric generators ... � these can keep busy as much as three quarters
of the army. The government must, since it is the government, protect
everywhere the interests of property owners; the gtterrilleros don't have
to protect anything anywhere.'
By tying up the opposing forces, the guerrilla's job is made that
much easier, and the .balance of effective fighting forces is more
nearly equal.
(J) If the "no ransom" policy was able to stop all hostage
incidents, what would the terrorists do? Since they are funda-
mentally opposed to certain targets, it is doubtful that they would
close up shop entirely. Rather, they could engage in other types
of action not involving the taking of hostages, which might be
even less desirable. For example, they could attempt to assassinate
former potential hostages, an operation that takes less time than a
kidnaping. leaves them less vulnerable to the strengthened security
measures taken to stop kidnapings, and still has most of the
advantages of a hostage situation, including the publicity they
want. Many threatened assassinations have been avoided by those
who have agreed to pay off the extorter's demands. The threat to
bomb symbolic facilities may also be engaged in, with the bombing
being carried out if extortion is not paid.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
In broad outline, we have seen the problems faced by the
policymaker who must live in a world plagued by international
terrorism. Each position � "no ransom" or negotiation � is sup-
ported by convincing arguments but is also loaded with inherent
disadvantages to be overcome. In recent months we have witnessed
tests of the two positions, with mixed results. At one end of the
spectrum, the French engaged in a shoot-out with Somali terrorists,
which meant death for the terrorists but also hostage casualties.
The British and Dutch took a wait-and-see attitude and were able
to stall the IRA and the South Moluccans, respectively, into
surrender. The Ethiopians refused to give in to ELF demands and
witnessed the kidnaping of citizens of Italy, Taiwan and the
United States. The Austrians again gave in to Palestinian demands.
The answer may lie somewhere between a stated "no ransom"
position and a pragmatic view of on-the-scene bargaining. It may
be that we should aim at creating a new self-image for the terror-
ists by gaining their commitment to what can be presented as
humanitarian policies, such as releasing some of their prisoners
or allowing food and medical aid to be supplied. If the terrorists
would agree to making incremental moves in this direction, we
might be able to keep up the process of commitment and eventu-
ally make possible the release of all hostages. Such tactics appear
to have been successful when applied, and may represent an
optimal mix of the advantages claimed for the two positions we
have discussed.
Mgis Debray. Revolutiort in the Revolution? Armed Struggle and Political
Struggle in Latin .-linerica (New York: Grove Press), p. 75. SA
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THE U.S. RESPONSE TO TERRORISM
AGAINST INTERNATIONAL CIVIL
AVIATION*
by Robert G. Bell
T N Why Men Rebel, Ted Gurr writes. "The most fundamental
A human response to the use of force is counterforce. Force
threatens and angers men. Threatened, they try to defend them-
selves; angered, they want to retaliate." Terrorism, by its deliber-
ate disregard for moral and legal norms, selective targeting of
innocent parties and ruthless exploitation of human fear provokes
a response more vengeful perhaps than any form of force. Yet in
modern society, in which government possesses a monopoly on
the organized use of force, victims of terrorism cannot act as
vigilantes; they must turn to the state for redress.
Jordan Paust defines terrorism as
the purposive use of violence by the precipitator(s) against an instru-
mental target in order to communicate to a primary target a threat of
violence so as to coerce the primary target into behavior or attitudes
through intense fear or anxiety in connection with a demanded power
(political) outcome.'
This definition offers a cogent distinction between the act of
terrorism and its intended effect. "Instrumental targets" may be
either persons or materiel � power stations or water supply sys-
tems, for example. The "primary target" is normally a state, but
it may be a bloc of states or a faction within a state.
In most incidents of terrorism, the victims are powerless to
affect the outcome of the deadly game played between terrorists
and the state. Thus, the essential dynamic of terrorism is the value
relationship between victims and the state. Any society that re-
gards each human life as inviolate cannot ignore terrorists who
bomb, kidnap or hijack its members.
The value relationship between victim and state is most likely
to occasion accommodation in democratic societies. Since demo-
cratic governments act both in the name and at the discretion
of the people, they must yield state interest to the more tangible
expedient of the safety and well-being of a single citizen. In the
words of one author, "The immediate value of the individual
life outweighs the ulterior interest of the group." 3 While there
are a number of strategies for negotiating with terrorists, a demo-
cratic government must compromise when faced with the immi-
nent murder of the victims. Israel is the exception that proves
this rule. For the Israelis, war with terrorists is a constant reality,
and they are willing to support government policies that place
the state interest first. Elsewhere, no such siege mentality exists.
� The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the
Library of Congress.
1 Ted Robert Gum Why Men Rebel (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University
Press, 1970), p. 232.
Jordan J. Paust, 'Terrorism and the International Law of War," Military Law
Review, Spring 1974, pp. 3-4. Although current literature reflects wide disagree-
ment on the proper definition of "terrorism," Paust's is the most comprehensive.
It requires a 'terror outcome," recognizes that terrorists may be governmental
or nongovernmental actors, and limits terrorism to political acts.
� Smart, "The Power of Terror," International Journal, Spring 1975, p.
230.
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For the terrorist, then, success will initially be forthcoming if
he selects a target of maximum value to the state and demonstrates
that he is willing and able to use violence until his demands are
met. In the long run, however, this same high-value relationship
between victim and state will work against the terrorist. Repeated
attacks against a designated category of targets (e.g., diplomats,
business executives, airline passengers) will compel the state to
organize a defense-in-being. At a certain threshold, overcoming
the state's point defense of the target will become too costly for
the terrorist, and he will move on to different, "cheaper" targets
of opportunity.
Nowhere has this pattern been better demonstrated than in
the campaign against international civil aviation. As a vital and
vulnerable component of world commerce and communications,
aviation was a natural target for terrorist attack. The terrorist
campaign threatened not only the passengers and material value
of the aircraft and cargoes, but also the fundamental public
confidence that flying was safe. International air travel is a
highly visible, relatively glamorous aspect of the contemporary
era; as such, the bombing and hijacking of airliners was guaran-
teed to attract widespread publicity. In many cases, publicity for
a cause is a principal, if not the paramount, objective of a terror-
ist attack.
From 1960 through 1975, there were 439 hijacking attempts on
American and foreign aircraft.' In the 1960s, most hijackings
were not political in nature; the hijackers were fleeing from prose-
cution, attempting criminal extortion or acting out of mental
derangement. Nevertheless, lessons learned during this decade
were to prove invaluable when hijacking assumed a decidedly
terrorist character in the 1970s. Beginning with the September
1970 hijacking and destruction of four airliners by members of
the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), international civil
aviation was assaulted by a succession of increasingly murderous
attacks.
The attempt to shoot down an El Al 707 with a missile in
January 1975 was generally believed to have brought commercial
aviation to the brink of disaster. Surprisingly, statistics indicate
that the terrorist campaign had in fact crested in 1972. In that
year, there were 62 hijacking attempts worldwide. In 1973, the
number dropped to 22 and it has since averaged 25.5. The greater
significance of the missile attack was that it revealed the extent
to which the defense of international civil aviation had been
organized. By 1975, extraordinary means were required for ter-
rorists to get to the aircraft. Since weaponry equivalent to the
Soviet-made Strela SA-7 anti-aircraft missiles is not readily availa-
ble, most terrorists have moved on to more vulnerable, unpro-
tected targets.
This article examines the U.S. role in countering the terrorist
campaign against civil aviation. With the most comprehensive
aviation network in the world, the United States has the largest
stake in maintaining the security of this mode of travel. Moreover,
U.S.-flag airliners have been victimized more often than the
carriers of any other country. More than 40 per cent of the hi-
jackings around the world since 1960 have involved American
'AN statistics regarding dates, numbers and persons involved were provided by
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), current as of January 1, 1976.
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aircraft. Predictably, the United States assumed leadership of the
international response to aerial terrorism.
Has the U.S. effort been a success? Proponents of the American
response point out that since 1973 there has not been a single
successful hijacking of a U.S.-flag airliner. Worldwide, there were
only seven successful hijackings last year, compared with seventy
in 1969. Today, newspapers chronicle what seems to be a "mop-
ping-up operation." Cuba has returned hijackers to the United
States for trial, and several hijackers recently have surrendered
voluntarily. On November 21, 1975. the FBI arrested this coun-
try's first hijacker � a fugitive for fourteen years:.
The December 29, 1975, bombing at La Guardia Airport again
focused national attention on the security of civil aviation. Sixty-
two persons were killed or injured when a bomb estimated to be
equivalent in force to twenty-five sticks of dynamite exploded in
a baggage claim area. In the wake of this tragedy, the government
organized a task force to recommend new airport security mea-
sures. There is admittedly only so much that can be done. That
the terrorists placed the bomb outside the airport's secure area
illustrates that they will always take the path of least resistance.
More than anything, though, this incident is notable for its ran-
dom quality. Had the bomb been placed at a football stadium,
the task force would likely have been studying the problem of
safeguarding sports spectators.
What has really been accomplished? Around the world the
overall incidence of terrorism is on the rise. Rather than seizing
airliners and holding passengers hostage, terrorists in 1975 seemed
to prefer storming embassies. This development prompted bol-
stered security measures for diplomats and other officials abroad.7
A predictable consequence has been a new shift in terrorist targets
� most recently to trains (Holland), school buses (Afars and
Issas), and conferences (Vienna). In each case the attack was novel
and the target was totally undefended.
Certainly, the American success in preserving the security of
international civil aviation has been commendable, but it is not
enough. The essential lesson of the U.S. experience in the war on
aerial terrorists is that point defense of the latest target alone will
not suffice. Unless the broad and fundamental causes of terrorism
themselves are addressed, governments will remain one step be-
hind the terrorists. As long as states cede the initiative, the power
of counterforce will necessarily be limited.
THE EVOLVING AMERICAN POLICY
Unlawful interference with aviation dates to Bedouin seizures
of French aircraft for ransom in the 1920s and the world's first
hijacking in Peru in 1931. Official American interest was not
aroused, however, until the late 1940s. In July 1947, three Ru-
manians commandeered a state-owned DC-3 in flight and landed
it in Turkey. During the next three ye-ars, fourteen other East
European airliners were hijacked across the Iron Curtain, seven
landing in the U.S. zone in Germany. In each case, the authori-
ties granted political asylum and imposed no punishment. The
fact that crew and passengers were killed in the course of some
of the incidents was of minor interest to a public more inclined to
regard the hijackers as heroic freedom fighters.
3 Waslringlon Star, November 22, 1975, p.
� Aviation Week & Space Technology, January 5, 1976, p. 22.
7 New York Times, November 16, 1975, p. 7.
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In 1948, a man named Diego Cordova assaulted three people
while on board a U.S. airline flight over the Caribbean Sea. This
incident exposed a gap in U.S. municipal law concerning crimes
of violence committed over the high seas. Public Law 82-514,
approved on July 12, 1952, closed the gap by authorizing the
federal government to prosecute similar crimes. This act was
the first in a succession of federal laws intended to protect air
travelers.
The United States experienced its first hijacking on May 1,
1961, when Antulio Ramirez-Ortiz commandeered National Air-
lines Flight 337, en route from Miami to Key West, and ordered
the crew to fly the plane to Cuba. Four subsequent hijackings
within a sixteen-day period that year (two of which were success-
ful) convinced the government that this would not remain an
isolated phenomenon.
The initial U.S. response to hijacking combined legal and
technical (physical security) countermeasures. Public Law 87-197,
approved September 5, 1961, made ",aircraft piracy" a federal
crime punishable by death or not less than twenty years' imprison-
ment.8 This law, superseding P.L. 82-514, provided for the ap-
plication of federal criminal law to acts of assault, maiming and
murder occurring on board aircraft engaged in air commerce.
In 1962 the Federal Aviation� Administration (FAA) deputized
twenty of its Flight Standards Branch employees as U.S. marshals
and utilized them on board designated high-risk flights.9 Unlike
the later, highly publicized "Sky Marshals" program, the FAA
kept this first armed guard program secret. This decision was
consistent with the low-profile policy that governed the anti-
hijacking program until 1968.
At this early date in the war against hijackers, the FAA hoped
that hijacking could be stopped by legal deterrence. It accepted
the airlines' contention that passengers should not be alarmed or
inconvenienced by highly visible security measures. In fact, be-
tween 1962 and 1967 there were only seven hijacking attempts.
Thus, for the traveling public the possibility of being hijacked
seemed remote.
At the international level, a corresponding sense of complacency
prevailed. Although the United States had first recommended
study of the legal status of crimes committed on board aircraft to
the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) in the wake
of the Cordova incident, there the matter languished until 1959.
In that year, the ICAO Legal Committee counseled the promulga-
tion of an international convention to address the subject. In
preparatory drafts presented to the committee in 1962, the United
Again, there is wide disagreement on the terms "air piracy," "hijacking" and
"skyjacking." Alona E. Evans in "Aircraft Highjacking: Its Causes and �Cure,"
American Journal of Internal Law, October 1969, observed, "Aircraft piracy is
not 'piracy' in the classical sense or as defined by Article 15 of the 1958 Geneva
Convention on the High Seas, which refers to piracy by aircraft in the following
terms: 'illegal acts of violence, detention, or any act of degradation, committed for
private ends by the crew or passengers of . . � a private aircraft, and directed
against another ship or aircraft.'" P.L. 87-197, as presently amended, defines
"air piracy" as "any seizure or exercise of control by force or violence or by threat of
force or violence or by any other form of intimidation and with wrongful intent, of
an aircraft within the special aircraft jurisdiction of the United States [49 USC
1472(i)(2)(Supp. IV, 1974)]." Congress has declared that the meaning of the law
should in no way be influenced by precedents or interpretations relating to piracy
on the high seas. U.S. House, Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
Crimes Aboard Aircraft in Air Commerce, Report. No. 953, 87th Congress, 1st Session,
1961.
'Interview with Don Myers, chief of Air Security Branch, FAA New England
Region, February 11, 1975.
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States proposed that the convention obligate the state in which the
hijacked aircraft landed either to prosecute the hijacker in ac-
cordance with its domestic laws or to extradite him according to
applicable treaties.1�
The committee deleted this provision from its final draft to
the full ICAO membership; consequently, the resulting Conven-
tion on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board
Aircraft (the 1963 "Tokyo Convention") included no forceful
threat of punishment to deter hijackers. Article II, the so-called
hijacking clause of the convention, simply states that contracting
states shall take measures to restore control of the aircraft to the
aircraft 'commander, permit its passengers and crew to continue
their journey, and return the aircraft to its owners.11
The Tokyo Convention was of value because it resolved key
jurisdictional questions, strengthened the concepts of free move-
ment and commander's powers, and established a precedent for
multilateral action against hijackers. But it did not go into effect
until it was ratified by the twelfth state (the United States) in
1969. This leisurely rate of ratification reflects the general toler-
ance with which governments regarded the infrequent hijackings
of the mid-1960s.
Official disinterest was dispelled sharply in 1968. In that year
alone eighteen aircraft were hijacked, and the FAA began to
consider physical security measures to keep hijackers off planes.
A task force under the direction of Dr. Evan W. Pickeral identi-
fied thirty-five behavioral characteristics common to past hijackers
and, in 1969, conducted a successful test of a simplified behavior
profile with Eastern Airlines. The test established that if all air-
lines applied the profile to all boarding passengers, less than
.5 per cent would fit the profile and require searching.12
Although the number of hijacking attempts on U.S. aircraft
soared to forty in 1969, the FAA chose not to order the airlines
to apply the profile. Further, it rejected the more stringent mea-
sure of requiring the physical or electronic search of all passen-
gers: the priority interest still was passenger convenience, rather
than fail-safe passenger security.
Priorities shifted dramatically in September 1970, when Pales-
tinian guerrillas seized and destroyed four airliners. Three were
blown up at an airstrip in the desert after the passengers had been
exchanged for imprisoned members of the PLO. The fourth
aircraft exploded minutes after landing at Cairo Airport and
only seconds after the last passenger had scrambled to safety.
With electrifying suddenness, the terrorists had shattered all prior
assumptions about hijackers' motivations and made obsolete
previous strategies for protecting air travel. This incident pres-
aged new thresholds of violence and danger for the coming decade.
For the first time, the hijackers' objective was not to use the
aircraft for a flight to freedom or to ransom its passengers for cash,
but rather to exploit the vulnerability of aviation for political
ends. The obvious ruthlessness of the terrorists and their fanatical
dedication to their cause posed a danger not likely to be deterred
by the threat of punishment alone. Clearly, new measures were
needed to keep terrorists off planes. On September 9, 1970, Presi-
dent Nixon directed the FAA to implement a large-scale Sky
"Stanley Rosenfield, "Air Piracy: Is It Time to Relax Our Standards?," New
Enigland Law Review, Fall 1973, p. 96.
1 ICAO Doc. 8364, TIAS No. 6768; 20 UST 2941.
"See above, note 9.
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Marshals program. Initially, military personnel were employed
in this role until civilian armed guards could be trained.
On the international level, a new sense of urgency infused
ICAO deliberations regarding a second anti-hijacking convention.
When the International Conference on Air Law was convened
at The Hague in December 1970. delegates from seventy-four
states signed the resultant Convention for the Suppression of the
Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft." Where the Tokyo Convention had
omitted specific anti-hijacking measures, the Hague Convention
declared:
The Contracting State in the territory of Which the alleged hijacker
is found shall, if it does not extradite him, be obliged, without excep-
tion whatsoever and whether or not the offence was committed in its
territory, to submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose
of prosecution.11
This article was the subject of great controversy at the con-
ference. In preparatory drafts, the United States had proposed
mandatory extradition for all hijackers.' When it became obvious
that this idea would not be supported, the U.S. delegation backed
a proposal calling for either the extradition or the prosecution of
all hijackers, including those acting out of political motivation,
only to have it defeated by states intent on preserving the tradi-
tional sovereign right to grant asylum. The delegates finally ac-
cepted substitution of the expression "without exception whatso-
ever" in lieu of the more explicit "whatever the motive for the
offence:"
Despite this tactical setback, the United States was pleased
with the results of the conference. Article 4 the "universal
jurisdiction clause" � ensured that, regardless of where the of-
fense was committed, each contracting state would have to estab-
lish its jurisdiction to prosecute when the alleged hijacker was
present in its territory and it did not extradite him.17 Although
the convention proclaimed only that the case be submitted for
prosecution, to have required prosecution would have constituted
unacceptable interference with the criminal procedures of the
individual states. Finally, Article 2 dictated "severe penalties"
for convicted hijackers. The Hague Convention was ratified by
the required number of states and entered into force on October
14, 1971.
The Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful
Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation likewise was drafted in
the face of escalating terrorist violence. An extraordinary assembly
of ICAO met in Montreal in June 1970 to hammer out deterrent
controls for acts of sabotage � such as the bombings that had
destroyed a Swiss airliner and damaged an Austrian airliner in
February 1970.16-The resulting draft built on the provisions of
the Hague Convention, even before that convention had been put
into final form. Such was the exigency of the moment. The Mon-
treal Convention was adopted on September 23, 1971. Its provi-
" ICAO Doc. 8920, TlAS No. 7192; 22 UST 1641.
"Ibid., Article 7.
"Gerald F. Fitzgerald, "Toward Legal Suppression of Acts Against Civil Avia-
tion," International Conciliation, November 1971, p. 43.
P. 58.
" Ibid., p.56.
" Nancy D. Joyner, Aerial Hijacking as an International Crime (Dobbs Ferry,
N.Y.: Oceana, 1974), p. 216
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sions on sabotage constitute a valuable complement to the anti-
hijacking provisions of the Hague Convention.
The international legal framework for combating terrorism
against civil aviation, as established in these three multilateral
conventions, was predicated on three fundamental assumptions.
First, most states would accede to the protocols. Second, contract-
ing states would faithfully execute their responsibilities under
the conventions, particularly those dealing with extradition and
prosecution. Third, the international aviation community could
influence "responsible" behavior by states not party to the con-
ventions.
Subsequent terrorist incidents severely shook the fragile hopes
engendered at the conferences. During a ten-day span in May/
June 1972, Japanese agents of the Popular Front for the Libera-
tion of Palestine massacred twenty-five tourists at Lod Airport in
Tel Aviv, two Americans hijacked a Western Airlines 707 to a
heroes' welcome in Algiers, and ten Czechoslovakians hijacked
a Czech airliner to West Germany, murdering the pilot. From
1970 through 1972, there were 203 hijacking attempts throughout
the world.
In the wake of this explosion of violence, advocates of strength-
ened countermeasures focused on the issue of "sanctuary." Re-
peatedly, hijackers landed in countries sympathetic to their cause
and received little if any punishment. Since these recalcitrant
states seemed immune to world public opinion or diplomatic
persuasion, hard-liners demanded "enforcement" of the conven-
tions against states that dealt lightly with hijackers. Their pro-
posals met with considerable resistance for political and economic
reasons, however, and the initiative stalled.
This diplomatic deadlock was not acceptable to the U.S. Air
Lines Pilots Association (ALPA), whose members were beginning
to regard each flight as a combat mission. In a letter to President
Nixon, ALPA's president declared, "It is our firm conviction that
aerial piracy will not cease until there is absolutely no place to
go � no place [the hijacker] could land without the sure knowl-
edge that he will be apprehended and tried either in that country
or the country from which he departed.""
Acting on ALPA's initiative, the International Federation of
Airline Pilots Associations (IFALPA) announced that its members
would institute a global stoppage of air service on June 19, 1972,
if the United Nations failed to implement measures supplemen-
tary to the existing conventions, "including enforcement measures
against states offering sanctuary and failing to prosecute hijack-
ers."'" When the deadline for the suspension of service passed
without adequate UN or ICAO response, eighteen European,
South American and Pacific airlines stood down. U.S. airline
pilots were prohibited from joining the strike by a court restrain-
ing order; nonetheless, many U.S. pilots refused to fly.2'
The pilots' boycott sparked renewed diplomatic efforts toward
the convening of an enforcement assembly. ALPA's president
commended the U.S. State Department for "doing all they could
to stir the ponderous international machinery into unprecedented
action."22 Where states had failed to act or had procrastinated
"John J. O'Donnell, "Suspension of Service: Pilot's Answer to Hijacking," Air
Line Pilot, July 1972, p. 7.
"Ibid., p. 44.
21 Ibid.
"Ibid., p. 45.
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in adopting adequate countermeasures, IFALPA had demon-
strated that private pressure group tactics could supply the neces-
sary incentive.23
Nineteen hundred seventy-two had also been a busy year on the
home front. Within a forty-eight-hour period during the first week
of March, bombs exploded or were discovered in time on aircraft
in New York, Las Vegas and Seattle. Declaring a resolve to "meet
this blackmail on the ground as vigorously as we have met piracy
in the air," President Nixon ordered the Department of Trans-
portation to implement tougher security measures.24 Transporta-
tion Secretary Volpe announced that airport operators would be
required to establish secure zones and granted the FAA authority
to review and approve all airport security plans.23
In September 1972 the director of air transportation security
for the FAA listed the objectives of the government's program:
"One, keep unauthorized, concealed weapons off the airplanes;
two, have the airplanes free of bombs and incendiary devices;
three, have the aircraft serviced in a secure airport environ-
ment."23 However, without mandatory electronic screening Or a
physical search of all embarking passengers and their carry-on
luggage, the first objective could not be guaranteed. Although
there were twenty-six hijacking attempts against U.S. aircraft
during the first ten months of 1972, the FAA continued to resist
pressures to implement new security requirements.
That year's twenty-seventh hijacking provided an impetus pre-
viously missing. On November 10, three hijackers took command
of a Southern Airlines DC-9 over Alabama. During this particu-
larly harrowing incident the pilot was forced to fly for two days,
criss-crossing the southern United States and refueling at several
different airports. Only his consummate professionalism averted.
a major disaster when he was forced finally to take off for Cuba,
even though marksmen had shot out the airplane's tires.
Responding to a surge of criticism from Congress, the press
and ALPA, the government on December 5, 1972, announced new
security requirements, to be effective in thirty days. Airport op-
erators were directed to (1) station armed law enforcement officers
at passenger check points, (2) search all carry-on items, and (3)
screen all passengers with electronic devices as a condition to
boarding.27 There has not been a single successful hijacking of
an American airliner since these requirements were implemented.
The Memorandum of Understanding on Hijacking of Aircraft
and Vessels and Other Offenses, signed by the United States and
Cuba on February 15, 1973, was the result of years of painstaking
negotiations. It was of value both as a symbol of a "thaw" in
Cuban-American relations and as a deterrent to hijackings. This
last point must be qualified somewhat, however, for the agree-
ment's provision mandating extradition or prosecution is not
ironclad.
The memorandum recognizes
mitigating circumstances in those cases where the persons responsible
for the acts were being sought for strictly political reasons and were in
real and imminent danger of death without a viable alternative for
� Mona E. Evans, "Aircraft Highjacking: What Is Being Done?," American
Journal of International Law, October 1973, p. 669.
"White House Press Release, March 9, 1972.
^ DOT (Department of Transportation) News, FAA News Release, March 17,
1972.
""Airport Security," speech by James T. Murphy to the Airport Operators
Council International, September 6, 1972.
'1 DOT News, Oilice of the Secretary Press Release, December 5. 1972.
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leaving the country, providing that there was no financial extortion or
physical injury to the members of the crew, passengers, or other
persons in connection with the hijacking.23
In explanation, Secretary of State Rogers said, "It does not affect
the right of asylum. What it does mean is that you cannot commit
major crimes on the way to asylum."29 This subtlety is of little
relevance to the airline pilot faced by a terrorist committing the
minor crime of pointing a gun at his head. The pilot probably
will not be comforted by the knowledge that the hijacker will
be denied asylum in Havana if he pulls the trigger.
THE ICAO ROME CONFERENCE
The diplomatic offensive waged by the American delegation
at the 1973 ICAO Conference in Rome denoted the high-water
mark in U.S. leadership of the response to terrorism against in-
ternational civil aviation. The American objective at this time
remained the total reduction of attacks on aviation. The strategy
was to eliminate all terrorist "safe havens" by establishing ICAO
sanctioning authority.
However, the first blow to the American plan was struck even
before the conference began. In preliminary subcommittee ses-
sions the United States had campaigned arduously for the crea-
tion of an independent ICAO commission that could impose
sanctions against states acting contrary to the principles of the
Tokyo, Hague and Montreal conventions. These sanctions would
include suspension of air service by all ICAO states to the offend-
ing state.
Led by France and the Soviet Union, most states maintained
that economic sanctions could be imposed only by the UN Se-
curity Council. A French official explained, "We thought that
such a formula, which basically implies sanctions against states
outside the framework of the procedure set up by the United
Nations Charter, raised very difficult problems."" The full Legal
Committee rejected the American proposal and substituted a
milder draft presented by several Scandinavian countries. The
so-called Nordic proposal envisaged a two-phase ICAO response
when a state failed to adhere to the provisions of the conventions:
"fact-finding" and "recommendations."at
The conference agenda.also included debate on three proposed
amendments to ICAO's charter i.e., the 1944 Chicago Conven-
tion. France proposed incorporating the Hague Convention ver-
batim into the Chicago Convention, omitting the Montreal Con-
vention entirely and adding mandatory expulsion for any member
not ratifying the amendment once it entered into force. A British-
Swiss draft proposed the inclusion of the substantive provisions of
both the Hague and Montreal conventions and would have obli-
gated all ICAO members to deny use of their airspace to any
member acting contrary to the amendment. The third proposal
represented a compromise between the above. It omitted sanctions
altogether and required incorporation of the Hague and Montreal
conventions if the amendment and the two conventions were rati-
fied by two-thirds of the membership."'
DePartment of State Bulletin, March 5,1973, p. 261.
aThid., p.251. (Emphasis added.)
New York Times, August 29, 1973, p. 74.
" Arthur W. Rovine, "The Contemporary International Attack on Terrorism,"
Israel Yearbook on Human Rights, Vol. 3, 1073, p. 21.
'2 Charles N. Brower, "Aircraft Hijacking and Sabotage: Initiative or 'Inertia?,"
in Department of State Bulletin, June 18. 1973, p. 874.
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The United States maintained that the amendment approach
was not a timely response to the problem. Previous amendments
had taken years before entering into effect due to the lengthy
process of ratification. A State Department official warned, "Unless
an independent convention is adopted . . . there will be no new
international law measures to combat hijacking and sabotage for a
period of five or ten years, if ever.""
The second blow to the U.S. plan came on August 10, 1973 �
just two weeks before the conference. The Israelis, with an
appallingly poor sense of timing, forced down a Lebanese com-
mercial airliner in order to search for Palestinian guerrilla leaders
suspected of being on board. Echoing the August 15 UN Security
Council resolution condemning the Israeli action, Lebanon, sup-
ported by the entire Arab bloc, opened the conference with a
demand that Israel be ousted from ICAO.34
For the United States, it was now evident that ICAO would not
promulgate further enforcement provisions, and it was possible
that the Arabs might weaken the three multilateral conventions
already agreed on. In addition, there was a real danger that Israel
would be stripped of its ICAO membership. Paradoxically, the
American delegation that had pressed for the conference with such
forcefulness was now constrained to scuttle it. Although the
United States did succeed through difficult diplomatic maneuver-
ing in retaining Israel's membership, the conference adjourned
without having adopted a single substantive addition to existing
international legal machinery intended to deter terrorism.
Since the disappointing collapse of the Rome Conference, the
United States has regarded the multilateral approach as closed.
In 1974, Congress passed Public Law 93-366, entitled The Anti-
Hijacking Act of 1974. This legislation authorizes the president to
suspend air service to any foreign nation that he determines is
encouraging aircraft hijacking by acting in a manner inconsistent
with the Hague Convention, or that he determines is used as a
base of operations or training by terrorists who attack aircraft.
Further, the act authorizes the secretary of transportation, with
the approval of the secretary of state, to revoke the operating
rights of foreign air carriers that fail to adhere to the standards
and practices of ICAO for air transportation security. To date,
this authority has not been exercised.
ANALYSIS
The American effort to orchestrate the response to terrorism
against international civil aviation was limited by a number of
factors, from sovereign rights to legal and social norms � not to
mention costs.
The Right of Asylum
The American response has contended consistently that hi-
jacking must be regarded exclusively as a criminal matter. En-
dorsing U Thant's assertion that hijackings are crimes of a
"totally different category" which must be judged for their
"criminal character and not their political significance," Secre-
tary of State Rogers declared, "Political passion, however deeply
"..4 Ibid., p. 875.
New York Times, August 29, 1973, p. 74.
6A.
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held, cannot be justification for criminal violence against inno-
cent persons."" A Department of State official had said earlier,
"We have concluded that the hijacker of a commercial airliner
carrying passengers should be returned regardless of any claim
that he was fleeing from political persecution.""
The U.S. argument for mandatory extradition or prosecution
was rebuffed by three counterarguments. First, the United States
seemed to be adhering to a double standard, since it has histori-
cally welcomed those fleeing from political repression. Critics of
the American position could not believe that Washington would
return all political refugees who reached the United States via
hijacking. Second, the threat posed by hijacking did not warrant
surrendering the sovereign right to confer asylum in any and all
cases. And third, for many Third World states, political terrorism
is the "last resort" for militarily powerless peoples in their struggle
against colonialism or imperialism.
The U.S. error was one of extremism. As noted by John
McMahon:
. . if an international agreement requiring extradition or prosecu-
tion is to function in deterring the forcible diversion of aircraft, it
must be a compromise between the preservation of the state's right
to grant refuge to individuals who flee from prosecution and the need
to discourage hijackers.37
Too liberal a position on asylum will not stop hijacking, McMahon
says, while too strict a requirement for extradition will be unac-
ceptable to most states.
The parable of the sun, the wind and the man in the coat
comes to mind. At ICAO, the United States acted like the wind,
trying to force the Arab states into agreeing to punish all hi-
jackers � to no avail. Then, like the more subtle approach taken
by the sun, the Arab states themselves realized that the dilemma
could be avoided simply by blocking their runways and denying
hijacked aircraft permission to land. This quiet revolution in
policy was perhaps the single most decisive advance in dealing
with the problem of sanctuary.
Does the Threat of Punishment Deter?
The U.S. effort to eliminate "safe havens" was based on the
assumption that once the terrorists knew they would be prose-
cuted in all cases, terrorism would stop. This presumption ignores
two realities. First, in many cases terrorists are so fanatically
dedicated to their cause that they are fully prepared to accept
capture. The second reality facilitates this inclination: imprison-
ment of terrorists occasions follow-on terrorist action to free
those in jail. The vast majority of terrorists imprisoned during
this decade are now free. One commentator suggested the probable
necessity of an international prison to protect states from terrorist
blackmail."
Inadequate Support of Foreign Technical Prevention Programs
While the United States has led the world in its utilization and
support of technical security measures, it could do more. The
�William Rogers, "A World Free from Violence," Department of State Bulletin,
October 16, 1972, p. 429. The assertion by U Thant is from the New York Times,
September 15, 1970, p. 17.
Departmen t of State Bulletin, March 10, 1969, p. 213.
'John P. McMahon, "Air Hijacking: Extradition as a Deterrent," Georgetown
Law Journal, June 1970, p. 1150.
�Chester L. Smith, "The Probable Necessity of an International Prison in Solv-
ing Aircraft Hijacking," International Lawyer, April 1971, p. 274.
1-�
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issue is one of cost. Although a share of the cost can be passed on
to travelers in the form of surcharges on air fare, the initial
capital investment in large-scale technical security systems re-
quires special financing.
In this regard, the United States has been stingy. With few
exceptions, it demands full reimbursement for services rendered,
including the salaries of experts loaned to foreign countries to
survey aviation security systems at their major airports. What is
needed are financial initiatives, manifested in direct grants or
loans or a special ICAO Technical Assistance Fund to aid member
states in installing effective security systems.
The willing participation of a large number of countries in
present U.S. technical prevention assistance programs demon-
strates their genuine interest in protecting civil aviation. As of
1975, eleven governments had requested inspection of their avia-
tion security systems by FAA experts; representatives of seven-
teen nations had attended the Department of Transportation
Aviation Security Training Course in Oklahoma City; and more
than fifty countries had received audio-visual programs on such
subjects as explosives security and in-flight hijacking defense
tactics." Among the participating states are many generally
regarded as sympathetic to terrorists: for example, Syria, Jordan,
Egypt, France and Saudi Arabia. In addition, through the State
Department's Bilateral Air Transportation Security Information
program, the United States consults with all foreign governments
and foreign air carriers on the full range of anti-hijacking tech-
niques.4� Thus, the United States has laid the foundation for
international cooperation in the technical prevention field; with a
more farsighted policy, the cost of worldwide security could be
met.
The Costs and Appropriateness of Intelligence Operations
Aggressive intelligence operations can effectively pre-empt ter-
rorist attacks; however, there are limitations to this method of
counterterrorism. The first is cost. It is extremely expensive to
maintain surveillance of all known or suspected terrorists. After
the massacre at the Munich Olympic Games in 1972, the United
States established an extensive surveillance-and-screening pro-
gram designed to intercept terrorists before they could enter the
country.41 Although the State Department had been pleased with
the results of the program, it scrapped Operation Boulder in
March 1975. The coordinator for combating terrorism explained
that the program had not been "cost effective."42
A second problem is that of scope. Contemporary- terrorism is
transnational in character. Mass communications allow terrorists
on one continent instant access to information and ideas relating
to successful terrorist tactics on another continent. Often, states
are attacked "by proxy": terrorist organizations may employ
"foreign" agents in a particular operation or obtain weapons from
yet another foreign source. As a consequence, counterterrorist
agents must demonstrate an equal facility in crossing international
boundaries. Agencies such as Interpol provide a valuable clearing-
house for information regarding terrorist activities.
The final restraint on intelligence operations is that of legal
and social norms. I.M.H. Smart comments:
�-
...DOT/FAA (ASE-5), "U.S. Assistance to Other Nations," 1/3/75.
'� Department of State AIRGRAM, A-1288, "Exchange of Information on Anti.
Hijacking Techniques," February 12, 1973.
"New York Times, April 24, 1975, p.7.
42/bid.
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Government in a democracy is expected to conform, in its behavior,
to the general norms of the society. Thus, a democratic government
which persistently adopts violent means of responding to terrorism
. . . may achieve local success in the short term, but at the longer term
expense of providing other groups within the society with a basis for
claiming to use violence legitimately in their own interest.43
As has been demonstrated by the recent expos�of the CIA,
democratic societies may determine that illegal or unconscionable
activity by intelligence agencies poses a threat greater in the long
run than that of the agencies' targets.
CONCLUSION
This review has shown that the American effort to stop attacks
on civil aircraft was in no way perfect. The government's recog-
nition that mandatory electronic screening was necessary came
far too late. The American contention that states should relin-
quish their right to grant political asylum in cases of aerial hi-
jacking was rejected by the international community. The attempt
to obtain an enforcement convention turned into a diplomatic
fiasco.
Yet, all in all, it worked. Today, hijackings are out of the
headlines. The public now is arouseU only when it is suggested
that security measures be dismantled. The frequency of hijacking
attempts has declined to acceptable levels.
To some extent, hijacking declined of its own accord. Terrorists
increasingly had to compete with the hijacker "who commits the
crime simply to get his name into the newspapers or television,
in a last desperate effort to become someone."44 A saturation of
media coverage led to public apathy, robbing the terrorist act of
its publicity effect. Finally, the UN General Assembly's acceptance
of the PLO as a legitimate entity compelled the guerrillas to
act in accordance with a new code of responsibility. On January
29, 1975, the PLO announced that it had decided to treat hi-
jackings as crimes and execute any hijacker whose actions led to
loss of life.45
Nonetheless, these influences were minor compared with the
myriad countermeasures arrayed by the international community
against the terrorist, even though they were not always coordi-
nated or in line with the American plan. Often, actions taken
unilaterally by states benefited the community at large. For
example, when Iran executed a political dissident who had hi-
jacked a domestic flight, it served notice on terrorists everywhere
that Iran was not a promising place to start or end a hijacking.
Some states ceased to provide sanctuary to hijackers after they
learned that the terrorists could prove to be a nuisance or
embarrassment. States that secured their airports in order to
protect their national airline also protected foreign carriers.
Without the "push" provided by the United States at home and
abroad, however, it is probable that international civil aviation
would still be imperiled.
The price of future aviation security is constant vigilance;
defenses cannot be relaxed. At best, though, these defenses can
succeed only in diverting the terrorists to other targets. 'Without
a fundamental resolution of the rivalries, strife and injustices that
spawn terrorism, the future promises recurring violence. In the
case of international civil aviation, the United States won one
battle, but-the war with terrorism goes on.
43 Smart, p. 230. _
"Roberta Wolilstetter, "Kidnapping to Win Friends and Influence People,"
Survey, Autumn 1974, pp. 39-40. 67
45 New York Times, January 30, 1975, p. 1.
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