CA PROPAGANDA PERSPECTIVES

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02599106
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 89
• Document Creation Date: July 13, 2023
• Document Release Date: February 22, 2022
• Case Number: F-2018-00095
• Publication Date: July 24, 1972

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SECRET
Propaganda
PERSPECTIVES
24 JULY 1972
VIETNAM PERSPECTIVE
MOSCOW'S NEW TREATIES
THE HERETIC'S HOMECOMING
SHORT SUBJECTS
JUST FRIENDLY SUBCONTINENTAL MEDDLING?
SECRET
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(b)(1)
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FOR BACKGROUND USE. ONLY 24 July 1972
VIETNAM PERSPECTIVE
On 30 March 1972, the North Vietnamese regime launched a
massive, unprovoked attack by first-line-North Vietnamese Army
divisions spearheaded by hundreds of tanks and supported by massed
artillery across the borders of South Vietnam. The attack openly
and blatantly violated the agreement reached in 1954 that both
North and South Vietnamese forces remain on their own sides of
the Demilitarized Zone. It also violated the understanding to
de-escalate the war reached in the fall of 1968 when the U.S.
unilaterally ceased the bombing of North Vietnam. In one stroke,
the NVN wiped out its carefully developed and nurtured false
image of the war in South Vietnam as a civil "war of liberation"
conducted by freedom-loving, anti-imperial Southern guerrillas
with the aid of the North. As a result, new and different
perspectives on the Vietnamese conflict were revealed:
--- Many fictions assiduously cultivated by North Vietnam
stood exposed (see below).
--- The South Vietnamese government (GVN) and its military
forces responded with unexpected unity and effectiveness,
giving evidence that the initiative has passed to the
Southern forces.
--- The U.S., while holding to its unilateral commitment to
continue withdrawing its troops from Vietnam, responded to
the North Vietnamese action with an air offensive of
unprecedented magnitude and effectiveness, both against the
North's war-making capacity and against the North Vietnamese
invading troops in the South.
- More unexpectedly, it mined North Vietnamese harbors,
including Haiphong, severely restricting North Vietnam's main
source of supply of Soviet materiel.
--- Free world public opinion, which has evidenced substantial
support for the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong stand,
experienced a major reversal,
--- While voicing their continued moral support, North Viet-
nam's major allies, the Soviet Union and Communist China,
in the middle of long-sought negotiations to normalize rela-
tions:with ttfQ U.S., were clearly dismayed by the misbegotten
North Vietnamese strategy, and pursued their own wider
national interest over and above Hanoi's.
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The supreme irony of it all is that in the above respects the
reckless North Vietnamese gamble has achieved exactly the opposite
of what their offensive was designed to achieve. The North Viet-
namese are sacrificing thousands of lives lost, a significant
portion of their economic and industrial base, and whatever support
they enjoyed in the world community in a fruitless effort to
achieve domination of the South. Yet it seems they would have been
just as close to their goal if they had followed the path of
negotiation instead of embarking on the uncertain course of seeking
a military victory.
Some North Vietnamese FictiOns
The North Vietnamese Army (NVA) has now made it unequivocally
clear that the conflict is not a matter of a purely South Vietnamese
civil war, a war of "national liberation," carried on against the
Government of South Vietnam by Viet Cong insurgents indigenous to
the South. A Blitzkrieg reminiscent of North Korea's invasion of
South Korea in 1950, it is plainly a cross-border invasion, launched
by North Vietnamese regular troops. This despite the fact that the
North Vietnamese leaders --- incredible as it may seem --- still
maintain that the NVA is not participating. (Hanoi refers to its
forces in the South simply as the "People's Liberation Forces.")
The fact is that North Vietnam committed 11 Divisions to the
invasion. Even pro-North Vietnamese supporters throughout the world
no longer are willing to maintain the fiction that the conflict is
a southern civil war.
Another fiction dissipated by the aggression is the assertion
that the conflict is designed to free South Vietnam from U.S.
"imperialism." It is amply clear that, far from seeking to retain
a territorial hold in Vietnam, the U.S. has sought to withdraw
altogether from the area. It has reduced its armed forces from
over 500,000 to less than 50,000. This massive withdrawal of
troops, in accordance with an announced schedule, with the similarly
announced promise of complete withdrawal on release of U.S.
prisoners of war should have convinced any remaining doubters of
U.S. intentions.
Yet another fiction is the notion propagated by the North Viet-
namese that "the South Vietnamese population welcomes Viet Cong
and North Vietnamese liberation from the oppression of the Thieu
government in the South." But the southern population quite clearly
"voted with their feet" and fled their "liberators" by the tens
of thousands. Even the most critical observers on the scene could
not help but note that though the NVA temporarily gained a certain
amount of territory, they retained only a small fraction of the
population inhabiting that territory. The vast majority of the
civilian population elected to live with the imperfections of the
South Vietnamese government in preference to suffering the terrorism
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characteristic of the invading regime. Over 800,000 South Vietnamese
have fled from their "liberators."
Miscalculation of Allied Reaction
The GVN and U.S. response to the North Vietnamese aggression
evidently was totally miscalculated by-Hanoi's leaders, who in their
isolation and obsession with their own distorted view of reality,
underrated the will and capabilities-of-the-South Vietnamese govern-
ment forces as well as the determination of the U.S. government and
people not to permit,a forcible takeover of South Vietnam. After
some local initial retreats, the South Vietnamese forces, aided
only by U.S. air support, withstood the combined strength of the
NVA and the Viet Cong (weakened by the ill-fated 1968 Tet offensive
and subsequent attrition) equipped with the best of Soviet weapons,
and have taken the initiative to regain the territory lost in the
NVA's initial surprise assault.
The South Vietnamese government itself, an incipient democracy
with difficulties typical of many in the so-called Third World, is
admittedly beset by dissension among various groups. But the
significant fact is that the dissidents are able to express their
views in elected legislatures and are working to establish a better
form of government more responsive to the competing needs and desires
of the people. Moreover, the South Vietnamese government has
gained wider popular support than ever before in opposition to the
common enemy. Whatever the internal differences and the imper-
fectiOns of their government, the overwhelming majority of South
Vietnamese reject the grim prospect of being subjected to the
ruthless rule of the North, one of the most truly closed and
monolithic societies in the world. It is significant that when
the North Vietnamese threat was the greatest in the early phases
of the invasion, the people of South Vietnam were the most united.
While misreading the temper of their southern neighbors,
Hanoi's leaders made an equally serious -miscalculation in consider-
ing the U.S. response. Misled by the.patent attempt of the U.S.
to withdraw from Vietnam and to make concessions in the interest
of an honorable, negotiated settlement, Hanoi's leadership thought
they could attack with relative impunity from U.S. retaliation.
They did not foresee that the U.S. government, strongly supported
by public opinion at home, would not abdicate its essential
responsibilities, and so were unprepared for the resumption of
massive bombings of the North on a scale greater and more effective
than ever before. These bombings are striking both military and
industrial targets which contribute to Hanoi's war-making capa-
bilities. At the same time, the accuracy of the laser-guided
"smart" bombs reduces the extent of the unavoidable accidental
damage to non-military objects accompanying the bombing of military
targets. The allegations of the NVN and its supporters that U.S.
bombing is targetted at the dikes in North Vietnam are incorrect
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and cannot be taken seriously. If they were indeed a target, they
would long ago have been destroyed, given-the-new-effectiveness
and accuracy of the "smart" bombs.
The bombings plus the equally unexpected mining of the harbors,
which have supplied some 80% of North Vietnamese military needs will
-sObnet_or:later affect North Vietnamese offensive capabilities.
The ultimate outcome of the military struggle is still uncer-
tain. It is obvious that the North Vietnamese have failed thus
far to attain their maximum objective: .a military takeover of
the South or destruction of the GVN. It also seems more and more
certain that the South will succeed in its efforts to regain most
of the lost territories. What is clear is that the North Vietnamese
have paid an enormous cost in lives, in destroyed military equip-
ment, and in bomb damage to military and industrial installations
in the North for a tenuous hold on a small bit of South Vietnamese
territpry. As of the end of June, the best available estimate of
NVA casualties in those killed, wounded and taken prisoner, since
30 March of this year, ranges between 40,000 and 45,000. It is a
measure of the cynicism and moral bankruptcy of the North Vietnamese
leadership that they show every intention of going on sacrificing
human life and property apparently in total disregard of civilized
values, obsessed with their vision-of a mandate to rule over Indo-
china and beyond.
North Vietnam's Isolation in the World Community
North Vietnam's invasion of the South has gone far to isolate
it in the world community. The mass protest demonstrations of
the late 1960's by youth and other groups in the non-Communist
world have not been repeated now that it is clear Hanoi was
responsible for the escalation of a war that had been winding
down. Communist front groups have indeed tried to mobilize
non-Communists in order to match the demonstrations of the earlier
period, but obviously have struck no responsive chord among those
outside their own disciplined ranks. Indeed they appear confused
and working at cross purposes, engrossed in their own quarrels
over prestige, to the despair of North Vietnamese representatives
abroad whose exhortations to Camffunist-and other pro-North Viet-
namese front groups have been met with an unenthusiastic response.
The free world's disapproval of Hanoi's action is evident
from the statements of influential leaders and groups throughout
the world, and from the columns of the world's major newspapers
and journals.
The realization that North Vietnam is becoming increasingly
isolated in the international Communist-community as well has
tended to be obscured by the equivocal-verbiage commcm1y used in
international Communist communications and by the compulsion of
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Communist: countries to profess unity, if not unanimity of views.
But in the case of Moscow and Hanoi, actions speak louder than
words.
Although it may be true that the nature, and especially the
timing, of Hanoi's armored onslaught on the eve of the Moscow talks
was contrary to Moscow's wishes, it is-also true that without the
massive military aid the Soviet Union-has continually provided to
North Vietnam, the current offensive could � not have been launched,
and the Soviet Union must-bear.a heavy responsibility for the North
Vietnamese escalation of the war. There also can be little doubt
that, despite their evident competition for influence with North
Vietnam, both the Soviet Union and Cahnunist China for many years
saw their ideological and national interest served by energetically
supporting the North Vietnamese effort to destroy South Vietnam
and eliminate the U.S. presence from Indochina.
However, now one cannot but conclude that Soviet and Chinese
priorities have changed. Each in its own national interest has
placed a higher priority on reaching an accommodation with the
U.S. than. on supporting North Vietnamese war plans. Under these
circumstances, the North Vietnamese revival of the fighting and
their clamorous insistence on continued moral and material support
may well have become an embarrassment to the USSR and China.
One indication of the importance to Moscow of its larger
priorities and of its downgrading of the North Vietnamese problem
was the Soviet response to U.S. measures to counter the North
Vietnamese invasion. Moscow maintained-a-silence of some days
concerning the resumption of bombing and the mining of Haiphong
harbor and when it did respond it did so-in mild terms, much to
the dismay of Hanoi.
The Sino-Soviet conflict has become a-matter of the deepest
concern to each of these protagonists� and this seems to be the
main reason for their proceeding-with-the-summit meetings with
the U.S. despite-North Vietnam's barely concealed denunciations.
The Soviet Union has other reasons as-well for normalizing
relations with the U.S. and its European allies. These reasons
center around the necessity to avoid-a nuclear war with the U.S.
and the Soviet need for Western trade and technology to rescue
the domestic economy, which has long -been stagnating and is
reaching an impasse. Thus, for good reasons, the Soviet Union
has downgraded the importance of the North Vietnamese war effort,
in favor of its own more important objectives.
Some of the propaganda exchanges between Moscow and Hanoi
illustrate their differing views. On 21 May, the eve of
President Nixon's visit to Moscow, NhanTan, the principal Lao
Dong Party newspaper in Hanoi, harshly denounced "Communists
who set national interest above the common interests of the
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world revolution and serve national selfishness at the expense of
tWworld revolution." Moscow's response-to this kind of attack
appeared in its multilingual international journal New Times
(#22 of May 1972) in an article by Vadim Zagladin, deputy chief of
the foreign affairs department of the Soviet Party's Central
Committee:
"Soviet policy is a truly national policy determined by the
fundamental interests of the working people of our ' country, by the
interests of the entire nation in building communism. . . .
Socialist policy never derived its strength fromIprimitive,
stereotyped patterns, and least of all from imitation of devices
and methods employed by the class enemy. . . The experience of
past years has shown beyond the shadow of a doubt that any
tendency to be guided by considerations of the moment (emotional
or other reasons), to confine oneself-to-the intereStS'Of.the
present while ignoring the long-term-perspectives, has never led
to anything good. . . ." (Emphasis added).
It may also be significant that the invasion was not launched
during the Peking summit, but rather some six weeks before Presi-
dent Nixon met with the Soviet leaders late in May. It was the
Soviet Union, as the mainstay of North Vietnam's war effort, which
had to be pressured against reaching agreement with the U.S., and
the North Vietnamese did their utmost, though in vein, to prevent
the success of the Moscow summit.
It seems quite evident that Hanoi and Moscow differ on how
the Vietnam problem should be solved. While both are technically
in agreement in their public insistence that the problem will be
solved at the Paris negotiating table, most observers have inter-
preted Moscow's statements as urging immediate negotiation and
cessation of the fighting, while Hanoi has given little sign that
it will stop the bloodshed.
The trend in the Communist world toward settling differences
by negotiation rather than by the North Vietnamese method of
armed aggression was dramatically illustrated by the joint
announcement by North and South Korea concerning their negotiations
to seek reunification of the two halves of the country and their
agreement to refrain from armed provocations. This effort to
settle differences peacefully was undertaken while South Korean
troops continue to share the burden of the military conflict in
Vietnam and highlights the extent of North Vietnamese isolation
in the Commnist community. Hanoi's refusal to abandon military
means to achieve its goals is a measure of the degree to which
they are removed from today's realities.
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The Obsessed North Vietnamese Leadership
Vietnam war protesters have tried to make conventional wisdom
of the supposition that the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese effort
to destroy the South Vietnamese government is ehow a just cause,
a popular rising up of sentiment in behalf of a superior ideology
and morality. Whatever the origins of these sentiments, the
current aggression should strip away any remaining illusions about
the North Vietnamese leaders-. After years of iron-handed control
by the North Vietnamese leadership, during which all spirit of
dissent and all dissenting elements of the population were elimin-
ated, the leaders have been able to mobilize an army to fight for
a cause that only a benighted leadership-can-still believe in as
the self-appointed would-be dictators of a-Greater Indochina. What
the current North Vietnamese-attack-demonstrates is that the
leadership has now been willing to be identified with the very
creed of imperialistic aggression of which they accuse the U.S.,
the GVN, and their allies. North Vietnamese actions have once
more been clearly revealed as based on a creed that can only be
described as chauvinistic imperialism,- in the truest sense of
this much misused expression.
For their part the South Vietnamese have sought nothing more
than to be left alone to work out their own form of government,
free from the threat of forcible takeover whpOier by southern
insurgents or by northern invaders armed by the Soviet Union and
Communist China, and U.S. involvement has been limited to making
it possible for the South Vietnamese people to realize South
Vietnam's aim.
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?VW YORK Trms
4 j'Irrie 1972
ark.r.......-ftv.rawtfewake,imvientialeithioliAeladitt
South Vietnam;
Again the
Refugees
Are on
The Roads
SAIGON�"Three months ago," an
American official here said last week,
"we were virtually out of the refugee
business. The next thing We knew
there were refugees all over the Place,"
)3y the weekend, American officials
:Were estimating that nearly 800,000
;South Vietnamese had been driven
from their homes since the North
Vietnamese offensive began more than
two months ago.
, Nobody knows exactly how- many
'Civilians have been killed and maimed
In this latest round of fighting. In-
formed estimates range from at least
20,000 to as many as 50,000 Wounded
and between 5,000 and 15,000 killed.
In the months of calm that pre-
Ceded the North Vietnamese attack,
the number of war victims being
assisted by the United States and the
Sonth Vietnamese Government had
fa,,ert to one of thc, !--lwest levels in
eight years. The refugee count, how-
ever, did not include the millions of
South Vietnamese who had fled VI the
cities or were living in ramshackle
camps and had long been off the
Government relief rolls. Most of these
people had been given the standard
Issue of rice, blankets, money and tin
roofing, and, officially, they were no
longer refugees.
By conservative estimates, more
than a quarter of the 27 million people
of South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia
have been uprooted at least once since
the United States intervened in the
Indochina struggle, and half of them
still live somewhere other than the
place they call home. Most of ' them
art not officially regarded as refugees.
The Governments ,of the three coun-
tries have done as much as they
intend to do for them. And though in
sonic cases that has meant no help
whatever, these war victims are
viewed officially not as refugees but
as people who have changed addresses.
Over the years in Indochina It has
come to be generally 'accepted that al-
lied bombs and artillery have been
major "refugee-generating" factors.
The reason, of course, is that the Com-
munist guerrillas have sought to en-
tangle themselves with the village pop-
ulation. American or other allied
troops, for instance, would find them-
SOWS under fire from a supposedly
pro-Government village and Would re-
taliate with bombing and artillery. The
civilians killed or chased out during
the action would thus be been as vie-
ens of allied fire nowerAtunteltit was
JAPAN TrMES 550,0008. Vietnamese
29 May 1972
Have Fled Into Camps
\
SAIGON (Kyodo-Reuter)�
More than 550,000 people in
South Vietnam have fled into
'Government refugee camps
since the North Vietnamese be-
gan their current offensive in
the South on March 29, accord-
ing to Social Affairs Minister
'ran Nguon Phieu.
'- Speaking/in a television inter-
view Saturday night the minis-
ter said this figure did not in-
clude an estimated 200,000 to
300,000 more refugees believed to
be living 'outside the camps
either with friends or family.
The big majority of the refu-
gees came from the northern
military district where the North
Vietnamese are in control of
' Quang Trl Province bordering
i North Vietnam and heavy fighta
ing occurs daily around the ford
I vier imperial capital of Hue n
'little farther south.
pldeu put the number of refu.
gees from the five northern pro.
vinces at 330,000, those from the
second military district in the
heavily contested Central High-
lands at 122,000, those from the
third military district around
Saigon at 74,000 and those froth
the fourth military district In
the Meking Delta at 22,000.
They were distributed among
the ComMtlnists Who had started the
firefight.
In the latest frontal attacks of the
North Vietnamese, however, it has
been clear to victim and outsider
alike that it was Communist troops
and Communist firepower that genera
stud the new refugee wave, The greata
est concentration of refugees�by some'
Calculations more than 400,000�has
been in Danang, the first available
haven of safety in the path of the.
North Vietnamese advance in the
northern part of South Vietnam. '
For most of the refugees there was
no time to ponder ideological ques-,
tions. They simply ran south because
the house-wrecking shells and the
troops were coming from the north.
At first the weather was bad for fly=
ing, end it Was a few days before.al.;
lied planes began striking back.
initially the refugees jammed into;
schools, pagodas. churches and aban-1
dened buildings in already overcrowd-,
ed Danang. Many felt the safest places
were in the heart of the city, and they)
resisted efforts to move them to more,
functional quarters on the outskirt.4.)
By last week, however, the majority)
of the refugees were living in the for-_
met. American military camps in the;
Danang area.
In recent days, as the fighting has
eased in intensity, the floodtide
refugees has slackened. But no one be.,
heves the current round of fighting IS
over. "And the minute It beats up
again," said one American official,
, "there are going to be more refugees."
'�JOSEPH L TREASTliA
267 Government camps. The
Government was providing 500
grams of rice per day for adult4
and 200 grams for children at a
total cost of 25 million piastres
(05,000) a day.
Phieu said the Government
planned to resettle the refugees
on some of the islands just off
the South Vietnamese coast In
the South China Sea.
He stressed that all those In-,
should understand that
this in no way meant that they
Would be held in detention but
was intended as a Move to pro-
tect them from possible Corn.'
.thunist shelling attack's.
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THE TIMES, Blantyre
1 MAY 1972
;"\F
11\4.
J1
. � .
� FtlEradoicii; photographer
Gerard Hebert of Montreal
who spent five days in the.,
beseiged provincial Capital. of
An � Lne, Wane:meth ' heavy
fighting Ahern and -was
� wounded dining one of the
tank battles. Brouedit safety
out of the city. by helicopter
on April 13. be cabled...the
La
�
�N�r
1\. LATA
I. tank 'crewman I saw hod
. ,� been chained inside his tank.
f 0110Wing r
tO.� 4 .
AN LOC. APRIL 18 "The I
first dead North Vietnamese
WASHINGTON STAR
30 May 1972
WASHINGTON CLOSE-UP
I was photographing, one of
.: the tanks that had betm
knocked out in the middle
of the town in the battle and
thure avtia a lind outside
the tank, apparentiv that 11E1
! the tank commander.
Doavn inside w.ere.twe.more
dehd� fron 'a direct
hit by M72 'antt-tank
rocket: / saw something gunt,
in the darkness. I felt the
mans, ankle, It was ellained
to, the inside .ot's'� the v'itink
.C7.2:EVSO.ii4X
�
�with
,
lInks.
I had heard of this happen-
1 bur with North Vletnamew
a
tank erewa in Laos knit
year. Still. I was surprised.
. Soti,th ViOnamose ' soldiers
,told , Ati , tank crewmen
"ern' chnbied althouelf tRHI
Ironiniandem were not.
,onn captured North Viet.*
.namese crew tit Cf told inter..
rogatore he' had been assured
before he entered ,An. 1,00:
,that the town was already
lin- North Vietnamese hands.'
North Vietnam Being 1evc,stcgkd.
North Vietnam. tion of those tnegets
Something terrible is hap-
pening.
North Vietnam, a country of
some 20 million persons, is
being rapidly and completely
taken apart by the cumulative
effects of the mining of its
harbors, the shelling of its
coastline and the bombing of
a wide variety of targets
throughout the country.
Nothing remotely like this
has happened since the final
days of World War II, when
the air defense and fire-fight-
ing systems of Germany and
Japan collapsed, leaving them
virtually defenseless�and yet
what is happening to North
Vietnam is different in signi-
ficant ways from the situation
in those last days of World
War II.
The full impact of Opera;
tion Linebacker has not
dawned on the American pub-
lic, at least partially because
of the old argument on the
m ilit a r y effectiveness of
bombing and mining. Some
opponents of the bombing ar-
gue that it is not militarily
effective�and thus give the
Impression that it is not hav-
ing a major effect within
� No one, however, can read major difficulties, there was
,
almost always time to make
the bomb damage reports�
now issued daily � without repairs or find an alternate
coming to the conclusion that way of doing things. In the
three weeks of the current
the attacks are having a campaign, almost all these
devastating effect and that, classes of targets have been
while there is relatively little attacked in rapid succession,
direct loss of life, the impact ' leaving litle time for repairs
on the people will be severe, or adaptation.
The bombing campaign of A major, and perhaps cru-
1965-68 was also devastating, cial, difference is that the
but there are major differ- enemy's air defense system,
ences that will make the ef- or important parts of it, re-
feels of the current campaign, , mained off limits most of
if continued for even a few, the time during the earlier
more weeks, much more bombing campaign. Pilots
severe. I were specifically forbidden to
A major difference, of attack MIG airfields or cer-
course, is that the port of Ilai-J tam n air defense control points.
phong remained open through-' The North Vietnamese air de-
out the earlier campaign. fense system not only sur-
While major efforts were vived, but improved remark-
made to block the movement ably, between 1965 and 1968,
of supplies after they had making the Hanoi-Haiphong
been unloaded, there always : area one of the most danger-
was a significant amount that ous places in the history of
did get through. Now, accord- , aerial warfare.
ing to reports from both sides, , In the current campaign,
the mining of the harbors has the air defense system was a
totally cut off the movement priority target. Naval gunfire
of supplies by sea. smashed virtually every radar
In the earlier bombing cam- station along the coast. Large
paign, different classes of tar- _nutribers of planes were used
gets were hit over a period in the early raids to destroy
of years. Mile the destntez surface-to-air missile sites and
- to confuse the remaining ra-3.8
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1
!I That 'explains why Ltw ;
1 tanks moved into town at ani
f
1 icavgoing , pace i with,�,7 heir I
!turrets open ;A .;. udi'. tlibiii. ' afro')
i!manders looltitik.' idly:. it; tind,i
1 pi . If: they Wined ' the Place: i
: Pouth Vietnamese infantry-'
; "men couldn't . ,belleve thalr
1
.1eyes. � i
lw Unsuspecting tanks got toj
!thin 50 yards- of the ,Soutit!
Vtotnaineee positions before'
� the, , laftintrY:tAti iiitiati ilt4
,ing their M72's 1 w
Itanks and seven 14n of 6 theirni
were knocked Out......P ....,.,
dar. A major air defense cen-
ter nal 11a0 nid'kkt of Hanoi
bombed, American pilots
don't yet have a free ride'
over Hanoi, but the air de-
fense system already has
been badly degraded.
With the use of laser- and
television-guided bombs
American bomber crews have
knocked out hundreds of
bridges and probably can
keep them down. This is a key,
part of the strategy of keeping
supplies from reaching the
fighting front. But this dis-
ruption of the lines of com-
munication throughout the
country also is the part of the
bombing that will have the
major impact on the civilian
DOntliation.
There is no way of telling
how long the bombing will go
on. President Nixon clearly
indicated his determination to,
retain the pressure on the
North Vietnamese when he
permitted continued heavy
raids on the Hanoi area while
he was in the Kremlin. On the
other side, the North Vietnam-,
ese have given every indica-
tion that they intend to go
ahead with their offensive in
the South, at least until the
issue is decided on the ground
at Hue.
It thus seems likely that the
bombing and the mining opor-
Alton will go en for at leant
another month and that vir-
tually insures a human dis-
aster of historic proportions
for the people of North V;et-
nam,
Approved for Release: 2018/04/25 CO2599106
WASHINGTON, July 5�State
Department officials said today
that there was a strong likeli-
hood North Vietnam would be
flooded later this summer, but
they said North Vietnam's dike
system would be responsible
r, .her than American bombing
raids.
In separate interviews, re-
sponsible State Department of-
fered its worst flooding in
years. Administration experts
say the dikes were heavily
damaged by those floods, and
they back up their views with
citations from the Hanoi press.
A State Department senior
official showed a translation of
an article that appeared in the
June 20 issue of a Hanoi news-
paper, Hanoi Mel. Written by
Tran Duy Hung, chairman of
ficers did not deny that some the Hanoi Administrative Corn.
bombs were falling on the fillatee, the article said: "In
dikes. But they again insisted some places, the repair of the
that there has been no syste-
matic targeting of the dike sys-
tem, which runs throughout the
Red River basin.
In recent weeks North Viet-
nam repeatedly accused the
United States of intentionally
bombing the dikes to cause
flooding during the monsoon
� NEW YORK TIMES
18 'nine 1972
LOCAL HANOI RADIO
EDITS AT TROUBLES
Home Broadcasts Denounce
Crime and indiscipline
$reetal to The New York Times
HONG KONG, June l4�
North Vietnam projects abroad
an Image of a selfless, dedi-
cated people and a valiant, un-
beatable army, but in broad-
casts intended only for home
consumption there are hints of
problems and pressures among
the civilian population and the
members of the armed forces.
Translations provided by a
monitoring agency of broad-
casts on the home service of
the Hanoi radio since the Com-
munist offensive began in South
Vietnam rit the end of March
give a more balanced picture
of the nation at war than the,
English-language broadeasts of
the same station or the trans-
missions of the official North
Vietnamese press agency.
The broadcasts intended for
abroad concentrate on hailing
communist victories in the
1.0111C TIMES
South and denouncing Ameri-
can bombing raids against the
North. The home-service broad-
casts include calls for intensi-
fied security to combat crime.
blackmarket operations and
sabotage and campaigns on the
war front to tighten military
cotmier defeatism
and heighten morale.
'Bad, Rioting Elements' ,
If there has been open op.t
position to the war in North
Vietnam, this has not been re-
ported by Hanoi. But Nhan Dan,
the official publication of the
Communist party, reported in
April that the authorities were,
determined to "punish bad,
rioting elements." The asser-
tion was made without further
explanation in an editorial
broadcast in Vietnamese over
the Hanoi radio.
Early in May, the Govern-
ment promulgated "regulations
on the maintenance of security
and order and on running the
economy in wartime" which
called for stepped-up "guard-
ing and patrolling to detect and
prevent crime and bring de-
linquent to court for prosecu-
tion."
The regulations, broadcast
over the home service of the,
Hanoi radio, said that severe!
punishment would be meted'
out to persons "taking advan-
tage of war conditions to sabo-
tage � production and combat
gan activities air in attempts
6 July 1972
Enemy Is Facing Floods,
U.S. Says, Denying Role
dike portions that were dam-
aged by torrential rains in 1971
has not yet met technical re-
qu irdnents."
"A number of thin and weak-
enad dikes which are probably
full of termite colonies and,
holes have not been detectedl
for repair," it said.
season, which has just begun. The article said that each
Last summer, when there individual and locality must ac-
was no American bombing of tam , 4,1," e.re- in thr. rlirroret
dike:.APproved for Release: 201
against life or socialist prop-
erty."
They stipulated that it was
"strictly forbidden to engage
In speculation, illegal trade or.
the sale and purchase of food
ration cards or to . exploit,
. evacuated people and agende.
responsible for their transpor-
tation, or to sell there food
products, grain and other staple
goods."
Warns of.Pamisliment �
The regulations also stated
that security personnel who
did good work would be re-
warded while those who de.
sorted their posts or made use
of their positions to harm the
state and people would be,
punished.
Problems of a military nature
have been aired in Quan Doi
Nhan Dan, the armed forces
publication. An article from
the paper broadcast over the
borne service of the Hanoi
radio on May 30 said that war
required that the "army make
outstanding efforts and move
forward rapidly. It said that in
order to generate a "revolu-
tionary impetus" among mem-
bers of the armed forces, po-
litical education must be
stepped up.
On June 4 a front-page edi-
torial in Quan Doi Nhan Dan
called for strict dicipline both
on the front line and in the
rear. According to excerpts
broadcast by the home service
1
of the Hanoi radio, it stated
that discipline must be en-
forced "conscientiously and
strictly" and brought into a
"new, better pattern in order
to suit a unit's present combat
and living conditions."
Stresses Security
The editorial stated "It is
necessary to execute strictly.
all orders issued by -higher
, echelons, to overcome resolute-
ly all difficulties and not re-
treat because of any fierce
challenge."
The,need for security against
possible enemy landings in the
North has been stressed in a
number of broadcasts over, the
home service of the Hanoi
radio. One, taken from a
Nhan Dan editorial, com-
mended security forces in in-
land coastal and border areas
for having spotted and cap-
tured or annihilated "many
groups of enemy spies, com-
mandos and armed scouts." It
warned that the United Statea
might "brazenly launch surprise
raids and attacks against a
number of areas in the North.".
A few days later Quan Doi
Nhan Dan carried an editorial
that said, that United States
imperialism had "sent armed
agents to land' in secret." It
called for the protection of ter-
ritorial waters and the smash-
ing of "all enemy sabotage ac-
tivities."
"there is not much time before
the torrential rain season."
"Repair methods must be
firmly grasped in case the
dikes are eroded, eaten away,
broken through or washed over
by water," it said. "We must
organize many dike repair ex-
ercises; including cases in
which the dikes are attacked
by the enemy."
The article-also accused what
it called "the warlike Nixon
clique" as having destroyed
parts of the dike system by
bombing.
The State Department offi-
dals interviewed said that in
view of the heavy air campaign
against North Vietnam, acci-
dental bombing of the dikes
could_ not be ruled out.
One official said that such
bombing could take place under
at least three circumstances:
the first, when North Viet-
namese antiaircraft guns are.
situated at or near dikes, And
are attacked; the second, when!
American fighter-bombers. en-I
gaged In aerial combat, un-1
8/04/25 CO259910e to
gain
speed, and the third, whea
to-ground missiles a ire-
against North Vietnamcaa radar
,become "undirected" a aen the
-radar is shut off.,
I Administration ..xperts,
!studying the over-all situaticat
in North Vietnam, have um-
, eluded that there is "a hieaer
' than normal probability" i.hat
floods similar to last ye .,..r s may
strike next month.
Because North Vietnam has
charged repeatedly that the
dikes have been de-
aiberately, the Ad; ist ration
has become sensita to the
possibility that won l ',arm
would blame the Unite res.
for any flooding that cie- :.s.i
Therefore, the State DC: rti
ment has been eager to palea
cize any internal evidence, suc
as the Hanoi Moi article, that
supports, even indirectly, the
American contention that flood-
ing may occur for reasons un-
connected with the bombing.
' President Nixon and Admin-
istration spokesmen have regu-
larly denied that the dikes are
targets for destruction.
Approved for Release: 2018/04/25 CO2599106
WASHINGTON STAR
31 May 1972
Hanoi's Silence on Su
Reveals Fears on Sup
By HENRY S. BRADSHER
t Star Staff Writer
)SAIGON � The slowness of
North Vietnam to comment on
President Nixon's Moscow
talks reveals Hanoi's fear that
it can no longer expect effec-
tive support from the Soviet
Union.
The fear has been made
mere real by what Moscow
has said recently, and what it
has failed to do.
During Nixon's visit to the
Soviet Union, the Kremlin
leadership kept the Vietnam
issue very cool and secondary
in public comments.
� The Soviet statement of sup-
port for Hanoi in the final
communique was considered
by Communist affairs analysts
here to be perfunctory.
Moscow radio broadcasts in
Vietnamese to Vietnam for the
past week have been empha-
sizing the need to negotiate an
end to the war rather than
keep fighting.
These indications of attitude
have been matched by Mos-
cow's failure thus far to do
anything about trying to get
supplies through the U.S.
mines off the North Vietnam-
ese coast.
Neither has China, Hanoi's
other main source of supplies,
done anything to try to over-
come the U.S. military actions
since May 8.
And Peking, like Hanoi, has
bren slow to comment on the
Nixon visit to Moscow. It was
silent on the visit's implica-
tions for Vietnam.
In places like Paris and Lon-
den, East European sources
have begun to speculate on an-
other secret Soviet mission to
Hanoi.
One led by a Soviet Commu-
nist party secretary, Konstan-
tin Katushev, went to Hanoi
after Henry A. Kissinger's
April visit to Moscow. Al-
though details have never
came out, it seems to have
been an abortive Soviet at-
tempt to get Hanoi to negoti-
ate.
Now, the East European
sources are speculating on an-
other mission to try to reas-
sure Hanoi that the Soviet Un-
ion did not sell them out in
Moscow talks with Nixon.
A similar visit was reported-
ly paid to Hanoi by Premier
Chou En-lai shortly after Nix-
on was in China last February.
Hanoi criticized the Nixon-
Chou talks in indirect but very
strong terms.
Some reports say Chou only
met North Vietnamese leaders
in southern China, rather than
going to Hanoi. But it seems
certain that he spoke with
them.
Since then, however, China
has been noticeably cool to-
ward the current North Viet-
namese offensive against
South Vietnam.
Hanoi has held its tongue on
the Moscow talks so far, with
one possible exception.
Broadcast Cited
The Associated Press said
May 23 it had picked up a
Hanoi broadcast calling Nix-
on's trip to Moscow an "at-
tempt to undermine the soli-
darity of those who support
the Vietnamese."
U.S. government monitors
saki they had not heard this.
A possible indirect comment
by the North Vietnamese mili-
tary newspape r, People's
Army, said true Communists
do not place national interests
above help to the world revolu-
tion.
Moscow has indicated that it
is sensitive to this kind of crit-
icism. It has tried to head it
off by arguing that it-s policies
have not changed. �
A Vietnamese -language
broadcast from Moscow on
Thursday�the day after Nixon
and Communist party chief
Leonid I. Breshnev had their
long evening talk about Viet-
nam�had a very defensive
tone on this.
It said Soviet policy "is con-
sistent with the fundamental
interests of the U.S.S.R., world;
� socialism and the national lib-
, eration movement."
Conditions for "the anti-'
imperialist struggle of various'
nations depends to a great �
measure," the broadcast
argued, on the satisfactory.
settlement by the big powers
of major problems like nu-.
clear disarmament and Euro-
pean security.
The Soviet Union is support-
lag and aiding "the heroic,
. Vietnamese people," whose
;victories are portly a result of
that "enormous support of the,.
U.S.S.R.," it said. .
But it added that "the war,
of aggression in Vietnam can!
be ended only through negotia-.,
thms." Moscow supports "the;
legitimate proposals of the'
Vietnamese patriotic fighters"'
for negotiations. .
, Another Moscow broadcast
,in Vietnamese the same day
said "practical experience
clearly shows that the Viet-
nam problem cannot be solved'
iby military means."
Accent .1,n Talks .
Both broadcasts seemed to
be an indirect way of saying ,
North Vietnam must negotiate:
rather than simply expect So-i: �
yid help for continuing the',
war.
"In view of the present int'
ternational situation, the unity
of thought of all Socialist coun-
tries has an especially impor-:,
tant meaning," for Vietnam,
the first broadcast said.
Communist affairs analysts':
felt this qualification, making
clear that unity is of thought
rather than of action,- was pars
ticularly significant.
Both this broadcast and the.
joint communique on Nixon's.
visit downgraded Vietnam to
the. status of just another
world problem being viewed,.
from Moscow along with thc
Middle East and others.
Hanoi would prefer to have'
its struggle be given top prior-
ity in Communist thinking. �
The NorlhVietnamese -
might also be apprehensive
about the basic principles
relations signed Monday by,
Nixon and Communist party; �.
chief Leonid Breshnev.
It said the two superpowers- .
"will do their utmost to avoid'.
military confrontations."
With the thilW States
dc-
termined to maintain Its naval:
and aerial strength around:
North Vietnam, this pointed to', 1
a lack of intention by the Sov1,...
et Union to interfere.
The principles also talked
about "the recognition of the,
security interests" of each;.
other. While primarily directs.
ed to direct nuclear tbreats,!
this could be read in Hanoi as
signifying Soviet acceptance of.
the American role in Vietnam,. �
20
Approved for Release: 2018/04/25 CO2599106
Approved for Release: 2018/04/25 CO2599106
R011711111d EValtS and Robert Novak
POC3T noi Schism
111- J�ttle! 1972
I�
EVIDENCE. of a deeply
s significant. schism between
�IInhol and Moscow has now
become inesenpable in 114..4
� nol's vituperative outpour-
ings against the Kremlin for
consorting with President
Nixon.�"this Nuntber One
gruel, ':diehard thug of the
- world," In the words of a
senior North Vietnamese
commentator writing in the
June 3 issue of the party
' newspaper, Nhan. Dan. .
Although. Hanors fury
- against the Soviet Union is
` partially cloaked in immesh_
dos and .subtleties, there is
no mistaking its meaning.
by inviting Mr. Nixon to
Moscow, particularly after
',Soviet , shipments of war
� supplies were blocked by
the mining of North Viet-
nam's, harbors, the Kremlin.
Is playing the U.S. game of
splitting the world Corn-
� Munst movement.
Thus, on May 21, the day
:before Mr. Nixon arrived in
Moscow, the North Vietnam-
ese army newspaper
charged that "wherever ne
sets foot, he carries out
- counterrevolutionary acts."
By permitting the President
s to "set foot" in Moscow, in
, 'short, the Kremlin was an
accessory before the, fact in
I one of the 'most'. heinous
crimes of cormnimism,
NEW Yam TINES
counterrevolutionary activ-.
ity.
Developing the charge of."
counterrevolution, the May
21 polemic accused the So-
viet Union of putting its
own "national interests".
'over those of the world rev-
olution in tie following
thinly veiled doctrinal ser-
mon:
"Communists always con-
sider the revolution of each
nation an inseparable part
of the world revolution.
They never set -national in-
terests against the interests
of the world revolution nor
place private national inter-
lots above the common In-
terests of the world revolu-
tion, much less serve their
. own national selfishness."
� The only way to deal With
Mr. Nixon's latest offensivb
In Vietnam is by "a relent. ;
less attack against the U.S.
imperialists."
But what did the Soviet
� Union do? Hanoi hurls- the.
.accusation ' in Polemical
terms:
"By ignoring the tolerat-
ing , the U.S. imperialists'
crimes, one cannot repel'
their aggressiOn. By showing
weakness, one cannot pun-
ish their aggressivenest."
ADDING INSULT to in-
jury, another article in the '�
tightly controlled North VI
20 June 1972
SOVIET INDICATES
COOLNESS IN HANOI
Hints at Differences Over
improved Ties With U.S.
By HEDRICK SMITH
sptsigi So me New York Times
MOSCOW, June 19�The So-
viet press today provided indi-
cations of unresolved Soviet-
North Vietnamese differences
over Moscow's improved rela-
tions with the United States in
its first reports on the special
mission to Hanoi of President
� ;
etnantese' party newspaper
' boasted that although the
Vietnamese people have
'215ecti fighting "for thousands
of yettr5;,." they "do not beg
� I from
,
their enemies. The Implica-
tion by' Inviting President
Nixon 10 Moscow, the Soviet
Union begrime a supplicant.
Nowhere In these vellecl
attacks against the Russians
did the North Vietnamese
publish the facts concerning
Mr. Nixon's summit. trip to
Moscow or 'discuss the
agreements that emerged.
But the Russians them-
selves in a �cotinterattack
aired to North Vietnam over
the Soviet overseas radio, at-
tempted. to 'put the' Nixon
visit in perspective and
blunt the ariti-Soviet over-
tones of Hanoi's Propagan-
da. � �
On May 25, in the middle
of the Moscow ,suinmit,
Radio Moscow invoked
"Leninist principles" in de-
fense of the Kremlin's stra-
tegic decision to weltotne
Mr. Nixon despite escalation
of the Vietnam war.
"Peaceful coexistence"
with nations of different po-
litical systems, the broad- '
Ost in Vietnamese stated, is
not only essential to prevent.
world war but also corn- ,
plete conformity with the in-
(communism)." � ,
Reminding Uanol that it
Owes much to the "awe
Pious support" of the Soviet'
' Union in the'� 10-year wail
against the South,. Radio
Moscow sang the praises of;
,.the VietnameSe Communistsj
but added a pointed warn-
. log: "The war of, aggreSsiOrt
In Vietnam can be ended:.
. only through negollatithis
. . . practical experience
clearly shows that the Viet-
nam problem cannot be,
Solved by military means."
More pointedly, a lengthy'
May 23 article In New
.Times, signed by a deputy
thief in the Central Conn!
mittee's forcigh Affairs De-1
� partment, strongly defended
the Kremlin's refusal � to,
, �make a military response to:
.
the U.S. blockade of North
Vietnam.
� The � strength � of 'Interns-
tional communism, New.
Times said, "has never Isin
� in primitiveness and st m co-'
type not- in an identical rep,.
'etition of . the methods
(armed force) used to 'he
class enemy." In an or, seo
dented rebuke, the avt� ,
stta&ced ilanoi's "innesors
and extremely arbitr,
� terpretation" of �IVir oes's
supposed duty in the ;a: e of
the Nixon-imposed blues :ote
� terests of world socialism 1.
,
gorney was reported to have
pledged that the Soviet Union
would "continue to render all
the necessary assistance" to
the Vetnamese struggle against
"Imperialist aggression" and
sincerely wished them "fresh
Successes."
Frankness, Not Unanimity
There was no mention of
unanimity. Instead, there was
a reference to the "comradely
frankness" of the talks, a nor-
mal euphemism for disagree-
ments. The absence of a joint
statement was also seen as an
indication of continuing strains.
No specific mention was
made of military air and, unlike
last fall,' no senior military fig-
ures were included in Mr. Pod-
gonny's delegation.
Missing from the group of
tmnApproved for Release: 2018/04/262510611ese off i
Nikolai V. Podgorny.
The tenor of these reports,
In Tass, the Soviet press agen-
cy, and Izveslia, the Govern-
ment newspaper, routinely re-
affirming solidarity and calling
for negotiations, sharply under-
scored how sharply Mr. Pod-
gorny had toned Down Soviet
pledges of support for Hanoi
and criticism of the United
States in comparison with his
last trip to North Vietnam in
October.
At that time he declared that
Moscow would "resolutely sup-
port" the Vietnamese against
the United States "until full
victory" with aid on three
levels�military, political and
diplomatic. A joint statement
affirmed their "unanimity of
views."
By contrast, during his visit
cials who normally n-so.: 41i
top Soviet Leader e
mier Pham Van Dses sod
Defense Minister Vo snl
Giap. Their zihsenc, c4-441;(i
have signaled la- r rcrriariy
strong personal ''ova o'
Moscow's willingn to olay
host to Mr. Nixon � r 141an
respond to his mino,
bong harbor harbor with tons
The Soviet press gave ri
dication whether, as . .
sources had said he would. -
Podgorny had tried to persti,..
Hanoi to agree to a cease-fire
in Indochina to open the way
for a resumption of peace nego-
tiations.
� The Soviet reports today,
largely repeated over the Hanoi
radio, quoted the two sides as
joining in a demand that Wash-
ington "resume constructive
tlaks in Paris" and end immedi-
ately all air attacks on North
Vietnam and the mining of its
ports. But there was no refer-
ence to remarks attributed to
President Podgorny in press re-
ports from India that the Viet-
nem negotiations in Paris would
resume soon.
Briefing Isn't Mentioned
The Soviet reports did not
touch on what was widely pre-
sumed to have been Mr. Pod-
gorny's primary mission � to
brief the North Vietnamese
leaders on the results of the
meetings with President Nixon
in Moscow last month and to
patch up differences stemming
from Moscow's decision to go
through with the summit meet-
On the day before President
Nixon arrived in Moscow, the
North Vietnamese Army news-
paper accused the Kremlin of
having showed weakness to-
ward the American President
and of having put dts own "na-
tional interests against the in-
terests of the world revolution."
The charges did not mention
Moscow by name but it was
clearly the target.
Five days later, on May 26,
Novoye Vremya, a Communist
party weekly on international
affairs, carried a sharply word-
ed and unusually explicit rebut-
tal written by Vadim V. Zagle-
.din, deputy chief of the Central
'Committee's department for re-
SCIELIC.Z. MONITOR
4rtarse 1972
6 1.9/01Ma tiC
CO
Hanoi is in a state of diplomatic shock in.
duced by the visit of presidential adviseri
Henry Kissinger to Peking and the visit ot
Soviet President Nikolai V. Podgorny tod
North Vietnam.
Perhaps the clearest indication of thisk
Is the change in the plans of Hanoi's chief,
negotiator, Le Due Tho, who left Paris for
a leisurely visit to Bulgaria, only to cut it
short before its announced duration had
expired, and to rush home for consultations
amid signs of growing friction with its allies.
When passing through Moscow, he was
met by a party official of such low rank
as to suggest that the Kremlin was being
deliberately, offensive. In Peking, the Chi-
nese leaders took advantage of this to score
a point over the Russians by arranging
a "very cordial" meeting for him with Chou
En-lai.
But the � continuing restraint in Peking's
public utterances about the war, after reg-
istering its formal protest that the bombing
was getting too close to China's borders,
makes it clear that the Chinese leaders, too� :
favor a compromise settlement.
Podgorny's announcement after his visit
to Hanoi that the Paris talks would be re-
sumed "soon" meant that he had prevailed
upon the North Vietnamese leaders to make
the concessions that would make the re-
sumption possible.
They made the concessions unwillingly, as
is indicated by the evidence of disagree-
ment between them and Podgorny in the of-
ficial communiqu�n his visit. This means
that he had managed to mobilize the doves
in the North Vietnamese leadership to do
what the Soviet Union wanted, and that he
has left behind him in Hanoi a stronger
peace faction than he found on arrival there.
ing. Approved for Release: 2018/04/25 CO2599106rnurlist
r. ernes.
The article denied that Mos-
eow was shirking its socialist
duty. It argued for proceeding
with the summit meeting in the
Interest of major achievements,
such as an agreement to limit
arms, through the policy of
peaceful coexistence, Commu-
nist terminology for better re-
latioas with the West.
Hanoi Demands Talks
PARIS, June ID (Reuters)�
North Vietnam today followed
up President Podgorny's pre-
diction of a speedy resumption
of the Paris peace talks by de-
manding that the United Stales
return to the negotiating table
here.
"We demand that the United
States negotiate seriously and
resume the work of the Paris
conference on Vietnam each
Thursday as usual," the North
Vietnamese delegation said in,
statement.
HANOI, North Vietnam, June
10 (Agence France-Presse)
The North Vietnamese Goverrir,
men today broke its silence
over the visit by President Po&
gorily, issuing a laconic comr
munique stating that he hag
been on a "nonofficial" mist
sion.
The clear indication was that
he had not met Premier Phan?
Van Dong.
The chances are, therefore, that more
rapid pro ;Tess will now be made toward a
peace setelement. The constellatioo of forces
suggest :hat the progress will be rapid
enough ti bring peace to Vietnam before
the American general elections in No-
vember.
It is th combination.of the three separate
forces for peace, in Moscow, Peking, and in
Hanoi in .elf, that makes this outcome like-
ly. The shock caused in Hanoi by what it
sees tv., the "betrayal" of its interests by
both Moscow and Peking has obviously
weakeeed the hawks and made it possible
for the doves to begin moving toward a set-
tlement.
The bitterness with which the Hanoi press
has denounced, almost openly, the Nixon
visits to both Peking and to Moscow has
now e. 'ven way to a pained silence, which
suggeets that it seet, little point in resisting
its alles as well as the United States. The
almost transparent hint in the Hanoi press
after the 'Moscow summit, that the "major
powers" were ganging up on smaller coun-
tries kike Vietnam, is now being translated
into the hard language of politics.
What it all amounts to is that Hanoi's
"big brothers" are, in spite of their pro-
testations to the contrary, trying to impose
a settlement. The signs of this were evident
at the beginning of the year, when Hanoi
first complained that the .big powers were
trying to "bully" the small countries. This
coincided with the announcement that the,
North Vietnamese Ambassador in Moscow
had a "frank" exchange of views with Mr.
Kosygin, the Premier, which indicated that
Moscow had begun putting really heavy
Pressure on Hanoi.
Few people in the West were prepared
to accept at that time the evidence suggest.
ing that this pressure, combined with pres-
sure from Peking, was real enough or could
prove powerful enough to make a difference.
Some skeptics still stick to this view. But
the Podgorny and Kissinger trips are the
culmination, not the beginning, of the Nixon
grand design to end the war in Vietnam
by summitry in Peking and in Moscow.
Hanoi is still capable of a show of force,
particillarly in the Saigon area, but the pur-
pose of any such operation would be to
strengthen its position in the final round of
negotiations.
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NEW YORK TINES
4 July 1972
HIGH-LEVEL TALKS
'llall BY 2 KOREAS
ON REUNIFICATION
.North and South Agree to,
Avoid Armed Incidents and
Seek et ter Relations
It Thol Arvitinte4 nen
i SEOUL, South Korea, Tues-
day, July 4�Nortit and South
Korea have held top-level meet-
ings in Pyongyang and in Seoul
to discuss problems concerning
Improving relations and terri-
torial reunification of the 'coun-
try, South Korea announced to-
day. -
They agreed, among other
things, to refrain mutually from
armed provocations and to in-
stall a hot line between Seoul
and Pyongyang 'in order to
prevent the outbreak of unex-
pected military incidents," an
announcement said.
The announcement was made
simultaneously in Seoul and
Pyongyang, the North Korean
Capital,
Tension Reduced
sped/a to The Nem. 'York Times
WASHINGTON, July 3�The
announcement of new contacts
between the two Koreas was
preceded by months of reduced
tension during which prelim-
NEW YORK TIMES
5 July 1972
Text of the Joint Korean Communique
willing to go to war in support
of the interests of either Korean
state.
President Nixon's trip to Pek-
ing last February came as a
shock to North Korea and was
believed to have heavily influ-
enced Premier Kim to enlarge
his country's foreign contacts.
The South Koreans, with their
economy expanding and their
political situation relatively'
stabilized, had already begun a
policy of seeking contacts with
East European Communist na-
tions.
Tensions between the two
Koreas have been high for most
of the post-Korean war period,
and have been marked by prop-
aganda exchanges of, extreme
,invective. In the peak year,
11968, there were hundreds of
casualties from clashes along'
the dimiliterized zone and in'
coastal areas where northerni
agents were infiltrated.
But despite -the tensions, both
sides have always called for re-
unification as a primary na-
tional goal. The South Koreans
have generally insisted on ful-
.fillment of the United Nations
Genefal Assembly call for free
elections in both North and
South and on formal renuncia-
tion by Pyongyang of any use
of force to achieve unification.
� Federation Is Held Possible
But recently, South Korean
officials have said that they
could envision some kind of
federation after a long period
of gradual improvement in re-
lations. President Park has said
that discussion of political
problems such as unification
should come at the end of a
three-stage program: First,
agreement on humanitarian
questions involving divided
families, then nonpolitical mat-
ters such as trade and commu-
SEOUL, South Korea, Tues-
day, July 4 (Reuters)�Fol-
lowing is the text of a joint
North and South Korean corn-
muniqud made public simul-
taneously in Seoul and
Pyongyang today, as issued
in an official South Korean
Government translation:
Recently there were talks
held both in Pyongyang and
Seoul to discuss problems of
Improving South-North rela-
tions and unifying the di-
vided fatherland.
[nary negotiations between the
Red Cross societies of North
and South were carried on suc-
cessfully.
The Red Cross talks, officially
aimed at humanitarian goals of
establishing contacts between
members of divided- families,
and eventually at . reuniting
them, have had important po-
litical implications. Each side
has used the 10 months of Red
Cross talks at Panmunjom as a
means of sounding out the
other's intentions. �
The two sides at the Panmun-
jom sessions, which began last
August, have agreed on an
agenda for substantive negotia-
tions, which are to he held
alternately in Seoul nod Pyong-
yang. ,
. In recent months, Premier
Kim II Sung of North Korea has
voiced an interest 'in contacts
not only with South Korea but
with Japan and the United
States, seemingly looking to-
'Ward an end of his country�S.
long, self-imposed isolation.
; He has given interviews to
'Japanese and American corre-
spondents, and said last month
that .he would be willing to
meet with President Park Chung
Hoe of South Korea to discuss
issues.
1 Concern Over Allies Noted
Many . Western diplomats
have speculated that the deci-
sion to begin contacts was in-
spired in both Seoul and Pyong-
yang by parallel concern that
their principal allies�the United
States in South Korea's case,
and China and the Soviet Union
in North Korea's�were heading
,toward a period of conciliation
lin which they would be un-
Director Lee Hu flak of the
Central Intelligence Agency
of Seoul visited Pyongyang
from 2 to 5 May, 1972, to
hold talks with Director Kim
Yong Ju of the Organization
and Guidance Department of
Pyongyang. Second Vice Pre-
mier Pak Sung Chul, acting
on behalf of Director Kim
Yong Ju, also visited Seoul
from 29 May to 1 June, 1972,
to hold further talks with di-
rector Lee Hu Rak.
With the common desire to
achieve peaceful unification
of the fathApproved for Release: 2018/04/25 CO2599106
possible, the two sides in
these talks had frank and
open-hearted exchanges of
views, and made great prog-
ress in promoting mutual un-
derstanding.
In the course of the talks,
the two sides, in an effort to
remove the misunderstand-
ings and mistrust and miti-
gate increased tensions that
have arisen between the
South and the North as a re-
sult of long separation, and
further to expedite unifica-
tion of the fatherland, have
nication, and finally political
questions.
That eniliee appears ;not
much , different front rreent
sugeeetions made in the N,ortit
Korenn press calling lot gradual improvement in the atnms,
phere, to he followed by a
con-
federation of the two Koreas
in which each side would inain-
�tain its own form of gOern-
Among important issues to
be resolved would be the status
of the 40,000 American trleops
based in South Korea, ti,hder
the flag of the United .Nailons
Command, and South Korea's'
defense relationship with the
United States. In the past, Pre
-
mice Kim said that withdrawal
of American troops was a pre-
condition for better North-
South relations, but more re-
cently in interviews he has
been less demanding.
First Direct Negotiations
The Red Cross talks aroused
considerable international In-
terest when they began last
summer because they marked
the first time representatives
of the two Koreas had met in
-their own country on bilateral
matters since the Korean war,
which ended in 1953.
Both Governments have been
under some pressure to im-
prove contacts and respond to
,the strong pull of Korean na-
tionalism, which has remained
'strong despite 35 years of Jap-
anese occupation, from 1910 toi
1945, and 27 years of divisioni
following � the end of World!
t War H.
; The South Korean ,^ariers
have argued that thk et'f(L
ccgotiatc might lort!�en thr:
rir:id totalitarianism ,)f North
urea. The North Koran lead-
. � t. by holding out the hope of
entual unification, may feel
it this could produce a
()setting of Seoul' ties with
fite United States teel Japan.
reached full agreement on
the following points;
[11
The two sides have ag:
to the following principi
for unification of the fathei-
land:
First, unification shall be
achieved through independ-
ent Korean efforts without
being subject to external im-
position or interference.
Second, unification shall be
achieved through peaceful
means, mid not through the
use of force against each
other.
Third, as a homogeneous
people, a great national unity
shall be southt above all.
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transcending differences in
ideas, ideologies and systems.
[2]
In order to ease tensions
and foster an atmosphere of
mutual trust between the
South and the North, the two
sides have agreed not to slan-
der or defame each other,
not to undertake armed prov-
ocations whether on a large
or small scale, and to take
positive measures to prevent
inadvertent military inci-
dents,
[3]
The two '!sides, in order to
restore severed national ties,
promote mutual understand-
ing and to expedite independ-
ent peaceful unification, have
agreed to carry out various
exchanges in many fields.
[4]
The two sides have agreed
to cooperate positively with
each other to seek early suc-
cess of the South-North Red
Cross talks, which are under
way with the fervent expec-
tations of the entire people.
[5]
The two sides, in order to
prevent the outbreak of un-
expected military incidents
and to deal directly, prompt-
ly and accurately with prob-
lems arising between the
South and the North, have
agreed to install a direct tele-
phone line between Seoul
and Pyongyang.
[6]
The two sides, in order to
implement the aforemen-
tioned agreed items, solve
various problems existing be-
tween the South and the
North/ and to settle the uni-
fication problems on the
basis of the agreed prin-
ciples for unification of the
fatherland, have agreed to
establish and operate a
South - North coordinating
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
6 July 1972
Pikis up the pieces in Korea
The sudden and dramatic agreement be-
tween the two Koreas this week earnestly
to seek reunification, after 27 years
of total separation marked by sporadic
fighting and steady verbal abuse, is as wel-
come as it is important for history present
and history future.
It is hardly coincidental that the over-
tures between the two capitals of Seoul
and Pyongyang followed close behind
President Nixon's visits to Peking and
Moscow. In the family of nations, as in
the families of men, strong and positive
examples set by the higher levels in the
hierarchy influence those at the lower
levels to act positively.
The agreement between the two major
Communist capitals of the world and
Washington to look beyond differences in
social, political, and economic systems,
and to put ideologies to one side, is re-
flected in the agreement between Seoul
and Pyongyang. Thus the establishment
of a hot line between the two Korean
capitals to prevent any military flareups
along their joint border. Thus their set-
ting up of a joint coordinating committee
to "unify the fatherland." Thus their dec-
laration of intent to reunify on a national
basis in such a way as :to transcend
differences "in ideas, ideologies, and
systems."
It will not be easy. Those ideological
differences are great. The virulence of
propaganda. hurled against each other
during 27 years of division has left scars,'
bitterness, and suspicion. And there are
practical problems to be 'compromised.
South Korea wants United Nations-super-
vised elections in both countries to elect
an all-Korean Legislature. North Korea?
with a population of 13 million against its
southern neighbor's 31 million, wants to
cut both sides' armed forces to 100,000
men each, then follow with a confedera-
tion, in which each side would retain its
own government and its own social and
political systems. It will take time, pa-
tience and 'determination to achieve the
necessary compromise. -
In favor of success is the deep desire of
the Korean people to be reunited. This is
underscored by the continuing effort of
the International Red Cross to arrange for
reuniting divided families, an effort that
has gone on for years without results. If
that work begins to bear fruit, as now
seems more likely than ever, the opening
up of communications and eventually a
flow of people across the long-sealed bor-
der would start a process difficult for
either government to halt.
The new moves toward reunification
have a world significance beyond the
Korean peninsula. The point will not be
missed in the two Vietnamese capitals
that the desire of their respective big
power patrons for a� relaxation in world
tensions only begins at the top interna-
tional level. It extends down .to their own.
It is to be hoped that North and South
Vietnam, recognizing their rapidly dimin-
ishing capability to play Peking and Mos-
cow against Washington, will ponder seri-
ously the precedent of their Korean broth-
ers to the north. The direct distance from
Hanoi to Saigon is shorter than via Paris,
Washington, Moscow, or Peking.
committee co-chaired by Di-
rector Leo Hu Ralr and Di-
rector Kim Yong Ju.
[7]
The two sides, firmly con-
vinced that the aforemen-
tioned agreed items corre-
spond with the common as-
pirations of the entire peo-
ple, who are anxious to see
an early unification of the
fatherland, hereby solemnly
pledge before the entire Ko-
rean people that they will
faithfully carry out these
agreed items, upholding the
desires of their respective
superiors.
24
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Sihanouk Ville
THE OPEN
OF THE -REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM
BY COMMUNIST NORTH VIET-NAM
ong Hoi
th Vietnam �
Mu
k TcHEPoNt.
�'NLAOSC
�P"
ve.CHAVANE
;ATTOPEU
� 1
4.140e. 4-�""
x
41,
11"1.
SIEM
CAMBODIA
0(4 Ba
it or"
out
PANG
Ben Hai DMZ
Quang Tri
1
RATIE
MQ'NDOLKIRI
KHUM KRE �4",',"'IsLOC OINH
.AN LbC
" g�TAY
SVAYRIENG NINH
*Bien Hoa
.�1444:1-1'RSA�GON
anang
South Vietnam
Infiltration routes
N VA 324e
D, r.
m .
. ;
A Shall'
LAOS
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io Linh
ua Viet
Firebase
Bastogne
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THE - COMMUNISTS
OPENLY- CROSSED THE DMZ
AND BLATANTLY ATTACKED ...
N March 29, 1972, several North Vietnamese regular unit have
openly crossed the DMZ and attacked the Republic of Vietnam outposts,
In an attempt to occupy the territory of South Vietnam below the demar-
cation area.
The DMZ. the symbol of a reasonnable solution for the two Zones pen-
ding a negotiated formula for the eventual peaceful reunification of Viet-
nam, is being trampled by the Communist North Vietnam who, in so
doing, has violated the 1954 Geneva Agreements as well as the 1988 secret
understandings on the cessation of the American bombing over North
Vietnam.
The invading forces include the elite infantry Divisions 304, 308 and
324B, supported by 6 other infantry regiments, .3 artillery regiments, ex-
tensive anti-aircraft units, one tank regiment and one surface-to-air mis-
sile regiment. The North Vietnamese invaders also used MIG planes in
support of their offensive. Columns of Russian made PT. 76, T. 55, T. 54
tanks moved down openly along Road No. 1 to attack the RVN outposts
south of the DMZ. The strength of the Communist forces Is later estimated
at around 15 divisions including e Farming Sites ). No. 2. and 3 and 4, Work-
ing Sites No. 5, 7 and 9.
At the Cambodian frontiers bordering the provinces of Tay Ninh,
Binh Long and Phuoc Long, the enemy supported by long range artillery
and T. 54 tanks massively attacked the province of Binh Long, meanwhile
in the in-border area, Vietnam � Cambodia � Laos, bordering the pro-
vinces of Kontum and Pleiku, a North Vietnamese division attempted to
attack the province of Kontuzn.
In these three areas, fierce and bloody fighting has taken place in the
past months and is still continuing, and the RVN troops have inflicted
very heavy losses to the enemy. But the civilian population have suffered
much harm caused by North Vietnam indisC'riminate shellings into the
densely populated areas. More than 650,000 people have had to take refuge
in more distant areas.
This is eloquent evidence that North Vietnam is the real aggressor
and the NLF was created for the only purpose of misleading world opinion.
The objective of the North Vietnamese leaders, when ordering the in-
vasion of the RVN territory, is to occupy the two provincial capitals of
Quang Tri and Thua Then in order to use them as capital for that which
the North Vietnamese Communists have been forging for a long time, the
so-called Government of the National Liberation Front, and as a gate for
their domination of the whole South Vietnam.
This open invasion of the Republic of Vietnam is a campaign that the
North Vietnamese Communists have prepared for a long time and which
they called the 1972 general offensive, general uprising and general revolt:
That proved the Communists do not advocate peace, they do not seek to
end the war by negotiations, but they on the contrary advocate aggression.
2
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the pursuit of the war and the annexation of South Vietnam by force and
by military victory.
The Vietnamese people and troops are determined to win over the
communist aggressors and wipe them out of the Republic of Vietnam
territory.
A MEASURE OF DESPERATION . .
HE regular Army of North Vietnam has launched an attack on South
Vietnam, supported by massive quantities of Russian and Chinese arms
and equipment, including tanks and giant guns.
� The South Vietnamese are containing the multiple thrusts across their
borders, and in some areas counter-attacking and inflicting heavy defeats
on the North Vietnamese. Thus despite the tremendous resources of regular
soldiery and equipment that the North Vietnamese war-makers have
thrown into this invasion, they have been thwarted by the defence forces
of South Vietnam from attaining their initial objectives.
� No doubt the invasion will continue. In the totalitarian society of the
North nobody can protest against the terrible losses of men. Appreciating
� how vital has been the aid given to South Vietnam over the years by
the United States, Australia and other free-world nations, Hanoi will try
to sustain its aggression in the hope of weakening the resolve, of South
Vietnam's friends and stirring the flagging support given to the Northern
communists by their friends outside Vietnam. In particular Hanoi hopes
to influence the United States Presidential Elections, to further their
� peace plans.
In the meantime the South Vietnamese people and government de-
serve the congratulations of all freedom-loving people.. The support for
South Vietnam is fully vindicated. The return of Australian ground troops
does not arise since the South Vietnamese are confident that they can
handle the attack from the North themselves. But in view of the Russian
and Chinese provision of huge quantities of modern war materials, allied
air support and economic aid will still be needed on a large scale. The
Australian government should be willing to cos,dider sympathetically any
request for air and naval support, as well as increased economic and arms
assistance.
The fraudulent nature of the leftwing propaganda campaign is now
-clear. The internal insurgency in South Vietnam is now no more than
a minor irritant because of the progressive reforms of the South Viet-
namese government. The communist leaders in Hanoi have been forced
to abandon the pretence that there is an internal war against the South
Vietnamese government by domestic dissidents. The Viet Cong, always
buttressed by Hanoi, has so withered on the vine that war by proxy is
no longer possible and the North Vietnamese communists have been re-
duced to outright invasion.
This is a measure of their desperation.
Professor David AMSTRONG
Chairman of The Committee
of THE FRIENDS OF VIETNAM,
� AUSTRALIA
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Hanoi and its supporters abroad are now hard put to explain away
the invasion of its own ally's territory, for by Hanoi's definition South
Vietnam belongs to the Provisional Revolutionary. Government of South
Vietnam (PRGSVN) and only one-fifth of it is still g temporarily occu-
pied w by the GVN. It would be pretty torturous thinking to believe that
Hanoi's 15 divisions are needed to g repel the i� aggression coming from
only one-fifth Of the territory of South Vietnam. That this hardly makes
sense is no deterrence to Hanoi's friends abroad who recently go so far
as to request that the Soviet Union increases arms shipments to Hanoi
so as to strengthen Hanoi's killing capacity. It is thus -clear that the
Government of Vietnam and the anti-war groups abroad are agreed om
at least one point: the strength of Communism. in Vietnam does not
reside in the revolutionary fervor of the Communist troops native to
South Vietnam, rather it is the direct translation of Russian weaponry
engaged in a classical confrontation 'where Hanoi's troops merely play
the role of cannon fodder. In the resulting clash of steel the revolutionary
war of Hanoi appears in its naked garb, a full-scale invasion, ideologically
motivated, in which the Soviet Union expects to put the world in front
of a fait accompli with Hanoi acting as a willing proxy.
CONDLMN TH2 ON1/0 SlON �
�L he troubled and tragic states of Indo-China � the Republic of
Vietnam in particular � are struggling to cope with enormously difficult
problems. They face a North Vietnam which remains determined to im-
pose by force on the South a government of the North's choosing. North
Vietnam has launched its regular forces in attacks in great strength out-
side its own borders into the Khmer Republic and Laos as well as into
South Vietnam.
ir North Vietnam is supported in this by extensive aid from the Soviet
Union and other Eastern European countries, and from China. The bulk
of this aid, much of it in the form of the most modern weapons, now
comes from the Soviet Union.
g I emphasise that what we are watching now is not a g people's up-
rising 0. It is not a civil war. It is an invasion of one country by another.
The great bulk of North Vietnam's regular army is now deployed in the
South.
g Why has North Vietnam persisted in this war policy?
a It is not for lack of alternatives. The peace proposals put forward
by President Thieu and President Nixon on 25th January this year offered
the opportunity for the people of South Vietnam, on whose behalf the
North Vietnamese claim to be acting, to determine their own future
through elections conducted by an independent commission and under
international supervision. President .Thieu offered to resign prior to these
elections. But the communists are still not prepared to face the test of
elections. ,
0 Why did the North act when it did? No doubt a number of factors
were involved in the timing. There is some evidence that Hanoi wanted
to attack earlier, in the region of the Central Highlands, but that its plans
were disrupted by South Vietnamese and United States pre-emptive ope-
rations. Another factor was probably the weather � suitable 'for cam-
paigning while providing some cover from air attack. Another may have
been a wish to demonstrate, at a time of increasing contacts between
4
I,
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the United States and the Soviet Union and the United States and China,
that it is Hanoi which detenritnes events in Indo-China. Yet another fac-
tor, which was evident at the time of the unsuccessful Tet offensive in
1968, appears to be a deliberate attempt to exert pressure on United States
opinion, and through it on the United States administration. They are
mindful that this is a Presidential Election year.
It also seems clear that a compelling reason for the invasion at this
time was an assessment on the part of the North Vietnamese leadership
that South Vietnam was doing too well.
= Hanoi needed to disrupt the consolidatiOn that has been going on
in the Republic of Vietnam, both within its armed forces (ARVN) and
in its society generally: and to act before South Vietnam became too
tough a nut to crack. Their offensive had been foreseen: but it is one
thing to foresee events and another to live through them, preserve one's
balance, and, in circumstances where the aggressor naturally has the
initiative, to withstand them.
= The South Vietnamese forces have suffered reverses. There may be
further setbacks before the situation clarifies. But it is worth remem-
bering the experience of the offensive of Tet 1968, which showed the
importance of reserving judgment on the outcome of the fighting. In
1968 hasty judgments allowed the communists to make great propaganda
gains, although subsequent events showed that Tet 1968 had, in fact, been
a major setback for the communists, both in terms of military casualties
and of damage to their orgarisation and infrastructure in the South.
= On behalf of the Government, I condemn the invasion of the Repu-
blic of Vietnam by North Vietnamese regular army units. It has been
launched, and could only have been launched, with massive support from
the Soviet Union and China. I believe the overwhelming Majority of Aus-
tralians have deep sympathy for the people of the Republic. of Vietnam.
They were fighting courageously in defence of their country even before
their allies came to their assistance with ground troops. They have con-
tinued to fight with great courage notwithstanding that the ground troops
of their allies are being withdrawn.
= We are continuing with our civil aid. We are despatching urgently
needed supplies to assist them in coping with the flood of men, women
and children fleeing as refugees before the advance of the invading armies.
� If the South Vietnamese fall before this onslaught not only will it
be a sad day for all who believe small countries and their peoples should
be free to determine their own government, but the repercussions of their
fall will reverberate in the South-East Asian region for years to come..
NIGEL B GWEN
Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs
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LIBERATION MYTH SHATTERED
HATEVER the outcome of the Communist offensive in South
Vietnam may be, the record of the past four weeks has robbed Hanoi and
the local Viet Cong of any pretence of playing the noble role of Libe-
rators � in the South.
For despite setbacks suffered, the resistance of the Southern Armies
and the refusal of the civilian population to 'rise in support of the Red In-
vaders clearly -show the true sentiments. Of Most people in the South.
These sentiments are fear of and hatred for the aggressors.
No army kept together by American money and driven by Saigon's
whip, as the red have claimed, would have fought as well as the Southern
soldiers have fought so far.
And no downtrodden and grossly exploited people would either flee
from its presumed liberators or refuse to rise in their support as the South
Vietnamese have done, despite Viet Cong efforts to call them to :'volt.
CLEAR LESSON
The lesson is clear : South Vietnam can only be
from the North .or flee to the South. They chose the South, despite all
the misery and suffering they will undergo as refugees. And, also, despite
claims that the Thieu Government is a harsh and oppressive tyranny.
By 'walking away from the � liberators �, the people of Quang-
Tri are virtually � voting with their feet �. Similar popular referendums
in recent history were: the fleeing of masses of Dutch, Belgian and
French people before invading Nazi hordes ; the exodus from the East
German � socialist paradise >> which compelled the Soviets to 'build a
wall to keep the East German population from running away to the
West ; and the flight of thousands of Hungarians in 1965 and Czechs
in 1968 from Soviet tanks.
BANGKOK POST
NORTH VIETNAMESE INVASION
OF SOUTH: (( UNPARDONABLE DEED))
HE invasion in force of South Vietnam by North Vietnamese armies
Is unquestionably a deed of unpardonable aggression. What do the North
Vietnamese want to prove? They want to discredit the Government of
Nguyen Van Thieu as well as the United States. They want to fulfill the
'well-known Communist objective to dominate peoples � and even their
kith and kin.
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The whole world knows that the United States forces are being with-
drawn from the territory of the South Vietnamese in order that the Repu-
blic of Vietnam may be able to carve its own destiny without interference
by any force outside their territory.
REDS CAN'T BE TRUSTED
There is no question that the North Vietnamese who are dyed-in-the-
wool communists are violating the principle of self-determination which
is the keynote to peace and prosperity not only in Asia but in the rest of
the world. South Vietnam wishes to be free. It does not 'want to crook its
knee to any outside power be it American or North Vietnamese. There-
fore, the invasion of South Vietnam will serve only to emphasize one fact:
that the Communists can never be trusted.
The transgression on the life, land and treasure of South Vietnam by
the North Vietnamese is exactly what would be the case if the North
Koreans were to cross the demilitarized zone and disturb the peace, pro-
gress and prosperity of South Korea.
PROTEST CALL
� With such an aggressive neighbor as Communist North Vietnam, how
can we feel secure and happy in this part of world?
Therefore, I call on all free peoples to protest vigorously against the
violation of covenants and the plighted word which has been perpetrated
by the North Vietnamese in recent weeks. Let us all uphold with all the
strength of our collective will the principle of self-determination.
Sen. JOSE J. ROY, Chairman,
World Anti-Communist League
THE WHOLE NATION
IS UNITED AND OF
ONE MIND...
A. N the last few days, the North Vietnamese Communists have used three
divisions of regular troops, identified as Divisions 304, 308, and 324B.
with the support of three artillery and anti-aircraft regiments, one heavy
armored regiment and many surface-to-air missile units to openly cross
the Seventeenth Parallel and invade the Republic of Viet-Nam at the
border area with North Viet-Nam.
This belligerent and aggressive action on the part of the North Viet-
namese Communists represents a blatant violation of the 1954 Geneva
Accord of which North Viet-Nam was a signatory, and reveals that coun-
try's scheme of a military takeover of the Republic of Viet-Nam. North
Vietnam is not interested in seriously negotiating a solution to the war
whereas the Republic of Viet-Nam is ever ready to search for a just
peace.
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For the reasons detailed above, the National Assembly of the Republic
of Viet-Nam solemnly proclaims to the nation and to the world:
First, We vehemently condemn the act of open aggression of the
North Vietnamese Communists as they send their troops across the border
to invade the territory of the Republic of Viet-Nam, blatantly violating
the 1954 Geneva Accord of which North Viet-Nam was a signatory.
Secondly, We denounce the cruel action of the North Vietnamese
Communists as they indiscriminately shell our cities, causing much suf-
fering and loss of lives and property to our innocent compatriots.
Thirdly, The whole nation is united and of one mind ,in firmly sup-
porting the Armed Forces of the Republic of Viet-Nam as they fight and
smash the North Vietnamese invasion, protecting our independence and
territorial integrity.
Fourthly, We urgently appeal to the United Nations and all ;the
peoples of peace loving nations in the world to support the legitimate,
struggle of self-defense of the people and army of the Republic of Viet-
Nam, while at the same time to apply every necessary measure aimed
withdraw all their troops and cadres to the North of the 'Seventeenth
at forcing the North Vietnamese Communists to stop their aggression and
Parallel.
Saigon, the 4th of April, 1972
PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE
SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE
MANIFESTO
by The Political Port3e5
of South Viet 'Horn
FTER a full examination of the situation as created by the North
Vietnamese invasion of Quang-Tri Province, the political parties present
' at the session of April 5, 1972 of the Joint Committee of Vietnamese
Political Parties hereby resolve:
1. To severely condemn North Viet-Nam for having launched its
regular troops across the Seventeenth Parallel, violated the status of the
Demilitarized Zone and attacked the province of Quang-Tri, thus once
more violating in the most flagrant manner the Geneva Accords of 1954
of which North Viet-Nam was a signatory.
2. To request that Great Britain and the Soviet Union, the two Co-
Chairmen of the 1954 Geneva Conference, condemn North Vie tnam:s
aggression committed against the Republic of Viet-Nam and force North
Viet-Nam to withdraw to its territory all the military units just brought
across the Seventeenth Parallel and the Demilitarized Zone, as well as.
all the forces infiltrated into the Republic of Viet-Nam since the begin-.
fling of the war.
3. To request that the international -Control Commission acknow-
ledge the invasion of North Vietnamese troops across the Seventeenth
Parallel and the Demilitarized Zone. In case International Control Com-
mission' keeps its silence in the face of the brazen invasion by North
Vietnamese troops and North Viet-Nam's clearcut violation of the 1954
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4. To request 6.121.).m.Y.2.c.1 for se: 49, (21,3 2,9106
of Viet-Nam
refuse to meet with the Communist side at the Paris talks as long as the
other side has not called off its aggressive actions in violation of the
understandings that they themselves have agreed to in exchange for the
1968 cessation of bombings over North Viet-Nam.
5. To request that the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam make
ready a punitive action plan against North Viet-Nam in case the latter
refuses to withdraw its troops north of the Seventeenth Parallel and to
� respect the Demilitarized Zone.
6. To urgently appeal to the members of all political parties included
within the Joint Committee and to all compatriots to heighten their vigi-
lance so as to avoid being hoodwinked by the Communist propaganda
into disrupting our ranks while at the same time positively .participating
in the efforts to help refugees generated by the border fighting and the
families of our coxiibattants being engaged in the border fighting..
7. To ardently salute the fighting spirit of the Armed Forces of the
Republic of Viet-Nam and to support to the full the units that are fighting
heroically, at the Demarcation border and on the other battlefields.
COMMUNIST INVASION CONDEMNED BY
WORLD OPIIVION
...In the past month Hanoi has been openly sending regular North Vietnamese
Army units, armed- with tanks and heavy artillery, directly aocross the demilita-
rized zone into South Vietnam. This is an invasion in the true sense. It is a clear
violation of the 1954 Geneva Agreements, in which North Vietnam explicitly under-
took to respect the demilitarized zone and the integrity of South Vietnam...*
SIR KEITH HOLYOAKE
Foreign Minister of New Zealand
� The British Government are.. in no doubt that the North Vietnamese, by
conducting a flagrant invasion of the territory of the Republic: of South. Vietnam,
are acting in violation of the Geneva Agreements.,,
.... The present invasion to the South Vietnamese territory showed clearly
to us that Hanoi had chosen the way of force to achieve its goal.*
ADAM MALIK
Foreign Minister of Indonesia
Communist North Vietnam's attacks against South Vietnam in the past few
days had been prepared for a long time, when the Paris peace talks were still
in progress. This testified to the usual Communist trick of using the so-called
peace negotiations for propaganda purposes, with a view to make the outside
world believe that the situation was calming down.
CHOW SHU KAI
Foreign Minister of The Republic of China
. The violent military offensive unleashed by the Democratic Republic of
Vietnam. to the south of the 17 th Parallel in the so-called � Demilitarized � Zone
on March 29 against the Republic of Vietnam shows once again the warlike
character of the ruling group of Hanoi, which, despite the Geneva Accords of
1954, has not hesitated to deliberately launch open aggressions against tw, three
countries of former Indochina and to maintain permanent subversive activity
throughout our whole region.
LONG BORET
Minister of Information
of the Republic of Khmer
e The Government of Belgium finds that the offensive launched by North
Vietnam and by the Provisional Revolutionary Government and the escalation of
all forms of military activity now taking place are contrary to the objectives of
negotiated settlement.
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.... In this outmoded expansionist venture, North Vietnam has received mas-
sive support in military hardwares from another major power, without which the
present offensive could not have been carried out.
THANAT KHOMAN
Special Envoy, National - Executive Council
Delegation Chief of Thailand
. The grave escalation of the war in Vietnam. had started by a massive inva-
sion of regular troops from North Vietnam. This constituted a North Vietnamese
, violation of the Geneva Agreement..
SCHMELZER
Foreign Minister of the Netherlands
. The recent large scale communist assaults on South Vietnam were most
deplorable and might even reduce hope for peace in Indochina. The escalation of
Communist offensive was taking place just at the time when other countries inclu-
ding Indonesia were striving for a peaceful solution to the protracted crisis in-
Vietnam..
DOMO PRANOTO
House Speaker of Indonesia
The Republic of Korea expressed the sincere desire of Korean Government
that North Vietnam immediately withdrawn her armed forces back to the North
in cessation of her flagrant violation of the 1954 Geneva Agreements.�
The Government of Japan deplores .the intensification of fighting caused
by the tnaive invasion by North Vietnamese forces across the DMZ into South
Vietnam and hopes the fighting will end as soon as possible, the Geneva Agree-
ments will be respected, and fruitful talks will take place at the Paris negotiations..
The North Vietnamese aggression constituted an action which trampled
over the Geneva Agreements about Indochina. Therefore we strongly condemn
the North. Vietnamese aggression, ....
Journalists, Politicians,
Students and the World Anti-Communist
league in Indonesia.
Le Cercle des Etudiants Liberaux de l'Universite Libre de Bruxelles s'eleve
de, la facon la plus formelle contre les actes inqualifiables d'agression contre le
peuple du Sud Vietnam perpetres par les forces armees nord vietnamiennes en
contradiction aviec les accords de Geneve de 1954..
a The Philippines � Vietnam society has been saddened by the news received
here that several North Vietnamese regular infantry divisions, supported by tanks,
artillery and surfece-to-air missiles, had crossed the DMZ and invaded the ter-
ritory of the Republic of Vietnam.
a The open aggression is not only a condemnable violation of the 1954 Ceneva
agreements but it would irreparably further divide the Vietnamese nation which
has been at -war for more than a quarter of a century.
. Unable to overthrow a legally-elected government by subversion and in-
surgency within the country, the North has had to resort to a full-scale invasion
in its efforts to impose totalitarian rule and deny liberty to its southern neigh-
bours...
. I am at a loss to understand why the protesters were so quiet when the
North's invasion was in full cry.
. Why are they not demanding that Hanoi stop the war in Vietnam? Perhaps
the invasion by North Vietnam is what they agree with..
McCREADY
Defense Minister of New Zealand
4... The Hanoi Regime has been damned by all, freedom and peace loving
� peoples of the world due to-its evil deeds of aggression and kitting. The Buddish
Association of the Republic of China therefore, calls on all buddhist brothers of
the world to condemn the North tr'atnamese Communists' aggressive move and
render without reservation our spiritual support to the South Vietnamese people..
�
PAT SHENG �
Director-General of the Buddhist
Association of the Republic of China
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.. Regardless of how the cr. -
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has been willing to sacrifice tho ,.
mo..tiuz, u.I. 114 t.aut.rpa viuy w zaLlaiy lallG 1-1..,� aiin
rulers in their political adventures. ,
Harlan Nusantara
(Indonesian Newspaper)
North Vietnam is waging a war of aggression in the South. It explains
everything. For years people have tried to make us believe that the South Viet-
namese people � oppressed by a military dictatorship � were instinctively revol-
ting and, with armed force, were demanding independence.
. Something has dispelled that idyllic view: The Communists in the South
are imposing terror. They torture, they murder, and they are responsible for
provocations and attacks. They resort to those barbaric actions because they
haven't succeeded in convincing and in rallying the people..
LE RAPPEL
(Belgian paper)
Though Hanoi keeps denying that its troops are fighting in the South of
the divided country some 50,000 members of the North Vietnamese People's
Liberation Army have crossed the demarcation line.
ARBEITER ZEITUNG, VIENNA.
A- Hanoi had sent its troops to 'overtly cross the 17th parallel and the demili-
tarized zone (DMZ) regardless of the 1954 Geneva Agreements since it realized
that communist underground elements left in the South had become impotent
before the gallant fighting spirit of the RVN government and people.
Communist North Vietnam will bear full responsibilities for the sufferings
and mournings it has caused to the civilian people both in South and North
Vietnam..
FRENCH-VIETNAMESE FRIENDSHIP
ASSOCIATION.
, I wish the Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam can resist the North
Vietnamese invasion. Your victory is our victory.
CARLOS ROMULO
Foreign Minister of the Philippines
. Why such an overt invasion and why now? It must be assumed that Hanoi
well understood the success of Pacification and Vietnamization within South
Vietnam. If both were allowed to continue uninterrupted for another year, then
the Viet-Cong might , be completely finished as an internal threat and South
Vietnam might become the strongest military power in Southeast Asia.
Sir ROBERT THOMPSON
The Times of London
We severely condemn communist offensive which violated agreements signed
by Hanoi itself. We pay hi:mintage to valiant ARVN and courageous Vietnamese
. people under President Thieu leadership which crush this offensive as they critshed
the 1968 Tet offensive.,
ARGENTIN� VIETNAMESE ASSOCIATION '
..We strongly condemn the violation of the DMZ committed by communist
North Vietnam because it was in violation of existing agreement. With this large
scale invasion of South Vietnam territory by North Vietnam it became clear that
North Vietnam is the real aggressor while the so-called NLF in South Vietnam
was created only for the purpose of misleading world opinion. In this connection
we should support the struggle of the South Vietnamese people who are defending
their sovereignty from this communist invasion. North Vietnam should withdraw
immediately her armed forces from South Vietnam and if it failed to do so and
continued with its policy of aggression then she will have to bear full respon-
, sabilities for any consequences brought about by her own action ..
MUHPiMNIA.D BUANG
Chairman of the World Anti-
communist League, Indonesia.
. Hanoi has shown its real face, that of an aggressor... This flagrant violation -
of Geneva Accords... shows what would be awaiting South Vietnam if the Com-
munists from North had their hands free.,
GAZET VAN ANT WERPAN, HOLLAND.
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What remains of the 'myth of non-intervention in the South by Northern
forces, a myth so long cultivated by Hanoi? � �
Ot While the Amiricans have chosen disengagement in an irreversible manner,
the other side increases its own engagement. How can one, then, fail to con-
clude that Hanoi envisages no other solution of the drama than the annexation
of South Vietnam � either by placing a reunified Vietnam under its one control
or else by imposing in Saigon a communist regime?
COMBAT, PARIS.
* We condemn unequivocally the brutal invasion by the repular forces of Hanoi
across the DMZ and into other areas of the territory of the Republic of Vietnam..
FREDERICK STOCWELL
Society for Individual Freedom.
. The Free World must maintain a defense shield, against communist aggression
in the face of the current open invasion of South Vietnam by COmmunist North
yietnarnese forces.
.1 The Communist had made a big mistake militarily and politically in launching
an invasion of the South and they would suffer reverses on both counts. ,.
SEATO Secretary General.
Gen. JESUS VARGAS
We demand Hanoi authorities to Immediately withdraw their aggressive
troops from Sotith Vietnam and put an end to the killing and to embark on
serious negotiations to settle he conflict..
THE FRENCH COMMITTEE FOR SAFEGUARD
OF FREEDOM IN EUROPE,
� 4. Nous elevons une protestation formelle contre l'invasion ouverte du Sud-
Vietnam par les troupes du Gouvernement d'Hanoi. La preuve est faite que les
cornmunistes du Nord veulent annexer purement et simplement le Sud-Vietnam
tandis que la population Sud Vietnamienne est determinee a ne pas se retrouver
sous la houlette des communistes et de leurs complices du Viet-Cong,
-COMITE FRANCAIS POUR SAUVEGARDER
LES LIBERTES EUROPEENNES
�* The Young Democratic Labour Association calls upon the Australian Govern-
ment to assist South Vietnam in s greater military capacity in its endeavour to
protect itself from blatant aggression from North Vietnam..
YOUNG DEMOCRATIC LABOUR ASSOCIATION, AUSTRALIA
No fair minded person can.be in any doubt whatsoever about the cause and
the nature of the latest offensive in Vietnam. The undeniable truth is that it is
the result of a full scale invasion by the regular Armed Forces of North Vietnam,
in flagrant and brutal violation of the Geneva Agreements. This is a callous and
calculated aggression that pays no attention either to international law or human
suffering. It could be perpetrated only by a Government that is impervious to
moral outrage.
The fact that the North Vietnam has had to use regular troops is proof of
the failure of their guerilla activities in South Vietnam. The Viet Gong have
proved in this invasion a force of no significance. The people of South Vietnam
have, by their actions during the last few weeks of the invasion, demonstrated
their loyalty to the democratic regime in Saigon.
The morale of the people of South Vietnam remains high. I have no doubt
that they are fighting with high courage for the cause of free peoples every-
where. The British Government supports totally the action of South Vietnam, and
condemns the invasion of that country by the North.
IAN SPROAT
Secretary General of the All Party
Anglo-Vietnamese Parliamentary Group.
Vietnam is again wracked by intense warfare as the result of a massive
Vietnamese invasion of the South.
'No amount of rhetoric or use of euphemism such as � People's Liberation
or ,g Viet-Cong Liberation Movement � can mask the reality that North Vietnam
has again openly violated solemn agreements.
* The root cause of the * tragedy in Vietnam lies not in what is happening
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in the air, but um= ties nappen,ea.om tne yr yam,. ,,,54 when North Vietnam
decided to conquer the South by force. In that year, thousands of people living'
In the North fled from their liberators * to an uncertain future in the South,
w Today, even as the North Vietnamese claim to w liberate w areas of the South
as part of their latest offensive, new refugees are again in flight. They flee not
North but farther South .. farther from their 4 liberators..
KENNETH B. KEATING
TI.S. Ambassador to India.
w General Giap is indulging in illusions if he counts on a crumbling Of the South
Vietnamese regime. The failure of the TET Offensive in 1968. has shown that the
South Vietnamese population � even if it is not satisfied with the present regime,
which is a consequence of the war � is not at all disposed to accept domination
by the North.
The South Vietnamese army now is infinitely stronger and more pugnacious
than it was a few years ago, and it is obvious that Washington will not fail to
react in the face of this sudden re-escalation of the conflict.
w In trying this Poker bluff, Hanoi has, taken a calculated risk that May cost,
it a very high price.*
MICHEL VOIROL
Combat
The great majority of the soldiers in the fierce battles at Bastogne near
Hue, and at An Loc, demonstrated outstanding morale which surprised the skep-
tical observers
DIE WELT
German Newspaper in Hamburg
To mount the present attack, it has been necessary (for. Hanoi) to drop
the fiction that the war is being fought by the Viet-Cong. The offensive is an
undeniable invasion across the Demilitarized Zone.
NEW ZEALAND HERALD
NOW IS THE DECEIT: TIME ���
N short, our troops from all arms in the front line and in all the battlefields
are valiantly fighting to destroy the enemy and to hold every inch of our
land, and they are fighting with high morale.
In the rear, our people are providing support to the Army and ore deter-
mined not to let the Communists take over any land and kill people, disrupt
the pacification and development program and the security which all our
people and armed forces have brought back to the country since many years.
Today, I earnestly call upon
� All the combatants from the Army, Navy, Air Force at the front
line to continue to destroy the enemy and to secure our borders;
All the troops, cadres, members of the Peoples Self-Defense Forces
at the rear to maintain firm the territorial security, to maintain stabi-
lity in the rear, to implement the laws correctly and to preserve the
Community Pacification and Development endeavor.
I earnestly call upon people from all walks of life, the peoples' repre-
sentatives in the provincial towns to do all that can be done both spiritually
and materially to further increase the support to the front.
I earnestly call upon the press to praise and widely publicize the brilliant
victories of our fighting men and not print false, inaccurate or exaggerated
information which is detrimental to the fighting spirit in the front and the
political stability in the rear.
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I have often told you that:
Once we win, everything remains;
Once the Communists win, everything is lost.
Now is the decisive time for the loss or the survival of our nation. The
actual fight is the decisive fight for the loss or the survival of the people
of SVN. To let the Communists occupy two provinces of Central Vietnam
or two provinces of the Highlands does not mean that we only lose those
provinces. It does not either mean a communist limited military victory.
A communist global military victory will lead to a political solution
which is totally disadvantageous to South Vietnam.
Consequently, at any cost we should prevent the Communists from
obtaining a military victory, we should also not let the Communists free to
force us to accept any disadvantageous political solution.
All our people and troops are determined to win over the Communist
aggressors, and we will defeat them.
I believe that they will be defeated.
Excerpts from the Address of
President NGUYEN VAN THIEU
to all the People, the Combatants
and Cadres on the situation at the
Demarcation Line, April 5 1971
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No. 55
June 20
1972
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UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY
TALKING PAPER
OFFICE OF POLICY AND PLANS
Facts on the Current North Vietnamese Invasion
1. QUESTION: What preparations did North Viet-Nam make for the
offensive which began March 30?
ANSWER: The decision on the offensive and invasion was made long in
advance. The NVA built roads across the DMZ and accumulated huge stocks
of supplies and war material in three major areas focused on the South Viet-
namese provincial capitals of Quang Tri in the north, Kontum in the Central
Highlands and An Loc just north of Saigon. The war material included
hundreds of T54/55 and PT76 Russian-supplied tanks and 130mm, long-range
artillery pieces which are useful primarily for offensive warfare.
2. QUESTION: How did the offensive begin?
ANSWER: The NVA offensive began on March 30 with intensive long-
range artillery and rocket fire against South Vietnamese defensive positions
south of the Demilitarized Zone followed by a massive invasion on the grounci
by regular NVA troops. On April 5 the NVA opened a second front against
Binh Long Province north of Saigon. They opened the third front in the
Central Highlands against Kontum on April II.
3. QUESTION: Why did the NVN forces make such rapid progress during
the first few days?
ANSWER: Attacking forces always have a certain advantage of surprise
by picking the time and plaice to fight. The NVA launched a broad frontal
attack across the DMZ in blatant violation of agreements which had been
largely respected since 1954. They picked a moment when unusual weather
inhibited air support and resupply for ARVN forces. They utilized long-
range artillery and tanks on a scale unprecedented in the Indo-China war.
Despite these advantages, the NVA after the first several days had advanced
only 16 kilometers. The South Viet-Nam armed forces dug in and held along
the Cua Viet River, the first defensible line below the DMZ.
4. QUESTION: How many NVA troops have invaded South-Viet-Nam since
the spring offensive began March 30?
ANSWER: At the outset North Viet-Nam openly committed ten of its
thirteen regular divisions to the invasion. Two divisions were operating in
Laos. Only one unit -- infantry division 325C -- was within its own borders.
Elements of this division crossed the DMZ on May 22.
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5. QUESTION: Have the SVN forces counterattacked?
ANSWER: Yes, SVN Marines carried out three heliborne/amphibious/
ground operation raids behind NVA lines in Quang Tri Province on May 13
and 24 and on June 8. ARVN troops recaptured Firebase Bastogne and re-
occupied high ground west of Hue. In fact, every front has seen local counter-
attacks which have forced the enemy to halt, regroup, and fall back. SVN
Air Force planes and naval ships have also struck at the enemy in every
theater.
6. QUESTION; What is the record of the ARVN as a fighting force?
ANSWER: The most eloquent testimony for the ARVN is its record.
After a maximum effort over a period of two months by ten regular NVA
divisions supported by independent regiments, Viet Cong units and other
elements, the NVA has not taken any one of its major objectives, which
POW's revealed to be An Loc, Konturn, and Hue. As with any army anywhere
in the world the record of individual ARVN units varies. The Third Division
and the 22nd Division, which absorbed the brunt of the NVA invasion across
the demilitarized zone and in Konturn, are being reconstituted. On the other
hand, soldiers and elements of the 5th and 18th Divisions with airborne and
ranger units in An Loc have held longer under siege than the French did at
Dien Bien Phu.
7. QUESTION: How have the South Vietnamese territorial forces
measured up in conventional warfare?
ANSWER: South Vietnamese territorial forces, known as the RF and
PF--for regional forces and popular (local) forces--were trained to protect
their homes and villages against Viet Cong guerrilla attacks. Yet, according
to American advisers, they are standing up against NVA regular forces even
when outnumbered. They are highly motivated--as one would expect since
they are defending their own homes--and have a thorough knowledge of the
terrain in which they operate. They are often the first to make contact with
enemy units. Their job is to hold the ground until regular army units come
to their support. In some instances these units have outmaneuvered, out-
fought, and even driven off their NVA attackers before help arrived from
regular ARVN forces.
8. QUESTION: What are the comparative losses of military personnel
on both sides?
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ANSWER: Official GVN figures show enemy forces as having
lost 33,000 killed in action during April and May compared with 12, 000
friendly forces MA. The GVN figures also showed 34,000 ARVN and
territorial forces wounded and 15,000 missing in action during the same
period.
9. QUESTION: How many NVA soldiers has South Viet-Nam been
holding as POW's, and how many have been captured during the current
offensive?
ANSWER: On March 30, 1972, when the North Vietnamese offensive
began South Viet-Nam was holding about 9,000 North Vietnamese soldiers
as POW's. As of June 15, more than 250 additional NVA soldiers had
been captured. This figure does not include NVA and VC soldiers who
have rallied to the side of the GVN (Hoi Chanh).
10. QUESTION: How many South Vietnamese citizens have fled south-
ward from Quang Tri and other areas of SVN entered by NVA troops or
occupied by Viet Cong forces?
ANSWER: As of June 15 there were estimated to be 808,100 war
refugees in South Viet-Nam. More than half a million--509,100--fled
southward from Quang Tri and other areas of Military Region I, to escape
the invading NVN army and the fighting. Another 169,400 fled the invaders
in western SVN to coastal areas of MR II in central Viet-Nam. In MR III,
where An Loc is located 82,700 persons left their homes to evade the North
Vietnamese; and in MR IV, the Delta region, 46, 900 persons chose to leave
home rather than come under communist control. Of the total, 691,200
are being housed in refugee camps. The rest are living with friends and
relatives until they can return home.
11. QUESTION: How is South Viet-Nam financing the cost of caring for
the war tefugees?
ANSWER: The GVN as an emergency measure has increased taxes
on luxury items such as cigarettes, beer, imported liquor, restaurant
meals and theater admissions for the specific purpose of providing funds
for refugee relief.
A portion of the costs is financed through the sale of donated
American produce on the Vietnamese market, i. e. --counterpart
funds. However, numerous Vietnamese volunteer agencies such as
Buddhist associations, the Cao Dai Church, Catholic relief associations,
businessmen, boy scouts, local Red Cross chapters, etc.
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have made an all-out effort to raise funds and supplies to care for the
refugees. University and high school students have plunged themselves
into relief work. Thousands have opened their homes to the homeless.
In addition, substantial contributions in food, medicines and cash have
come from Australia, Canada, Taiwan, West Germany, New Zealand,
Great Britain and the Republic of Korea.
12. QUESTION: How has the invasion affected the GVNTs pacification
program?
ANSWER: Pacification is judged by the attitudes of people and
their confidence in the GVN to provide security in their daily lives.
The degree of apprehension among the Vietnamese rural and urban
population is directly proportional to the proximity of combat. Where
there is no serious combat, apprehension and damage to pacification is
slight. The example of Hue following the fall of Quang Tri is illustrative.
The loss of Quang Tri to the communists and the massive influx of refugees
caused near panic among the citizens of Hue. Yet as soon as the newly
appointed commanding general of Military Region I demonstrated his
ability to restore order and protect the city, panic subsided, people
returned to their normal lives, and many who had fled the city returned
to their homes.
13. QUESTION: What has been the record of VC terrorist incidents
in 1972 compared with previous years?
ANSWER: With extensive fighting going on it is difficult to sort
out the purely terrorist type incident from military combat, but a record
on abductions is a good index. In "normal" years there has been an
average of 6,000 abductions. In 1968, the year of the TET offensive,
the figure was over 10,000. During the first five month's of 1972 there
were 6,000, an annual rate even higher than 1968. People abducted may
be used for work details, forced to fight for the communists, moved into
areas the communists control, or they may be held for several days,
given an intensive communist indoctrination, and then released to carry
out propaganda activities in their villages or suffer reprisals if they
fail to comply.
14. QUESTION: What is the actual population of areas of SVN that
have fallen under NVA communist control since March 30? What
percentage of this is of SVN's communities?
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ANSWER: Before March 30 the communists controlled only seven
hamlets with fewer than 20,000 South Vietnamese citizens. Since the NVN
invasion and as of May 31, an additional 1,157 hamlets with 575,000 people
had come under their control. This is approximately 3 per cent of the
total SVN population. The communists now control 1,164 hamlets out
of 12,032, or 9. 7 per cent of the total number of hamlets. Only 14 out
of 272 districts have been entirely occupied by the NVN. There are large
unpopulated areas along the western fringes of the country under no one's
control.
15. QUESTION: How valid are the communist claims to having established
"revolutionary governments" in the conquered areas?
ANSWER: Communist broadcasts have claimed the establishment
of "revolutionary administrations" in several districts and a number of
villages. Only in Quang Tri, immediately adjacent to North Viet-Nam,
do they claim a province level "revolutionary committee" is functioning.
The names of its leaders have not been announced.
It is interesting to note that in contrast to the South Vietnamese
government,which passed out guns to the populace for self defense,one of the
first acts of the communists is to pick up all firearms from the people.
16. QUESTION: How have the North Vietnamese treated the SVN
population in areas which have come under their control?
ANSWER: Qua.ng Tri is the only province to come under NVA
control. Some 250,000 of the Province's 320, 000 people moved southward
to escape the invading army, leaving only 70,000 who remained voluntarily
or were trapped by the NVA. Since the communists took over on May 1,
several thousands more have escaped on foot or with the help of SVN
marines who made daring sorties into the areas. In interviews with
newsmen some of these escapees say the communists have impressed
every able-bodied individual into forced labor battalions to harvest rice,
dig weapons caches and build bunkers for the NVA. The penalty for trying
to escape, if caught, is death. The escapees also say individuals are
compelled to wear different color identity tags indicating whether they
are pro-communist, neutral, or pro-GVN.
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6
17. QUESTION: What steps did the United States take to assist South
Viet-Nam in countering the North Vietnamese invasion'?
ANSWER: The United States Government immediately denounced
the invasion and ordered U.S. naval and air reinforcements to support
its South Vietnamese allies, promising to consider all options short of
reintroducing American ground troops or use of nuclear weapons. On
April 16 U.S. aircraft raided military supply depots in Hanoi-Haiphong
area. On May 8 President Nixon announced his decision to interdict
supplies to the DRV--that is, to mine all entrances to North Vietnamese
ports to shut off supply channels by sea, and to use air power to halt over-
land deliveries from other countries needed by Hanoi to keep its offensive
going.
18. QUESTION: Have the U.S. actions hurt Hanoi's military efforts?
ANSWER: Yes, Nhan Dan, Hanoi's official communist party news-
paper, tacitly admits serious damage to North Viet-Nam's transportation
and communications system and to her industrial production capacity in
a three-part series of articles published June 1, 3 and 5. The articles,
signed by Hong Ha--a pen name meaning Red River--discussed the DRV's
tasks under wartime economy. They urged the North Vietnamese people
to accept ever greater sacrifices and exert ever greater efforts to prosecute
the war in the South. On June 8, one month after the mining of seven
North Vietnamese ports, Vice Admiral William P. Mack--who directed
the mining operation--said the blockade has cut the communist war-making
capabilities radically. He cited the following as evidence: anti-aircraft
fire, surface-to-air missile launchings and short battery fire--all intense
during the first month of the interdiction campaign--dropped off markedly
in May. There is reduced highway traffic throughout the country. On
the same day Lt. General George Eade, Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff
for Plans and Operations, told newsmen: The interdiction campaign has
virtually isolated Hanoi from outside sources of supply and continues to
destroy stockpiles of fuel and war material already in the country. North
Viet-Nam imported about two million short tons of war material in 1971.
Since May 11 it has received practically nothing. Railway shipments from
China are almost completely stopped as a result of the destruction of
bridges and the sealing of a railway tunnel near the Chinese border.
U.S. pilots report some truck traffic from China, but nothing close to
the magnitude of the previous rail shipments.
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19. QUESTION: When will the effect of the mining be felt by the NVA
offensive action in South Viet-Nam?
ANSWER: The immediate results are most apparent in the tie-up
of NVN supply lines; but the combined effects of the mining and air strikes
on the offensive are already being felt in the South, particularly in fuel
supplies for NVA tanks and trucks used in logistic support for the invading
forces. Monsoon rains also play a role in slowing down the offensive.
The continued NVA artillery fire against cities like An Loc and Kontum
(which has been slowly declining) shows that the NVA had laid in a massive
supply of ammunition in preparation for the invasion. It may be some weeks
yet before the full effect is felt by NVN's invading forces.
20. QUESTION: Did President Nixon offer on May 8 to withdraw remaining
U.S. troops from Viet-Nam, and, if so, under what conditions?
ANSWER: On May 8 President Nixon said the United States"will
proceed with a complete withdrawal of all American forces from Viet-Nam
within four months" on these conditions: "First, all American prisoners
of war must be returned. Second, there must be an internationally supervised
ceasefire throughout Indochina. Once prisoners of war are released, once
the internationally supervised ceasefire has begun, we will stop all acts of
force throughout Indochina."
21. QUESTION: How many American military personnel are left in
South Viet-Nam?
ANSWER: As of June 8, 1972, there were 61,900 U.S. military
personnel in SVN. There were another 42,000 naval personnel manning
ships offshore. The President has stated that Arnerican troop strength
in SVN will be reduced to 49,000 by July 1, that is, 500,000 less than the
ceiling established for U.S. forces in Viet-Nam in 1968.
22. QUESTION: Did the Peking and Moscow Summit talks between the
U.S. and the PRC and the U.S. and USSR make any contributions toward
resolving the Viet-Nam conflict? If so, what were they? Were there any
secret agreements concerning Viet-Nam?
ANSWER: First, there were no secret agreements concerning
Viet-Nam at either Peking or Moscow. In each of the two summit meetings
there were extensive conversations concerning the Viet-Nam conflict.
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The views of both sides are summarized in the final communiques.
Perhaps the most significant contribution of the talks toward the resolution
of the conflict was in clarifying each power's viewpoints. As Presidential
adviser Dr. Henry Kissinger said in a Kiev press conference: "When
two great powers deal with each other, one of the best things they can
do for each other is to make absolutely sure that they understand each
other's point of view. What actions they then take, based on the under-
standing of that point of view, only the future can tell." In his address to
the Congress of the United States immediately upon his return from
Moscow June 1, President Nixon said: "I emphasize to you once again,
this Administration has no higher goal--a goal that I know all of you share--
than bringing the Viet-Nam war to an early and honorable end. We are
ending the war in Viet-Nam, but we shall end it in a way which will not
betray our friends, risk the lives of the courageous Americans still
serving in Viet-Nam, break faith with those held prisoners by the enemy,
or stain the honor of the United States of America."
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SECRET 24 July 1972
MOSCOW'S NEW TREATIES
1. Since May 1971, the USSR has concluded treaties of
"friendship and cooperation" with Egypt, Iraq, and India ---
each with the primary objective of secW.ing the type of political
and military gains that can enhance the Soviet position at the
expense of Peking and the non-communist world. Oscow views
these treaties as valuable adjuncts to its policy of maintaining
a permanent great-power position in the Mediterranean and of
establishing a similar position in the Indian Ocean.
2. For the immediate future, anyway, the Soviets are present
in the Middle East and on the Indian subcontinent. Our main task
then is to try to ensure that the Soviet position will not be at
the cost of the security of the U.S. and its allies. To this end,
a primary propaganda (and/or political action) aim is to neutralize
Soviet covert political actions and potential (e.g see the short
subject in this issue on Soviet meddling in Bangladesh student
affairs and concerning Soviet attempts to influence Indian
journalists). In the attached backgrounder is an overview of
the implications of the new treaties for Soviet foreign policy
and for Soviet relations with its three new partners and with
their neighbors. One of the backgrounder's,underlying themes is ,
that unless the Soviets maintain diplomatic propriety in executing
these treaties, they risk alienating not only their cosigners but
some of their equally strategically important neighbors as well.
3v All three treaties practically guarantee an increase of
Soviet Military-technical personnel (particularly in Iraq)c on the
cosigner's soil. For some audiences this is open to interpretation
as analogous to Soviet encroachments under the "Brezhnev Doctrine"
as an effort to extend a Soviet "protective umbrella" over
the Third World. Also, in discussion of steady Soviet naval
expansion into the Indian Ocean, press,and media assets, particularly
in countries bordering on that ocean, Should as often as possible
refer to the Soviet naval presence as the "Soviet Indian Ocean
Fleet." In connection with these two themes, see also "The
Reach of the Brezhnev Doctrine" and "Soviet Naval Strength in
Third World Waters", respectively in the August 1971 and March
1972 issues of Perspectives. Extra copies are available on
request.
SECRET
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FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY
NOSCOW'S'LATEST-TREATIES
24 July 1972
Just as Egypt has always been the key factor in Soviet
strategy aimed at a permanent presence if not domination of the
Mediterranean, so now India and Iraq appear to be emerging as two
key factors in Soviet designs on the Indian Ocean and Persian
Gulf. Since May 1971, the USSR has signed "treaties of friendship
and cooperation" with all three and, while the provisions in each
are different, each to some extent guarantees the Soviets the
kind of presence they are after. On the other hand, without the
exercise of a considerable degree of diplomatic flexibility and
subtlety (traits for which Soviet diplomacy is not famous), the
treaties could turn out to be disruptive factiars in Moscow's
relations with the signatories as well as with their neighbors.
Why's of the Treaties
The new treaties are the first that Moscow has signed with
countries that are neither neighbors of the USSR nor Communist.
She has had treaties of "friendship and good-neighbor relations"
with Iran, Afghanistan, and Turkey off and on since 1921. And with
the Warsaw Pact countries and with Finland she maintains and
consistently renews treaties of "friendship, cooperation, and
mutual assistance" --- all of which bind the signatories to the
canons of the Brezhnev Doctrine, There are those who see the
latest treaties signed with Egypt, Iraq and India as a calculated
move to extend the umbrella of the Brezhnev Doctrine into the
Middle East and onto the subcontinent and into Southeast Asia.
* * * * * * * *
It is apparent that with the Egyptian and Indian treaties,
Moscow was the instigator while it is suspected that Iraq asked
for her treaty. The Soviet approach to India is seen as reflecting
Moscow's concerns with the Sino-Soviet border disputes and the
politburo's eagerness to get Indian political support for its dealings
with China. India, on the other hand, viewed the treaty as a means
of discouraging Soviet aid to Pakistan (to say nothing of
guaranteeing military support for India) should the Indo-Pakistani
crisis heat up --- as indeed it did.
In Egypt, Moscow pressed for a friendship treaty because of
fears that, following Nasser's death, Sadat might well drift a
bit from the "anti-imperialist direction" in his approach to
foreign policy. Sadat, on the other hand, wanted concrete evidence
of Moscow's intentions to continue its military and economic
maintenance program and its diplomatic support of Egypt in the
Arab-Israeli crisis.
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As for Iraq, she may well have looked to a treaty of mutual
support with the Soviet Union as a means of enhancing her reputation
among the radical Arabs, enhancing the regime's status at home,
getting more Soviet military goods and help with her oil industry,
and finally as a useful political lever in the troubled Iraqi-
Iranian relations. Thus, with Iraq viewing herself as possibly
having the most to gain, in the short run anyway, the Soviets were
able to set several preconditions such as guaranteed access to
Iraqi ports and airfields, broader Communist participation in
running the government, and a commitment to consult with Mbscow
before launching any military undertakings.
Differences of the Treaties
Soviet President Podgorny has said that the three treaties
"represent a new, practical embodiment of the strengthening link
and expanding interaction of world socialism with the forces of
national liberation." Not quite so. A review of the published
texts of the three treaties showsmarked differences in approach.
The Indo-Soviet treaty, for example, makes no mention of Soviet
military aid to India while Article 8 of the Soviet-Egyptian treaty
says that both parties "will continue to develop cooperation in
the military field on the basis of appropriate agreements . . ."
In contrast, Article 9 of the Soviet-Iraqi treaty says that
both "will continue to develop cooperation in the strengthening
of their defense capabilities": clear implication that the Soviet
Union gets access to military installations on Iraqi soil. With
Egypt and Iraq, it is a matter of coordinating foreign policy
approaches, while with India it is a matter of "mutual cooperation."
Lip service is given to India's "nonalignment" whereas Soviet
influence in Egyptian and Iraqi internal affairs is implied by
their cooperation with the Soviet Union to preserve their "socio-
economic gains." Whereas no mention is made of Indian or Egyptian
natural resources, Article 5 of the Iraqi treaty takes note of
"cooperation.. .in the working of oil and other natural resources."
The treaty fails, however, to commit the Soviet Union to anything
specific in its economic "cooperation" with Iraq.
Reactions to the Treaties
The Soviet-Iraqi treaty has not done much to enhance the
latter's reputation with some radical Arabs. Libya's former chief of
state Qadhafi not only vociferously denounced the Soviet-Iraqi
treaty as anti-Islam treachery, he also withdrew his ambassador
from Baghdad. Following the treaty announcement, Syria has
become noticeably cool to both Iraq and the Soviet Union and is
reportedly actively trying to reduce the Soviet military
presence in Syria.
2
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Despite Soviet attempts to reassure the Shah of Iran that the
Soviet-Iraqi treaty cannot become a disruptive element in Soviet-
Iranian relations, the Iranian head of state remains wary. His
misgivings will be borne out if he sees the Iraqis getting
sophisticated, more modern weaponry and if Soviet naval squadrons
start berthing at the head of the Persian Gulf. From Moscow's
standpoint, Libyan and Syrian coolness are tolerable and probably
interpreted as a passing phase Soviet-Iranian relations, however,
are much more precariou$ly balanced and Tehran's reactions to
closer Soviet-Iraqi ties could well be a long-term worry for
Mbscow.
As a result of the Indo-Pakistani war, India has emerged as
the unchallenged leader of the subcontinent. Some of India's
neighbors see the indo-Soviet treaty as signalling Soviet take-
over of the subcontinent by proxy. But, if the Soviets in their
haste to spread their own influence, fail to give India the voice
she feels she deserves --- India's sense of goodwill towards
Moscow could easily reverse itself. For example, if India finds
that the Soviets are meddling in internal affairs in Bangladesh ---
as they were known to have done during recent student disturbances
in Dacca --- such meddling is open to interpretation as, at the
very least, a violation of the spirit if not the terms of the
Indo-Soviet treaty.
The Soviet quest for naval bases for its Indian Ocean fleet
as well as the expected increase in the Soviet naval presence in
that ocean, near Indian shores, will irritate Indian sensitivities
over potential outside interference, In time, India may well
decide that as the undisputed power on the subcontinent, she is
secure enough not to have to depend on such intimate bilateral
relations as are implicit in the lndo-Soviet treaty.
The Soviet-Egyptian treaty cannot but have raised hopes in
Cairo that the USSR would somehow break the deadlock with Israel
and Soviet, failure to do so cannot help but foster Egyptian
resentment against the USSR. Persistent criticism of the USSR
by some Egyptian officials and outspoken journalists in recent
months have been indicative of increasing Soviet-Egyptian dis-
agreements which, from Moscow's point of view could suggest that
the treaty is actually- fostering a deterioration in Soviet-
Egyptian relations. In the long run, for the Soviets this treaty
may well be diplomatically the most troublesome of the three.
* * * * * *
Whatever misgivings some in the Soviet leadership may have
concerning the long-range benefits to be derived from these three
treaties, there is every indication that the majority views them as
highly useful for two very basic Soviet foreign policy aims: to
maintain a great power role in the Mediterranean and to establish
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the Soviet in the same type of role in the Indian Ocean. Thus, the
Soviet search for additional durable ties with strategically
important countries in both areas will intensify rather than
diminish, With each willing candidate that the Soviets approach
and/or possibly win over (such as Malta, Bangladesh, the People's
Democratic Republic of Yemen, Ceylon, or others) the real question
will be how to ensure that the Soviet presence takes forms that
are tolerable to the security of all.
4
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BASLER NACIIRICHTEN, Basel
17 May 1972
Damaskus gegen einen Pakt mit Moskau
Spielt Syrien
the chin esische Karte?
Der sowjetische Vcrteidigungsminister Marschall Gretschkii beendete semen
im wizen Nahen Osten mit grosser Aufmerksamkeit beobachteten viertiigi-
gen offiziellen Besueh in Syrien und flog von Damaskus welter nach Kairo.
Pie Befiirchtung, nach Aegypten und Irak werde such die syrische
Regierung einen langjahrigen Freundschafts- und Beistandspakt mit der
Sowjetunion schliessen, hat sich jedoch nicht bestatigt.
Von unserern Korrespondenten
Gretschko hatte wahrend seines
Aufenthaltes in Damaskus nahezu
pausenlos mit Staatsprasident Gene-
ral Asad, dem syrischen Premiermini-
ster, Aussenminister und Verteidi-
gungsminister konferiert. Er konnte
seine Gesprachspartner jedoch offen-
kundig nicht davon Oberzeugen, ciass
ein Vertrag nach dem Muster der
Abkommen mit Agypten und
Irak im Interesse des Gastlandes lie-
ge. Weder aus amtlichen noch aus
den inoffiziellen Angaben nach der
Abreisc des sowjetischen Gastes gcht
hervor, dass sich das syrisch-sowjeti-
sche Verhaltnis in nachster Zukunft
intensiviercn wird. Beiruter Sowjet-
kreise zeigten am Sonntag denn auch
dcutliche Enttaischung tiber Verlauf
und Ergebnis der Gretschko-Mission
in dem Nachbarland.
Wahrend der Anwesenheit ,:des
Moskauer Verteidigungsministm's "in
. Damaskus war aus Ostblockquellen
in der nahiistlichen Nachriehtenborse
. Beirut durehgesickert, der Kreml: b6-
trachte den Absehluss eines PalC!ts
mit Syrien als vorlaufigen
� SchluBstein seiner vorderorientali-
,schen EinfluBsphare. In Moskim
schcint man damit gerechnet zu
ha-
beb, gestiitzt auf gesieherte' langfri-
stip Positionen in den drei wichtig-
sten arabischen Hauptstadten
Bagdad und Damaskus nicht nur
eine �Pax sovietica) diktieren, son-
dem such den amerikanischen Prasi-
denten Nixon bei semen bevorste-
henden Besprechurtgen mit Bre-
schnew, Kossygin und Podgorny mit
einem zum kommunistischen Ein-
flussbereieh gehorenden Nahen
Osten konfrontieren zu kortnen. Der
Widerstand des Prlisidenten Asad
und seiner Regicrung verdarb den
Rtissen zunachst dieses Konzept.
Uebereinstimmend erzielt wurden
nach syrischen Quellen die
schon wahrend des geheimgehaltenen
BeSuches von Generalstabschef Gee
neral Chakkur grundsatzlich verein-
barten neuen Waffenlieferungen. Sy-
rien wird demzufolge urtter anderem
Srim-3-Raketen erhalten und durch
weitere moderne Sowjetwaffen sein
'Srcherheitsbedtirfnis gegen den nur
rund 40 Kilometer vor seiner Haupt-
stadt stehenden israelischen Gegner
besSer als bisber stillen konnen. Es
kOnnte sich jedoch erfolgreich gegen
eh= politischen Preis ftir diese
wehren.
Staatschef Asad hat ftir diese Zu-
rtickhaltung irn Urngang mit den
Sowjets vor allem zwoi Grtinde: Die
Rtissen sind in Syrien womoglich
noch Weniger popullir als in Aegyp-
ten..Alles, was Flit den sowjebischen
Rtistungslieferungen zu tun hat,
wird daher hierzulande soit langem
iiusserst geheim gehalten. Selbst hohe
Regierungsbeamte, dcren politische
Zuverlassigkeit ausser Zweifel stcht,
mtissen sich auf abentetterlichen Urn-
wegen .aus der westeuropaisehen�
Presse Ober den Umfang der roten
Waf fenhilfe informicren. Spricht
man amtliche Vet-teeter der syrischen
Regiei-ung auf die Sowjethilie an,
bekommt man zur Antwort, das
Land babe gegcniiber den Israeli
ein wesentlich. grosseres Sicherheits-
,bedtirfnis als andere arabische Staa-
Itcn, babe abet- gegenwartig keine
anderen potentiellen Waffenlieferan-
'en. Zweitens ist Damaskus von sei-
nen Verbtindeten Aegypten und Li-
hyen in der,,gRicleration Arabischer
Republiken� (FAR) offcnbar ein be-
sonderer Part zugedacht. Das Land
soil eine wichtige Rolle bci der In-
stallicrimg eincr net= Art �Schau-
kelpolitilo> zwischen zwei ausserara-
bischen Mehten spielen. Wiihrend'
Aegypten gezwungen ist, ganz auf
die sowjetische Karte zu setzen,
spielt Syrien den chinesischen
Trumpf. Das zeigte sich deutlich in
der Behandlung des Grotschko-Besu-
ches durch die gelenkte Damaszener
Presse. Sic berichtete verhaltnismiis-
sig zurtickhaltend Ober die Gesprii-
che des Moskauer Castes, wiihrend
seiner Anwescnheit aber erstaunlich
detailliert tiber die bevorstehende
Reise des Damaszener Aussenmini-
sters nach Peking.
Die Sowjets verhehlten in Gesprii-
chen mit westlichen Beobachtern am
Wochcnende nicht ihre Enttauschung
Ober dieses gDoppelspiel Syrienso. ,
Die Araber erwiesen sich, so filgten
Ostblockdiplomaten hinztt, immer '
molls als gsohwierige Verbilndete*.
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BASLER NACHRICHTEN, Basel
17 May 1972
IS SYRIA PLAYING THE CHINESE TRUMP CARD?
Soviet Defense Minister Marshal Grechko ended his four-day official
visit to Syria, a visit which was followed with great attention through-
out the Near East, and flew from Damascus to Cairo. The fear that the
Syrian government, following Egypt and Irak, would also conclude a
long term frienship and support pact with the Soviet Union, proved un-
justified, however.
During his stay in Damascus, Grechko conferred almost uninterruptedly
with State President General Asad, the Syrian Prime Minister, Foreign Minister
and Defense Minister. But evidently he was unable to convince these officials
that a treaty modelled on the agreements with Egypt and Irak would be in the
interests of their country. Nothing in official or unofficial statements
following the departure of the Soviet guest indicates an intensification of
Syrian-Soviet relations in the near future. Soviet circles in Beirut showed
on Sunday that they too were plainly disillusioned with the way the Grechko
mission in the neighboring country went and with its outcome. While the Soviet
Defense Minister was in Damascus, the news seeped through in Beirut from East
bloc sources that the Kremlin regarded conclusion of a pact with Syria as the
final move, for the time being, in its Near Eastern sphere of influence. With
its long term positions assured in the three vital Arab capitals of Cairo,
Bagdad and Damascus, Moscow seemed to count not only on dictating a pax Sovie-
tica, but also on confronting President Nixon during his forthcoming discussions
with Brezhnev, Kosygin and Podgorny with a Near East belonging tothe Communist
sphere of influence. As of now, the resistance of President Asad and his govern-
ment has spoiled the Russian plan. According to Syrian sources, Final agreement
was reached on the new weapons deliveries that had already been agreed upon in
principle during the secret visit of General Staff Chief General Chakkur. Under
its terms Syria will receive, among other things, SAM 3 rockets, and thanks to
additional modern Soviet weapons will be able to meet its security requirements
against the Israeli opponent. That opponent is only about 40 kilometers away
from the Syrian capital. And yet Syria successfully avoided paying a political
price for that assistance.
Chief of State Asad had two reasons in particular for his reserve in
dealing with the Soviets: if anything, the Russians are even less popular in
Syria than in Egypt. Everything having to do with Soviet arms deliveries has
therefore been kept very secret in this country for a long time. Even high
government officials, whose political reliability is above doubt, must resort
to elaborate roundabout ways to learn from the Western press about the extent
of Red arms aid. When Syrian government officials are asked about this Soviet
aid, they reply that their country has considerably higher security requirements
vis-a-vis Israel than other Arab states, and yet has no other potential source
of weapons supply at present. Secondly, Damascus is evidently assigned a -
special role by its allies Egypt and Libya in the Federation of Arab Republics.
2
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The country is supposed to play an important part in getting a new kind of
"seesaws' policy started between two non-Arab powers. While Egypt is forced to
play everything on the Soviet card, Syria plays the Chinese trump. This was
clearly seen in the way the controlled Damascus press handled the Greehko vi-
sit. The Moscow visitor's talks were reported with comparative restraint, but
during his visit the press gave amazingly detailed coverage to the forthcoming
trip of the Syrian foreign minister to Peking.
On the weekend, Soviets conversing with Western observers made no secret
of their disappointment over Syria's "double game." East bloc diplomats added
that the Arabs are proving to be increasingly "difficult allies."
DER BUND, Bern
17 May 1972
Kommunisten in der Bagdader Regieru
Moskau verlangt seinen Preis fiir den sowjetisch-lrakisehen Paki 110
A. Beirut. Zwei KorfiltrriMisten, die. Zen-
tralkomitee- und Politbiiro-Mitglieder
Abdullah El-Amir und Makram El-Tala-
bani, sind seit Anfang dieser Woche Mit-
glieder der am Sonntag ilberraschend urn- '
gebildeten Regierung de Militardiktators
General Aehmed Hassan El-Bakr in Irak. '
Das Paradoxe darin ist, class die irakische
Kommunistische Partei offiziell noch im-
mer verboten ist und Hunderte ihrer Mit-
glieder hingerichtet wurden oder ohne
orderitlichen Prozess in den Zuchthausern
Ste eken.
Die Ernennung zweier KP-Politiker zu
Mmistern ohne Geschaftsbereich ist die
Erftillung einer Klausel des auf 15 Jahre
befristeten Freundschafts- und Beistands-
paktes, den Staatsprasident El-Bakr und
Ministerprasident Kossygin im April in
Bagdad unterzeichnet hatten. In dieser '
Klauscl verpflichtete sich die irakische
Regierung, die Verfolgung der Kommuni-
sten zu beenden und ihnen eine politische
Wallensbildung im Rahrnen der regieren- -
den Partei �Baaths zu gewahrleisten. Der
Urnstand, dass bisher weder das formelle
Parteiverbot aufgehoben wurde, noch die
inhaftierten Parteimitglieder aus ihrer
teilweise jahrelangcn Haft entlassen wur-
den, lasst jedoch darauf schliessen, dass
das irakische Militarregime die Betati-
gungsmoglichkeit far die Kommunisten
in engen Grenzen zu halten bestrebt ist.
Die beiden kommunistischen Minister
ha'ben denn such nicht viel mchr als Alibi-
funktion. In Bagdad sind namlich such
die Kabinettsmitglieder nur Erftillungsge-
hilfen der obersten Fiihrung. El-Amir und
Ei-Talabani haben zudern nicht ,einmal
Kabinettsressort. Bagdader politische
Kreise bezeichnen sie denn auch als
gstaatlich bezahlte Politpensionare�.
Keine Sowjetunterstiitzung fur die
Kurden mehr
Das Kabinettsrevirement, das den bei-
den Kommunisten zu einfl-sslosen De-
korationsposten verhalf, ist der irakische
Teil eines politischen Geschaftes mit der
Sowjetunion, bei dem die Vorteile ein-
deutig auf seiten Bagdads liegen. Der
Kreml hat sich laut Beiruter Gewahrs-
leuten auf exilirakischer und kurdischer
Seite verpflichtet, die kurdischen Auto-
. nomiebestrebungen im Norden Iraks kiinf-
tig nicht mehr zu unterstiitzen. Die Kur-
den kiimpfen seit iiber 50 Jahren fur ei-
nen unabhangigen Staat oder doeh filr die ,1
politische und wirtschaftliche Autonomic
innerhalb des arabischen Iraks. Thr An-
Mirror ist der heute iiber 70jahrige Ge-
neral Mustafa Mulla El-Barzani, der �
ohne Kommunist zu sein � in Ivfoskau aus-
gebildet wurde und nach dem Zweiten
Weltkrieg Oberhaupt einer kurzlebigen
Kurdenrepublik im aserbeidschanisch-per-
sischen Grenzgebiet unter dem Protekto-
rat Stalins war. Die Kurden lieferten der
irakischen Regierung zehn Jahre lang
blutige Kampfe, und erst Militardiktator
El-Bakr machte diesem kraftezehrenden
Ringen scheinbar em n Ende. Er gewahrte
den Kurden Autonomierechte und er-
nannte El-Barzani zu seinem Vizeprasi-
denten. Das kurdische Misstrauen blieb
jedoch so gross, dass sich der Kurden-
fiihrer weigerte, nach Bagdad zu gehen
:und scin Amt anzutreten. Er blieb lieber
in seinem Hauptquartier Hadseh Umran
im unzuganglichen gebirgigen . Norden
des Landes. In letzter Zeit kam es spora-
disch zu neuen Gefechten zwischen iraki-
schen Regierungstruppen und kurdischen
Partisanen. �
El-Barzani hatte den sowjetischen Mini-
sterprasident wiihrend (lessen Aufenthal-
tes in Irak zu einem Gesprach in sein
1-1auptquartier eingeladen. Kossygin igno-
rierte jedoch die Offerte und verpflichtete
sich gegenither den' arabischen Gastge-
bern, die Unterstiltzung der Kurden ein-'
zustellen. Seitdem preist Radio Moskan
den antiimperialistischen Freiheitskampf
des kurdischen Volkes fiir seine legitimen
Rechte nicht mehr, und die Kurden erhat
ten auch keine sowjetischen Waffen mehr
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DER BUND, Bern
17 May 1972
COMMUNISTS IN THE BAGDAD GOVERNMENT
As of the beginning of this week, two columnists, members of the
Central Committee and of the Politburo, Abdullah El-Amir and MAkram El-
Talabani, have become members of military dictator General Achmed Hassan
El-Bakr's Iraqi government, which was restructured unexpectedly on Sunday.
The paradoxical element in this situation is that the Iraqi Communist
Party is still officially banned, and hundreds of its members have been
executed or jailed without due process.
The appointment of two communist party politicians as ministers
without portfolio is the fulfillment of a stipulation in the friendship
and assistance treaty, limited to 15 years and signed in April by the
President of the Republic, El Bakr and Premier Kossygin in Bagdad.
The Iraqi government committed itself in this clause to cease persecuting
the communists and to guarantee them influence in the determination of
policy within the framework of the ruling Beath Party. The fact that the
formal ban of the Communist party has not been repealed as yet, and that
arrested party members have not been set free from their, in some cases
year-long, imprisonment, raises the thought that the Iraqi military regime
is trying to keep the possibility for action by the communists within
narrow limits. Therefore the purpose of the two communist ministers is
not much more than a mere excuse. In Bagdad, even Cabinet members are only
assistants executing orders of the highest leaders, and El-Amir and El-
Talabami do not even have an area of responsibility. Political circles in
Bagdad therefore call them "politicial pensioners paid by the state."
No More Soviet Support for the Kurds
The restructuring of the cabinet which helped the two communists.
obtain decorative positions without influence, is the Iraqi portion of a
political deal with the Soviet Union, in which the advantages lie clearly
with:Bagdad. According to reliable sources, exiled Iraqi and Kurds in
Beirut, the Kremlin has committed itself to cease supporting the efforts
of the Kurds in the north of Iraq for autonomy. The Kurds have been fight-
ing for more than 50 years, for the establishment of an independent state,
or, at least for political and economic autonomy within Arabian Iraq. The
now 70-year-old General Mustafa Mulls. El-Barzani is their leader; he was
trained in Moscow without having been a communist, and after World War II
he was head of a short-lived republic of Kurds under the protectorate of
,Stalin, in the Azerbaidjani-Iranian borderland. For ten years the Kurds
fought bloody battles with the Iraqi government, and only the military
dictator El-Bakr has seemingly put an end to this energy-consuming struggle.
He granted autonomous rights to the Kurds and appointed El-Barzani as his
vice president. However, the Kurds remained so suspicious, that the leader
of the Kurds refused to travel to Bagdad to take up his office. He preferred
to remain in his headquarters, Hadj Utran, in the inaccessable mountainous
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north of the country. Lately, new fights between Iraqi government troops
and Kurd partisans have flared up sporadically.
El-Barzani invited the Soviet Premier for talks at his headquarters,
while the latter stayed in Iraq. Kossygin, however, ignored this offer
and committed himself vis-a-vis his Arabian hosts, to cease supporting the
Kurds. Since then, RaAio Moscow no longer praises the anti-imperialistic
struggle for freedom of the Kurdish people to obtain their legitimate rights,
and the Kurds no longer receive Soviet weapons.
GUARDIAN/LE MONDE WEEKLY
15 April 1972
Moscow: still busy making friends
Alexei Kosygin's visit to Bagdad last
week � the first ever by a Soviet Premier
to Iraq � marks an astonishing improve-
ment in relations between the two coun-
tries after a long period in the shadows.
The greater degree of cooperation be-
tween the two nations initiated during the
February visit to Moscow of Iraqi "strong-
man" and deputy chairman of the Council
of the Revolution Saddam Hussein, was;
consolidated last Sunday with the
signing of a treaty of friendship and co--
operation. There can be no doubt that
this pact represents another success for
the Soviet Union in its bid to strengthen
its influence in the Mediterranean and the
Persian Gulf. .
The treaty is also an indication that the
Kremlin, set on its guard by anti-Com-
munist repression in Khartum and
Cairo's momentary flirtation with Wash-
ington, wants to increase and diversify its
alliances in the Arab World.
The text of the Bagdad agreement is
virtually identical to that signed between
the USSR and Egypt on May 27, 1971,
except that this earlier pact spelled out
greater involvement by the two signa-
tories in the Middle East conflict, in the
military sphere, and in constructing and
defending Egyptian Socialism.
But if the Egyptian-Soviet pact falls
squarely into the frame_work of the Arab-
Israeli conflict, the agreement with Iraq
testifies to Moscow's concern with assur-
ing its presence in the Persian Gulf, which
harbours the world's largest oil reserves.
In a transparent attempt to upstage
China in this region and rival the United
States, which is well established in Turkey
CIIIIISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
11 April 1972
end Saudi Arabia, the USSR already main-
tains diplomatic relations with the United
Arab Emirates.
It was unable to do as-much with Qatar
and Bahrein, but it does have a port of
call in Aden for its warships from the
Indian Ocean, while its fishing vessels sail
at will through the Gulf, thanks to agree-
ments with Iraq and the People's Demo-
cratic Republic of South Yemen. Some of
these vessels on "special missions" have
been sighted regularly at the entry to the
Persian Gulf and the Red-Sea.
As part of its design to secure its
position in the region, the USSR, while
maintaining good relations with Tehran,
seeks at state level to exercise a tri-
partite mediation mission � along with
Damascus and Bagdad, whose own rela-
tions have improved � between Kurds and
Arabs to maintain peace in Kurdistan.
And finally to eliminate differences be-
tween the Beath and Communist parties
so as to pave the way to a "national front"
in Iraq.
Success of such a policy would be cer-
tain to strengthen the hand of the "pro-
gressive" Arab oil producers in their
dealings with Western petroleum inter-
ests � particularly the Americans. The
treaty just signed in Bagdad also repre-
sents an important card in the Soviet
hand only weeks before the Nixon-
Brezhnev summit in Moscow. Paradoxi-
cally, evert though Saddam Hussein is
soon to visit Paris, Europe, which is the
main user of Iraqi crude oil as well as the
petroleum products of the Persian Gulf,
remains a virtual spectator in a part of the
world that is vital to its Interests.
Soviet gains in Persian Gulf
. Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin's visit
to Iraq and the signing of a 15-year Soviet-
Iraqi friendship treaty have manifold
meanings, but the most immediately sig-
nificant are these:
The Russians have gained an important
toehold in the Middle East oil industry,
and they have greatly strengthened their
position in the Persian Gulf.
Mr. Kosygin's visit was timed to co-
incide with the formal inauguration of the
Soviet-financed North Rumeila oil field,
which was taken away from the Western-
owned Iraq Petroleum Company in 1964
and is now owned by the Iraq National
Oil CoMpany. Not only the Russians but
other East European countries will pre-
sumably be major purchasers of crude oil
from Rumeila. As Soviet tankers ply the
gulf, Soviet warships are likely to be
frequent visitors to Iraqi ports.
The treaty with Iraq is similar to those
that the Soviet Union concluded last year
with Egypt and India. Both sides under-
take not to join alliances without consult-
ing the other, nor to allow bases hostile -
to the other to be established on their
territory. They pledge to "cooperate in
strengthening each other's defense poten-
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tial." The defense commitment is notice-
ably vague, but undoubtedly it means
more Soviet arms aid for Iraq.
The Persian Gulf states in general and
Iran in particular may feel considerable
concern at Iraq's opening the door to a
Russian presence in this strategic water-
way. Since the withdrawal of the British
military forces from the area at the end
of last year, Iran has sought to fill the
leadership role in the gulf. Iraq is tradi-
tionally jealous of Iran, and by signing
the treaty with the Soviet Union un-
doubtedly hopes to enhance its own posi-
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
11 April 1972
Moves in east, south, and west
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tion and thus offset Iran's ascendancy in
the region. On the other hand, the Rus-
sians have cultivated good relations with
Iran in recent years and sought to re-
assure the Shah as to their intentions by
emphasizing that the treaty with Iraq is
not directed at any other country.
For the Soviet Union, the new treaty is
clearly part of an overall strategic pattern
of winning friends and strengthening ties
around the periphery of Asia. It comes at
a time when the United States once again
has its attention focused on Indo-China
and the war in Vietnam.
Soviets push interests in Asia
qtates is deeply occupied
in Soutneast ,;,e new North Vietnam-
ese offensive, the Soviets are rapidly ad-
vancing their own interests at Asia's south-
ern and eastern limits.
There is expectation here that the Soviet.
Iraqi 15-year treaty signed in Baghdad
April 10 may be followed by one with Syria.
A Soviet-Turkish friendship pact, follow-
ing Soviet President Nikolai Podgorny's
scheduled visit to Turkey April 11 to 18,
might also be brewing.
If so, this would be the boldest Soviet dip-
lomatic advance yet into what Washington
used to call the "northern tier" states �
which United States administrations, be-
ginning with that of President Truman in
1946 and 1947, sought to erect as A barrier
to Soviet influence.
By 1958�when the Iraqi revolution dashed
the U.S. plan of an anti-Soviet Baghdad
Pact including Arab states anchored on Iraq
�Moscow already had leaped over Turkey,
Iran, and Pakistan, where U.S. influence
was strong, and was concentrating instead '
on the Arab states of Syria and Egypt.
Today, West Pakistan�after losing East
Pakistan in last December's war with So-
viet-backed India to the new secessionist
state of Bangladesh�finds itself in direct
economic and political trouble.
Pakistani President Zulfikar All Bhutto
faces breakaway movements in Pakistan's.
Northwest Frontier and Baluchistan regions,
and a rising wave of protest over India's
failure to release about 90,000 Pakistani
war prisoners.
;;.- In Iran � where President Nixon is due,
.to stop May 30 and 31 for talks with Shah
NIuhammad Reza Pahlavi after President
:Nixon's Moscow visit � Moscow has an
-improving image and growing economic
:investments.
Possible topic
One of the points that President Nixon
:and the Shah might discuss is the real mean-
:ing of the new Soviet-Iraqi pact � and the
meaning of whatever new Soviet-Turkish ar-
4.angements might come out of this week's
Todgorny visit to Turkey.
4. Soviet Premier Alexei N. Kosygin returned
',from Baghdad to Moscow April 10 after
signing the 15-year treaty with Iraqi Presi-
lent Ahmad Hassan al-Bakr,
Earlier, Mr. Kosygin attended the inau-
guration of Iraq's Soviet-backed North
Rumeila oil field. Arrangements were an-
nounced for first tanker deliveries of Iraqi
crude oil to the Soviet Union during a forth-
coming new Soviet naval visit to Iraq's
Persian Golf ports.
.
- The Soviet-Iraqi pact provides for pond-
'cal, cultural, and defense links�like the old
:Western-sponsored Baghdad Pact and its
.low-feeble successor, the Central Treaty
*Organization.
Along the lines of last year's Soviet-Indian
and Soviet-Egyptian treaties, both Iraq and
the Soviet Union pledge themselves not to
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allow each other's territory to be used for
hostile bases.
Interest expressed
Interest in Iraqi oil, and Iraq's apparent
Interest in substituting Russian for Western
technology for developing it, is expressed in
clauses on economic, scientific, and techni-
cal cooperation.
In his speech at the North Run-Leila oil
ceremonies, Mr. Kosygin promised Soviet
help to Arab peoples to "free their wealth"
from "Western monopolies."
Neither Mr. Kosygin nor the treaty text,
however, referred directly to Israel, accord-
ing to Baghdad Radio reports. Article four
of the treaty does say both states will con-
tinue fighting "imperialism, zionism, and
colonialism."
Analysts here believe use of the word
"Zionism" spells continued Soviet refusal to
promise publicity to fight Israel.
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
10 August 1971
Soviets
Treaty scorned
The anti-Soviet Beirut newspaper Al-
Hayat said the treaty "ignores the libera-
tion of Arab territory."
The state radio of Col. Muamm�ar al-
Qaddafi's Libyan regime scorned it as "a
new pact of the imperialist type." After
a Moscow visit by Iraqi leader Saddam
Hussein al-Takriti in February, the Libyan
Government condemned signing of Arab-
Soviet pacts as reviving "imperialism" and
as a violation of the Arab League charter�
which pledges preservation of independence
and sovereignty of member states.
The Soviet commitment to Iraq's defense
is less rigid than that to Egypt in the May,
1971 Egyptian-Soviet treaty.
Before the 1967 Arab-Israel war, Moscow
was Iraq's main arms supplier. It replaced
some of Iraq's 1967 aircraft losses.
From 1968 to 1970, Iraq bought tanks�
armored cars, transport planes, and heli-
copters from France.
rust into k sia's flank
New pact stiffens Indian alliance
With dramatic suddenness, the Soviet,
Union has moved to bolster its influence in
turmoil-ridden southern Asia.
It has signed a 20-year treaty of peace,
friendship, and cooperation with India.
which, in the opinion of diplomatic observ-
ers here, seeks two broad goals:
� To deter an outbreak of hostilities be-
tweet) India and Pakistan by making clear,
which side the Soviet Union would back.
� To consolidate the already solid Soviet
position in India in the face of Washington's
diplomatic rapprochement with Communist
China.
Article 9 of the treaty provides that the
two.-,sides will consult in the event of attack
on either country by a third party and "take
appropriate effective measures" to ensure,
peace and security. It also provides that in
the event of an armed conflict involving one
country the other signatory will not give the
third country any assistance.
Western diplomats believe that this.
article also gives the Russians leverage to
� put pressure on India to prevent a conflict.
, However, if ho$tilities were to break out be-
tween India and Pakistan, Moscow ,has
. pledged itself not to help Pakistan.
� Sequel to U.A.R.� accord �
The treaty was signed in New Delhi Aug.
9 by Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A.
Gromyko and Indian Foreign Minister
Swaran Singh. Mr. Gromyko immediatelyt
hailed the pact as a document Contributing,
to stronger peace in Asia.
Significant in an historical'context; this i is
the second time in three months the Rus-
sians have adopted long-term commitments
with non-Communist tountries. In May they
signed a 15-year treaty with tfie United
Arab Republic. The Soviet Union is ,thus
moving vigorously to formalize and consoli-
date its relations with nonaligned countries.
It is generally agreed here that in the ,�
subcontinent Moscow's role has. beeii; one.
of a pacifier. Because conflict and hostility
merely invite Chinese involvement, the Rus-
sians have a strong interest in maintain-
ing stability in the region..
Since the Tashkent Declaration of 1966,
which put an end to the Indian-Pakistani
war, the Russians have sought good rela-
tions with all reunifies in south Asia, induct.
ing Pakistan, although their primary influ�
ence and investment is in India.
In this connection, what will now be close-
ly watched is Pakistan's reaction. Some ob-
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servers suggest that a pOsswie eilect MC
Inew treaty will be to impel Pakistan to seek
closer ties with Peking. This would lead to a
polarization of the area which the Russians
have sought to avoid. .1
Diplomats think the Russians, however,,
concerned about an outbreak of war, had to
weigh the risks of polarization against the
gains of securing their interests and voice
in India.
New Delhi, for its part, apparently wanted
'an increased commitment from the Soviet
Union in view of the latter's policy of balanc-
ing its relations as between Pakistan and
India. In this despect the treaty is seen to be
a victory for the Indians.
'Status quo backed
It is also suggested that in Article 10
India has recognized Moscow's present ob.'
Iigations to Pakistan. Under this article,
each party declares it has no commitments
, and will not undertake any commitments
;with other states that may cause military
damage to the other party. This seems to
confirm the status quo.
, Poliical observers note that the treaty
differs from the Soviet-U.A.R. pact in many
.respects, a fact that reflects Moscow's dif;
� ferent relationship wih India. The Soviet-
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idle pact with zgypt outlaws all unions and
groupings aimed against a side, thus Inv-
ing India far more freedom of' maneuver
'and independence,
The New Delhi pact, to cite another con-
trast, states that the U.S.S.R. respects In.,
dia's policy of "nonalignment." This term
is not spelled out in the U.A.R. treaty,
although Egypt considers itself a nonaligned.
, nation.
Other- provisions
Other provisions of the Soviet-Indian,
treaty call for regular contacts on major'
international problems and a pledge to
strengthen economic, scientific, and techni-'
Cal. cooperation. The agreement will come,
force only after ratification.
Meanwhile, since the tragic events in East'
Pakistan, Moscow has been scrupulously
.correct in its relations with both New',
Delhi and Islamabad. In April Prtsident
Pocigorny sent a message to President.
Yaliya Khan in which he expressed concern,
is"! well as hope for a "peaceful political
setflement."
While measurei have been urged to stop,
the repressions, Pakistan has not been cone.
deinned outright.
The,Soviet press treats the two halves of
Pakietan as one country, referring carefully.:
nnioto. It --- � -���rn
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1 The treaty announcement came against
the teeming backdrop of Delhi's largest-ever
rally supporting the ruling Congress Party.
An estimated 1 million people poured into
the capital over the weekend to join a Con-
gress-sponsored show of national solidarity.
The treaty news was greeted by jubilant
shouts. "Hindi, Russi, bhai bhai" ("Indians,
Russians, brothers").
Four points for talks ,
Speculation preceding the treaty focused
on the Bangle Desh issue, touchstone of cur-
rent Indian domestic and foreign thinking.
Talks between Indian officials and M.
Gromyko were slated to cover four points;
'Bangle Desh; socioeconomic strains caused
:by the refugee influx; the Chinese-America.
thaw, and separate Chinese and American
assurances of support to Pakistan.
Indian anticipation was limited to a joint
communiqu�not a treaty. But concern that
the Russians would propose Tashkent-style
negotiation were floated mainly by pro-West
elements. After weeks of weathering blis-
tering attacks on their ineffectual foreign
policy, government circles now feel vindi-
cated.
Hope that the Russians would consider
India a worthy junior partner in restoring
the balance of power upset by the Chinese-
American thaw was tenuous. But founda-
tions for strengthening Soviet-Indian rela-
tions were laid soon after the visit of U.S.
presidential assistant Henry A. Kissinger
to Peking. Mr. Kissinger's trip was cited
here as a triggering factor in the Indian
invitation to Moscow. Indians think the first
hint of Pakistani belligerency dates from
HINDUSTAN TIMES
10 August 1971
Mr Gromyko was not exag-
gerating when he &scribed the
Illndo-Soviet Treaty of Peace,
Friendship and Co-operation as
a "most important landmark"
,whose significance "cannot be',
!overestimated". Mr Swaran
[Singh was more blunt in des-
cribing the pact as, a "Treaty
of Non-Aggression" and a
"credible., .deterrent to any
,powers that may have aggres-
sive designs on our territorial
integrity and sovereignty". He
called it a Treaty of Peace
against War and one that would
'strengthen non-alignment � "a
,dynamic policy which can be
adapted to.. .changing situae
,tions".
the Kissinger trip, giving the impression
that China would back Pakistani pugnacity
and that American reluctance to weaken
the thaw would prevent American opposi-
tion to the Chinese stance.
Visit not isolated
�
India sent former ambassador to Moscow
D. P. Dhar posthaste to meet Kremlin
leaders with minimum fanfare .for a top-
level mission. -
'There is little doubt that the urgency ex-
pressed in the Dhar-Moscow mission found
responsive echoes in the Kremlin. Prompt
Soviet acceptance of the bid for bilateral
talks Is seen here as recognition of the need
for both countries to make' public long-
standing ties.
Mr. Gromyko's visit is not an isolated epi-
sode but an important first step toward a
probable new perspective in India's foreign
relations. Relations with the United States
are heading for a new low.
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi told massed
crowds Monday that the treaty does not
mean the end of nonalignment but the
strengthening of India's hands. Indian initia-
tive in arranging the Gromyko visit is not,
being concealed here.
New Delhi now feels assured of Soviet
backing on Bangle Desh but will probably
heed Moscow's advice to avoid giving Paki-
stan excuses to escalate rumblings of war.
Speculation now is focused on prospects
of Soviet help in tackling refugee-care costs
,and general deepening of economic. rela;
'Mons. Mr. Gromyko so far has neither ac-
cepted nor refused an Invitation to. visit
refugee camps.
_
IVAS TFIL) NECESSArrr)
F
When the gloss is removed,
,What ,tands revealed is a 20-.
1,1'ear mutual security treaty,:
[Although the Treaty might not:
{quite commit India to a formall
tor automatic military alliance
i,with the Soviet Union, there:
absolutely, no doubt that in-
tentering into a security, ar-;
rhangement with one of that
world's two superpowers India,
as abandoned non-alignment,
land will in the eyes a manyl
are obviously the two countries,
against which India would need.'
;a "ex edible deterrent" against
"an attack or a threat thereof".
l'The text of the Ida-Soviet
iTreaty is strikingly similar 1.9
ithe text of the UAlt-Sovict
.Tr,enty signed last May. 'rho
!global reactions may not be
very diAinillnr. �
We have often argued that
non-alignment ceased, to be a
viorld and the emergence of,
multi-polar power constellael
tions. Thereafter, non-align-
ment could only. be regardedl,
afi an 'attitude (underlying an:
haven more sharply since thes
;independent foreign policy)!
as such with the end:
'third countries be regarded asi whey
hiapolar,
!having aligned itself with thelfcd the cold war in a
1Sov1et bloc. The United States,
and other western powers will;
[interpret it as such and China.
and Pakistan are likely to react,
rather than a policy in Q�J.11.!
i,The Lido-Soviet Treaty, how,'
fever, entalla alignieieet with3
the Soviet Union which is
kranged against the triC'ed 3tates,
fend, more acutely, -a. Twoi
lyears ago Mr Brezhn,.: 'rondo,
proposal for colleetiv
1r1ty in Asia. This Inune,.
laintsed a lifting of eyebi.
lround the world. India
�ritiestioried this idea and Sova.t.
�spokesmen were quick to ex-,
Iplain that all that had beeni
'intended was regional economic
,co-operation and the renuncia,
tion of force in the settlement
et disputes, or peaceful coel
existence. Obviously it is col-1
security of a rem ei
,positive kind that Mr Swaran4
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'Singh Is now promoting in.' 'the stalen.a.e IA{ � 1, Al 0,14 eillaalallA� SO01141. 6,,,,44��
,ests do not centre on Pakistani
;and it would not lightly vene
ture to � launch on a major,
trans-Ilimalayan war. to :pull:
lIslamabad's chestnuts out of a!
(revolutionary fire. Were it to't
"do so, India has ten mountairn
;divisions poised to Meet just:
esuch threat, And in Alio reel
;mote possibility of their beitd
ioverwheirned, the seperpowers,1
especially the Soviet Union,,
;cciuld not afford to stand by,.
idly in _their own global triter-I
) �
tests. In ' other worchi�.ain ,a
'situation of real. crisis, Soviet',
support would have been forth...1
,ccirnirig without a treaty, Ancili
If it was merely sought to' deter:
'Pakistan politically,, a firmer,
enunciation of the earlier Pod4!
gornye thesis might have
�lid.
�
Now it is quite conceivable)
that the Inclo-Soviet treaty will
�
antagonise. China, bring Chine
and Pakistan even nearer, and
widen the gulf between India
.and the West. President Nixored
foreign policy: report to Cone!
term last March expressed a
US interest in ensuring tha
'the sub-continent did not be-
:come a. focus of great powe
conflict. It added that American:
:activities in the area would be
'kept in balance with those of
:the other major .powers cons:,
;cernecl, namel?, the Soviet";
i,Union and � �China, winch' it�i
'stated had "legitImate"
ests in the area. But it waif!
;pn to, assert ehat.,"nd outsidel
!power ,has 'claim to priedomi-
!riant. influence in the region.".
In View of :this decleretion Viet
tAmericane � may, for other
ireaam04.1%.,::.welL"L05.!ILAtiet
!strengthen "Paidi tad a ensiTol
:and the ROI group to connterl
,the � Indo-Soviet.'seritente..!Ther
the Indo-S,ovigt �:Treaty .'snight
.;Well mak thelapiiirtr4rW.of
new cold war In. '`.thiseparVok,
the world ewithe:/ndia� � feeeth,0!
eye of. the ,storsre. Could .it Le;
;that India' has entered-. into �ee
Iteng-ternel:::ODiql1Aitment 'Met
suggesting that the Indo-Sovietl
Treaty "will provide a .patterni
for similar treaties between
Xlidite and other � countries irn'
:hie ,region". Would this ex-)
ilude a similar treaty with the
'VII? And collective- security:
F;ot.mt, whom?_ (Mr Nehrte:
itsked this question when in
let-oi President Ayub Khan
'proposed joint 'defence between
,India and Pakistan.)
For more than two years:
now the Government of India'
,has from time to time stated its
willingness to open a diatoms,
with Peking. This sent1men0
'was reiterated in ParliamentI
last eviele when Mr Swarani
Singh said that if, necessaryi
India would be willing toi
"create : centiltione for this'
purpose given a favourablei
Chinese response, But all alongi
there Wei been a fear of,
Chinese support to Pakistan in
the event of a crisis in Indoe"
Pakistan relations. This feart
, has continued to haunt policy-'
makers in Delhi with rising
tension .between India and Pak-t
istan over Bangli.' flesh.'
Swaran Singh in fact made.
reference to this in his speech.
on the occasion of the' signing,
or the Indo-SoViet Treaty. He
told Mr Gromyko that his visit
coincided "with developinente'
In this part of the world which;
are a matter of common con-
cern to both our countries and:
could jeopardise peace and.
security." For its part., the;
Soviet Union is locked in an:
ideological and nationalist-.
territorial power struggle with'
'China. The signs of a Sino-TIS.;
:thaw have caused some unease,
in Moscow which is accordingly)
tanxIons to buttress its own,
position. It has quite expectedly'
;turned to India as among the
' count ries on which it can:
:nnehor itself in Asia. The
;United States, in turn, is being,.
!impelled ,to withdraw from;
,Indo-Chitia and the South-Eastl
Asian mainland by virtue ofi
Alin pressure of its own domes-
tic public opinion. It would
ilike to seek a rapprochement,
with China, which cannot seri.'
;ouster threaten it for at least
;another decade or more. Des-
Ipite . the growing detente in
[Europe the. -United States*"
principal .contender . for global
Isupremacy during the seventies,
iremains the Soviet Union whii e
Is sought to be prevented from
ithrusting south to the oil rich
:areas of West Asia and North4
:Africa and, down to the Indian
'Ocean.' Hence the importance
'of West Pakistan .in American.
'strategie thinking 'And Pre-
sident
Nix-on's � military � 'anti
`political supped to President
Xahya � Khan's regime. despite
its possible distaste for .� what
;has happened in East Bengal:
;Washington's complete insene
"eitivity to India's thinking 1W
this. Matter, and Dr Henry Kis- .
:singer's reported statement to
;Mr L. K. Jha that India must
mot count on i positive Aine-
!rfcan response should China
;intervene in favour of Islamaei
!bad in any !tido-Pakistan 'con-t
'filet has probably m1steken1Y1
jedded to the Governmett ofi
;India's sense of loneliness Mel
he -Bangle Desh issue , an
encouraged'. It to seek seourit
aseurtinces from, ' the Sovie
alnion. which Moscoev has. lettei �
rtelaci.to. offer against the' Wicket
'ground of its own global inter.
eats. The United States has
pushed India much fiirtheei
i along than where' it tnigh
! 'have ventured on its own, Andi,
;esuch 'has been the dismay M.
;American support � to Pakietant
"in recent Weeks that: Delhi has;
:lodged a. diplomatic protest
with Washington over, thesel
rhostile acts", .
In Our judgment the�GoVern-1
lment has overreacted tee the',
r'prospect 'of an "Indo-Pakistanl
'conflict, the possibility' and:
!scale of sChinese interventioii
tin any such event, and the'
:American attitude towarciii
,
.1-iort-range coneideratione ertq
freight it periu4N 'anwittiriglx
!be eueked, into the Sine-Sovie
reonflict? Whether it btu)
'return' gained any leverage ot
:flexibility :over Bringia'�De.,
remains to: tie Peen.
It is quite clear that a Treitt:31
of such far-reaching implica
(teens could not have been negol
ttiated overnight even tlieughl
ethe Preparations may 'have(
Ibeen hastened by more reetin
;developments, It is surprising
�that the Prime Minister sliouldt
not havd thought fit to give
Parliament or the countrY the
slightest inkling of such a' pro
�found change despite numerous
,upportunities for doind so.
'whether in the External Affairs
IMinistry's annual report 'or in
;the course of parliamentary
;debates or other public; pro-
notincements. There h.{ co in-
Cidence of interests between
kInclia and the Soviet Union 1n4
'Asia. Even othei wise, we'
(would welcome a strengthening
lof the close and cordial eco-
'nornic and political tics that
t subsist between the two cows-
tries. But we do regiu�d India.
a potentially great power,
:and certainly a major factor
:in Asia which is neither so'
.weak nor even so lonely as,
(to accept any arrangement that
;might reduce it to the status,
,of being anything less than
tequal in its..relationa with any
'other country. The Soviet Union
;needs India as much as India
;needs the Soviet' Union. There
ils also no reason' to suppos
that this country cannot secure
lan honourable resolution of I
(differences with China or place
Its relations with the United
;States on a more rational end
;mature footing. These 'objec-
tives must Still be pursued s
;that; India'S foreign and domes
itic pellicles 'remain completely
;independent and are :guided b
the' national interest and"arc
!not .'overshadowed by. the gl
"hal � interests of howsoeVe
Iiittlbre,.4 tir4ntqleCtqe.:.
10
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HINDUSTAN TIMES
10 August 1571
Text. of Ind
r� '
NEW DELHI, Aug. 9�The fol-
lowing is the text of the treaty
of peace, friendship and co-ope-
rsition between the Republic of
India and the Union Of Soviet
!Socialist Republics:
Desiroue of expanding and con-
solidating the existing relations of
isincere friendship between them,
Believine that the further deve-
lopment ot friendship and co-
operation *eta the basic national
Interests of both . the States as
eWeil as the interests of lasting
!peace in Aela and the world,
1 Determined to promote the con-
tolidation of universal peace and
security and to make steadfast
efforts for the relaxation of In-
ternational tensions and the final
elimination of . the remnants of
colonialism,
. Upholding their firm faith in
the principles of peaceful co-
existence and co-operation � be-
tween States with different poll.
beg and socinl systems,' .
Convinced that In the world to-
day international ' problems can
only be solved by eel-operation
rtnd not by conflict,
, Reaffirming their determination
o abide by the purposes and
principles of the United Nations
'Charter,
' The Republic of India on the
one side, and the Union of Soviet
;Socialist Republics on the other
side, have decided to conclude
the present treaty for which pur-
poses the following plenipoten-
Ittaries have been appointed: �
1 On behalf of the Republic of
India: Sardar Swaran Singh, Min-
ister of External Affairs.
� One behalf of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics: Mr A. A.
Gromyko, Minister .of Foreign
Affairs 'who, having each present-
ed their � eredentials, which are
found to be in proper -form and
due order, .have agreed as fol-
lows:
. .
Artide. I
" The high contracting parties
solemnly declare that enclurine
,peace and friendship shall prevail
;between the two countries and
etheir peoples. Each party shall
respect the independence, saver-
eighty and territorial integrity of
the other party and refrain from
;Interfering in the other's internal
i affairs. The ,high contracting par-
1 ties shall continue to develop and
consolidate the relations of sin-
cere friendship, good neighbourli-
ness and comprehensive co-opera-
tion existing , betWeen them on
the basis of the aforesaid prin-
ciples, as well as those of equality
and Mutual benefit,
Article II
Guided by the desire to contri-
bute in. every possible way to
ensure enduring peace and secu-
rity of their people, the high con-
tracting parties declare their
determination to continue their
efforts to preserve and to streng-
then peace in Asia and through-
out the world, to halt the arms
race and to achieVe general and
complete disarmament. including
both nuclear and conventional,
under effective International con-
trol.
.Article III "
Guided by' their loyalty to the
�lofty ideal of equality of all peo-
� ples and nations, irrespective of
race or creed, the high contract-
ing parties condemn colonialism
and racialism, in all forms and
manifestations; and reaffirm their
determination to strive for their
�final and complete elimination.
The high contracting parties
shall co-operate with other 'States
to achieve these aims and to sup-
port tho just aspirations of the
peoples in their struggle against
colonialism and racial domination.
�. Article IV
The Republic of India respects
the peace-loving policy of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Repub-
lics aimed at strengthening friend.
ship and Co-operation-I with all
nations.
The Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics reepects India's policy
of non-alignment and reaffirms
that this policy constitutes an im-
portant factor in the maintenance
of universal peace and interna-
tional security and in the lessen-
ing of tensions in the world.
Article V �
� Deeply interested in ensuring
universal peace and security, at-
taching great importance to their
mutual co-operation in the inter-
national field for achieving these
aims, the high contracting parties
will maintain regular contacts
with each other on major Inter-
national :problems affecting the
Soviet treaty
'interests of both the Statea by
means of meetings and exchanges
of views between their leading
statesmen, visits by official dele-
gation's and special envoys cif the
two Governments, and . through
diplomatic channels. ,
Article VI
Attaching great importance to
economic, scientific and technoe
logical co-operation between them
the high contracting parties will
continue to consolidate and ex-
pand mutually advantageous and
comprehensive co-operation in
these fields as well as expand
ti ade, transport- and communica-
tions between them' on the basis
of the 'principles of equality,
mutual benefit ' and onost-favour.
ed-nation - treatment, subject to
the existing' agreements and the
special arrangements 'with conti-
guous countries as specified in
the Indo-Soviet trade agreement
of Dec. 20, 1970.
Article VII �
-The high contracting parties
than promote further develop.
meat of ties and contacts between,
them in the fields of science, art,
literature, education, publio
health, Press, radio, television..
cinema, tourism' and sports.
Article VIII
In accordance with the tractie'
,tional friendship established be.;
tween the two countries each of
the high contracting particle
solemnly declares that it shalt,
not enter into or participate
any military alliance directed
against the, other. party.' �
Each high contracting party,
undertakes to abstain � from any
aggression against the other party.
and to prevent the uto of its
mutual consultations in oroer to e
remove such threat and to take 1
appropriate effective measures to e
ensure peace and the ,security of
their countries.
� Article X
� Each high contracting party ,
solemnly declares that it ehalle
not enter into . any obligation,...
secret or public, with one or More 4
States, which is incompatible with
this treaty. Each high contrecting ,
party further declares that no
obligation exists, nor shall any
obligation be entered into, be-
tween itself and any other State
or States, which might causal
military damage to the other �
party. � , .
Article XI
Thli treaty is concluded for the
duration of 20 years and will be I
automatically 'extended for each.,
successive period of five years
unless either high contracting
party declares its desire to termie
nate it by giving notice to the
other high contracting party 12
months prior to the expiration of,.
the treaty. The treaty will bo
subject to ratification and will.
come into force on the date of
the exchange of instruments of:
ratification which will take place
in Moscow within one month of �I
the signing of this treaty.
� Article XII
Any difference of interpretation
of any article or articles of this
treaty� which may arise between
the high contracting partica will;
be settled bilaterally by peaceful:
means in a -spirit of mutu -I eon-
pect .and understanding.
The said plenipotentiarlen heve
signed the present treaty In Bindle
Russian and English, ell �exts
territory for the commission of being equally authentic reed have
any act which relight inflict mill, affixed thereto their scale. .
Done tary damage on the other high one In New Delhi on the ninth
contracting party. � day of August in the year one
thousand - nine hundred and
At-title � �, seventy one.
Each high contracting party On behalf of the
undertakes to abstain from pro. Republic of India
viding any assistance to any ,third
party that engages in armed con-
flict of External Affairs. 'Swarin Singh
Met with the other party: In the Minister
event of either party being sueel . On behalf of the 11
ties shall immediately enter. nto A.. A. eiromykoi*
jected to an attack or a threat'
thereof, the high contracting yr- e
.� e Union of Soviet Socialist 1
' � �� Republics .
Minister of Foreign e.
11
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BALTIMORE SUN
11 August 1971
India
New Delhi�The Indian public
and its representatives in Par-
liament welcomed yesterday
what they considered an "alli-
ance" with the Soviet Union.
t "Nothing in recent times has
I electrified). the people so much
' as signing" of the 20-year pact
1 .of friendship Monday, the Indian
minister of external affairs,
Swaran Singh, told the Indian
Parliament yesterday.
Bs PBAN SABILiftWAL
Neu > Dehi Burton of The Sun
The minister declared that the
pact represented no deviation
from India's non-alignment. In a
listless six-hour debate on the
treaty in the Parliament, mem-
bers gave the treaty ma55ive
support not for what the treaty
said but for what it meant in
view of threats of general war
by the Pakistani president A. M.
Yabya Khan, If India continues
to support the East Pakistan
Bengali rebels.
A typical interpretation of the
treaty in the Indian press yes-
terday was: "The Soviet Union
will come to India's help in cage
of an attack or threats of an
attack by Pakistan, China or
any other country."
� Members of Parliament inter-
preted the treaty to mean a de-
fense alliance between two na-
tions. They expressed hope and
expectation that the Russians
ekoines Pact Of Friendship
With Soviet
will come to aid India in case or
war with either China or Paki-
stan.
Hiren Mukherji. the leader of
the pro-Moscow Communist par-
ty of India, asked the govern-
ment "to shed our approach of
cold feet, now that we have this
treaty." He asked the govern-
ment to extend recognition not
only to the Bengali nation provi-
sional government but also to
North Vietnam, North Korea
and East Germany.
Sonic members called the
signing of the treaty a "red-let-
ter day in Indian history." And
there was general criticism o
the United States and the west-
ern powers in their relations
with India.
Members said the U.S. ap-
prapch to India has always been
"partisan toward Pakistan. �
A spokesman from the ruling
Congress Party said that the
Soviet Union has always been a
"true friend of India" in many
of the critical times faced by the
nation. They said in all the
wars, including the Sino-Indian
war of 1962 and Indo-Pakistan
war of 1965, it was Russia which
came to the aid of India.
Soviet Neutrality
The United States gave India
emergency arms aid in I9r1
while the Soviet Union remained
neutral. In 1965 the United,
States cut off arms aid to both!
Indian and Pakistan, hurting
Pakistan more, while the Soviet
Union mediated the conflict.
Atal Bihari Vajpayee, Hindu
leader of the orthodox Jan
Sangh party, welcomed the
treaty because it won India a
friend at a critical juncture. It
indicated India was not friend-
less as in the Sino-Indian war of
1962. The pact will also cheek
Pakistan's aggressive designs
against India, he added.
Mr. Vajpayee ridiculed the
government's defense of non-
alignment and said non - align-
ment was not sacrosant at a
time when international rela-
tions were being forged for
"naked self-interest."
Mr. Singh admitted that tim-
ing of the treaty during a period
' of tension with Pakistan has
been such that "even those who
, want to oppose it know, that the
people are behind it" and dare'
not oppose it.
He also assured the Puha:
ment that the pact would not
"restrain" India from taking
unilateral action in East Paki-
stan or continuing the support of
the Bengali rebels. Not even the
Soviet Union can restrain India
from exercising its sovereign
rights, he said.
It was not a defense pact nor
.a military alliance, Mr. Singh
said. By the provision of mutual
consultations, the pact only pro-
vides a framework within which
two nations could take steps to
maintain security.
This provision - makes the
friendship treaty different from
the Warsaw Pact and other mili-
tary pacts as there is no clause
for automatic commitment "of
armies by either side, "Mr.
Singh asserted.
In reply to a question, the
minister said that anything in
the perpetual Sino-Soviet friend-
ship treaty which is inconsistent
with Indo-Soviet friendship pact
is "not binding."
No vote was taken on the
treaty, because the Cabinet has
the constitutional power to rati-
fy it on its own.
Nevertheless, the government
still took the treaty to Parlia-
ment for debate.
Little Opposition
Of the eight major parties In
the country, six extended their;
support and only two�the con-,
servative Swatantra and the
Socialist party�opposed it. �
Speaker after speaker of all
political sentiments used the de-
bate to criticize the U.S. policy
or shippings arms to Pakistan
'after March 25, when the civil,
war erupted in East Pakistan,
12
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aiRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
27 May 1971
ellieatte
sparrin 11�E1
By Geoffrey Gothic!'
Qverseas news editor of
The Christian Science Monitor
Soviet President Podgorny and Egyptian
.President Sadat are shrewdly trying to get
the measure of each other in their talks in
Cairo.'
' Mr. Podgorny will want to discover the
effect on the Soviet �investment in Egypt�
military, economic, and political�of the re-
cent purge of those in the Egyptian leader-
'.ship generally deemed most pro-Soviet. �
Mr. Sadat wit( want to reassure the Rus-
sians that what has happened is no cause
for Moscow to weaken its support of Egypt
or to try to put the skids under him and
restore to power any of the men Whom he"
has ousted.
If in the 1.:ocess, Mr. Sadat can give the
' Russians the impression that their backing.
�, of any move from within Egypt against him ,
would be at their peril, he will probably,,
� .seize the opportunity.
It can hardly be a coincidence, that the
. front page of the leading 'Cairo newspaper,
Al-Ahram, carried alongside a report of Mr.
Podgorny's arrival in Cairo a report on the
Egyptian Prosecutor General's statement,
� that the "mastermind!' behind this month's
alleged plot to depose President Sadat was
, former Vice-President Ali Sabry.
News report cited
Mr. Sabry has long been considered the.
most pro-Soviet of the men at the top in
Egypt. He was dismissed from office at the
, beginning of the month and since mid-May
� has been in detention.
Ai-Ahram, writing of the first round of
talks between Mr. Podgorny and Mr. Sadat,
Another base for Mr.
Sabry's friends until Mr.
Sadat's purge was the
newspaper �Al-Gomouria.
Through. its columns ear-
lier this year Mr. Sadat's
willingness to reopen the
Suez Canal before total
Israeli withdrawal from
afro
said that two facts had already emerged.
First, the Soviet Union had renewed its
pledge of political, economic, and military
support for Egypt. And second, ,both Presi- '
dents reaffirmed their commitment: to work
for the liberation of all Arab territories 0e;
cupied by Israel. ,
This was in keeping with the amenities'
.which attended Mr. Podgorny's arFival in.
the Egyptian t.c"a-pital. Mr. Sadat was at the;
airport to welcome him and embraced him'.
There ,was also a 21-gun salute, together:-
with the cheering crowds and banners which
Egyptian officialdom can usually produce
as the occasion demands.
� All facets of the Soviet Union's involve-
ment in Egypt are reflected in the team
that President Podgorny has brought with
him. In putting Mr. Podgorny in charge of
the delegation the Kremlin is honoring Mr..,
Sadat by making the talks a genuine sum-
mit, with president talking to president.
Almbers of 'party
t Mr. Podgorny's side are: Soviet For-
eign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko, his coun-
try's highest foreign-policy expert; the First
Deputy Defense Minister, Gen. Ivan Pay-.
lovsky; and Boris Ponomarev, secretary of.
the Soviet Communist Party's Central Com-
mittee.
The latter's inclusion in the Soviet dele-
gation can probably be explained by the
disrupting effect which President Sadat's
purge has had on the bureaucracy of the
Arab Socialist Union (ASU), Egypt's single-
party organization.
Ali Sabry's main power center within
Egypt had long been the ASU. Mr. Sadat
has dismissed Mr. Sabry's friends from the
ASU machine and has announced his inten-
tion of rebuilding the party organization
almost from scratch.
Sinai was vigorously chal-
lenged.
Another of Al-Gom:
houria's arguments was
that Mr. Sadat was naive
:to put so much trust in
'the United States as a
'benign influence to secure
a settlement with Israel
acceptable to Egypt.
Interview run
On Thursday, Al-Gom-
houria carried an inter-
view with the Soviet Am-
bassador in Cairo, Vladi-
mir Vinogradov' who is
participating in Mr. Pod-
gorny's talks with Presi-
dent Sadat. Mr. Vino-
gradov is quoted as saying
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-filet he believes "it is pos-
sible to achieve a political
solution" inythe .Middle-
East "if efforts are
stepped."
The way to a just settle-
ment, he said, depended
to a large extent on a
strong Egyptian position
and on convincing Israel
and its supporters of the
strength and capability of
the Egyptians.
Mr. Sadat's present ef-
forts are concentrated on
� getting the United States
�to use its� good offices to
persuade Israel to match
the concessions which
in Egyptian eyes � have
� already been offered by
� Cairo in the interest of a
settlement.
THE GUARDIAN, Manchester
29 May 1971
Soviet view
To the Russians, this
would be tantamount to
peace under American
auspices. They would pre-
fer peace under Russian
auspices�which could be
represented as having
been achieved through
joint Soviet-Egyptian
tar)' pressure on the Is.
raelis.
Friendship sealed�on paper
The Soviet Union likes to see things written
down in black and white. Whenever its friends
have taken unilateral action and Speculation has
followed sooner or later, Moscow has felt the need
to set the record straight .once and for all. This
has been the case in Eastern Europe many times.
With some significant differences the 15-year
"Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation"
between Egypt and the Soviet Union falls into
this category. It comes against the background of
President Sadat's purge of plotters, many of
',whom were senior officials known to be sympa-
thetic to the Soviet Union. At the same time the
rapprochement between Cairo and Washington
had 'encouraged Mr Rogers to take a direct
personal lead in trying to guide Egypt and Israel
towards peace. The Soviet Union must have been
apprehensive that its massive economic. and
.military investments 'were at stake. Worse stil4
the geographical and military facilities it had in,
Egypt, if threatened, could have undermined the
Soviet Union's global strategy. President
Podgorny's visit was primarily to find out what'
had happened. But both he and President Sadat
had compellingreasons for keeping things as they
were. What better way of showing this than
through 'a treaty?
The published clauses of. the treaty suggest
nothing more than "a further concrete expression
. of the relations which have brought 116 together
over many years "�to use Mr Sadat's words. The
'points about mutual non-interference, coopera-
tion in economic, cultural, and other fields, corn.
, . mitments � not to join anti-Soviet alliances, and
pledges to pursue socialism at home are all either
" old hat or ambiguous enough to afford a way out
� if needed. The military clause is, essentially
.defenslye and connected with tralling ifl supplied
� arms (though Israel will dot like the srtund of the
. clause "with a view to Strengthening Egypt's
� capacity to eliminate the consequences of aggret-
'sion as Well as increasing its ability to stand up
� to aggression "). This stops well short of: ,the
sli ar clause hi the "Treaty of Friendship, . Co-
' operation, and Mutual Assistance" signed by
:Rumania and the Soviet Union last ,Aust,' for
example. That said "In case one of the high
contracting parties is subjected to an armed
attack . . . the other party, implementing the
inalienable right to Individual or collective self-
defence in accordance with the Article 51 of the
UN Charter, will immediately render it all-round
assistance with all the means at its disposal,
including military."
If the treaty marks no change in relations,'
why was it necessary at all? The clause dealing
with consultation on matters of interest and with
coordinating policies gives a clue.. The extent of
Mr Sadat's purge and Moscow's muted reaction
indicated that Russia's Aircct influence on Egypt's
'eternal affairs is limited. It did not know fully
what was going' on and it was not consulted.
There are also Indications that the contents of Mr
Sadat's exchange of letters with 'Mr Nixon and
,Mr Rogers were being kept very largely among
themselves. The Soviet Union is seeking in this
treaty some right to a share in the secrets of
Cairo's goings on both Maid� the country and in
Its Middle East policies. The Soviet Union mutt__
alSo hope that it will now be in a better position.
to ensure that Egypt does not strike out on Its
own, militarily, or indulge in,negotiations harmful
to Moscoves' long-term interests. .
The treaty and an accompanying communiqu�
said the search for peace would continue. But its'
may make the search tougher. The two sides have.
strengthened their relations and Increased
responsibilities just by putting their 'terms in.
,writing. The Egyptian side has a new dipldmatin,
card to play and this may make it harder, to get
/negotiations ' with Israel going again or to open'
the Suez Canal as part of an overall peace
settlement. The main danger is that the polarisa-
tion between Egypt and Israel and their patrons
may be hardened., It may cause Israel to press for .;
further military guarantees from the United
States�and push the potential conflict up on to �
higher plane. But it would. pay both sides to
regard this treaty as .marking the conclusion (as
far as can be told) of Mr Sadat's probationary.,
.period as absolute ruler of Egypt..For whatever _
is ;in the treaty, it remains on paper. In moments.
Of stress �uch treatleS often become no more than.,
pieces of 'paper,
,111
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THE SUNDA!' TELEGRAPH
30 May 1971
Soft Soap
rEIHE Egyptian-S oviet
I. "Friendship Treaty" just
signed in Cairo is a natural by- ,
product of� that savage counter-
coup in which President Sadat
recently imprisoned or immobil-
ised those plotting to unseat him. t
Some of the plotters were held to '
be Soviet proteges and the Krern.1
Hn must have been pressing Sadat
hard. for something to save Bus- ,
sia's fare as well as Bussia's vast
Strategic and emnomic � lniCstk
lt14411 ttt itt% ,
This the treaty has now pro-
vided. But it does no more than
formalise an existing situation..4
'Indeed, one passage�where the
two signatories promise "non-
interference" in each other's '
internal affairs�can only be,,
regarded as a plus for Sadat.'!
Egypt is hardly likely to interfere :
in Russia's domestic politics.
As to the general prospects for',
a Middle East settlement, Sadat
Is a peace-maker, and ,anything',,i
which strengthens his personal
position, as this treaty does, can''
only help those prospects in the
long nu1
Witnwhile, iNe htsdiscomitted
rivals at home, the Russians have,
learnt how deceptive those sleepy'
eyes of Anwar Sadat can be, , -
FEW YORK TIMES
23 MAY 1971
Text of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation
Following, as transmitted
in English by Toss, the Soviet
press agency, is the text of
he Soviet-Egyptian treaty of
friendship signed in Cairo
yesterday:
The Union of Soviet Social-
ist Republics and the United
'Arab Republic,
Being firmly convinced that
the further development of
friendship and all-around co-
operation between the Union
of :Soviet Socialist Republics
.and the 'United Arab Repub-
lic meets the interests .of thee
peoples of both states and';
helps strengthen world peace,
Being inspired by the ideals'
of struggle against imperial-
ism, and colonialism, and for
the freedom, independence
and social progress of the
peoples,
Being determined to wage
persistently the struggle for
stronger international peace
and security in 'accordance
with the invariable course of
their peaceable foreign policy,
Reaffirming their allegiance
to the aims and principles of
the United Nations Charter. .
Being driven by a delsire to
coneol id ate a nd strone then
tire traditional relations of
sincere `friendship between
Signed by Soviet and Egypt
the two states and peoples
through concluding a treaty
of friendship and cooperation
and thus creating a basis for
their further development,
Agr- ed on the following:.
� Article I
The high contracting par-
tics solemnly declare that un-
breakable friendship will al-
ways exist between the two'.
, countries and their peoples.
They will continue to develop
and strengthen .the existing
relations of friendship and
all-around cooperation be-
tween theM' in the political,
economic, scientific, techno-
logical, -cultural and other
fields on :the basis of the,
principles of respect for the
sovereignty, territorial integ-
' rity, noninterference in the
internal affairs of each other,.
: equality and mutual benefit
Article 2
." The' Union of Soviet Se-
cialist Republics as a socialiq
state and the United Axel)
Republic, which has set itslf
the aim of re i rum Ag
society along sociriliet
will cooperate closely and in
all fields in ensuring condi-
tions for preserving and fur-
ther developing the social
and economic gains of their
peoples.
Article .3
. .
Being guided by a desire
-to contribute in every way
-toward' .maintaining interna-
tional peace and the security
of the peoples, the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republic.s and._
the United Arab Republic will
continue with all determina-
tion to make efforts toward
achieving and ensuring a last-
jog and fair peace in the Mid-
die East in accordance with
'the aims and principles of the
United Nations Charter.
In pursuing a peace-loving'
foreign policy, the high con-'-'
tracting parties will come out '
for peace, relaxation of, inter-
national tension, achievement
of general and complete dis-
armament and prohibition of
nuclear and other types Of .1
weapons of mass destruction.'
Article 4
Being guided by the ideals
of freedom and equality of
all the peoples, the high con-
tracting parties ,condenin ,
perialism and colonielism lit
all their forms and manifesta-
tions. They will continue to
come out against imperialisni,
for the fuli and final elimina-
tion of colonialism in pursu-
ance of the li.N. declaration-
' on the granting of independ-
ence to all colonial countries
and peoples, and wage un-
swervingly the struge le
against racialism and apart-
heid.
Article 5
The high contracting par--
ties will continue to expand
and ,deepen all-around co-
operation and exchange of
experience in the economic
and scientific-technological
fields�industry, agriculture,
.water conservancy, irrieat ion,
development of nautrai re-
sources, development 11
power engineering, the tre
'hug of national personnel one
other fields Of economy.
The two sides .will expand
..trade and sea shipping be-
tween the two states on the
basis of the principles of mut-
ual benefit and most-favored
nation 'treatment.
Article. 6 .
The high row:reciting par--
tics will further promote co-
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operation between them in
the fields of science, arts, lit-
erature. education, health' '
services, the press, radio, :
television, Cinema, tourism,
physical culture -and other"
fields. '
The two sides will promote -
wider cooperation and direct �
connections between political`
and public organizations of .
working people, enterprises,
culutral and scientific .institu-
tions for the purpose of a
deeper mutual acquaintance
with the life, work and
achievements of the peoples ,
of the two countries. . �
Article 7. �
Being deeply interested in �
ensuring peace and the secu-
rity of the peoples, and
taching great importance, tol.
concertedness of their actions."
in the international area in
the struggle for peace, the.:
high contracting parties will,'
for this purpose, regularly
consult each other at differ-
ent levels on all important
questions affecting the inter-'
ests of both states.
In the event of develop-
ment of situations creating,
in the opinion of both sides,
a danger to peace or viola-,
tion of peace, they will con-
tact each other without delay
In order to concert their po-.� �
sitions with a view to remov-
ing the threat that has arisen -
or reestablishing peace. -
' Article 8
In the interests of strength-
ening the defense capacity of .
the United Arab Republic, the
high contracting parties will
continue to develop coopera- �
tion in the military field on
the basis of appropriate
agreements between them.
Such cooperation will provide
specifically for assistance in
the training of the U.A.R.
military personnel, in master-: �
� ing the armaments and equip-
'ment supplied to the United
� Arab Republic with a view to
� strengthening its capacity to.
, eliminate the consequences
of aggression as well as in-
creasing its ability to stand
� up to aggression in general.
Article 9
Proceeding from the aims �
and principles of this treaty. -
Each of the high contract- ,
ing parties states that it will
not enter into alliances and .
will not take part in any,
groupings of states, in ac-
stions or measures directed
against the other high con-
tracting party. ,
Article 10
Each of the high contract-
ing parties declares that its ,
commitments under the
existing international treaties �
are not in contradiction with '
the provisions of this treatr`
and It undertakes not to
enter into any international '
agreements incompatible with
it.
Article 11
The present treaty will be
operative within 15 years
since the day it enters into
force.
' If neither of the high con-
tracting parties declares a i
year before the expiry of this
term its desire to terminate
the treaty, it will remain in '
force for the next five yearp
and so henceforth until onp
of the high contracting
parties makes a year befo
the expiry of the curre
'five-year period a writte
warning on its Intention to
terminate it.
Article 12
The present treat, is ub
ject to ratification and shall
come into force on the day
'of exchange of ratification
instruments, which will tal
, place in Moscow in the neat-,
est future.
, The present treaty is done
In two copies, each in Rus-
sian and Arabic, with both
texts, being equally authentic.
Done in the city of Cairo
on May 27, 1971, which eor-
responds to 3 Rabia as Said,
1391, liejira.
For the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics.
N. PODGORNY.
For the United Arab Re.'
.,,public.
ANWAR SADAT.
16
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SECRET 24 July 1972
THE HERETIC'S HOMECOMING
1. The attached backgrounder deals with the latest Soviet
effort to win back Yugoslavia and treats the subject within the
framework of the current Soviet policy of detente with the West.
2. A ministerial meeting_of nonaligned countries is
scheduled for Georgetown, Guyana, early in August. The meeting
can serve as a peg for keeping the significance of Tito's June
trip to M4cow in proper perspective. Depending on target
audiences, we suggest some of the following propaganda points
which are supported in the backgrounder:
a. Moscow's attempt to warm up relations with
Tito is illustrative of the Soviet Union's opportunism in
its foreign policy dealings; reversals in Soviet policy
are commonplace whenever the USSR sees its power position
Challenged (as it does by the growing influence of China
worldwide and especially in Europe).
b. The latest move was made only because the USSR
needs Yugoslavia to consolidate its base in Europe as a
preparatory step to any conference dealing with European
security.
c. In bilateral relations, the Soviet goal is to
be in a position to directly influence Yugoslav policies
in the post-Tito era.
d- The lip service given Tito's independent policies
typifies Soviet duplicity and can be contrasted with
the vehement hardline campaign instigated early this year
against "those who would place national interests ahead
of the interests of the Socialist commonwealth."
e. Finally, the Yugoslays are fully aware of Soviet
motives. Titoi.tsucceeded inAeeping lirmly to his own
political line, and if anything he has succeededoin, re-
newing Soviet acquiescence4otAlis policy of nonalignment.
SECRET
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FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY
24 July 1972
THE HERETIC'S HOMECOMING
Yugoslav President Tito, responding to a Soviet initiative,
visited the Soviet Union from 6 to 10 June. Soviet media gave
extensive coverage to Tito's visit., playing up the warmth of
his reception and the prospects of further Yugoslav-Soviet
cooperation. On the day of his arrival in Moscow, Tito was
given the Order of Lenin, the first time in his long and
controversial career as a Communist, dating back to the 1917
Bolshevik Revolution, that he was so honored by the Kremlin.
Before he left Moscow, Tito became the first foreigner ever to
he awarded a Soviet marshal's sabre. Despite this ostentatious
wooing of Tito and the openly warm response on the part of the
Yugoslays, there is no indication that significant new agreements
were reached that would change the basic positions of either
country.
Ever since Tito's break with Stalin in 1948, a constant
factor in. Yugoslavia's relations with the Soviet Union has been
Belgrade's adamant insistence that such relations be based on
"mutual recognition of the principles of full sovereignty,
independence, equality, mutual respect and noninterference in
internal affairs for any reason whatever." As the only sovereign
nonaligned Communist state in East Europe, Yugoslavia has also
demanded of the Kremlin recognition of these same principles in
party-to-party relations.
The lowest points in Yugoslav-Soviet relations have
invariably stemmed from Soviet policies and actions in direct
disregard for these principles, such as the Soviet invasion of
Czechoslovakia in 1968. The Yugoslays had followed the
exciting days of the "Prague Spring" with high expectations that
a moderate Soviet reaction to Czech attempts to find their own
democratic way to socialism would signal basic changes in Kremlin
policies that could lead to a democratization of the Soviet Union
itself and a general easing of world tensions.
Tito himself played an active role in trying to influence the
Kremlin leaders toward moderation. There was shock and dismay
in Belgrade when Soviet tanks rumbled into Prague in August
1968 and Yugoslav-Soviet relations reached their lowest point
since the break with Stalin.
Then, just three years later, the man who advocated the
"limited sovereignty of states in the socialist commonwealth",
found it necessary to go to Belgrade and pay lip service to
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Yugoslavia's "sovereignty, independence, and equality." The
task could not have been pleasant or easy for Brezhnev. Further-
more, warming up to the maverick Communists in Belgrade risked
encouraging feelings of independence and nationalism in the other
Communist states of East Europe. It could also add to the already
confused and divided situation existing among many Communist
parties by providing further stimulus for those "naive and misguided"
nationalists who, disdainful of Moscow's leadership, seek their
own roads to Socialism. It could, in addition, further inflame
nationalistic and liberal elements in the ethnic republics of
the USSR itself. Clearly, in taking this initiative, the men in
the Kremlin must have been motivated by reasons they considered to
be of the highest priority to Soviet foreign policy objectives --
reasons that extend well beyond even the broadest concept of
bilateral Yugoslav-Soviet relations.
True, Moscow fully appreciates Yugoslavia's strategic
geographical location, its hundreds of miles of Adriatic coast-
line, ideal for naval bases adjacent to the Mediterranean, as well
as Yugoslavia's location astride air and land routes from Europe
to the Middle East, The Kremlin also appreciates the fact that
Tito has recently celebrated his 80th birthday and that once his
charisma and forceful leadership have left the scene his successors
will be faced with difficult political problems in keeping the
six Yugoslav republics and various nationality groups united. In
the post-Tito era, good relations with Yugoslavia could facilitate
broader Soviet contacts with Yugoslav leaders and might even
provide an opportunity for a greater degree of Soviet influence in
Belgrade's future policies.
The above factors were undoubtedly considered by Brezhnev and
. his foreign policy advisors. However, in view of the major risks
involved, other factors, broader in scope and more vital to Soviet
interests, probably played the decisive role in Brezhnev's courting
of Tito. The basic decision appears to have been made in line with
"a sweeping program for world peace" presented by Brezhnev to
the 24th Congress of the CPSU, just five months before he went to
Belgrade. The overriding concern of the CPSU at this congress was
the problem of China and the need to consolidate the Soviet position
in Europe.
Brezhnev's "peace program" emphasized "peaceful coexistence"
between the Socialist and non-Socialist camps, to include
specifically, "detente in Europe" and "the convocation of an all-
European conference"; the "conclusion of treaties banning nuclear,
chemical and bacteriological weapons"; "invigoration of the struggle
to halt the race in all types of weapons"; and "mutually advantageous
cooperation in every sphere with other interested states."
2
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To lessen the possible negative consequences of embracing
Tito and engaging in detente with the West, Moscow, in a move that
appears to many Westerners as a puzzling contradiction, also
laid the groundwork at the 24th Party Congress for a concerted hard-
line campaign for ideological unity in the communist camp
subsequently has included some of the strongest attacks against
"revisionism" and "separate roads to socialism" that have emanated
from the Kremlin since the days of Stalin. A central thesis in
this campaign appeared in the main journal of the Central Committee
of the CPSU, Kommunist (issue No. 3, February 1972), entitled,
"The Falsifiers of Scientific Communism and Their Bankruptcy."
The vehemence and scope of this Soviet drive against both
"right-Wing" and "left-wing" revisionism was such that some
responsible Western observers predicted a Kremlin move to
formulate a new Comintern or Cominform. It does, indeed, reflect
the duality of current Soviet policies that this concerted drive
against "revisionism" reached its highpoint only after Brezhnev
had gone to Belgrade where he acknowledged the continued validity
of Yugoslavia's independent form of Socialism and policy of
nonalignment.
Underlining Yugoslavia's determination to make this acknowledge-
ment a reality and to remain politically independent and nonaligned,
at Yugoslav insistence the joint communique issued at the conclusion
of the Tito visit made no mention of "proletarian" or "socialist
internationalism" or "socialist commonwealth," terms which had
been defined by Moscow since the Brezhnev Doctrine to rationalize
its political hegemony over its East European satellites.* Perhaps
more striking evidence of Yugoslavia's continued nonalignment was
provided when, just two days after Tito's return to Belgrade, the
USS Springfield, a modern cruiser of the NATO Mediterranean Fleet,
dropped anchor at the Yugoslav Adriatic port of Dubrovnik for a
three-day visit.
*Last September the Soviets had been able to persuade Tito to
refer to "proletarian internationalism" in the Communique issued
after Brezhnev's visit to Belgrade. The disappearance of this
phrase from the latest Communique may seem to be a small point --
but for the Yugoslays it is a very important one.
3
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WASHINGTON POST
14 June 1972
(- �
`1
In Detente
By Robert G. Kaiser
WaShirteton Post Foreign Service
MOSCOW, June 13�Pres-
ident Tito of Yugoslavia had
planned to be in Poland
today, but instead he is at
home in Belgrade. The Poles
are most anxious for Tito to
pay them a visit, but they
asked him please not to stop
News Analysis
on his way home from Mos-
cow, as Tito suggested. War-
saw, it seems, would prefer
a separate, diplomatically
di
stinct Tito .visit. They'll
get one next week.
Josip Broz Tito, just 80
and the newest recipient of
the Soviet Union's highest
honor, the Order of Lenin,
seems to be ending his ca-
reer with unprecedented re-
spect from all quarters, in-
cluding his old adversaries
in the orthodox Communist
world. His comings and
goings have not always been
so carefully orchestrated.
His visit last week to Mos-
cow, which prodileed no dra-
matic results, reconfirmed
the new understandings Tito
has reached with the heirs
of Stalin�who regarded

-1 � and attitude which nave
ki ovte (
ts ourt Tito long srlWaied Moscow and
4 � Belgrade still exist. The So-
. viets have obviously decided
- to accept these differences,
rive
him as an enemy. The Sovi-
ets wept even farther than .
they had last September,
when Leonid Brezhnev went
to Belgrade, to demonstrate
tolerance for Yugoslavia's
special brand of commu-
nism.
The final communique re-
fleeted Yugoslav positions :
on all important points. It ,
reiterated Soviet under- '
standing � that Yugoslavia .
was on its own path to so-
cialism. Last September, the
Soviets persuaded Tito to
refer to "proletarian inter-
nationalism" in the coinniu-;
nique after Brezhnev's visit, .
a phrase typically used only
by Moscow and its satellites.
Last week that phrase disap-
peared from the commu-
nique. A small point, per-
haps, but one taken seri-
ously by the Yugoslays.
It is arguable that the
Russians are happier with
Tito than they were last
September, because in 'the
interim he showed a firm
hand to wayward Croatian
nationalists. The Soviet.
press praised him on this
count before he arrived last
week.
Nevertheless, the funda-
mental differences of policy
THE NEW YORK TIMES ,--"'�"�miu
11 JUNE 1972
Order of
Lenin to a
Former
Pariah
'MOSCOW�To a man once vilified
by Moscow as a counterrevolutionary
and an agent of American imperialism
and of whom Stalin once angrily de-
and to bestow all the sym-
bols of warm friendship on
Tito despite them. The ques-
tion remains, why?,
Embracing Tito's unortho- �
dox policies�and an em-
brace, plus kisses, is just
what the Yugoslav leader
got here' more than once�
may not be easy to explain
to the satellites of East Eu-
rope, as Yugoslays here
point out. The leaders of Po-
land and Hungary, to men-
tion two, might be Inter- ,
'ested in such blessing for '
their own unorthodoxies in '
the future.
The Soviets are obviously:
prepared to take this' risk:
(and Poland's courting of
Tito suggests that it may be.
real.) What do they get in .
return?
First, as diploinats and-,
- other observers here note,.
they win friends in Yugosla-
via ., perhaps hedging against
the post-Tito era, whenever
it may come. From the Yu-
goslav point of view, Brezh-
nev's new reasonableness is.
merely a sensible recogni-
tion of the realities. Yugo
slays seem impressed by.
Brezhnev's calm, rational
approach to foreign policy,
dared, "I shall shake my little finger
and there will be no more Tito," the
tributes of the current masters of the
Kremlin must have seemed sweet in-
deed, especially since he was able to
keep firmly to his own political line.
No sooner had President Tito of
Ytigoslavia landed last Monday in Mos-
cow for his first visit since Soviet
troops rumbled into Czeclaoslovakia in
1968, provoking his most recent priiti-
cal clash with Moscow, than he was
hustled off to a Kremlin ceremony
Where he was honored with -the Order
of Lenin. He was praised for participa-
tion in the 1917 Bolshevik revolution
and even for contributions to Soviet-
Yugoslav friendship. No one uttered
a word about the confrontations of
the past.
and they are happy to see it
applied to them.
In a broader sense, the So..
viet position improves the .
Soviet Union's image at an :
important moment in Euro-
pean history, on the appar-
ent eve of a European secu-
rity conference. The Soviets
. are aware that their inter-
vention in Czechoslovakia in !
1968 had disastrous conse-
quences on Moscow's stand-
ing in. other world capitals.
� It certainly helps overcome
memories of Czechoslovakiai
to see Brezhnev kissing Tito.
at a Moscow airport.
' The Yugoslays believe the
new rapprochment with
Moscow is more than sym-..
bolic. They now expect sig-
nificant economic agree-
ments to be signed before -
the end of the year; for inst-
ance, and they hope for
long-term development of
Soviet-Yugoslav trade rela-
tions
The Yugoslays have seri-
ous and immediate needs '
.for investment capital and
technological assistance and
they are looking to Moscow
to provide both, as well as
markets for Yugoslav con-
sumer goods.
If these Yugoslav expecta-
tions prove , justified, and if
' Moscow adheres to its prom-
; ises to respect Yugoslavia's �
independent path to soc.al-
ism, then Tito's visit to
cow�perhaps the last
make as Yugoslavia's presi-
dent�may seem monc
pertant in the 'future th t
does today.
,a vindication of ,his independent for-
eign policy course and a demonstra-
tion of his durability at 80.
For the Soviet party leader, Leonid
Brezhnev, and the other Kremlin rul-
ers, President Tito's arrival constituted
a tacit, though belated, acceptance of
the Soviet triumph in Czechoslovakia
and a demonstration of the present
normalization in Moscow's ties with
Belgrade after the post-1968 chill.
For the long run there was a more
delicate balance.
With Europe moving into an era
of dOtente, Moscow wanted to draw
Yugoslavia back toward closer coop.:
oration with the Warsaw Pact group
and away from affiliation with the
West European Common Market, as
well as to bolster its influence among
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Marshal Tito saw the trip as an op-
portunity to renew Soviet acquiescence
for his nonalignment policy and his
own brand of socialism, As well as to
bolster his own party apparatus, which
has been under strain from nationalist
tensions in Croatia.
The public emphasis was on friend-
ship, harmony, and mutual dedication
to Leninist principles; but for all the
cordiality, Marshal Tito and Mr. Brezh-
nev talked like men on two different
wave-lengths in their speeches to a
Kremlin banquet Monday and later in
the week.
While Mr. Brezhnev was claiming
that the new mood of East-West de-
tente sprang from the increased might
of Communist states and was talking
big-power politics. Marshal Tito cred-
ited the "substantial" role of the non-
aligned states in promoting peaceful
coexistence. He dwelt on the need to
meet the "aspiration and desires of
the younger generation" and to "bridge
the gap" between rich and poor na-
tions�categories that make Mcscow
uncomfortable because it gets lumped
with the Western powers.
Moreover, after a midweek over-
night trip to the Latvian capital of
Riga, Marshal Tito found occasion to
vaunt Yugoslav economic n,-hicve-
meats to workers at a Moscow ball-
bearing factory Friday. Not only did
he claim that Yugoslavia's system of
worker self-management socialism had
produced one of the highest growth
rates in the world, but he ticked off
statistics likely to make Soviet work-
ers envious-170 radio sets, 100 TV
sets and 42 cars per thousand of popu-
lation�and he invited them to come
see for themselves.
"Our frontiers are peaceful and
open�crossed by more tourists each
year than we have population," he
said in outlining the benefits of Bel-
grade's policy of nonalignment and
friendship toward virtually all nations.
When it came to writing the joint
communiqu�t the end of the week,
this bold language was muted. The
communique spoke of a "cordial,
friendly and frank" atmosphere. In
the Communist lexicon the word
"frank" was a tipoft to continuing
differences. But the differences were
not made public.
Instead there was a catalogue of
topics �Vietnam, the Middle East,
disarmament �on which Soviet and
Yugoslav views largely coincide, and
there were routine references to past
agreements that have been taken as
effirming Yrigesiavia's riht to pur-
sue a policy on nonalignment and ide-
ological independence.
The language, in fact, was consider-
ably less clear-cut than a similar Tito-
Brezhnev declaration issued last Sep-
tember, and there was no immediate
indication whether President Tito had
gotten promises of more access to
Soviet markets, as some of his aides
he
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trade of the past year. - expeeteu to retire in the next few weeks,
hut also with the two leading candidates
Nonetheless, among the thousands to succeed Sato�Foreign Minister Takeo
who flocked to watch the maverick Fukucla and Minister of International
Yugoslav leader being driven to Vnu- Trade and Industry Kakuei Tanaka. In
kovo airport in an open limousine with addition, the Japanese Government de-
Mr. Brezhnev at his side, there were liberately arranged for Kissinger to meet
!. some Muscovites who privately re- with members of the opposition Socialist
spected him as "a fox", deftly playing Party as well as with scores of busi-
I off East and West until the end of his nessmcn, journalists, scholars and offi-
career. The real question was whether his ends representing virtually every politi-
cal point of view in japan. Given these
j
deftness and his subtly maintained in- circumstances, it seemed unlikely that
; dependence would become more of a the swift-moving Kissinger would in-
model for other East European states duke his penchant for flying off secretly
in the new era of detente in Central to some other capital just because he
Europe, or whether Moscow had sue- happened to be in the neighborhood. In
cessfully signaled to its Warsaw Pact fact, his Japanese hosts had crammed so
allies that Marshal Tito was a special many appointments into his three-day
case, now carefully contained�and visit that the Nixon Administration's lead-
that the exampl bar1 better re- Mg swinger was left with little time even
, mcinber was � for ilightelubbing in the Ginza.
In his talks with Japanese officials, SOVIET UNION:
Kissinger emphasized that relations with
Tokyo remain the basis of U.S. foreign Wooing an Old Adversary
policy in Asia. And he insisted: "We are
not casting Japan adrift." (That theme Compared with the coolly correct re-
was also underscored by U.S. Secretary ception given President Nixon when he
of Health, Education and Welfare Elliot first touched down in Moscow last
Richardson, who told a session of the month, the welcome that Soviet leaders
influential Japanese-American Assembly bestowed on Marshal Josip Broz Tito
in Shimoda, "Japan continues to be the last week was downright fervent.
United States' prime ally in Asia.") Though he had been notably absent for
But for their part, the Japanese made the Nixon arrival, party chief Leonid
it dear that they wanted more than a Brezhnev was on -hand at Vnukovo Air-
mere ego massage. Instead, they expect- port to plant a comradely kiss on the
ed "substantive discussions" and specific Yugoslav President's cheek. And while
guidance as to what role Washington en- Mr. Nixon was sped into town in a closed
visions for japan in Asian defense. They car, Tito was driven slowly in an open
also wanted a line on U.S. thinking re- I:mousine along a route lined with bun-
garding China: how rapidly and in what dreds of thousands of cheering Musco-
ways the U.S. plans to cultivate relations vites. To show that they harbored no ill
with Peking and whether the U.S. strate- feelings toward the man who broke with
gic commitment to Chiang Kai-shek's Na- Stalin and the Soviet bloc almost a
tionalist regime on Taiwan is really solid, quarter of a century ago, the Soviet
At the same time they wanted to be leaders presented Tito with their coun-
filled in on the Peking and Moscow sum- try's highest civilian award, the Order
mit meetings to reassure themselves that of Lenin.
President Nixon had not made secret Given his long and stormy relationship
agreements that might leave Japan out in with Moscow, however, it was doubtful
the cold. that the crusty old marshal was overly
Suspicion: Kissinger's task was made impressed by this show of friendship. In
all the more difficult because the Japa- , fact, since the Soviet invasion of Czecho-
nese regard him as the prime architect slovakia in 1968, Tito has been warier
of many of the policies that have strained than ever of Russian objectives. Just last
U.S.-Japanese relations. They pointedly summer, concerned over rumors that the
Russians might intervene in Rumania,
the Yugoslav President reiterated his
determination to defend his own coun-
try's independence against "anybody."
By last fall, Yugoslav-Russian relations
were so strained that Brezhnev traveled
to Belgrade in an effort to assure Tito
� that the "Brezhnev doctrine," under
which the Soviet Union claims the right
to intervene in Socialist-bloc countries,
did not apply to Yugoslavia.
In Moscow last week, however. Tito
made it plain that these assurances had
not been enough to erase his suspicions
of Soviet intentions. "No threat to in-
dependence, wherev and under
ever pretext it is made," he bluntly k old
had honed. in nrapr tn
note that Kissinger does not have a single
recognized expert on Japanese affairs on
his staff and some of them even charge
him with indulging in a "love affair" with
China�a suspicion reinforced by occa-
sional Kissingerian remarks contrasting
. the alleged elegance of Chinese culture
with what he sees as the stiffness and
commercialism of the Japanese. Thus,
many Japanese leaders viewed Kissin-
ger's fence-mending visit as an oppor-
tunity to educate Mr. Nixon's chief
foreign:policy adviser on the tremen-
dous importance of japan in the global
scheme of things.
As part of that educational process,
KissimA. r wris sciu duled to talk not only
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his hosts at a Kremlin banquet, "should
be tolerated." In response, the Soviet
leaders reportedly gave him private
promises that they had no designs. on
Yugoslavia. To sweeten the pot, the -
Russians were expected to hold out the !
possibility of increased Soviet investment !!
in Yugoslavia and improved trade re-
lations between the two countries.
Goals: In taking such a conciliatory!
line, the Soviets had a number of objec-
tives in mind. They wanted Tito's stamp
of approval on the Soviet-American sum- ,
mit accords and on their proposal for a :.
European security conference�both of
which the Marshal did endorse during
TIME
19 June 1972 -
C 0 MM UNISYS
Heretic's Homecoming
For years he was reviled as an arch-
traitor of Communism, the heretic who
destroyed the unity of the Marxist faith.
But last week, in a dramatic culmina,
tion of a historic reversal of Soviet pol-
icy, Yugoslav President Josip Broz Tito
was treated to arhero's welcome in Mos-
cow. At a state dinner in Tito's honor,
Soviet Party Leader Leonid Brezlinev
did not even allude to the earlier dis-
agreements that led to the 1948 break
between Stalin and Tito. Instead, Brezh,
nev praised Tito for "your friendly at-
titude toward our country." In perhaps
the most ironic turnabout of all, Tito,
who reached 80 last month, was award-
ed the. Order of Lenin, the highest So-
viet decoration, which is reserved for
the Communist faithful. It was more or
less as if Pope Leo X had conferred
Rome's blessings upon Martin Luther.
Twice before, the Soviets have made
major efforts to win back Yugoslavia,
but each time those overtures collapsed
because of troubles within the East Noe.
This time the Soviets seem more deter-
his stay in Moscow. They may also have
wanted his agreement to the establish-
ment of Soviet bases in the -Adriatic�a
proposition that Tito has repeatedly re-
jected in the past. Beyond that, the
Soviets were anxious to improve their
long-term ties with Yugoslavia in the
hope that they will be in position to
exert increased influence in Belgrade
after Tito, now 80, passes from the scene.
Until that time, however, it seemed un-
likely that there would be any funda-
mental change in relations between the
two countries. "Important differences
still remain," commented a Yugoslav in
Moscow last week. "We still have our
own theories and our own Yugoslavian
path to socialism."
mined than ever, at least in part became
Yugoslavia's independent brawl 1)1
Marxism exerts an tinsettlim,
ence upon the rest of Eastern Europe.
Moscow is also motivated by a de-
sire to consolidate its position in Eu-
rope as a preparatory step to the Con-
ference on European Security. Owing
to the growth of Soviet seapoWer, Yu-
goslavia is strategically far more impor-
tant than ever to Moscow, which wants
a naval base on the Adriatic for its war-
ships in the Mediterranean. The Sovi-
ets also seek to reassert their former
"elder brother" status in Yugoslavia so
that they will have a direct influence in
the maneuvering that is bound to fol- -
low Tito's death or retirement.
The Yugoslays are fully aware of
the Russian motives. Nonetheless, they
believe that the timing is promising for
improving relations with Moscow with-
out sacrificing their own unique polit-
ical and economic system. The Yugo-
slays would like to sell more goods to
Russia in return for technical equip-
ment and raw materials. Now, they feel,
the Soviets could not put undue pres-
sure on them for political concessions
without jeopardizing Moscow's policy
of detente with the West.
3
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FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY 24 July 1972
SHORT SUBJECTS
JUST FRIENDLY SUBCONTINENTAL MEDDLING?
New Delhi questions whether those monthly Soviet-sponsored
press parties are a matter of public relations or a matter of
monkey business. The attached reprint of an article from the
New Delhi Organizer of 20 May cites several cases of known Soviet
attempts to bribe Indian journalists and to warn them against
publishing anti-Soviet commentaries -- all of which do little to
ease India's sensitivities about foreigners meddling in their
internal affairs.
In addition, India cannot be too elated over apparently
justified Bangladesh suspicions that the Soviets had a hand in
helping the Bangladesh Student Union (the Bangla Chhatra Union)
come out the winners inTaast-spding's stmy,stUdent elect ions
In Bangladesh, student politicians are taken very seriously
because the campuses have spawned and spearheaded many important
movements, including the agitation for independence from
Pakistan.
Sources in Dacca say that the pro-Moscow faction of the
Student Union never has had the popular following that would
have permitted it to score the sweeping victory it achieved
in universities in Dacca, Rajshahi and Mymensingh in late
In fact, they say, during the late 1950's and through the 60's
its members (then the East Pakistan Student Union) did the
students and people of Bangladesh a disservice by acting in
such an irresponsible fashion as to invite a crackdown against
the whole student movement of which the Student Union was only
a small part. In the late 60's the Union had split into pro-
Moscow and pro-Peking factions and were not really reconciled
until the pro-Peking faction decided (despite Chinese aid to
Pakistan) to support the Bangladesh independence struggle�
They say in Dacca that it has been with the Bangladesh Student
Union, and especially its leadership which retains a warm spot
for Peking that Soviet "cultural" officers in Dacca have been
the most active. Active, in fact, to the extent to having given
a financial subsidy to the Bangla Chhatra Union for the purpose of
fighting the elections. Some in Dacca are even going so far
as to suggest that the Soviets, actually uncomfortable with
Sheikh Mujib's moderation, saw the undercutting of his party
affiliate in the universities as a step toward strengthening the
pro-Soviet National Awami Party with whom the Student Union
group is affiliated.
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ORGANISER, New Delhi
20 May 1972
SOVIET BID TO BRIBE INDIAN PRESS
� NEW DELHI.� An impression is training
ground that ever since the signing of the 20-
year Treaty, Soviet Russia has begun to treat
this country as its domain. There are a number
of pointers to confirm such an opinion.
Recently a number of
MPs have written to the
Prime Minister .complaining
of political interference by
some Russian diplomats in
our internal matters. They.
have asked for a probe into
the incidents they have
mentioned in this context.
For example, it is said
that Shri 'Morozov and Shri
V. 1. Gurgenov of the USSR
Information Centre in Cal-.
culla have recently tried
to influence the editor of
"Sat yajttg", a Bengali
newspaper' published from
Calcutta, and supporting
CPI(M) policies. Large
financial assistance was
offered by the Russian dip-
lomats to this paper to
persuade it to lend support
to vb., CP1,
. They also warned the
editor against publishing
anti-Soviet articles. When
..the said � editor refused the
� said Russian offer, he was.
"- reportedly threatened with
- consequences .which - might
. even lead to the closure of
the, paper by the Gov&ii-
ment of India. This means
that the Russians took the
- hacking of the Government
in the matter for granted.
Again, Shri A. A.
� penko of the Madras Infor-
mation Mice of the Rus-
sian Embassy reported. to
have visited Kerala some-
� time back anti met a nutu-
bar of editors and publi-
shers. The mission was
aimed at enlisting support
of Indian journalists and
intellectuals to write arti-
cles in favour of the Soviet
Union.
Shri Filipenko wanted
articles and material pre-
pared-by the Russian In
centre to be publish-
ed in as many journals and
newspapers as possible, of
course, on fancy payments.
But he was told by the per-
son l approached that what-
ever material he wanted to
be published could be ac-
commodated, but as paid
advertisements.
Even otherwise, a study
of pro-Russian articles or
propaganda material ap-
pearing in a number of
:newspapers, particularly �n
�some regional papers, shew,
that Russians buy space ,,n
regular editions rather than'
putting out advertisements
in special supplements.
Shri Filipenko, it is. stat-
ed. had to face- hostile ques-
tions when he tried to in-
fluence "Deepilta", -a Catho-
lic daily and, "Chandrile,-,
a journal operated by the
Muslim League in Calicut.
' There may be many .sueh
examples which have not.
come to light. �
An Indian employee of
the USSR Information
Centre at Calcutta, who is
a member of the local CPI,
and against whom a few
criminal eases 'are pending,
is busy doing public rela-
tions for the Russians. This
particular employee was
involved in a scuffle with a
member of the CPI(M) in
which he is stated to have.
stabbed the CPI(M) man in
.the back, causing him grave ;
'injury
But in spite of his tn-
volvement 'in criminal cases
which are pending against
him at the Kharclah police
station, this inployee con-
tinues to w.,, k in. the Rus-
sian Embassy without being
challenged by the local
authorities.
Obviously, Russians have
' influenced the local authori-
ties so much that they do
' not take any notice of the
Activities of this 'efficient'
employee of the USSR In-
formation Centro
In. Delhi, . �,04J, almost
every month, the USSR (In-
formation Centre throwF
grand party where a big
crowd of journalists�and
H others who parade as jour-
nalists. or -even those Who
do. not pretend. as such�are
, invited and . drinks flow in
gallons. �
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U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT
12 June 1972
Urn! THE
F 0 TEFITiratidil
GROUND hR'IN Tir7TINAM
A new spirit�part willing-
ness to fight, part confidence
Reds can be whipped--is found
on major battlefields visited by
James N. Wallace of "U. S.
News & World Report." Still
ahead: difficult days for Saigon,
and no guarantee of survival.
Top Allied oflieers�once privately
possimistic over South Vietnam's chances
of military survival�now are starting to
, predict . openly that the tide could be
turning against the Communist "go for
broke" offensive.
Is this just another case of misplaced
optimism?
American commanders have been mis-
led by South Vietnamese performance
in the past. On more than one occasion.
expectations of victory have been erased
by lightning success of the enemy on
the battlefield.
No responsible commander believes
Hanoi has yet been defeated. Heavy
.-fighting�even defeat-dcould still come
at An Loc, Kontum or Hue.
New spirit. Yet, from air-conditioned
conference rooms in Saigon to stifling-hot
front-line command posts, a new confi-
dence is replacing the despair that was
so prevalent just a few weeks ago when
South Vietnamese troops, deserted by
their commanders, ,fled in panic, from
Quang Tri Province. The reasons:
� Saigon's long-denigrated Army has
proved it has the ability�when it has
the leadership and the will�to hold on
against seemingly impossible odds.
� American air power, still essential-
to South Vietnam's military survival, is
r.stiffening Saigon's willingness to fight.
, � Hanoi is suffering tremendous bat-
tle casualties. U. S. warplanes and Navy
ships have cut the flow of Soviet and
Chinese mar supplies into' North Viet-
nam to "close to zero," according to
U. S. Defense Department: officials.
� Most significant, perhaps, South
Vietnam's people aro displaying a de-
termination to hold on that seldom had
been seen in earlier years of fighting.
'Visits to the throe "hot spots" in South
Vietnam provide a closer look at what's
behind the official optimism.
ON HIGHWAY 13 NEAR AN LOC
The bloody slugging match along -this
rocket-scarred highway and in the dev�
astated provincial capital of An Loo a
.few frustrating miles to the north is
dramatic evidence of the shift in atLi-
tucks and determination seen elsewhere
in South Vietnam.
An Loc, GO miles north of Saigon,
hardly is a town Any longer, It is a bat-
tered rubble heap, looking more like a
bornbed-out German city in World War
II than a once sleepy trading center for
nearby rubber plantations.
The town was not even a particularly
significant military target, except as an
obstacle to the quick Bed thrust toward
Saigon, which sonic military analysts be-
lieve was one of Hanoi's early goals in
the current invasion.
But, under siege, An Lee became both
a Symbol and an example of how the
. newest phase of the war is being fought.
An idle boast. The Communists,
who evidently wanted An Loc as a pro-
vincial capital for their "liberation
front" government, proclaimed in early
April that it would be captured within
a few days. South Vietnamese President
Nguyen Van Thieu, stung by the col-
lapse of his forces at Quang Tri, ordered
the town held "at all castS.'
The fight for An Loc, which started
April 7, turned into a house-to-house,
bunker-by-bunker contest. Air strikes
were ordered on houses as close as 50
feet to South Vietnamese positions.
When Communist soldiers fled to neigh-
boring buildings, Saigon troops shot
An Loc undoubtedly would have fall-
en quickly except for massive U. S. air
support, military experts believe. The
Communists had overwhelming superiori-
ty in artillery, much of it captured from
South Vietnamese forces farther north.
An average of 2,000 rounds of artillery,
rocket ail mortar lire poured down on
An Loc every day. Some days, more
than 7,000 rounds slammed in.
The only available offset to this enemy
shelling has been U. S. air power, includ-
ing the most concentrated 11-52 bomb-
ing of the entire war-21 strikes within;
5 miles of the town's besieged garrison:
in a Single 24-hour period in mid-Ma,
Trading punches. On one retent:
day, described by field commanders as
fairly typical,' Communist gunners fired:
2,100 rounds at An Lee, said were hit in:
turn by 150 air strikes-13-52s, fighter-
bombers and helicopter gunships.
On Highway 13, where a drive to le-
Iieve An Lac' 'creeps forward with ago-
nizing slowness, criticism is heard that
South Vietnam's troops are too depend-
ent on- American air power. A U. S. ad-
vises complains: '
"They do not latish out hard enough
on the ground. They figure every tree
line is full of the enemy, so they wait
for it to be arc-lighted [the code name.
for 11-52 strikes]. They want to walk to
An Loc through bomb craters."
But military observers emphasize that
air power alone did not save An Lac
hems early capture. The decisive factor
was that the defenders, unlike those at
Quang Tri, (lid not break and run from
artillery barrages. A similae will to stand
under fire, these experts 'stress, seould
be equally decisive elsewhere.
Both sides have taken pi }117N 7 ' ' loss-
es at An Loc, which some officer,
may be the most costly single battle ol
the war. Smith Vietnamese dead and
wounded have been estinuiteii at 40 to
. 50 daily. The entire Fifth Division de-
fending the city will have to l "com- �
pletely overhauled," sources my c: t.
But Hanoi has lost at Am the
fequivalent of an entire infant my
�more than 10,000 killed mid wounded.
:�The Communists' Ninth Division was
reported so badly mauled at it has
merged with two other units.
Has the effort been worthwhii
Very much so, say Allied ofii, Ac-
cording to a ranking South Vietnaea.�,e:
"Hanging onto An Loc has been a
big morale booster. It proves that, mai,
for man, we are as good as the enemy."
Equally important, says this officer;
"An Loc shows the vital importance
of the commanding general, his staff
and his American advisers staying in
the midst of battle. The panic at Quang
Tri started when the commanding gen-
eral and his U. S. advisers pulled out."
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KONTUM
In this isolated, mountain-ringed pro-
vincial capital, which is reachable only
by heli� opters that duck in through Com-
munist rocket and artillery fire, harassed
South Vietnamese officers and U. S. ad-
visers have little time to think about
the U. S. naval blockage and tl-^ air
war against North Vietnam.
Almost daily, nevertheless, the see-
saw fighting for Kontum shows the de-
gree to which the fighting is shaped by
Russian and Chinese supplies given Ha-
noi, a I American weapons given Sai-
gon. in the ground, it is North and
South Vietnamese who are dying. But
the real Contest in one recent night bat-
tle was between Soviet tanks and Amer-
ican missiles.
In a single assault, seven Red tanks
grinding toward Kontum's defense perim-
eter were knocked . out, mostly by a
new wire-guided missile mounted .on
American helicopters and jeeps. The
missiles had just been flown in to help
counter the enemy's tank forces, which, ,
it was discovered, greatly exceeded ear-
ly estimates.
The missiles won that. mini-battle.
The big question for the �future is
whether Hanoi�harassed by U. S. air
strikes and mines�can keep supplying
its forces in the Smith with tanks, ar-
tillery, ammunition and fuel.
Two tired armies. One American
adviser who has served three tours of
duty in � Vietnam explains the situation
as he sees it:
"Maybe the South Vietnamese Army
is not very good. But neither is the en-
emy any more. We are seeing North
Vietnamese units break and run. They
are putting 15 and 16-year-olds- into the
line with only a few months' training.
"South Vietnam does not have to do
that. Saigon's best 'twits now are better
than anything has left. I am con-
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Military morale is rated eiOciallyi
vinced that the South Vietnamese, even
without the Americans, mild handle
the Communists�if the enemy did not
have all those Russian tanks and guns."
South Vietnamese troops around Kon-
turn dmonstra led that they could stand
their ground against tanks.
Soldiers demand M-72 rockets, a light,
shoulder-fired weapon that can destroy a
40-ton tank with one well-placed round.
This may be partly bravado, but offi-
cers insist that there also is a genuine
willingness to meet the enemy. Says a
U. S. adviser:
"Every infantryman fancies himself a
-tank-killer. A couple of years ago it,was
the M-16 rifle that was going to make
- him a tiger. Now it's the M-72."
'Another reason behind South Vietnam-
ese aggressiveness is a $50 reward that
gees to any soldier who knocks out an
enemy tank. A U. S. officer recalls the
tactics of one man who collected the
bonus: �
"It was right out of the book. Ho let
the tank roll right over his bunker,
jumped up and zapped it from behind."
,
� .HUE
For the old women selling lottery tick-
ets outside the Hue citadel, the war
. strikes home when buildings start to
shako from the concussion-of 13-52s
bombing troop concentrations �
held mountains to the west.
The war is even closer to the tough
young Vietnamese marines dug in along
the My Chanh River who regularly 'en-
gage Communist attackers at hand-gre-
nade
For all Vietnamese, the war is the
biggest fact of life. Here in Hue, in Sai-
gon and in other cities there is evidence
of a rising determination among both
soldiers and civilians to defeat the
Communists.
'good in ,Hue. ,The city is defended by
South Vietnam's best troops�the First
Army Division and the Marines, Some
officers/ here even urge more-ambitious
offensive thrusts than Saigon plannOrs or
Amerrean advisers think wise. Among
some units, say American sources, there
is a kind of eagerness for the "Batiks of
.Hue" to begin. �
Some U. S. advisers see a dank:r in
. this attitude. One explains:
"These men are the best Saigon has
to offer. If they are attacked and Crack:
then Vietnamization has failed, and no-
body can hide it. But: they are not oing
Jetnronlr"
A stronger will. South Viettrarnese
civilians Seem more resolved to defend
their country than in the past. My are
. shamed, even angered, that QuOg Tri'
was given up. There is an apparont will-
ingness to pay the costs. So far,' heavy
battle casualties' de not seem to he
creating as much resentment us usnal.
. Except for a few political opportun-
ists, there is little support in Saigon or in
menaced cities like Hue or Kontum for a
"coalition" settlement with. Ilanoi.
I Instead, there is growing conviction
.among articulate South Vietnamese that
their nation has a future. A young Hue-
;born Army captain puts it this way:
I "We now believe that we have a na-
tion of our own, that it is worth saving,
iand that it can be saved. We are going
to save it."
, An almost conventional war of attri-
tion is being fought on the battlefronts.
1For the next few months, at least, this
Ishould favor Saigon's Army�backed by
I U. S. air power.
South Vietnam has no guarantee of.
survival. But now�with the Communist
advance slowed�people who should know
say there is reason for hope.
AFTENPOSTEN, Norway
14 June 1972
Some circles believe thatithe war of Liberation in Vietnam is
supported by the masses of the people'. However, the North Vietnamese
'Liberation' of South Vietnam has now lasted for more than two months and
we can see no signs that 'the Masses' in the south greet the soldiers
from the north as liberators. On the contrary, the South Vietnamese
have defended themselves in a way which deserves the highest respect.
Of course they Could not fight the invaders without American support
from the air, but American bombs do not force them to fight so
determinedly as they do. The bombing could not either prevent the
civilian populace from attacking its soldiers from the rear if it wished
such. But this did not occur.
Instead of uniting in a 'People's Revolt' for the benefit
of the communist invaders, the people of South Vietnam have more clearly
than ever demonstrated that they do pot want to open doors for the
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North Vietnamese. They are very certainly not satisfied with the regime
in Saigon, which is both corrupt and insufficiently democratically
developed, but it must also be clear that they do not want to exchange
this for what the North Vietnamese offer them as an alternative. This
is the only conclusion one can draw from the war developments in the
last couple months.
Neither militarily nor politically have the ones in power in
Hanoi attained what they had strived for when they in March sent the
first tanks over the DMZ. Their goal was clearly to collect on the
battlefield what they had not won through negotiations. It is
certainly too early to maintain that the invasion from the north. has been
repulsed, but there is currently very little doubt that it is very close
�to being stopped. During this military and political lull, the effects
of the American bombing of North Vietnam are beginning to become apparent.
The sitUation must gradually have become So problematical for the
regime in Hanoi that it is looking around for poggibilities to re-
turning to the conditions prevailing before the invasion into .South
Vietnam.
This can only happen with resumption of peace negotiations in
!Paris. In these days there is a gratifying sign whith suggests that the
parties are willing to meet again. The likelihood for sUch:a new tonfron,
tation,in the conference hall has increaSed gradually as North. Vietnam
after the lightning offensive began to lose its' Military grip, no
longer can have any hopes about conquering South. Vietnam by force.
Now at least Hanoi ought to be interested in a new negotiation round,
not only because such will afford the communists an opportunity to
obtain at any rate the limitation of bombing attack in the North,
but also because the, point of departure at the negotiation table is so
much better than before.
President Nixon has in reality put forward a generous offer
to North Vietnam. His peace proposal aims at a cease-fire under
international control (without a demand for North Vietnamese withdrawal
from areas which have been conquered in the course of the last two weeks),
the release of the American prisoners of war, sincere peace negotiations
.and American withdrawal after four months. While Hanoi, up to now, has
.not been willing to discuss this peace plan, it cannot be accused of anything
'other than that the master strategist, General GIAP, had counted on
,taking South Vietnam in a single blow. But his calculations have so
'clearly not held up that it will not come as any surprise if the difficult
Amilitary situation in which North Vietnam finds itself leads to the
iparties again approaching each other politically.
President Nixon's closest political security adviser, Henry
Kissinger, has let it be understood that he is counting on the resumption
, of the peace negotiations when the invasion from the north peters out.
:With the rainy season right around the corner it can only be a question
of time. Kissinger has shown himself as a formidable foreign affairs
ipolitician and.has turned out to be right for the most part in what he
has assumed about the opponent's moves. Be must prove right also this time.
But above all, a new round of negotiations must lead to a result whith.once
and for all brings the people in both. Worth and South Vietnam out of the
long lasting state of war.
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LB FIGARO, Paris
16 June 1972
THE TRUTH AND VIETNAM
With the renewal of their offensive in the border region of
the Parrots Beak, will the North Vietnamese divisions accomplish
anything capable of compensating for or disguising what, after two
and one half months of murderous, pitiless fighting, appears to
everyone as a semi-defeat. The results to date are the conquest of
a narrow strip of territory south of the de-militarized zone and a
city of mediocre importance, Quang Ti-i. Around Hue, Kontum and
An WC, proof has been furnished of the impossibility of.breaking .
the fighting strength of the South Vietnamese forces which -- except
for the local panic at Quang Tri, which opened the way-to Hue for
a few hours but which the Northerners were unable to exploit --'fought
extremely well.
The disorganization of the Northern supply system by the blockade
and by new bombing techniques of the American air force (guided bombs
and anti-missile protection) has already seriously reduced the possibility
of maintaining at maximum strength a "classical" offensive involving
tanks and artillery. It is probable (let's not go too far) that
when it realizes that it had under-estimated the extent of Southern
resisterice and American reaction at a time when the United States
had accepted the idea of disengagement, the North Vietnamese command
will attempt to exploit the meager results achieved by returning to
tactics Of dispersion, mobility, clandestinity, thus, to guerrilla
warfare as was done following the failure of the Tet offensive.
It remains a mystery how it could happen that the initial successes
of the invasion were exaggerated by international media to the
extent of being presented as a decisive defeat for the South, whose
military disintegration, a few weeks ago was not only predicted as
imminent, but announced as a fait accompli. Certainly, Saigon --
which had one division routed and the others engaged in difficult
struggle -- had some bad moments.
' However, it was as if the large news agencies --.and in Vietnam
this means the Americans -- wanted to blacken the picture of the
situation in the South. Not, certainly, as part of a plot to discourage
Mr. Nixon from intervening in a contest presented as already lost
(Mr. Nixon doesn't get his information on the Vietnamese situation
from news.agenE)idispatches) but solely as a result of the prejudices
or personal preferences of many correspondents. The penetration of
various leftists groups in the U.S. mass media, is wide and active.
This ideological bias can work against even those it presumes
to favor. Perhaps by trusting a bit too much in their successes on
the decisive battlefield of.interrjational_opinion. and in particular
of itg-ddlieriary's opinion,. Hanoi eonvinced,its.elf,that,Ihe�_
mem&A' for the final offensive Wai-ii-hind." This is the result of
- .
self-intoxication, a propaganda boomerang.
4
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DAILY TELEGRAPH, London
20 June 1972
IAN WARD on the unwitting aid given to Hanoi .
by the international Press corps in Saigon
MIR: one constant factor in Viet-
." - tiara's decade of turmoil has
been the unabashed
pessimism of the � Western Press
, corps. Since the 1963 assassination
of President Diem�an event that
could never have occurred without
the role played by international.
Press and television�Saigon has
been the tpriginating point for end-
less streams of negatives both in
print and on celluloid.-
Never has a war been subjected'
to such Public scrutiny.. Never
have so many prizes been awarded
for journalistic excellence. Never,
has distortion reached such limits,..
through both wilful and uninten-:
tional, me-ans.
The reason is simple. Bad news
makes infinitely better headlines
than good and selling it;is a com-
petitive, business. As a result the
Western Press has emerged as the
most effective, weapon in Hanoi's
arsenal. -'
The 1968 Tet attack was im-
mediately portrayed as a disaster
for Saigon. Startling headlines, but ;
untrue. The joint U.S.-South Viet- �
nameact invasion of Cambodia in
. 1970 was presented as foolhardy
adventurisin. Another gross
. misrepresentation. Saigon's drive,
into Southern Laos early last year.
rang through the Press columns-
_ like the death knell for South Viet-
nam's army which, of course, it
wasn't.
With; this unwavering track'
recotid the Western Press could
scarcely 'have been expected to
give the South Vietnamese much
hope against Hanoi's massive in-
vasion which rolled across the
demilitarised zone on March 31.
True to form, out poured the
pesSimism�only this time it came
� bigger and faster than ever before.
Somehow the conventional battles
�-on the -Quang Tri, Central High-
lands and An .Loc fronts added a
certain 'scope for interpretive dis-
tortion that had been .lacking in
bygone years when ;the accent was
on guerrilla action.
Within days, predictions of doom .
� brought an influx of some 350 ;
journalists, TV -ne.ws crews,
cameramen and broancasters. 'in
the early stages, the, fall of Quanta
Tri and the double collapse of the
South Vietnamese. Third Division
provided ready headlines. But then
the combined action of Saigon !
troops' and American au-power
appeared to blunt the enemy push.
A static battlefield has limited '!
news value. So, .in a re,markabia'
other
Vietn
.eneni
short time-space, the visiting
correspondents headed homeward.
Meanwhile, what of the South
Vietnamese. Army that the world
had been led to believe was on
the brink of collapse?
At the outset a handful' of
American and South Vietnamese
)'ho dared to, be optimistic were
the objects of ridicule. But now
their predictions for Government
successes at Hues in the north,
Nontum in the Central Highlands,'
and. An Loc. north of Saigon,,.
gather credence by the. hour.
A glance at battlefield statistics
helps to fill in some of the gaps in
the _current Vietnam picture.
On the northern front Hanoi
fielded. its 504th and 308th
Divisions as the primary punch for
the armour-supported drive across
the D M Z and into northernmost
Quang Tri Province. From the
notorious A-Shau valley, close 'to
the southern Laos frontier west of
Hue, came the 524B Division with
orders to thrust towards the old
imperial capital. -
Also committed on the front was
a regiment of Hanoi's 320B
Division, the Fifth and Sixth
Independent Regiments and ele--
mutts of the 325th and 711th
Divisions. Just north of the D M Z
the 312th Division was kept in
reserve along with uncommitted
units of the 325th:
Of the estimated 44,000 combat,
logistic and support troops Hanoi
actually fed into the Quang Tra��
Thua Thien battles, say .conserva-
tive American estimates, at least
21,000 were wiped out. The 304th
and 308th Divisions each suffered
60 per cent. casualty rates and
finally combined into a single fight-
.
lug unit of some 8,000 men.
Likewise the 32413 has taken
fearsome casualties in its attempt
to reach Hue with at .least
4,000 troops alone dying in one'
general area around Firebase
Bastogne, 11 miles southwest of
the city. �
Manpower shortage
a
m's
meats by both American and South
; Vietnamese teams indicate the
North Vietnamese now face an
acute manpower problem on
the Quang Tri-Thua Thien front.
,Far from planning a major
advance. Communist field com-
manders are more concerned with
holding captured territory.
On the Central Highlaaas aanat.
where the key target has been Its)
provincial capital - of Kontuni,
Hanoi threw in its NT 2 and 320th
Divisions plus four independent
!regiments. There were . some
:anxious days for Saigon when the.
headquarters of the All V N 22nd
-Division fell on April 24. But the
defenders regrouped and together
with the A R V N. 23rd Division
rallied strongly and Kontum held.
Here the campaign; is reckoned to
have cost the 'North Vietnamese
10,000 killed and probably ;twice
that figure wounded.
Sixty miles North of Saigon
Hanoi committed their entire
Seventh and Ninth Divisions plus
elements of the Fifth to fighting
for An Loc, the capital' of
Binh Long Province. Perhaps
ri-
tending a mini-Dien�Bien Phu. the
Communist strategists obviously
no Sai SOU'S detsr-
mination- to hold; this 'relatively
insignificant rubber g
centre. An Loc swiftly emerged a
prestige factor when President
Thieu ordered it held at all costs.
North Vietnam ese andcomm
tried wave attacks with ,armour-
backed infantry. .
Of the 6.000 original Govern-
ment defence force in An Loc at.
least. 1,500 died with almost :-,000
. wounded. Even today Hig,hwa:,
the 'vital supply link between �n
!Lac and Saigon, is subject. to
severe Communist harassment.
:MilitarY spokesmen balk at
declaring the siege broken,
But casualties in the region of
11,000 killed and 25,000 wounded
TS the ;price Hanoi paid on a. cam-
paign: front that failed in every
militarY objective.
Cynics argue that American
airpewer accounted for a su s an
tial proportion of North Viet
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and without it the South Viet-
namese would have been roundly
:defeated, While the first observa-
tion is unquestionably true, the
deduction from it is less than fair.
Battle strategists devise tactics
to suit prevailing conditions. If
vast aironwer is available and can
be employed to inflict maximum
enemy casualties while con-
'serving friendly manpower it is,
quite naturay, used in this
fashion. But should such airpower
be unavailable .different tactics
must be formulated. The whole
nature ,of the war then changes
and entirely new yardsticks pre-
sent themselves for judging the
combatants.
None of this � constitutes an
argument for a Saigon victory at
DIE WELT, Hamburg
22 June 1972
this stage. It does, however,
seriously undermine the credibilitY
or those who, early in April and in
years past, all �too readily . pre-
dicted calamity for Saigon.
The latest South. Vietnamese
figure for ARVN deaths in the
offensive is 8,934. In addition the
A ftV N have lost 596 ,tanks and
1,745 trucks and vehicles..
Since Jan. 1 thiS year the :South
:Vietnamese. Air Force has flown
277,954 air sorties 'within the
llepublic up to this weekend. The
U.S. Air Force has flown 57,058 in
the same period.
. Strategic. Air Command pilots
have flown 4,881 B32 sorties with-
in Vietnam since Jan. 1. This is
,more than seven-and-a-half times
the number 'flown in the ,same
period last year.
In March Saigon claimed to con-
tro1.99.9 per cent. of the popula-
tion. Five weeks later with one
province lost and heavy fighting in
14 districts Government crintrol.
was estimated to be effective filer
91.8 per cent. of the population �
By the end of this month 45.
forces in Vietnam will be redurecl
to 49.000. Koreans to 38,741,
Australians to 141. Thais to 188,,
New Zealanders to 58. FilipinoS;to
62 and Taiwanese to 31.
Since mid-1968 the South Vfet-
namese armed forces have �in-
creased from 680.000 to 1,100.000.
The most dramatic increase is in
Air Force. manpower from 16.000 to
61,000 and equipment from 400
to 1,600 aircraft..
CRITICISM OF VIETNAM POLICY GROWS WEAKER
"Photographs of the destroyed Soviet tanks which the North Vietnamese
left behind on the main street of An Doc do not appear on the front
pages of the large American papers. Since it now looks somewhat better
.for America's allies in the theater of war, the Saigon poolside-
strategists, who only a few weeks ago gloatingly exaggerated the
anticipated debacle of South Vietnam's army, have become remarkably
vague. "An Loc was not really worth the attention -- so many reporters
discovered with hindsight. Nonetheless, the Communist siege, which
lasted eleven weeks, left this unimportant city only a pile of rubble.
The North Vietnamese didn't consider it unimportant, or they would not
have advertised at the beginning of the offensive the announcement that
An Loc would be the seat of a Communist opposition government of South
Vietnam.
"The Pentagon readily admits that Saigon's troops would hardly have
mastered the situation without U.S. Air Force support. But the fact that
the enemy never achieved a decisive break-through in almost three months
has perceptibly strengthened the morale of the defenders. In contrast
to the 1968 Tet offensive, which was for Hanoi a military fiasco but an
overwhelming psychological success which deeply influenced the American
public and' led to Lyndon Johnson's fall, this time there is little
psychological impact on the USA to be felt. Since the dire consequences
which were warned when Nixon undertook the intensive air war and blockade
against North Vietnam have not materialized, criticism of his Vietnam
policy is now sharply circumsctibed.
" 'President Nixon," wrote the New York Times in an editorial on
11 May, 'has embarked on a dubious game of chance which risks the
fundamental interests of the USA for questionable gains. He is not only
.balancing military confrontation with the Soviets on a question which is
not vital to America's security; he risks the hardly less dangerous
collapse of so carefully achieved progress toward a genuine diplomatic
relaxation of tension which has already begun to take form in the SALT
6
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agreements. He thereby invites Soviet retaliatory action if not in
East Asia, then in another sensitive area. In view of Hanoi's current
military successes, there is little attraction for North Vietnam to
agree to a cease fire. The only salvation lies how in the hands of
Congress. Mr. Nixon has led the country to the brink of a constitutional
crisis. Only Congress can save the President from himself and the nation
from a catastrophe.'
"TWO weeks later champagne glasses clinked in the Kremlin at the
signing of the SALT agreements. 'Three weeks later Congress, which should
have blocked him, received the President's report of his Moscow successes
in a ceremonial session of both houses. And today, six weeks later,
.not one East-Bloc freighter, has yet broken through the blockade, which
had been denigrated by the isiew York Times as an ineffective 'half-
blockade.' It is questionable whether the Podgorny visit to Hanoi will
change this Soviet position. The Soviet Chief of State on his return
from North Vietnam predicted the resumption of the Paris peace talks,
in the progress of which America and the Soviet Union unquestionably'
have a common interest. He reported that the Soviet Union will do
everything for the de-escalation of the war.
"A direct relation between the Podgorny mission and the almost
simultaneous visit of Henry Kissinger to Peking exists only insofar as
they both served to inform the North Vietnamese and the Chinese leaders
on the Moscow summit. Podgorny's mission was to cool North Vietnamese
anger over Moscow's passive reaction to the blockade. As the Washington
Post reports, Podgorny rejected Hanoi's proposal that the Soviet Union
must break the American blockade. While the communique at the end of the
visit demanded the 'unconditional' cessation and promised North Vietnam
'all necessary aid,' it did not say that the Kremlin is prepared to
break the blockade.
"On the American side, it is believed probable that Podgorny, in
his discussions with Xuan Thuy, chief North Vietnamese delegate to the
Paris peace talks, urged a realistic position -- the' communique speaks
of 'constructive' talks. It is clear to Washington that neither Moscow
nor Peking have the intention or the capability to force the North
Vietnamese to a solution. It is certain that Podgorny emphasized to Hanoi
the difficulties encountered in getting Russian shipments through, not
only due to the American blockade but also due to Chinese obstruction
of Soviet transport. But the decision as to what conclusions to draw from
this situation and the stagnation of the North Vietnamese offensive remains
, with Hanoi.
� I.
I ,r1 EIC ail Vietnam-Pollak wird schwcsierso"
Von unserem Korrespondenten
HEINZ EARTH
� Washington, 21..Juni
Die Folos der abgeschossenen So-
wjetpanzer, die von den Nordviet-
narnesen nut der Haupistraf3e von
An Loc zurfickgelassen wurden, sind
!nicht nu f den Tiielseiten' der gronen
amerikonischen Informationspresse
erschienen. Seit es fiir die Verbiin-
&ten Anierikas au( dein Kricgs-
schauplalz etwas besser aussicht, sind
die militiirischen .Analysen der Sat-
goner Poolside-Strategen, die noch
vor wenigcn Wochen das sich abzeich-
nende Debakel der Armee Stidviet-
nams genilfilich ausgemalt batten,
merkwiirclig vage geworden.
An Loc, so entdeeicen viele Berleht-
erstatier jetzt nachtriiglich, war eigent-
itch den Aufwand nicht wert. Ohnehin
hnhe die itommunistische Beschief3ung,
die elf Wochen datirrte, von der berieu-
tungslost it Siarit nur omen Schutthau-
fen iihrigeciassen. Die Noreivietnarnescn
Mellen sic nicht fiir becicutungslos,
sonst Witten sic nicht zu Beginn der
Offensive mil. tier Ankiineligung aufge-
� trumpft, An Luc sci als Sitz ciner
kom-
It,r1,c'n cerfenrecierung Siidviet-
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Es wirtl im Pentagon ohne writcres
zugegeben, daf1 die Truppen
ohne Unterstidning dwell die Air
Force der invasion kat= Herr ;�
� or-
den. wiircii. Aber die Taiarhe, dal r
Geglier in fast drei IsiIonaten nii
citien cntscheidencien Durchbruch cr-
zielle, hat die Moral der Vericidiger
fdhlbir gcsUirkt. Im Untersehled zur
Tet-Offensive von 1068, die ftir Hanoi
� cinmhiitirisches Fiasko, aber cm n vor-
tibergehender psyehologischer Erfoig
war, der die arneriltanische Offentlieh-
licit lief breinfluOte und zum Stunz
Lyndon Johnsons fiihrte. 1st diesmal von
diner psycholocisehen Wirkung nut die
USA wenin in spiiren. Nachdem die un-
abschbaren Folgen nicht eingetreten
elm], die Nixon nach der Aufnahme des ,
106
intensiven Luftkriegs gegen Nordvict-
nam und nach Verliiingung der Blocka-
de angedrobt warden warm, 1st die
Kritik an seiner Vietni-,,mpolitik jetzt In
ihrer Bewegungsfreiheit stark behin-
dcrt.
�Prasiclent Nixon", schrieb die �New
York Times" am 11. Mai in einem Leh.-
arlikel�,hat sich auf cm n verzweifeltes
Vabanquespiel cingelassen, das filr den
fragwdrdigcn Gewinn fundamentale ln-
tcressen der USA rlskiert. Er mat nicht
nur die inilitiirische Konfrontation tnit
den Sowjets . in einer Frage, die ftir
Amerikas Sicherheit wedcr lebenswich-
tig war noch 1st. Er riskiert den kaurn
weniger gefahrvollen Zusammenbruch
der so mtihsam erzielten Fortschritte in
Riddling auf mine ethic diplomatische
Entspannung. die sehon 1m SALT-Ab-
kommen Formcn anzunehinen begann.
Er fordert dadurch eine sowietische
Vergetturigsaktion heraus, wenn nicht
In Ostasien, .dartn in" einem anderen
neuralgischen Punkt der Bide. Ange-
sichts der gegenwartigen mititarlschen
Erfolge Hanois hat es fur Nordvietnam
keinen Betz, einer Fetiereinstellung zu-
-istimmen. Die einzige Rettung Ilegt
jetzt in den Minden des Kongresses. Mr.
Nixon hat das Land an den Hand drier
Vnrfassungskrlse geftihrt. Nur der
Kongre0 kann dcn Prasidenten noch vor
sich selbst und die Nation vor einer Ka-'
tastrophe retten."
SVENSKA DAGBLADET, Stockholm
30 May 1972
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Zwei Wochen spate); klirrten bet der
Unterzeichnung 'des SALT-Abkommens
im Kreml die Charripagnerkciche. Drei
Wochen spater nahm der Kongrea, der
(km Priisidenten in den Arm fallen
sollte, in drier fcierlichen Sitzung beider
Hauser semen Moskaucr Erfolgsbericht
entgcgen. Und beide, sechs Wochet
spater, hat noch kein Ostblockfrachter
die Blockade durchbrochen. die win der
...New York Times" damals als wir-
kungslose �Halb-Block;ide" abquallft-
ziert warden war. Es 1st fraglich. ob der
Podgorny-Besuch in Hanoi etwas an
. dieser sowjetischen Haltung lindenn
wird. Das sowjetische Starnsoberhaupt
sagtc bei der Ittickkchr nits ,Nordviet-
nam die baldtge Wiederaufnahme der
.,arker Friedensgesprache voraus, an
U,Ten rertwhritt Amerika und die So-
wjetunion unvr.,rkennbar cin nerneinsa-
mes intercsse haben. Er ktindigto an. die
Sowjetunion wercle alles fiir die De-
eskalation des Krieges tun.
Bin direkter Zusammenhang zwischen
der Podgorny-Mission und dent fast
gleichzeitigen liesuch Henry Kis.singers
In Peking existicrt nur insoweit, els es
sich in bciden Flillen darum handelt, die
nordvietnamesischen mid die chinest-
i schen Fiihrer fiber den Moskatter Glpfel
1 zu unterrichten,
rodgorny war beauftragt, den Zorn
der Nordvietnamesen Ober die passive
UNANIMITIES ABOUT VIETNAM
by Professor Goran Lindahl
waktion Moskaus au( die Blockade zn
oeschwichligcn. Wie die �Washington
Post" meldet. lehntc Podgorny din For-
&rung Hanois ab, die Sowjetunion
musse die amerikanische Blockade bra-
then. Zwar fordert das Kommunique
zum Abschlufi des Bestiehes litre, �be-
dingungslosc" Einstellu4g und ver-
spricht Nordvietnam �jute notivondige
Hilfe"� aber es sagt nicht, daiV der
Kremi zur Brechung der Blockade be-
reft 1st. -
Man halt es auf amertkaniseheriSette
ftir wahrseheinlich, dal3 Podgorn;y bet
der Unterrcdung, die or mit Xuan
(km nordvietnamesischen Cliefriclegier-
ten bel den Parlser Friedensverh,anci-
iungen, hat te, dringend zu ciner rellisti-
scheren Elitstellung riot � von paten-
struktiven" Gespilichen 1st in a dem ,
Konuntiniqu6 die Rode. Wetter Mos- '
kati noch Peking, dal-Utter 1st man sich
In Washington Mar, haben die Absicht
odor die NIriglichkelt, dcn Nordvietna-
mesen eine Lasting aufzuzwingen. Aber
as 1st sicher, daB Podgorny Hanoi! auf die
SchwierIgkeitcn verwics, die Itir die
russisehen Lieferungen nicht nur dumb
die amerikanische Blockade, sondem
auch dumb die chinesische Obstruktion
gegen die Sowjettransnorte entstanden
slid. Aber die Entscheidung, welche
Konsequenzen aus dieser Situation und
au; dem Stagnieren der nordvietname-
slschen Offensive zu zlehoh Find, bleat
Hanoi tiberiassen.
No current event is more unsuited to one-sided and uncritical
.
parti gan�hiFthan the Vietnam war, according to Professor
Lindahl. Bilt-ho-CounfiY outside the Eastern European Bloc
has accepted all propaganda oversimplifications unanimously
and with such meager exchange of opinions as Sweden, main-
tains Professor Goran Lindahl in the article below. He
suggests some possible explanations.
The world has long known what happened in Hue during the winter
of 1968 -- more and more facts have gradually become known. But it may
not be quite proper to recall these facts -- since they do not strengthen
the stylized total picture of the war in Vietnam which is the only
view acceptable to public opinion today.
Supported by North Vietnamese troops, the NLF units captured the�
old imperial city of Hue during the Tet offensive in January 1968.
For 25 days they held out against frenzied attacks by American and
South Vietnamese forces, making Hie the only city the Communists were
able to occupy for any length of time. It is now possible to get a
relatively clear picture of what happened in the city during that month.
It was known quite early that there had been executions -- now we know
that the number of those killed amounts to at least 3000. That means
more than 100 executions a day out of a population of 150,000 people.
The mass graves that were discovered bear witness to violent excesses.
Mbst of the dead were shot, but others had been beaten to death or
8
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Approved for Release: 2018/04/25 CO2599106
buried alive. Unplanned violence may have occurred and certainly
mistakes were made in the huntjor suitable victims. Largely,
however, it seems to have 'been a question of carrying out a precisely
prepared plan. Its aim was to wipe out the political and ideological
leaders, anyone who could in any way be classified as enemies of the
revolution. The intention moreover was to involve the popular masses
as much as possible. During that month it was supposed to be praise-
worthy to denounce those who worked for the Saigon regime, to
point out where they lived, to assist in searching for them, to
participate in hastily established courts, or to take part directly
in killing itself. In this way, revolutionary hatred was to be
fanned and the masses were to be bound to new leaders and new political
goals.
One of the goals of the Tet offensive was to destroy the social
groups making up the strongest support 'of the Saidon government;
starting with its cadre of political leaders, officials in the administration,
and specially trained experts. However, the violent and definitive
element in this plan distinguishes it from the tactics the Communists
used earlier and also later -- although nothing is known of what is
happening right now in captured cities and towns. What has been
characteristic of the Communist side's course of action ever since
the war against South Vietnam began has been largely a kind of selective
terror, a more limited killing.
Actions that were too senseless and too widespread would also
have arodsed such strong popular opposition that continued infiltration
would have been impossible. A much better method was the series of
Deroetual and seemingly implacable murders and kidnapings they, resorted to.
In this way the efforts of the Saigon government to pacify and re-
organize the people were constantly disturbed and the group of
reliable leaders and officials right down to the most unassuming
at the village level was being steadily bled dry. The number of
murders and kidnapings in the period 1958-65 has been reported to be
!4.16,500. For the period 1966-69 the figure is 44,000.
This achieved another goal at the same time -- frightening those
who were unwilling into passivity, silence, or at best active cooperation.-
ilmrspecial-command in the National Liberation Front in charge of
terror works with a system of warnings that make it possible for all
those who have .supported the South Vietnamese government in any way
to resign from,their service or go over to active work, such as
intelligence activity or assisting with murder attempts and sabotage.
If they refuse punishment follows. Of course it is easier for
those who are highly placed to refuse -- they can count on armed
protection. The actions of the NLF have reached relatively few in
this group. It is the leaders and officials at lower levels who are
killed mainlyespecially those who work out in the villages. There
have also been actions of revenge on a larger scale, directed against :
entire villages cooperating with the enemy, and these actions have
affected as many as 200 to 300 people at one time. This then is
a question of a carefully thought-out, entiring, and implacable
system of terror, adjusted in its extent to suit different purposes.
With this kind of background, the question of the popular support
of the NLF becomes quite meaningless. The number of those who are -
really active, militarily and politically, the.hard core, has been
the object of certai
Appr6;-/edfielea.srj: flab'
4iEc7-6.2.5.ail06t0ta1 population
Apyroved forReleasr,2018/04/5 CO2599106a few
of South Vietnam the i percent.
The Tet offensive noticeably decimated these groups of hardcore
activists -- in the assault now taking place North Vietnamese regular
'units appear to be playing the most decisive role. The extent and
content of the popular response out in the provinces is even more .
difficult to estimate. Hew many have given their support voluntarily,
and how many have received warnings that their own life or that of
someone close to them.yas_ip danger unless those exerting the pressure
got their own 'way? What is conviction and what is adaptation to
a merciless reality?.
The experience of other countries has shown that rebel and terrorist
activity of basically the same type as that in Vietnam has had
enormous consequences even when it was carried out by very small groups
.of fanatics whose faith never faltered. Open countries whose goal,
is to live under peaceful conditions have limited opportunities to
protect themselves against the consequences of terror. The very
polarization of society which the attackers try to achieve is gradually
forced upon them'. Nations that once had something of a democratic system
are forced successively into the Severety and inhumane measures which---:
eventually tend to give the rebel movement meaningful substance in
the eyes of larger groups.
No one can deny the incredible resolution and ability to resist
the North Vietnamese have displayed. The way this attitude was
created is part of the picture too. At least some of the main facts
are well known. After the division of Vietnam by the Geneva agreement,
a stream of 850,000 refugees fled southward -- some of them later
played leading roles in the Saigon government.� At the same time a .
land reform program of the most drastic type was introduced. As was
the case earlier in the Soviet Union and China, this was not just a
matter of redividing land ownership but a bloody settling of accounts
with an entire class of landowners which was extended to include
'others considered to be enemies of the new regime. A, wave of killing
swept the country guided by quickly-organized people's courts and
accompanied by an intensive campaign of indoctrination and hatred.
There are varying estimates of the number of victims, the lowest being
50,000 dead and the highest figuring more than five times that. Since
that time.the country has been completely closed, and, its inhabitants
have recejlip-ct no messages other than those the 11 members of the
Politbureau saw fit to give them. What does it mean in such a
case to talk about popular unity? The only thing to be said is
that such means create a_homogeneous military state prepared to
make whatever aerifi&s_are needed to achieve its political goals.
Few current events are less suited to one-sided, uncritical
partisanship than the war in Vietnam. That is not the view of
,Swedish public opinion. NO country outside the East bloc has so
unanimously and with such a low level of debate Swallowed- all the
simplifications of propaganda. The people in South Vietnam., we have
been assured over and over, are united in their support of the National
Liberation Front. Outside of this popular fellowship there is only
a little clique of traitors, but they are the ones courted by the
United States, led by two equally war-crazy presidents. The role
of North Vietnam has long caused uncertainties in public opinion --
the increasing extent of its support was evidently seen as some-
thing that downgraded the NLF, something that raised doubts about
the strength and the popular base of the National Liberation Front. 10
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Approved for Release: 2018/04/25 CO2599106
New the facts are recognized and all doubts have been blown away in
enthusiasm over the successes on the battlefield. The military
capability becomes a kind of proof -- the victor must, of course,
have right on his side, while the retreating side represents
something fundamentally sick and unjust.
The notable aspect of Swedish public opinion is not the views
and the arguments -- those are largely the same all over the world.
What is astonishing and perhaps frightening is the uniformity, the almost
total lack of all-round debate. This judgment can be extended to other
areas besides the Vietnam war. Strictly speaking, there is only
one international political problem that has been fully and broadly
,presented to Swedish public opinion in recent years -- the conflict
between Israel and the Arab states. In that case the liars and
misinterpreters have found it difficult to get a firm hold -- constantly
renewed criticism has seen to it that one-sided propaganda has not
.remained uneontradicted for long. But that was an exception. In
normal cases the facts seem to interest people only to the extent they
strengthen an already established opinion,. while anything else is
smothered in the almost intolerable mixture of unction and .moralism
that has replaced true discussion.
There are a number of circumstances behind this one-sidedness.--
one of them is briefly suggested below.
In most western nations, free radicals play an important and
sometimes decisive role in shaping political and cultural opinion. At
the moment most of them call themselves' socialists, while previously
they saw themselves more often as liberals, more or less far out on
the left wing. Naturally it is difficult to define this group in any
meaningful way. The inner core consists of academically trained people,
mostly from the areas of social science and the humanities, but it
also includes other categories, such as those in artistic professions
and the professional opinion molders of the press, radio and TV. As
a whole this is a talented and alert group, more concerned than other
groups in our society with obtaining conscious opinions, with reading
and writing and debating. A significant part of any discussion is
initiated and led by this group. Taken as a group, these people
make up perhaps the most important opinion-forming force in the
western democracies, at any rate in groups other than the most tradition
bound.
This group plays an exceptionally important role in Sweden. This
has been true for a long time. It might be said that this has been
strengthened in recent years along with the growth of opinion-forming.
activity and the growing concentration in Stockholm, the expansion of
�educated society, and the enormous number of young people in search
of Opinions, all of which gives the big megaphones a bigger audience
than ever before. .This has also made both the strengths and the
wealmesses of this group'more apparent. It can be both alert and well-
informed,tut also faddish and faithless in an amazingly excessive way.
..Aniimber of people moving in these circles -- most strikingly those in '
the artistic professions -- were for along time totally uninterested
.in politics. Then an awakening took.place which has had the nature of
'a revival movement, of a long series of personal conversions.
The result is a mixture of newly-acquired faith, enthusiasm, in-
telligence, and an-incredible lack of political training. It is:riot just.
a matter of partisanship concerning political events here at home and
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out in the Wider world 4)123Angf.K.1.29:1 8z9_4/25cs259910 6Thout reality
that at times approaches the idiotic. Everything is interpreted
according to a tstylized scheme offering some kind of total explanation
or the chance to divide people and entire nations into good and evil.
This attitude is combined with an obvious distaste for facts --'for it.
is not a question of finding out what really happened but of keeping
one's enthusiasm or indignation at fever pitch.
, Of course these groups of people who are-aware of ideas are in
many ways an asset'to society, because of their sensitivity to new
shifts in the wind and their ability to express their opinions. But
they are also a danger to society because of their lack of understanding
that power involves obligations even in the area of opinion forming.
Intensive involvement in wor1a affali'S-does not have to exclude every
trace of intellectual discipline.
' TO a large extent international political propaganda is aimed at
social groups of this kind. Up to now, its success has been remarkable
and.apparontly this will continue to be the case. And clever political
propagandists all over the world will continue to impose upon these
easily-moved and credulous people who make such a mark on the political
and cultural climate in the western democracies.
Val.'den vet sottan lange vad
on hande I Hue 'Vintern.106g;
� och her fakfa har otter
- hand blivit klinda. Att erinra
Urn dem lir iincia into riktigt
:.romme 11 faut � de bidrar ju
into till nit stiirka den stilise-
rade helhetsbild ov karnpen 1
'Vietnam soin I dog ar den enda
'opinionsmiissigt gangbara.
.Stodda av nordvietnamesiska_
trunper crovracle leNL-forband
, den gamla kejsarstaden Hue
under Tet-offensivc I januari
.1.21:3. 1 25 dagar holt de sedan
st5nd mot frenetiska attacker
av amerikanska och sydvietna-
mesiska styrkor: Hue blev clan.
,mcd den enda stad kommunist-
idaa lyckactes hIla besatt un-
der nagon langre� tid. Dot ghr
numera ocksa att Z en relativt
av vad sort skedde
sIndrii under derma mAnad. Alt
avrattningar farekom blcv
ti-
dit belcant � an vet man att
;iuiran uppgAr till minst 3 000
j dodade. Dot betyder mer an 100
avrlittade em clagen ur ert be-
folkning p5 150 000 personer. De
massgravar FOM upptlickts, bar
vittne om vAldsainma excesser.
Dc fiesta av do (Made hade
skjutits medan andra Magas
ihkd med piikar oiler begravts
levandc. Planlkist viId kan ha
furekominit, slikert ocksA miss-
� lag I jaktcn p5 liimpliga offer. 1
stort sett tycks dct dock ha va-
;it (raga cm att genomti5ra en
' nogaf forbercdd plan. Doss sync
.vor att utplana dot politiskt och
idcologiskt lcdande slcilttet, alba
som pa nagot siitt kundo
rubri-
ceras som revolutionens lien-
der. Avsikten vnr viciare nit i
gorligasto man engagera folk-
massorna. Dot blev under
donna manad beromvarda
handlingar at ange dem som
verkat for Saigonregeringen,
att peka ut var de bodde, att
hjilpa till i sokandet efter dem,
att rnedverka i hastigt till-
lcomna folkdomstolar oiler att
direkt delta i sjalva dodandet.
Darmed kunde (let revolutio-
, nava hatet underblasas och
massorna bindas till nya ledare
� och nya politiska mil. ,
� Ett av Tetoffensivens mil vac
, att krossa de samhallsgrupper,
som utgjortle Saigonregimens
; starkaste stod, I forsta hand
' doss kader av politiska Ictiare,
funktionarer ' I forvaltningen
orli speclattithildacte expertcr.
Dot valdsamtna och definitIva
donna plan skiljer Mg dock frAn
den taktik kommunIsterna
tiril-
garo och ocksA rennre till5mpat
� om vad som hander just nu
erovradc stiidor och bynr lie
dock IngcntIng bchant. Utmlir-
kande for kommunistsidans
tillvagag;;ngssiitt arida sedan
kampen oin Sydvictnam 'flied-
des bar i stort sett varlt ett
slags selektiv terror, ott met
begransat dociande.
Alitfor meningslosa. orb orn-
fattande aktioner skittle ocks5
ha vacict ett A starkt tnjkligt
moistand, att fortsatt Infiltra-
tion omojliggjorts. Sent eft vida
lampligare model framstod en
standig och till syno obeveklig
serie av mord eller bortrth!an-
12
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tidon . 1950-05 angivits till aegrarna maste naturligtvis ha I
. Dessutom kunde ett annat kratis ortininea Prdssas succes-
enorma mangden av hsiktsso- .
� 4(a500, for perioden 1066-61:1 tin- sma lgorn tram. Stater, sorra: en pA sin aida den retire- Stockholm; utbilcinIngsamrtaal. ,
a s ansvillning oral ..t. den
44 000. . ttdiga", haft nagiat av derno-1 1 at
i rand� parten darernot Itiretaiida
mill &as samtldigt: att skramma . snit t1 den hardhanthet och l pagot i - grunclen sjukt och kande ungdom ger ockaA do
de ovilligt instailda till passivia omarnatlighet, SAM antligenkani twatalardlat- . stora megafonerna ett gensvar
td, tystnad eller 1 basta fall till ge up4rorarorelsen en menings-1 Dot anmarkningsv5rda med i
Lsorn aldrig film. Darmed , liar_
alativt satnarbete. De special-, full irrebord Or sr e g p i
kormnandon inom FNL, som per. j ning ar inte haikterna nch argu-
den svenska opinionens halla : ocksa bade styrkan och svaghea�
ten hos derma grupp bliviCallt-
err ru -
haft terrorn om hand, bar arbe- Ing a kan bestrida den oer-1 aneaten -,-.de 5r i stort sett de- !
a. mar uppenbar. Den kanvara
harda beslutsambet och inot-i saroma varklen runt. Det larva-
bade rorlig och valinforMerad
stand 4.r�fe, som _ Nordvietnami nande och kanske skraramande .
men � ocksa modebunden och
visat tarov pa. Tw. bilden harl ligger i sjalva enigheten, den �
trolos pat ett hapnadsvackande
ocksaa bar derma: attityd stund Wigan totala aysaknaden av '.
ytligt siitt. En m5ngd personer
allsidig debatt. Orndornet Ion '
ur dessa kretiar � allra mest
utstrackas ocksa till andra falt
pafaliande ' de konstnarligt
an just Vietnamkriget. Strtingt
verksamrna � var langc poll-
taget tir del bara ett enda pro- '
tiskt totalt ointresserade Sedan
blern I international' politilt, -
dess har ett uppvaltnande ligt
som under senare ar blivit .'
rum, som bait karaktaren av
verkligt allsidigt belyst infot .
:vackelserorelse, av Wilma seder.
svenala opinion: konflikten mel- '
med el jordreform av det mast Ian Israel och ar av personliga omvandelaer.abstaterna. I .
l
oar ocksa natt relativt fa ur aanotnaripande, slaa. Liksorn 11-.! I det fallet liar logner och van- - Fiesultatet ir en blandning av
detta skikt. Etat lir ledatre nth cligarek Soviet och. Kina gallcie; ! tolkningar haft svart att fh de-
nyforvarvad tro, av entusiasm.
funktionarer Pa 'dere diva som del it bara en ornfOrdelning, j finitivt taste:- standigt ater-
intelligens och oerhaard politisk
r.ramfor alit drahhata, i fOrsta av jo., iandet utart en blodig kommande kritik liar sorjt for '. obildning. Det 5r into barn
hand de 'scan arbotat ute t� uppgaialte mad en hal )(lass av att ensidig propaganda inte � fr5ga �I" Parliskhd 11116r P�11-
byarna. Hamralaktionar I starre besuntat; den nistracktes ocksa larrinats oemotsagd ldnge. Den tiska handelser Mom landet orb
i a
sitala liar ocksa iiiaekorrimit, till artilra som k ute varlden, det at ocks en
trade uppfattas Insatsen ur dock ett undantag. I
riktacla mot beta hyar, isiam sOrrs 4i.l.n3'a regimens taender. .normala fall tycks fakta Intres-
aningsloshet infor verkligheten,
samarbetat mad fienden orh lart vi,a� :iv dadaade gick aver sera bara I den man de kan far-
SOM ibland stegras till det narr-
aom pa en gang beriart upp LIU landen alt av snablit organise- starka en redan etablerad uP aktiga. Alit tolkas eller stilise-
P- .' rade scheman, som ger nagot
200-300 manniskor,- Del ur sf,..a , rade a..krlarnato!ar orb beled-: !miming, restcn drunknar i den
ledes Li ,a om att no,' over- lj sagat.1,v 1.11er:siva indoktrine- naaten outhardliga blandning : slag av totalforklaring eller
ainkt, nuttrattliat aalt oblidkraa rings- a .cl' hatkampanier, Ulm-as' salvelse och moralism, sorra mitjlighet att sortera upp m5n-
ligt terrorsystem, till sin orn- fattniaaan ' ern ;mallet offer. Iatt ersatta en verklig diskus- '' niskor och hela stater i onda
. attning avpassat for olika syfa I :titan-in den higata ralcnar meth :sion. ; orb goda. Attityden kornbineras
:�:en. , ' 50 000 ,iar.lacie. don ,hoasta matt! j Del finns en rad omstandig- f med en pataglig skygghet for
g , ,. ., 1 hater, som kan forklara denna ' fakta: det galler ju intl.: att
leer :ii� frill r,.1 cr aa manaa ' .
Mot en bakgrund av detta sari ..1 ' � - trlinga fram till vad sotn verk-
. lag lair fragan om FNLas folk- ri an; aaraa lid liar landet va-j 1 ensidighet; en av dein skall Mr :
t fi I tan,itat slutet cioas in-' I i ko-th t , ... , 1 , c antydas. ligen sker utan att halls+ sin en-
Ii iga Maid egentligen alldelea a 1 - ''' tusiasm eller indignallan brill-
a.inare tar. inte natts av andra it I flera vasterlandska stater .
&arts spelar fria radikaler en vilttig,� nancie. �
2ningsI63. Ant-del verklirt bu,1:;kar, an vad Poittbv-a "
7:1,tiva rnilitart och politiskt,.
:tan barcla kiirnan� bar gjnail:
ai faremal film vissa unpskatt-
anignr. 1 forhallande till total-
aafolkningen i Sytivintnam ror.
a.ct sig 001 mita sifiror. sanno-
latt boast ett par procent. Tel-,
,rfensiven decimeracie dessa
�....upper nvsevlirt; .1 den nu 0-
lfTIC1C anstormnineen tyeks:
,,Izsix reguljiira norcivieiname-
..ika. forband speln den belt
�avgarancle roam. Omfattningen.
. acti inneborden av det folkliga.
. gansvaret ute I provinserna ar
.�
rimligtvis !limn svarare att,
. iingc, Ilur mangit 15rimar sitt
. stad fris.illigt, .bur mhnro ham
1 natts av vat�ningar att tiaras
caet eller flagon anhorias liv.
star pa spel om inte pAtryciii�
karna far som de viii? Ved ur
avertygelse och vad ar tinnass-
fling till en skoningslos verklig-
het? .
Fran andra Wilder Or dot val-
beitatit att upprors- orb terror-
verksamhet av I princip samma
slag Isom I Vietnam hat* enorma
konsekvenser, ockaat dA den ut-
tat med eat system av var-
aingar far aatt farrna Irina som
pa tiagot satt verkat till rage-
ainge.ns staid att avaa rig sina
iiiinater eller &erg1 till aktiv
'nandlirtg t, ex. form av under? data Efter Viet-1
pats. jr
nagra huvud-
rattelseveeksarnhet eller med- nams aeIning Genaveav-
talet
flykti
dem
leclan
men..
hjalp vid attentat och sabotage!.
Vid vagran bar stralfet foljt.
De hogst uppsatta liar glVetV15
haft liittast att vag.ra � bar
launnat rakna med effektivt
vannat skydd. FNL:s aktioner
Approved for Release: 2018/04/25 CO2599106
aan, racal kande Saiaonrcia-- Ov:Li av bulYriligt Mimic� .g1111)-': son: nAgot necIsiittande Mr da mcst traclitionsbundna.
-1f-ns 5IC.ivandcn att. pacificera Pre av� fanatiker, vilkas tro Mt* zom�kunnot vacka 1 tavaraes apelar donna allIPP4
ach reorganisera oavlatligt aid- avilztar ett iaaonblick. �Plana om eNLas atyrka och ,folltliga exceptionellt vattig roll. Sit a
orb skiktot av paditliga le- landar. som hr r som mat att; farankring. har .fakta cr- 'hay dat varit 'tinge. ,laianske.
aareaoch funktionarer, tied till lava under areciliga' forhallan-; kanta och tvivlet bItIst bort 1: t. kan Lain oin lair-
.
(lc anspraltsliisaste pa bynlva, dera laiaks ha hearansade maj-i
atiinciigt aderlatas. Antalet
nord och bortrovanden bar for
entusiaaman dyer framaringarna
pa alagfaitet. Den militara Ita-1
paciteten blir nhgot slags bevis:
lighetar att skycida :Rim Just .de&
polarjering I samhallet, som tirt
attacicrnao syfte, tvingas fia!
ack en strain av B50 000;
�gar soderut nagra av
ar sedan (less spelat en!
2 roll learn Saigonregt- �
,.rntlelgt inleddes arbetet�
clva medlemmam. fitnnit lamp-,
ligt. Vaci Or (let fdr niening-mad i
alt I ett fall som delta tala om
foildie, enighet? Det enda som!
kan sagas Or ju att med sadana j
medal skapas en homogen milt-
tarstat, beredd till viika unp-
offringar som heist for att nal
sina politiska mal. �
Fa hand.elser I nutiden Or sa
litet 'ampule fot ensidigt och
reservationslost partitagande �
som ltriget i Vietnam. Detta at*
into den svenska opinioncns
syn. Inget land utanfor Ostbloc-
ket bar si enhalliat och under �
sa torftigt meningsutbyte
anammat alla � propagandans'
forcnIclingar. Folket i Sydviet-�
nam, forsalcras tict om och om
igen, slutar aniat upp balcorn,
FlaL. litanfiir folkaiernenskapen
star bara en liten 'dick av
fOr-
rOdare, men (let Or mad dem'
som laSA slagit lobe, lett ay.
tva libi itrigsgalna presidentera
Nordvietnamns roll bar hinge
va"aten viss tvekan diet;
alltmer omfattande stattlet.dXr,d
Wan ha" f
Approved for Release:
!itialkand avgairande roll som poll-
is ! a och kulturella ibildare opinionsa
ltaav dem beteckna si For tillfallet torde de
c ail sig
star, tidigare 5 g so in sole
!'nog snarast so liberalecire mseig n r
:eller' mindre liangt ut pa vans-
�
terkantie;run.pp svAturligtvis Or
danna r att a.vgrSnsa
Pa nagot meningsfullt satt.
lalarntruppen bestar av akade-
imisitt utbildacte, foretradesvis I
aamliallsvetenskapliga orb hu-
,marlistiska limnen, men dit hot*
ocksa andra kategorier, I. ex.,
jcoastniirliga yrken orb profes-
siorsella opinions ildare fran ,. propagannan tar 1 : � tit-
radio och TV. Sorn helhet ,i strackning sikte pa .saa ails-
air dct 'en begavad och riirligH grupper av delta slag. a:am-
grapp, mer an andra inorn sam- � � gangarna hat hittills varit av-
: ..1 et sysse satt incd att skaffa
'sig medvetna asikter, att ltisa
loch skriva och debattsra. En
!betydande del DV diskussionen
initieras och leda Iran detta. . .
aliirkning undar senare Ita-Istkt
med den opiniorsbildande
verksamhetens tillvtixt oak allt
starkaro koncentra tion � till �
� Naturligtvis Or dessa grupc:r
. av idemlissigt medvetria,
� skor ainda pa mangit satt en
til1g5ng for namhallet; de Or det
I kraft av sin ktinslighet foe nya
vindriktningar och sin formaaa
att ge uttryck at sina asiittcr.
Men de Or ocksa en' (ara genorn
sin brist pa forstaeise for att
malat forpliklar ocksa na opi-
nionsbildningens omrade. In-
tensivt ehgagemang i varldens
affarer behaver inte uiesiuta
vane gnutta av icllckluell
moral.
� Den internationella alitiska
! sevarda och set ut alt farlai
det. Ocksi I fortstiltningen
kommer skickliga politiska prc-
pagandamakare.ront on) i varl-
den att skjuta in sig pa dessa
Tillsammantagna utgor
snabbrorliga uch god trogna
idessa ratinniskor den kanskei manniskor, som i sA. hog grad
. . .
salter sin pragel ph det poll- b
tiska och kulturcila klimatet
vastcrns derankratier.
latigaste opinionsbildande
;kraften I vasterna demokratier,
vario fall pa orrtraden utantair
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BERITA BUANA, Djakarta
16 June 1972
PLANS TO COMMUNIZE INDOCHINA FALL THROUGH
Observing statements made by Hanoi and Peking, we know that
struggle for people's communizations launched by North Vietnam
applies not only to Vietnam but also to all of Indochina. Even when
North Vietnam moves its forces through Cambodia and Laos, it does not
feel it is in other people's territory but in its own territory.
It is this pretension that has brought about difficulties in talks with
Hanoi, because point of departure of its thinking is different from
fact. Hanoi just does not consider itself committing aggression,
even when it is encroaching upon other countries in Indochina. However,
its last offensive has shown that it cannot prove the truth_ of its theory,
even though it has used force. After having been trained by the U.S.
not only in the technology of war but also in the administration of a
democratic country, South Vietnam is able to match the strength of
North Vietnam and even supersedes it in some cases, although. U.S. air
support has played a decisive role. The persistence shown by. South.
Vietnam has even surprised U.S. public, as reflected in their press,
because they once thought that South Vietnam was no match for North
Vietnam.
Since South Vietnam has succeeded in. defending Hue, An Loc, and
Kontum, those who were pessimistic are now showing up to declare that
the fighting quality of South Vietnam is reliable. 'Most outstanding fact
is that despite the deep infiltration committed by the Viet Cong, no
rebellion of South Vietnamese people has taken place against Saigon
government.
The resistance shown by South Vietnam will certainly infuse
enthusiasm into anti-communist nations such as CaMbodia,-Laos.l.and
even Thailand, which were once Contaminatedbydefeatism, assuming that
communist forces were undefeatable.0
WASIECIMON DAILY NEWS
31 May 1972
- ,, i � A I. ...,
are systematically shooting officials of cap-. born, cruel, diehard individuals" as the first ,
tured South Vietnamese villages, a White step toward reducing resistance, coercing the
House source said today. . local populace and destroying South Vietnam's
,
The source, who declined to be identified, governmental cohesion. And scattered intelli-,
said the number of victims � is unknown be. gence reports indicate that this is being done,'
cause it may be years before their graves or he said.
bones ere found. This same practice was followed at Hue dur-
"All we can confirm," he continued, "is that ing the 1968 Tet offensive, it was noted. Mass
(South Vietnamese) village officials are being graves of Tet victims still are being found and
rounded up and led off into the jungle never to the unofficial count of victims exceeds 5,900.
be seen again." A clandestine radio broadcast monitored in
But it is known that the North Vietnamese South Vietnam April 24 ordered the attacking
are under orders "to eliminate the most stub- northern units "to annihilate the top archvil-
.. I
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Scripps-Howard Stall Writer
North Vietnamese firing squads apparently �
By JAMES FOSTER (Thi;v7 EI
(71
14
identified "archvillaIns" a s administrative
personnel and others responsible for control-
ling the masses.
The broadcast quoted an official named Cuu
Long as saying annihilation of enemy leaders
was "absolutely necessary" and "most impor-
tant" to achieve North Vietnam's goal of over-
running South Vietnam.
Intelligence sources say Cuu Long is the
name often used by Gen. Tran Do, North Viet-
namese headquarters political officer and an
alternate member of the Hanoi Central Com-
mittee.
ACCORDING TO STATUS
Potential victims are graded for execution
according to their importance In the communi-
ty. Executioners start at the top with an eye
toward scaring less Important individuals Into
cooperating.
"We must constantly create conditions tor
those who have followed the wrong path to
forsake their evil ways WI return to the right
KEW wax T3123
15 June 1972
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lains and cruel units one after tne Diner. it path," Cuu Long declared.
"The best way . � ." he continued, "is to
annihilate the top villains in the hamlets and
warning, educating and disbanding lower-rank-
ing villains."
This also applies, he said, to policemen,
spies, pacification agents and security agents.-
CASE-BY-CASE
"We should deal with the civil self-defense
corpsmen on a case-by-case basis," he added.
Self-defense corpsmen usually are very young
or very old villagers left behind to protect the
homefront when young men of an area march
off to war.
North Vietnamese cadre and guerrillas have
been told to mingle with the local people In
order to identify the "most dangerous" indi-
viduals.
By killing only the "top ringleaders," Cuu
Long said, the people will be impressed by the
North Vietnamese's humanitarianism, be less
afraid, and more helpful in establishing per-
manent bases.
'The Human Cost of Communism'
'If the North takes over the South,
what will the bloodbath be?'
By ROBERT THOMPSON
LONDON�The present invasion of
South Vietnam and the intense fighting
.of the last few weeks draw attention
once again to the human suffering
� caused, on an almost unprecedented
scale, to the Vietnamese people by the
continuing war. I am not here consid-
ering the battle casualties which,
although on each side they have prob-
ably reached 500,000, can at least be
regarded as "legitimate" in war.
Nor am I considering the refugees
who, although their plight may be
� tragic, are at least still alive.
. What should most concern us is the
number of civilians who have been
killed in both halves of Vietnam, and
those who may yet die in the future, as
part of the human cost of Communism.
The Western conscience is imme-
diately pricked by an American-
committed atrocity, such as Mylai, and
by the civilian casualties caused by
the bombing of the North .(although
such casualties are now likely to be
for less than during 1965-68 because
of the development of the extremely
accurate ,"smart" bomb).
Little or no attention, however, and
certainly no equivalent reporting, has
been giv'm to similar Vietcong or
North Vietnamese atrocities which
have occurred on a scale that makes
-not occurred because of some aberra-
tion, accident or inaccuracy of bomb-
ing. They have occurred, both selec-
tively and indiscriminately, as a matter
of deliberate policy.
At the time Hanoi complained of six
civilian casualties, as a result of the
first American raid on the North after
the invasion began, she was firing
I22-mm. rockets indiscriminately into
Saigon and Pnompenh, killing more
than ten times that number.
Her Russian 130-mm. guns have
pounded Anloc and Quangtri to rubble.
They will do the same to Kontum and
Hue if they get within range without
any consideration whatsoever for the
civilian population.
Everyone has heard of Mylai, but
who has heard . of Caibe where the
Vietcong, after its capture, lingered
only to murder the wives and children
of all the local militia? Or of the
Montagnard village of Dakson, where
they moved from hut to hut with
flame-throwers incinerating more than
250 villagers, two-thirds of them women
and children?
Most people have heard of the
massacres at Hue in 1968 where the !
Vietcong and North Vietnamese, after
its capture, executed 5,700 people (as
assessed from the mass graves found
afterwards) but who knows that in
captured documeats they gloated over
these figures and only complained that
Mvlal almost insignificant. These have ..... 1. .;ltr.A ttn"ttrrill Tknen Itenrn
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not aberrations, nor savagery for sav-
agery's sake, nor the work of undis-
ciplined soldiers acting in violation of
instructions, but part of a ruthless
deliberate pelicy designed to break a
people who would not otherwise bend
to their will.
The world cannot plead ignorance
because it has all been well docu-
mented. The evidence has been author-
itatively put together in a compendium
prepared, surprisingly, for the United
States Senate Committee on the Judici-
ary (the meat was obviously too red
for Senator Fulbright and the Foreiga
Affairs Committee).
There are distressing implications for
the future. If the invasion suer('
and the North takes over the So.., 11,
what will the bloodbath be? Four :.�cars
ago I estimated that it would be several
hundred thousands.
I now wish to amend that figure
to well over one million (mi
eighteen million people).
The critics of the war may clt-6:a
that the forecasts are exaggerate I. iut
Colonel Tran Van Dac, a North Vict-
namese officer who defect( a.ez
twenty-four years in the Coau ist
party, stated that the Cornmuni. � ;('
they win, would slaughter tin to t:
million South Vienamese, and anoti,c
colonel, Le Kuan Chuyen, who defecteti
after twenty-one years, stated that five
million people in South Vietnam were
on the Communist "blood debt" list
and that )0-15 per cent of these would
pay with their lives. When asked iii,
an interview if the possibility of
a bloodbath had been exaggerated he
replied: "It could not be exaggerated.
It will happen."
ments of late have been few andA
DDrOved
tween. He recognizes, however,
is still very much a popular figure with
largo segments of the Argentine massest
Many believe he could, if he chose to
run, be elected easily despite his 17-year
�
President Lanusse's government lifted.
the ban against the Justicialista Party,
in March, 1971, and since then the party
has been increasingly active in politicsi
preparing for the scheduled 1973 elec-
tions that are to return Argentina to
civilian rule.
Mr. Peron's wife, Isabel, spent three
months in Argentina recently, talking
with government and political officials.
She said on her return to Madrid that
Mr. Perein might return this year and
that "the country needs him and they.
for Release: 2018/04/25 CO25991 0A
0-.na who'
/Siete d/C ��� ���
believe that a PerOn return would help.
bring about some sort of national recoil-,
ciliation and heal the breach in Argen- '
tine political life. Ever since Mr. Peron
was ousted in 1955, the country has ex-,
perienced a wide variety of political
problems, which successive civilian and,
military governments have been unable
to solve.
Whether the return of Mr. PerOn
would help in the solution is a largci
qut4titifiti iltafkl� but those ft:Miring his
return�including poesy who diaftgrou
vigorously with his populist social and/
economic policies�argue that nothing
else has solved the problems and that
perhaps the PerOn return might be a'
favorable factor. I
WASHINGTON POST
30 June 1972
Villagers Tell of
Of Their Tow
� PHONGDIEN, South Viet-
nam, June 29 (AP)�On
April 20, about 300 North Vi-
etnamese soldiers entered
,the village of Naixuan, six
miles south � of Quangtri
City. -
On Thursday, two months
later, South Vietnamese par-
atroopers reoccupied the
vii-
lage in the new counterdrive
Into Quangtri .Province in
South Vietnam's northern
sector.
The villagers told this
story of the North Vietnam-
ese occupation:
� The soldiers who occupied
the village were accompa-
nied 1,010 Vietcong �agents,
all fortn6- residents of IIaix
litin who had fled to the
North after the 1060 Tet of-
fensive. , �
The enemy soldiers confis-
cated all the villagers' goy-
ernme at iden Li flea Hon cards
,and promised new ones:
.They also took a large
citiantity of rice,.snying they
:would pay for it later.
ccupation
by n,
The village was organized
into associations of youths,
farmers, women and a mili-
tia defense force of boys
and girls between the ages
of 17 and 21. -
The militia was armed by
the North Vietnamese with
M-16 rifles captured from
the South Vietnamese. The
young people received only
two days of training before
they were left to guard the
village under some North
Vietnamese �officers. The
rest of the Communist com-
mand troops moved on to
another. district.
Early in the occupation,
the North Vietnamese told
the. villagers � that � Saigon
had been captured. They
"�also said they delayed at-
lacking The until June 20
"to give the people a chance
to get away from the city
and guns."
The North Vietnamese
then told the villagers that
Hue was captured just this
past Wednesday, � but the
people did not believe them.
They could hear Radio Hue
and Radio Saigon on their
own transistor radios.
The South Vietnamese air-
borne troops' mOve into
liaixuan met almost no re-
sistance. �
Residents said the militia
force of young boys and
girls was taken from the vil-
lage by North Vietnamese
troops a few hours before
the paratroopers arrived.
� The government forces
found only old men, women
-and. young children when'
Ahoy. entered the village.
Half decided to remain
their homes once the area-
hod been liberated by gov-
ernment forces, the other:
half chose to move to -a
more secure area farther
south.
, The 136 villagers who de-
-eided to leave were brought
to the village of Phongdien,
'about 20 miles northwest of
Hue, aboard government
trucks.
16
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